The evolution of Irregular Warfare and a roadmap for the future
by Andrea Molle.
Irregular Warfare (IW) has been a persistent feature of conflict throughout history, evolving in response to shifting political, technological, and social dynamics. In the United States joint doctrine, it is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” and in U.S. law as “Department of Defense activities not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals. ” Broadly is a form of warfare that seeks to undermine an adversary’s power through asymmetric tactics, IW has taken many forms, from guerrilla warfare to cyber-enabled operations. While much of the modern discussion on IW is heavily influenced by Western experiences—particularly those of the United States—examining a broader array of historical and contemporary cases is essential for understanding how it should evolve to meet future security challenges.
Historically, IW has been the weapon of the weaker party in a conflict, whether insurgents fighting colonial powers, resistance movements opposing occupation, or non-state actors challenging state authority. Early examples include the guerrilla tactics employed by the Spanish against Napoleon’s forces in the Peninsular War (1808–1814) and the asymmetric strategies used by indigenous groups against European colonial armies.
In the 20th century, IW became a dominant feature of conflicts worldwide, especially in decolonization struggles. The Vietnamese resistance against French and later American forces showcased the effectiveness of a combination of guerrilla tactics, political warfare, and conventional operations. Similarly, Mao Zedong’s protracted warfare strategy in China emphasized the importance of mobilizing the population, blending political ideology with military action to wear down a stronger adversary over time.
The Cold War era saw both superpowers engaged in IW through proxy wars, support for insurgencies, and counterinsurgency operations. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the U.S. conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate the challenges of fighting irregular opponents with conventional military means. These cases highlight the importance of understanding local dynamics, political legitimacy, and the limits of military power in irregular conflicts.
Today, IW has expanded beyond traditional insurgencies and guerrilla movements to include cyber warfare, information warfare, and hybrid threats. Non-state actors like ISIS and hybrid threats from state actors, such as Russia’s use of proxy forces and disinformation campaigns in Ukraine, illustrate the evolving nature of IW. The role of technology, particularly artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber capabilities, has fundamentally altered how IW is conducted.
However, a critical shortcoming in current IW studies is the Western-centric focus that often disregards the rich and varied experiences of other regions. For example, Hezbollah’s asymmetric warfare strategies against Israel, the Houthis’ use of drones and missiles in Yemen, and the FARC’s long-running insurgency in Colombia offer valuable lessons in the adaptability and resilience of irregular forces. Examining how African nations counter insurgencies, such as Nigeria’s struggle against Boko Haram, or how India has dealt with insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, could provide fresh perspectives on counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies.
To effectively address the challenges of future IW, a shift in strategic thinking is required. Policymakers and military strategists should consider the following:
Expanding the Knowledge Base Beyond Western Experiences: IW research and doctrine must incorporate insights from diverse global conflicts. The experiences of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian actors in both insurgency and counterinsurgency provide critical lessons for adaptability and resilience in IW.
Leveraging Emerging Technologies: Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and cyber warfare will shape the future of IW. Adversaries are already integrating AI-driven propaganda, deepfakes, and cyber sabotage into their IW arsenals. Developing countermeasures and proactive strategies will be crucial.
Emphasizing Political and Societal Aspects: As history has shown, IW is not just about military force but also about winning the political and social battles. Future IW strategies must integrate political warfare, information operations, and economic tools to counter adversaries effectively.
Strengthening Resilience and Defense Against Hybrid Warfare: Given the rise of hybrid threats blending conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics, nations must adopt a comprehensive security approach that involves military, civilian, and private sector collaboration.
Prioritizing Local Partnerships and Cultural Awareness: Future IW efforts should emphasize local partnerships, recognizing that solutions to irregular conflicts are often context-specific. Training programs, intelligence gathering, and military operations should incorporate deep cultural and historical understanding.
To effectively evolve IW strategies, a structured roadmap should be implemented as soon as possible. Such a roadmap should begin with a dedicated phase of research and analysis over the couple of years. This period would focus on conducting extensive studies of non-Western IW experiences, integrating their lessons into military and policy training programs, and establishing international working groups composed of experts from diverse regions. Predictive models, for example leveraging AI and big data, would be developed to anticipate IW trends and potential threats, ensuring that future strategies remain adaptive and forward-thinking.
Following this foundational research, the next two to three years should be dedicated to revising policy and military doctrines. This would involve updating operational guidelines to incorporate insights from hybrid and cyber warfare, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms among allied nations, and refining legal and ethical frameworks to address the complexities of IW, particularly in cyberspace and information operations. As adversaries continue to evolve their tactics, policymakers must ensure that legal frameworks remain robust yet adaptable to emerging challenges.
Next, ample efforts should shift toward capability building and training. Specialized IW training programs would be established to focus on non-Western case studies and hybrid warfare tactics, preparing military and intelligence personnel for diverse operational environments. Technological advancements would be integrated into these programs, with investments in AI-driven intelligence analysis, autonomous systems, and cyber defense. Moreover, partnerships between governments, academia, and the private sector would be fostered to develop innovative countermeasures against disinformation campaigns and digital propaganda.
Beyond the foundational years, the focus would be on full operational integration and continuous adaptation. Flexible operational structures would be implemented, allowing rapid adjustments to emerging IW threats. Regular multinational IW exercises would be conducted to test and refine strategies in real-world scenarios. Additionally, an ongoing review process would be established, ensuring that IW doctrines and tactics evolve in response to technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. By maintaining this adaptive cycle, nations would be better positioned to counter the irregular threats of the future while remaining resilient against hybrid warfare challenges.
In conclusion, Irregular Warfare is an enduring and evolving form of conflict that demands continuous adaptation. The Western-centric approach to IW has provided valuable insights, but future strategies must incorporate a broader spectrum of global experiences to remain effective. As technology, geopolitical dynamics, and warfare methods evolve, IW must also transform, emphasizing adaptability, comprehensive security approaches, and a deeper understanding of non-Western conflict experiences. Only by embracing these changes can nations effectively counter the irregular threats of the future.