The Russian Strategy: offensive (action and interference), defensive, and deterrent. Digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence in global competition.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract.

This article explores the Russian strategy of digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) as fundamental tools in global competition. Initially welcomed, Russian soft diplomacy has experienced fluctuations due to information campaigns that have damaged the country’s international image. In recent years, Russia has developed a “digital diplomacy” to influence international public opinion, leveraging tools like social media to spread polarizing messages and alternative news. At the same time, the country has enhanced its cyber warfare capabilities, considering it an essential component of information operations and a means to achieve an asymmetric military balance against the West. The use of AI amplifies these operations, enabling large-scale disinformation and strengthening espionage techniques and cyber-attacks, with the goal of destabilizing adversaries and consolidating Russian influence on a global scale.

Public Soft diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy and Cyber Operations

At the beginning of the 21^st century, the emergence of Russian public soft diplomacy was met with optimism by both analysts and the international public. However, over time, Russian public diplomacy experienced several fluctuations due to information campaigns that damaged Russia’s global image, particularly after the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. In recent years, the advancement of information technologies and the growing spread of social media have introduced what is known as “digital diplomacy.” This form of communication, first launched by the Obama administration, involves direct dialogue between governments and the online community, known as netizens or cyber citizens, with the goal of influencing public opinion. Initially, digital diplomacy was praised for its ability to exert a significant impact on international public opinion during conflicts, thanks to targeted communication strategies, psychological warfare, and online operations.[1] However, the negative side of digital diplomacy soon became apparent, particularly when some authoritarian regimes began using internet resources to manipulate online traffic with the aim of hindering dissident groups and political opposition.[2]

Another significant aspect related to the digital advancement of information is the increasing use of information warfare, now enhanced by artificial intelligence, which has become a crucial factor in achieving strategic objectives.[3]

Russian strategy and doctrine have always placed great importance on cybersecurity and cyber operations, considering them an essential part of broader information operations. This approach often blurs the line between military and civilian capabilities, as both collaborate within the overall national strategy. Indeed, the main Russian cybersecurity agencies actively participate, even at the highest levels, within the government’s Security Council, which includes members such as the Minister of Defense, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Chief of the General Staff.

The 2015 military doctrine, which preceded the 2016 cybersecurity doctrine, emphasizes the importance of protecting cyberspace as an integral part of Russian national security, assigning this task to the armed forces. In line with this doctrine, in 2017, Russia established “information operations units,” initially designed for the defense of cyberspace, but which quickly took on a broader role, including traditional information activities and psychological operations. The “Main Directorate of the General Staff” (GU), formerly known as the GRU, along with its subordinate commands, such as the 85^th Main Special Services Center (Unit 26165) and the 72^nd Main Special Services Center (Unit 54777), under the direct control of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, is considered the primary entity responsible for offensive cyber operations and influence activities.

The graph in Figure 1 represents the evolution of Russian diplomacy and cyber operations, showing how they have become increasingly influential over time. The time phases are illustrated as follows:

First phase: Early 21st century – Introduction of public soft diplomacy.

Second phase: 2008-2012 – Development of digital diplomacy and initial cyber operations, especially after the Russo-Georgian conflict.

Third phase: 2013-Present – Consolidation and intensification of cyber operations and influence through digital diplomacy, enhanced by artificial intelligence.

The graph highlights a progressive increase in the level of influence of these strategies in the global context.

The Public Diplomacy of Russia: Between Strategy and Mechanisms

Contemporary Russian public diplomacy is based on the foreign policy strategy outlined in 2013. In an article titled “Russia and the Changing World,” published in February 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin defined soft power as a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy objectives without resorting to the use of weapons or other forms of pressure, with particular emphasis on the use of financial leverage.[4]  In line with this vision, the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” approved by Putin in February 2013, states that soft power—a comprehensive set of tools for achieving foreign policy objectives based on the potential of civil society, information, and cultural methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy—has become an essential component of contemporary international relations. However, the intensification of global competition and the increased risk of crises can sometimes lead to the distorted and illegal use of soft power and human rights «to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize political situations, and manipulate public opinion, even through the funding of cultural and human rights projects.»[5]

The quote aptly captures Russia’s attitude towards the concept of soft power, seen as a driving force behind the so-called “color revolutions” and Western activities that Russia perceives as unfavorable to itself. In developing its own public diplomacy, Russia has made extensive use of influence tools to shape the political landscape of third countries.[6]

With these ambitions, in 2010 Russia established two diplomatic agencies: the “Russian World,” focused on promoting the Russian language, and the “Alexander Gorchakov Fund for Public Diplomacy.” Additionally, as early as 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo Division, a federal agency responsible for affairs concerning the Commonwealth of Independent States, compatriots abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation, was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agency focuses on Russians and Russian-speaking communities abroad. In 2020, Rossotrudnichestvo expanded its structure by adding departments dedicated to information and cybersecurity, science and education, and foreign aid.

Overall, the Russian approach to public diplomacy demonstrates a continuous evolution in Moscow’s strategic communication and political marketing, where tools like targeted messages, tweets, and public engagement are becoming increasingly central, both in traditional and digital communication.[7]

Russian influence through the dissemination of information is limited by the low accessibility and penetration of Russian-language content, particularly in Europe and the United States. To overcome this obstacle, Russia is effectively enhancing its capabilities in cyberspace action and penetration. Given the political pressures and the ineffectiveness of traditional Russian cultural diplomacy, digital and data diplomacy is being used as a tool to spread “alternative news” in countries of interest to the Kremlin. In this context, political messages and divisive communications are aimed at polarizing national public opinions through social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, which are used as tools of information warfare by users registered in Russia. Through these means, Russian public diplomacy intensified its efforts during the Covid-19 pandemic, leveraging Russian humanitarian aid to present itself credibly to foreign public opinions. Countries like Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the Middle East, Venezuela in Latin America, and even Italy in the European Union received Russian aid, which was promoted on social networks through a well-organized and effective propaganda campaign.

Information warfare, artificial intelligence: competition with the NATO

As discussed, Russia perceives the West as a threat. This viewpoint was reiterated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, in April 2019, when he emphasized the danger posed by NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders and by Western attempts to destabilize President Putin’s government through the use of “hybrid warfare.”[8]

This perception is further reinforced by the awareness of the weakness of the Russian conventional armed forces, which are considered insufficiently prepared to face a potential conflict with NATO. Russian military leadership strongly believes that it is essential to avoid a conventional war, preferring instead to shift the confrontation to the cyber domain in order to achieve an asymmetric military balance. This strategy is actively pursued by the Kremlin to ensure that Russia gains a military advantage capable of countering NATO’s ambitions without resorting to conventional kinetic force.

The Russian approach can be described as a form of “strategic deterrence,” or as Gerasimov himself has termed it, an “active defense strategy,” known in the West as “hybrid warfare” or “below-threshold activities.” This concept is based on non-kinetic operations aimed at weakening potential adversaries over the long term during peacetime, by creating political and social divisions within them, thereby undermining the resolve and strategic decision-making capabilities of the target state. The primary targets would be strongly anti-Russian countries, particularly those located on NATO’s eastern flank, where Russia could focus intense information warfare to provoke significant political changes. In this way, Russia could pursue its doctrine of “sovereign self-assertion” and gain greater freedom of action in critical regions such as Syria, the Middle East, and Africa. These preventive measures could also serve to hinder any collective NATO decision, including the possibility of direct intervention against Moscow.[9]  In line with this understanding, at the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February 2022, there was a wave of actions aimed at penetrating NATO networks at the start of the conflict— a reasonable precaution from the Russian perspective, given the fear of a possible NATO intervention in support of Kyiv.

Information Warfare and Artificial Intelligence (AI)

As previously mentioned, Gerasimov emphasized the growing importance of information in neutralizing the state’s opponents, both internal and external. According to Gerasimov, “information technologies” are becoming “one of the most promising types of weapons” to be used against other countries. For this reason, he states that “the study of topics related to the preparation and conduct of information actions is the most important task of military science.”

With this approach, Russia has prioritized the development of advanced information operations over the expansion of conventional weapons, such as tanks or missile systems, as today “information technologies” can be significantly enhanced by artificial intelligence (AI).[10] The thinking of the Russian armed forces regarding the development and use of artificial intelligence in the military sector focuses on the advantages it can offer in supporting military operations. These advantages range from the enhancement of autonomous systems and other military technologies to the management of information, particularly at the global strategic level. In this context, artificial intelligence acts as an amplifier, strengthening disinformation operations through the intentional spread of false and misleading information, with the aim of influencing policies and societies and creating large-scale instability through information manipulation and cyber activities.[11]

During the crisis in Ukraine, Russia reportedly conducted a large-scale information operations campaign aimed at influencing public opinion and creating confusion in the information space by spreading a combination of true, partially true, and false information to make it credible. A significant example of these efforts is the more than 65,000 tweets disseminated by fake Russian accounts in the 24 hours following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 on July 17, 2014, with the goal of blaming the incident on the Ukrainian government. Additionally, during the annexation of Crimea, Russian forces reportedly blacked out nine Ukrainian television channels in Crimea, replacing them with Russian broadcasts to silence pro-government Ukrainian media:[12] An event that would confirm the conduct of electronic warfare (EW) actions as an enabling factor for information operations.[13]

The actions mentioned highlight Russia’s determination to improve and intensify its capabilities in the context of cyber warfare, which, within Russian military doctrine, is considered a component of the broader information warfare. The strategic threat posed by cyber warfare enhanced by artificial intelligence will be particularly dangerous, as cyber tools will increasingly be able to generate detailed and credible disinformation (including “deep fakes”[14]) in such volumes that it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish real truth from a vast amount of conflicting information.[15] AI will enable the saturation of the information space with artificial data, creating a “virtual truth” that can confuse and destabilize adversaries, paving the way for a possible “cognitive warfare” that Russia could dominate.

Another crucial aspect of cyber warfare concerns the technical domain: espionage, malware installation, selective destruction, and, particularly, the search for vulnerabilities in adversaries’ IT systems. With the advent of AI, these cyber techniques will become increasingly effective, allowing the weaknesses of opponents’ IT systems to be identified more quickly.[16]

Figure 2. Evolution of the importance of Cybersecurity in Russian Strategy.

Here is a graph that represents the evolution of the importance attributed to cybersecurity and cyber operations in Russian strategy over the years. The graph shows a significant increase in the emphasis on cybersecurity from 2010 to 2020, indicating its growing priority in Russia’s strategic planning.

[1] J. Fieke, Digital Activism in the Middle East: Mapping Issue Networks in Egypt, “Knowledge Management for Development Journal” 6 (1), 2010, pp. 37–52.

[2] N. Tsvetkova, D. Rushchin, (2021), Russia’s Public Diplomacy: From Soft Power to Strategic Communication, Journal of Political Marketing. 20. 1-12. 10.1080/15377857.2020.1869845.

[3] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution in Military Affairs’, The RUSI Journal, 165:3, 2020, pp. 12-21, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514.

[4] V. Putin (2012), Russia and the Changing World, “Rossiyskaya Gaseta”. Accessed October 20, 2020.

[5] A. Sergunin, L. Karabeshkin, Understanding Russia’s Soft Power Strategy, “Politics” 35

(3–4):347–63, 2015.

[6] U.S. Congress. 2015. “U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation

Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”. In: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions (ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).

[7] N. Tsvetkova & D. Rushchin, Russia’s Public Diplomacy…, cit.

[8] V. Gerasimov, Vektory Razvitiya Voyennoy Strategii [“The Vectors of Military Strategic Development”], “Krasnaya Zvezda” [Red Star], 3 aprile 2019, in http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/.

[9] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.

[10] Ivi.

[11] Ivi.

[12] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’, 15 July 2014, p. 31. In: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_Report_15July2014.pdf (ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).

[13] D. McCrory (2021), Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine, “The RUSI Journal”, 2021, pp –.

[14] A Deepfake is a technique that uses artificial intelligence to rework human images. This involves combining and overlaying existing images and videos with other videos or original images through a machine learning technique known as a generative adversarial network (GAN). GANs consist of two neural networks—one generates new data (like fake images or videos), and the other attempts to detect the fake content, improving the quality of the generated content over time. This process allows for the creation of highly realistic, yet entirely fabricated, visual content.

[15] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.

[16] Ivi.