Europe’s Defense Conundrum: Why PESCO and Other Initiatives Always Fall Short.
by Andrea Molle.
The European Union has long aspired to bolster its collective security and strategic autonomy. Over the past decade, initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) have been launched to strengthen European defense capabilities. However, these initiatives, while symbolically significant, have failed to provide Europe with a coherent and effective security framework. As geopolitical tensions rise, particularly with an increasingly aggressive Russia and ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, it is time for Europe to acknowledge the fundamental flaws in its current defense approach and consider more radical solutions.
As of March 2025, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) continues to serve as the European Union’s framework for deepening defense collaboration among its member states. Since its inception in 2017, PESCO has expanded to include 26 participating countries, collectively working on 68 collaborative projects aimed at enhancing military capabilities and interoperability. In November 2024, the Council of the European Union approved conclusions on the PESCO Strategic Review, reaffirming PESCO’s pivotal role in advancing defense cooperation. This review emphasized the need to adapt PESCO to the evolving geopolitical landscape and underscored the importance of addressing existing challenges to bolster its effectiveness.
Despite these efforts, PESCO continues to face significant hurdles. Many projects have encountered delays due to inadequate financial and practical planning, leading to discussions about reviving or retiring underperforming initiatives. Furthermore, divergent national interests and varying interpretations of strategic autonomy among member states have impeded cohesive progress. For instance, Poland has expressed concerns that PESCO could potentially undermine NATO or weaken security cooperation with the United States, both of which are vital for the security of NATO’s Eastern Flank.
To enhance the effectiveness of PESCO, the EU has opened certain projects to third-party participation. Notably, Canada, Norway, and the United States have been involved in the “Military Mobility” project since December 2021, with the United Kingdom joining in November 2022. Canada has also been invited to participate in the “Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations” project as of February 2023. This inclusion aims to leverage external expertise and resources to strengthen PESCO initiatives. In August 2024, Switzerland received approval to participate in two PESCO projects: “Military Mobility” and “Cyber Ranges Federation.” This move is intended to enhance Switzerland’s national defense capabilities while adhering to its neutrality obligations.
Looking ahead, the ongoing PESCO Strategic Review, set to conclude by the end of 2025, offers an opportunity to reshape the framework to better address contemporary security challenges. The review aims to reinvigorate PESCO by refining its objectives, improving project management, and ensuring that collaborative efforts yield tangible military advancements. In summary, while PESCO has made strides in fostering defense cooperation within the EU, it continues to grapple with bureaucratic inefficiencies, divergent national priorities, and varying levels of commitment among member states. The outcomes of the current strategic review and the inclusion of third-party participants will be crucial in determining PESCO’s future efficacy in enhancing Europe’s defense posture.
Similarly, the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017, serves as a pivotal instrument in bolstering the European Union’s defense research and innovation. For the 2021-2027 period, the EDF has been allocated a budget of approximately €8 billion, with €2.7 billion dedicated to collaborative defense research and €5.3 billion earmarked for capability development projects. Recognizing the need for enhanced defense capabilities, the European Commission has proposed a substantial increase in defense funding. In March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans for a €150 billion defense fund, aiming to encourage member states to invest in military capabilities with the support of EU-backed loans. This initiative underscores the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense posture in response to evolving geopolitical challenges.
The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is another crucial mechanism designed to harmonize national defense planning and investments among EU member states. CARD provides a comprehensive overview of the EU defense landscape, identifying collaborative opportunities and facilitating cooperation. However, the 2024 CARD report indicates that, despite progress in defense spending and cooperation, significant room for improvement remains. Member states are encouraged to take decisive actions to sustain investments and enhance the efficiency of their armed forces.
In addition to the EDF and CARD, several other key European defense initiatives and agencies contribute to enhancing the European Union’s defense capabilities. Established in 2004, the European Defence Agency supports EU member states in improving their defense capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as a facilitator for collaborative defense projects, the EDA serves as a hub for European defense cooperation, covering a broad spectrum of defense-related activities.
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the EU’s framework for defense and crisis management, forming a main component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP enables the EU to undertake operational missions outside its borders, utilizing both civilian and military assets to ensure peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security. The EU is also exploring the development of a new satellite network to reduce dependence on U.S. military intelligence. This initiative aims to enhance the EU’s capability to detect threats and coordinate military actions, providing more frequent updates and greater autonomy in intelligence gathering. These initiatives and agencies collectively contribute to a more integrated and robust European defense framework, addressing both current and emerging security challenges.
Compounding the challenges faced by these initiatives is the EU’s continued reliance on NATO as its primary security guarantor. While European leaders often speak of “strategic autonomy,” the reality is that Europe remains dependent on American military power. The war in Ukraine has underscored NATO’s irreplaceable role in European security, with the United States providing the bulk of military aid and strategic coordination. This reliance on NATO creates a paradox: while the EU desires greater defense independence, it is unwilling or unable to develop the necessary capabilities to make that independence meaningful. Attempts to establish a credible European defense identity, such as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France, have made little progress due to the competing priorities of member states.
To address these shortcomings, Europe must reconsider its defense strategy with bold, pragmatic solutions. First, a genuine commitment to defense spending is necessary. The EU should set binding defense investment targets akin to increasing NATO’s GDP requirement. ReArm Europe is a step in the right direction, but a common European military budget, funded through EU-wide mechanisms, could help overcome fragmentation in defense procurement and capability development.
Secondly, we must understand that establishing a fully integrated EU army has long been considered politically unfeasible due to concerns over national sovereignty and the complexity of aligning diverse military structures. However, recent developments indicate a shift toward more cohesive European defense capabilities. In March 2022, the EU introduced the Strategic Compass, outlining the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) by 2025. This modular force aims to mobilize up to 5,000 personnel, incorporating modified EU battlegroups and additional forces from member states.
French President Emmanuel Macron has also been a vocal proponent of strengthening EU defense mechanisms. In April 2024, he proposed the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2025, emphasizing the need for a “European Defense Initiative” to develop strategic concepts and capabilities, particularly in air defense and long-range operations. Despite these initiatives, several challenges persist. Nations like Germany face difficulties in recruiting and preparing their armed forces, particularly among younger generations who may prioritize work-life balance over military commitments.
Finally, enhancing Europe’s security necessitates a comprehensive approach that integrates institutional military frameworks and civilian preparedness. While the idea of an EU-wide right to self-defense akin to the United States’ Second Amendment is culturally and legally complex, Europe has been advancing initiatives to bolster civilian resilience and preparedness. In conclusion, Europe’s security environment is deteriorating, and its current defense initiatives are ill-equipped to handle the challenges ahead. PESCO, the EDF, and CARD have failed to deliver a credible path toward strategic autonomy. If Europe is serious about defending itself, it must embrace more ambitious solutions, including increased defense spending, operational integration, and a legal framework that empowers both states and citizens in matters of security. Without such measures, European defense will remain a fragmented and ineffective patchwork, leaving the continent vulnerable in an increasingly hostile world.