Abstract This article investigates terrorism beyond its traditional definitions; it examines its evolution within the geographical borders of Europe, it emphasizes its historical roots, individual and collective motivations, and operational adaptation, sharing the reasons why a revision of the very definition of terrorism is now necessary, and why it ought to be understood as an effect of violence, rather than an act which is merely organized for political ends. Analyzing the data provided by START InSight’s database, the article focuses on EU countries which are constantly affected by the trajectories of jihadism and the consequent challenges for collective security, while contributing to the academic debate with a multidimensional perspective on terrorism which considers its historical, socio-political and cultural aspects.
Keywords Jihadism, Functional blockade, Terrorism
1. Terrorism as a political and social phenomenon which evolves over time in response to the changing dynamics of competition between individuals, groups, and states. Contemporary terrorism, deeply rooted in a complex historical evolution, represents a widespread ideological threat. The threat of jihadist terrorism is particularly significant today and is linked to the historical, conflictual dynamics of international relations and competition in the Middle East and Africa, and to the violence stemming from a radical interpretation of Islam. This conflictual dynamic is increasingly associated with groups’ and individuals’ search for identity through the cultural opposition of a significant segment of second and third-generation immi-grants from the Maghreb living in Europe. We are discussing a fragmented jihadist galaxy characterized by various ideologies and practical approaches, prompting a reconsideration of the concept of contemporary terrorism, which emerges as a social phenomenon distinct from previous forms of terrorism.
This necessary reflection invites us to consider a paradigm shift in the very definition of terrorism, no longer to be understood as an action aimed at achieving political results through violence, hence in its intentions. Instead, terrorism should be seen as the effect of applied violence: it is terrorism, insofar it is a manifestation of violence, without an organization behind it. It is terrorism due to the manifestation, not organization.
Within the same jihadist galaxy, terrorism imposes itself as an instrument of struggle, resistance, and domination, employing various degrees and models of violence: from individual acts to organized, inspired, and insurgent terrorism, of the kind we became acquainted with in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that we now observe in its early manifestations in the Gaza Strip, where the Israel Defense Forces are engaging Hamas (Bertolotti, 2024).
The Afghan experience, which the author of this article has thoroughly studied for many years, combined with the wave of violence following Hamas’s call for strikes against Israel and its allies, has played a decisive role in the resurgence of inspired and emulative terrorism globally. The latter, on the one hand, is based on the victorious experience of the Taliban against the West; on the other, on the anger channeled through Hamas’s communication strategy, which finds resonance in some ideologized Western minorities, conflating Hamas’s violent and terrorist agenda with the legitimate Palestinian cause. Events in international relations are exploited by jihadist rhetoric to demonstrate the righteousness and validity of jihad, and thus of terrorism as a tool of struggle, victory, and justice.
Today, after and alongside Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, the it’s conflict dynamics in the Middle East and Hamas’s media-amplified terrorism that play this role of ideological and mass involvement drive. This results in emulative forms of violence, which terrorism against Israel has partly provoked and could increasingly provoke in Europe, as well as in North African countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel.
2. Trends and Dynamics: Numbers Decline, but the Threat of Terrorism Persists – An Analysis of Attacks from 2014 to 2023 Looking at the past five years, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend from a quantitative perspective, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-Isis/Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2024, 92 attacks (12 in 2023 and 2024 – situation at 20.09.2024), both successful and unsuccessful, were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland: 99 attacks were recorded in the previous period 2014-2018 (12 in 2015).
In the wake of major terrorist events in Europe in the name of the Islamic State group, and subsequently likely related to galvanizing elements following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the call from Hamas, 206 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2024, of which 70 were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 249 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 died in action), 446 victims were killed, and 2,558 were injured (START InSight database).
Both in 2023 and 2024, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks recorded in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by other attacks which took place over the previous days, which raised the figure to the high levels of previous years: from 17% of total emulative actions in 2022 to 58% in 2023 (56% in 2021). 2023 also confirmed an established trend in the phenomenon’s evolution, with an almost exclusive predominance of individual, unorganized actions, generally improvised, progressively replacing structured and coordinated actions characterizing the European urban “battlefield” of 2015-2017 (totality of actions in 2023 and 97% of actions recorded the previous year).
Knives and blades Terrorists are increasingly using knives for a variety of reasons related to practical, ideological, and strategic factors:
Ease of access: Knives are readily available and do not require advanced technical skills to use. Unlike firearms or explosives, which may require logistics or technical knowledge, knives are common in every household or store.
Discretion: A knife can be carried easily without raising suspicion, unlike more conspicuous or dangerous weapons. This allows the attacker to approach victims or locations without being noticed immediately.
Terror effect: Knife attacks, often conducted in public or crowded spaces, have a strong psychological impact on the population. The close and brutal nature of a knife attack amplifies fear among those present and in the media, creating a significant symbolic effect.
Individual attacks: In recent years, many terrorist organizations have encouraged individual or “lone wolf” attacks. Knife attacks are ideal for this type of action, as they require minimal planning and can be carried out by a single person without the need for a complex organizational network.
Weapon control: In many countries, firearm laws are very strict, making it difficult to obtain guns or rifles. Knives, on the other hand, are less regulated and can be legally purchased almost anywhere.
Inspiration model: Successful knife attacks, like those in various European cities in recent years, have inspired other extremists to replicate this type of action, following the narrative that it is an effective and relatively simple means of spreading terror. In summary, the growing use of knives by terrorists is linked to their accessibility, ease of use, discretion, and effectiveness in creating panic and fear among the population (Molle, 2024).
3. Profiles of “European” Terrorists Jihadist terrorism is predominantly a male phenomenon: out of 295 attackers, 97% are male (10 women); contrary to 2020, when 3 female attackers participated in terrorist actions, the 2021-2023 triennium saw no direct participation from them. Identified terrorists (men and women) whose demographic data were disclosed have a median age of 26 years: a figure that varies over time (from 24 in 2016 to 30 in 2019), recording an increase in age in the last analyzed period, delivering a figure of 28.5 years in 2023. The study of the profile of 200 individuals about whom there’s sufficient demographic information draws a very interesting picture: 7% of terrorists are under 19 years old (with a reduction in minors over time), 38% are between 19 and 26, 41.5% are between 27 and 35, and 13.5% are over 35and 13.5% are over 35. These data confirm an in-creasing relevance over time, of the 19-35 age group, with a reduction in minors involved in terrorist attacks over the same period.
93% of the individuals who carried out a terrorist attacks, for whom we have complete information, were “immigrants” (first, second, and third generation), both regular and irregular. 45% of the 155 terrorists, out of a total of 237, who were analyzed in START InSight’s database are first-generation regular immigrants; 28% are descendants of immigrants (second or third generation); irregular immigrants are 26%: a figure which has grown over time, from 25% in 2020, to 50% in 2021, to 67% in 2023, indicating a significant change in the nature of terrorists, with an increasing presence of first-generation attackers (overall 71% of total terrorists). Significant is also the figure related to 7% of European-origin citizens converted to Islam (a slight decline compared to the average of previous years). Overall, 73% of terrorists are legally resident in Europe, while the role of irregular immigrants emerges with a ratio of about 1 in 4 terrorists (the ratio was 1:6 until 2020). In 4% of events, there were children/minors (7) among the attackers, a figure which has decreased.
Ethno-national Dimension of Terrorists in Europe The phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe affects some specific national and ethnic groups more significantly than others. There is a clear proportional relationship between the main groups of immigrants and terrorists, highlighted by the nationality of terrorists or their families of origin, which reflects the size of foreign communities in Europe. In particular, the Maghreb origin prevails: the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan (especially in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy) and Algerian (in France). The phenomenon of radicalization has been particularly evident in Belgium and France, where large Moroccan and Algerian-origin communities have seen a significant number of young people join jihadist groups. In France, for example, a significant portion of terrorists involved in recent attacks came from families of Algerian and Moroccan origin, reflecting the historical presence and size of these communities in the country (Bertolotti, 2023).
Recidivists and Terrorists Already Known to Intelligence The role of recidivists (re-offenders) has grown over time. These are individuals already convicted of terrorism who have committed violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some cases, even within prison facilities. This trend shows a 3% recidivism rate among terrorists who struck in 2018 (1 case), 7% (2) in 2019, 27% (6) in 2020, and 25% (3) in 2023. This situation confirms the social danger of individuals who, although incarcerated, delay the implementation of terrorist actions. This phenomenon suggests an increased likelihood of terrorist attacks in the coming years, parallel to the release of many detainees for terrorism-related offenses.
START InSight highlighted a significant trend regarding terrorist actions carried out by individuals already known to law enforcement or European intelligence. In 2021, such cases represented 44% of the total, while in 2020, they were 54%. This is a significant increase compared to the 10% recorded in 2019 and the 17% of 2018. In 2023 this figure grew to 75%, supporting the concerns of institutions tasked with countering violent phenomena.
Individuals with previous detentions (even for non-terrorism-related offenses) in 2021 confirmed a certain stability in participation in terrorist actions by individuals with a prison record, with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year (33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018, and 12% in 2017); which seems to confirm that, despite a significantly lower figure in 2023 (8%), prison spaces can be identified as potential radicalization hubs.
4. What is the real destructive capacity of terrorism? To understand terrorism comprehensively, one must analyze it on three distinct levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategy involves the use of resources to achieve long-term war goals. Tactics focus on deploying forces in combat to secure specific victories in battles. The operational level bridges the two, coordinating tactical actions to meet strategic objectives. This synthesis, at its core, highlights the importance of human resources in conducting military actions.
Strategic Success Is Marginal Strategic success in terrorist actions, defined as achieving significant structural impacts like national and international air/rail traffic disruptions, military mobilizations, or broad legislative interventions, has decreased from 16% to 13%. This is still considered high given the limited organizational and financial efforts by terrorist groups or individuals. Over the years, strategic success rates have shown a declining trend, highlighting a gradual reduction in capacity and effectiveness: 75% in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in 2019, 12% in 2020, and 6% in 2021. Since 2022, strategic success has not been achieved by terrorist attacks; effectively confirming an ongoing process of normalizing terrorism.
Media Attention is Decreasing Media attention towards terrorist attacks is decreasing. Strategically, attacks received international media coverage in 75% of the cases and 95% nationally. Operations by commando and team-raid units received full media coverage. This media success significantly influenced the recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihadist fighters, peaking during periods of high-intensity terrorist actions (2016-2017). However, the effects of media coverage on recruitment efforts diminishes over time due to two main reasons: firstly, a prevalence of low-intensity actions compared to high-intensity ones, which have decreased, while low and medium-intensity actions have significantly increased from 2017 to 2021, with a notable rise in medium-intensity actions in 2023. Secondly, the public has become gradually less emotionally sensitive to terrorism, particularly low and medium-intensity events.
Despite concerns, Tactical Level Concerns but Is Not a Priority for Terrorism Assuming the goal of actions is to cause the enemy’s death (with security forces as targets in 35% of cases), this was achieved on average in 50% of the cases between 2004 and 2023. However, the long timeframe significantly impacts the margin of error. An analysis of the 2014-2023 period, shows a worsening trend in the terrorists’ desired effects, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an increase in failed actions, at least until 2022, when tactical success stabilized at 33%, which is consistent with 2016 data. 2023 is an outlier. Data from the last six years show that in 2016, tactical success was achieved in 31% of cases, with 6% failed acts. In 2017, success rose to 40%, with a 20% failure rate. In 2018, success dropped to 33%, while failed attacks doubled to 42%. In 2019, success further fell to 25%, then rose to 33% in 2020-2022. This trend, interpreted as a dual effect of reduced terrorist operational capacity and increased European security responsiveness, shows a 2023 rate of 50% actions achieving tactical success, i.e., causing at least one fatality.
Operational Success: The “Functional Blockade” Even when a terrorist attack fails, it produces significant results: it heavily engages armed forces and police, distracting them from routine activities or preventing them from intervening for public welfare. It can also disrupt or overload healthcare services, limit, slow down, divert, or stop urban, air, and naval mobility, and hinder the regular conduct of daily, commercial, and professional activities, harming affected communities. This effectively reduces technological advantages, operational potential, and resilience capacity. Overall, it inflicts direct and indirect damage, regardless of causing fatalities. Limiting citizens’ freedom is a measurable result of these actions. Essentially, terrorism’s success, even without causing fatalities, lies in imposing economic and social costs on society and influencing behaviours over time in terms of security measures or restrictions imposed by political and public safety authorities. This phenomenon is known as a “functional blockade.” Despite the increasingly reduced operational capacity of terrorism, the “functional blockade” remains one of the most important results achieved by terrorists, regardless of tacti-cal success (killing at least one target). From 2004 to the present, terrorism has proven effective in achieving the a “functional blockade” in 80% of cases, peaking at 92% in 2020 and 89% in 2021. This impressive result, obtained with limited resources, confirms the advantageous cost-benefit ratio in favour of terrorism, despite a progressive loss of capacity that saw the “functional blockade” drop to 78% in 2022 and 67% in 2023.
5. Recruitment Capacity and Operational Strategies The Islamic State, having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq (2013-2017), can no longer send its terrorists to Europe due to the loss of direct external operational projection capacity. However, the group has not lost its power of attraction, which demonstrates its ability to develop indirect recruitment, based on the “posthumous” recognition of individuals who successfully carry out individual terrorist actions. For these reasons, the threat remains significant, thanks to the presence and actions of lone actors, often improvised and driven by emulation, without direct links to the organization.
While the Islamic State continues to impose itself ideologically as the main jihadist threat, particularly exploiting the territorial control and financial resources of its Afghan franchise, the Islamic State Khorasan, it is evident that it cannot replicate the overwhelming appeal of the “caliphate” in 2014-2017. The novelty advantage and consequent appeal, particularly towards the youth, have diminished. Additionally, the European Union has significantly reduced its vulnerabilities legislatively and operationally, with more emphasis on counterterrorism than preventive action.
Concerns persist regarding emulative effects and the “call to arms” related to international events that can induce individuals to act in the name of jihad. The most significant event in 2021, which continues to fuel transnational jihad, was the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. This victory fed diverse jihadist propaganda with the message that “victory is the result of continuous struggle” and created competition among jihadi groups engaged in exclusively local struggles and those like the Islamic State, which promote jihad as a relentless global struggle. This competitive dynamic includes actions associated with the Israel-Hamas war and the jihadist call to violence, where Islamic State followers and Hamas supporters have vied for battlefield successes and consequent media attention.
In this continually evolving scenario, attention must be paid to jihadist strength in the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Rwanda, and Mozambique, in order to counter the emergence of new “caliphates” or “wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe. In prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic State boasts of its spread in Africa, in a competitive / collaborative relationship with its Afghan franchise. It highlights how the aim of combating the presence and spread of Christianity will lead to the group’s expansion in other areas of the continent. In places like the Ma-ghreb, the Mashreq, and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s activity focuses on intra-Muslim sectarian struggle. In Africa, its presence has become part of a Muslim-Christian conflict, strengthened by propaganda centred on stopping Muslims from converting to Christianity through the work of “missionaries” and the pretext of humanitarian aid. Violence, kidnappings, and the kill-ing of missionary clergy, attacks on NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso to the Congo, as well as attacks on Christian communities, are all part and parcel of this context.
From North Africa to the Sahel: A Look at “Mediterranean” Terrorism Looking at North Africa, the region continues to face threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State, and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who have travelled to Iraq or Syria. The unnoticed return of these fighters to their home countries following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat poses additional security challenges. In recent years, lone actors and small cells have carried out a series of deadly attacks in various North African states, proving difficult to detect. The Sahel is becoming a new center of jihadist terrorism, with a significant increase in victims in 2023. However, the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has seen a 42% decrease in victims over the past three years. North Africa, in particular, is witnessing a steady reduction in extremist violence, with the number of violent attacks returning to pre-IS levels. In 2022, North Africa saw a 14-fold decrease in victims com-pared to 2015, with Morocco being the safest country in the region, while Egypt remains one of the most affected by terrorism. Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia fall between these extremes with medium to low terrorism impact.
The Sahel and the Maghreb are politically, economically, and security-wise connected. The presence of terrorist groups exploiting ethnic tensions, climate challenges, and lack of public services has turned this region into a hub of jihadist activity, with the risk of spreading the terrorist threat to other areas.
Instability in the Sahel has already affected West Africa and the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are active. This situation could also involve North Africa, jeopardizing the progress made in prevention, counterterrorism, and deradicalization in some countries of the region.
Considering that North African countries are both emigration and transit countries for migratory flows to Europe, this raises the question of possible jihadist contamination or transfer. Monitoring the evolution of a phenomenon in the process of consolidation, which finds its lifeblood in the Mediterranean area, is therefore paramount.
Claudio Bertolotti, ISPI, START InSight’s Director and Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism (ReaCT). Claudio Bertolotti holds a Ph.D. and serves as the Executive Director of START InSight. From 2014 to 2023, he was a senior researcher with the “5+5 Defense Initiative.” He graduated in Contemporary History, specialized in Sociology of Islam, and earned a doctorate in Sociology and Political Science, focusing on International Relations. His work focuses on crisis areas, national strategic interests, national security, the Mediterranean, intercultural dialogue, and, in particular, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, jihadism, and migration flows. Since April 17, 2019, he has been the Executive Director of ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalism and Counter-Terrorism (Rome-Milan-Lugano). Since September 30, 2021, he has been a member of the Committee on Human and Civil Rights at the Regional Council of Piedmont. He is the author of several works, including Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban Warfare between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence (START InSight, 2024), Immigration and Terrorism (START InSight, 2020), Contemporary Afghanistan. Inside the Longest War (CASD, 2019), and Shahid: Analysis of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan (FrancoAngeli, 2010). Corresponding with the Author: claudio.bertolotti@startinsight.eu.
Bibliography Bertolotti, C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight ed., Lugano. Bertolotti, C. (2023), Unraveling the Evolution of Terrorism in Europe: Left-Wing, Far-Right, Anarchist, and Individual Terrorism, and the Role of Immigrants in Jihadist Terrorism within the European Union (Correlation and Regression Analysis), pp. 77-87, in #ReaCT2023, 4th Report on Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization in Europe, START InSight ed., Lugano, ISBN 978-88-322-94-18-7, ISSN 2813-1037 (print), ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Weaponizing Chaos: Exploring Militant Accelerationism from the Far-Left to the Far-Right
By Andrea Molle, Associate Professor, Chapman University
Abstract Militant accelerationism is defined by the Accelerationism Research Consortium as a set of strategies aimed at exacerbating social divisions to hasten the collapse of society, often through violent means. This phenomenon is not confined to a single poli-tical ideology, being present in both the far-right and far-left, though manifesting in different forms. Far-right accelerationism primarily opposes equality, viewing it as a threat to the natural social order, and seeks to precipitate the collapse of liberal de-mocracies through polarization and political violence. From a geopolitical perspective, nations like Russia and China might support such movements to destabilize the West and undermine the legitimacy of the liberal democratic model, thereby reinfor-cing their authoritarian positions. On the other hand, far-left accelerationism originates from Marxism, aiming to accelerate the downfall of capitalism to trigger a proletarian revolution. These dynamics represent a growing threat to international security, as they exploit internal tensions and social divisions to promote global instability.
The Accelerationism Research Consortium, a research initiative specializing in the study of militant accelerationism, defines it as a collection of tactics and strategies aimed at intensifying latent social divisions, often through violent means, in order to expedite the collapse of society. Accelerationism does not necessarily align with a specific political ideology and can be observed on both the extreme left and extreme right of the political spectrum. However, there are distinctions between the two.
For instance, far-right militant accelerationism does not concern itself with critiquing modern capitalism or postcolonialism, but rather focuses on countering the contemporary pursuit of equality, which is perceived as a manifestation of societal decay and a threat to the established social order based on inequality, which is considered the “natural order.” In order to safeguard or reinstate this “natural order,” far-right militant accelerationism seeks to create circumstances that would lead to the downfall of the existing liberal and democratic system, such as through a “race war” or a civil war. Militant accelerationism functions as a platform for political action with the objective of hastening the downfall of liberal and capitalist societies. Its core strategy involves disseminating contradictory and problematic political ideologies through various means, such as promoting polarization or engaging in political violence. This form of terrorism aims to create social emergencies and crises, ultimately incapacitating and dismantling social institutions.
From an International Relations and Security Studies perspective it is noticeable that this goal aligns with the objectives of hostile nations. Russia and China, for example, may support militant accelerationism regardless of its political ideology alignment in the West for several strategic reasons. Firstly, fostering chaos and division within Western nations serves to undermine their stability and global influence, thereby potentially strengthening the position of Russia and China on the world stage. By exacerbating existing societal tensions and polarizations, these countries can create distrac-tions for Western governments, diverting their attention and resources away from global issues such as Ukraine or Taiwan. Secondly, supporting accelerationist groups aligns with Russia and China’s broader objectives of challenging the Western liberal democratic model. By promoting extremist ideologies that reject democratic norms and institutions, such as militant accelerationism, these countries seek to delegitimize Western values and weaken the appeal of democracy as a political system globally. This tactic can help bolster the perceived legitimacy of authoritarian regimes like those in Russia and China, presenting them as stable alternatives to Western democracies. Moreover, fostering internal strife in Western countries can serve as a form of retaliation or deterrence against perceived Western interference in the domestic affairs of Russia and China. By supporting militant accelerationism, these countries can retaliate against Western sanctions, criticisms of human rights abuses, or support for opposition movements within Russia and China. Additionally, by highlighting the internal divisions and societal unrest in Western nations, Russia and China can dissuade Western governments from intervening in their domestic affairs or pursuing aggressive foreign policies against them.
1. Far-left militant accelerationism Accelerationism, as a concept, originated from Marxism and the belief that by intensifying the detrimental forces within capitalism, its eventual destruction and subsequent liberation through revolution can be achieved. Left-wing terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. They may also advocate for environmental or animal rights, hold pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs, or support decentralized social and political systems like anarchism. In terms of incidents, the number of fatal incidents attributed to far-left ideologies is fluctuating. The global peak of revolutionary accelerationist leftist violence occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. However, until 2012, there were still four times as many far-left terrorist incidents compared to far-right incidents. In recent years, particularly in 2019 and 2020, the number of far-right and far-left incidents has been roughly equal. As per more recent times, the situation has started to differ between Europe and the United States. In Europe, far-left attacks started again to be more prevalent. German organizations such as the Engel – Guntermann and the Hammerbande have a clear focus on targeting right-wing extremists or individuals perceived as such. However, there is a noticeable shift in their approach, as they are increasingly engaging in activities that extend beyond local conflicts with the right-wing extremist milieu. The collaboration between group members and non-Germans in carrying out attacks suggests a growing connection to external groups. This interconnectedness among left-wing extremist networks in Europe has the potential to influence their strategies and the specific targets they choose.
In the United States, according to the Anti-Defamation League, only 6% of the 443 registered extremist fatalities between 2012 and 2021 were linked to far-left ideologies. In comparison, 75% were linked to far-right beliefs, and 20% were linked to Islamist beliefs. It is important to note that all the casualties related to far-left ideologies in the US were associated with Black nationalism, which the ADL categorizes as left-wing extremism. Overall, the violent threat posed by left-wing extremists in the US remains relatively small whereas in Europe it is increasing. The trend has been confirmed by several authorities. For example, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) report in 2022 that 80% of the successfully executed attacks were carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups.
Globally, movements affiliated with far-left ideologies include Antifa groups, as well as environmental or animal issue groups like the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front. There are also various far-left alternative media outlets, such as The Grayzone or Breakthrough News, and organizations like the Party for Socialism and Liberation or Workers World Party. These entities may occasionally express sympathy towards authoritarian regimes perceived as hostile to the West and embrace conspiracy theories. While these platforms may not overtly endorse violence, their content and campaigns actively advocate for authoritarian ideologies within mainstream audiences, thereby eroding the credibility of human rights and democracy advocates and promoting polarization. The Grayzone, a far-left media outlet, exemplifies this concerning trend. Established in 2015 by journalist Max Blumenthal shortly after a trip to Moscow, this media platform consistently adopts an ostensibly anti-imperialist stance, frequently defending Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, and Venezuela’s Maduro for their purported resistance against US dominance. Furthermore, it denies the occurrence of the Uyghur genocide and chemical gas attacks in Syria. Blumenthal himself has participated in anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine rallies, and currently plays a highly active role in the Pro-Hamas/Pro-Palestinian movement, which poses a significant and alarming new challenge to national security.
1.1. The use of Internet by far-left militant accelerationism The exploration of the online far-left culture is a topic that is often overlooked. This particular faction, which exists on the fringes of the broader left, positions itself as being against various ideologies and groups such as the alt-right, political correctness, social justice warriors, and centrists and liberal-democratic stances. Despite its ideological roots and the tendency of the left to look down on popular online culture, it employs similar tactics to the online alt-right, including the use of humor, memes, Twitter trolling, and open hostility. However, it remains firmly rooted in progressive leftist ideology. Referred to by various names such as the “alt-left,” the “vulgar left,” or the “Dirtbag Left,” this origin of this movement is attributed to Amber A’Lee Frost, a writer, podcaster, and activist based in Brooklyn. Her podcast Chapo Trap House, associated closely with this movement, employs comedy and irony in a shock jock style, while also criticizing both the Democratic and Republican parties. Other media outlets and individuals connected to the dirtbag left include TrueAnon and Red Scare, which are also loosely associated with the BlueAnon movement, a leftist counterpart to the well-known QAnon phenomenon.
2. Far-right militant accelerationism Initially, militant accelerationism was not primarily associated with far-right extremism. However, it gradually found its way into this milieu through two significant avenues. Firstly, in the 1990s, British philosopher Nick Land developed a right-leaning libertarian version of accelerationism after studying the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on left-wing accelerationism and incorporating his own interpretation of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Two decades later, during the early 2010s, Land’s ideas gained traction among the emerging “alt-right” movement, which became deeply interested in his anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic concept of “neo-reaction.” The second and most influ-ential pathway through which accelerationism infiltrated the far-right was the publication of the book Siege, which compiled newsletter posts written by American neo-Nazi James Mason. Mason, a follower of Charles Mason, has been involved in various neo-Nazi organizations in the United States since the late 1960s. He had personal connections with prominent far-right leaders, including George Lincoln Rockwell, the leader of the American Nazi Party, and William Pierce, the author of the novel The Turner Diaries, which inspired the 1995 terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. Mason was also influenced by Joseph Tommasi, the leader of the National Socialist Liberation Front, a group inspired by leftist organizations and urban guerrilla warfare. Tommasi advocated for the creation of chaos through terrorism as a means to destabilize the political order in the United States.
Mason created the newsletter Siege, published from 1980 to 1986, as a platform to express his disapproval of the stance taken by American far-right extremism. Within the pages of his publication, he incorporated elements of antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories, specifically focusing on a “Jewish world conspiracy” that aimed to execute a “white genocide.” This concept, now labeled as the “Great Replacement,” contributed to the development of the “deep state” myth, spawning the bipartisan trope of a “Zionist Occupied Government” in America. In his book, Mason also argued that the prevailing social order had become so deeply corrupted that established organizations like the American Nazi Party, with their conventional methods of political engagement, had become ineffective in their pursuit of liberating the “white race.” According to Mason, progress could only be achieved through revolutionary, violent, means carried out by individuals and the estab-lishment of a National Socialist “New Order” would require the destruction of society. Far-right militant ac-celerationism, as a subtype of apocalyptic terrorism, draws heavily on antisemitic tropes, including concepts like “white genocide” and the “Great Replacement Theory. Moreover, it leverages perceived traditional knowledge and cultural codes to rationalize their anti-modern beliefs and to target individuals they hold responsible for societal decay. Consequently, accelerationism can be viewed as a quasi-religion, as evidenced by its resemblances and intermingling with groups like the Branch Davidians, whose eschatology mirrors similar dynamics.
2.1. The use of Internet by far-right militant accelerationism In the United States, adherents of far-right ideologies recognized the potential of the internet as early as the 1980s. They understood that online platforms offered an unparalleled opportunity to disseminate their message to a broader audience without the constraints imposed by traditional media. Notably, David Duke, a prominent figure in the US far-right extremist movement and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, lauded the internet as an ideal platform for a “white revolution.” The advent of online communication played a significant role in the rise of Siege, particularly during the mid-2010s when the “alt-right” gained prominence. This movement embraced militant action strategies, which were further amplified in the aftermath of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, USA, in August 2017. The events surrounding the rally, including the tragic killing of counter-protestor Heather Heyer, sparked intense debates within the American far-right extremist community. Mason’s critique of demonstrations and his advocacy for militant accelerationism resonated widely within these discussions. Consequently, following the Charlottesville events, the hashtag #ReadSiege gained traction both domestically and within the transnational far-right online discourse.
As today, the risk associated with militant accelerationism is primarily monitored in North America, with only a limited number of European analysts actively keeping tabs on its activities. The globalization of far-right militant accelerationism during the 2010s has given rise to various trajectories, all closely intertwined with digital spaces, which should raise concerns. One prominent platform for far-right militant accelerationism was the English-language Iron March, which operated from 2011 to 2017 and served as a breeding ground for accelerationist groups. This forum attracted a diverse range of militant far-right extremists who felt marginalized by other far-right internet forums like Stormfront, established in 1996, or were dissatisfied with the offerings of existing far-right organizations targeted at the youth. Within the Iron March forum, members cultivated their own subculture of far-right militant accelerationism, characterized by key texts and a distinct aesthetic featuring logos inspired by Waffen SS symbols and black and white skull masks. The administrators of Iron March actively encouraged transnational online communication and facilitated regional and local networking among members beyond the confines of the digital realm. Notably, a far-right extremist terrorist network emerged among the users of Iron March, which remains active to this day. Iron March’s influence extended beyond the development of its far-right extremist subculture, as it placed significant emphasis on taking action. Consequently, several accelerationist groups, including National Action (UK), Feuerkrieg Division (USA), and Antipodean Resistance (2016), were established as offshoots of this forum. It is also important to recognize that Iron March merely marked the beginning of this phenomenon.
3. The manosphere Despite a general decline in public activities among far-right militant accelerationists during the COVID-19 pandemic, their digital efforts have significantly increased since the spring of 2022. Consequently, the number of prevented attacks has also risen. The primary trends that originated within these tightly knit online communities during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s remain relevant within the global social network they have evolved into. Notably, new online spaces continuously emerge, often bearing little resemblance to formal, traditional far-right extremist organizations. These decentralized networks, organized in cells, foster sub-cultures defined by their cultural codes, such as memes, and constantly adapt to enhance their relevance in the public sphere. They have now permeated other online realms, including gaming platforms, and rely on the broader internet troll culture. They propagate through the manosphere, a collection of communities centered around radical anti-feminism and the conspiracy theory milieu, where individuals seek “the truth” or embrace the “Red Pill” ideology. These networks thrive in “politically incorrect” boards, forming a transnational subculture that revolves around both ironic and serious far-right extremist, misogynistic, antisemitic, and misanthropic content. Of particular interest is the manosphere, which has attracted the attention of accelerationists due to its rapid growth and potential for real-world violent outbursts.
Despite being referred to as a collective noun, the manosphere encompasses four distinct subcultures: men’s rights activists who view feminist policies as detrimental to men’s rights, incels (involuntary celibates) who hold women responsible for their lack of opportunities and social status, separatists who believe in a feminist conspiracy to dismantle masculinity and advocate for complete segregation between genders, and the seductive type who objectify women and promote the acceptance of rape culture. These emerging subcultures also align themselves with existing digital hate cultures that have already established their presence on various platforms, thereby bolstering their recruitment efforts.
4. When left and right join forces It is important to acknowledge that accelerationist groups primarily act as opportunists and will seize any opportunity to infiltrate a popular movement. This has been evident in various instances throughout history. For instance, in 2020, the far-right anti-government Boogaloo movement attempted to associate themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement by claiming shared goals. Similarly, in the 2000s, the far-left Black Blocs successfully exploited popular protests against the G8 leaders. During the pandemic, both far-left and far-right groups united against lockdown measures. In these contexts, stochastic violence has also surfaced, manifesting as sporadic acts of aggression, intimidation, or property destruction. While such gatherings ostensibly advocated against vaccination mandates and perceived infringements on personal freedoms, they often attracted individuals with extremist inclinations from both the far-left and far-right ends of the political spectrum. Amidst the commotion of these events, lone actors or small factions have engaged in acts of random (stochastic) violence, ranging from verbal harassment to physical violence, aimed at sowing chaos and instilling fear. Far-right extremists have exploited these rallies to propagate anti-government sentiment and amplify distrust in public health institutions, while far-left had view them as opportunities to challenge corporate interests and in particular Big-Pharma. The unpredictable nature of stochastic violence in this context not only poses immediate safety concerns but also underscores the broader societal polarization and radicalization fueling such events.
In the current political environment, these groups are now aligning themselves with the pro-Palestine movement. The pro-Palestine movement has gained significant support in recent weeks, with numerous protesters taking to the streets worldwide to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, this surge in support has also created an environment where various groups, including far-left, far-right accelerationists, and antise-mitic organizations, attempt to associate themselves with the mainstream pro-Palestine movement. This has resulted in a confusing web of claims and widespread dissemination of misinformation. One way these groups exploit the pro-Palestine movement is by adopt-ing its language to criticize the actions of the Israeli government in Gaza. However, they then utilize this platform to promote anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and stereotypes. The right-wing factions often reference the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, baselessly claiming that Jewish individuals purposefully facilitate migration into Western countries to replace white people. On the other hand, the left-wing factions attack liberal democracies and market-based economies by invoking references to Zionism and colonialism. Across the United States and Europe, far-right and far-left extremists have capitalized on the growing anger towards the Israeli government as an opportunity to spread anti-semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist conspiracy theories. Their intention is to legitimize these ideas within mainstream discourse and attract new recruits.
5. Main takeaways Both the far-left and the far-right militant accelerationist groups possess a digital evolutionary advantage due to the transformations in the online media landscape, which have created new avenues for radicalization. These accelerationists have also strategically utilized algorithms to target susceptible individuals for recruitment. Unlike their BBS predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s, which mirrored real-life communities, today’s platforms are characterized by the “attention economy” and “dopamine addiction.” Posts that fail to attract sufficient attention are gradually phased out from the front page to make room for particularly captivating posts, effectively turning extremism into a chemical dependency. Moreover, far-left and far-right violence is increasingly intertwined, creating a classic “security dilemma.” These characteristics further amplify the perilous nature of this phenomenon and should require active monitoring and intervention.
Stochastic violence is a disturbing tactic employed by political extremists, characterized by its unpredictable and random nature. Unlike organized violence with clear targets and objectives, stochastic violence aims to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear and uncertainty by striking seemingly at random. This strategy often involves lone actors or small groups carrying out acts of violence without direct coordination with a larger organization, making it difficult for authorities to anticipate or prevent. The perpetrators may be motivated by extreme ideologies or grievances, using violence as a means to spread terror and advance their agenda. Stochastic violence poses a significant challenge to counterterrorism efforts, as it can be difficult to detect and preemptively address the underlying radicalization that fuels such attacks. Moreover, its unpredictable nature amplifies the psychological impact on communities, fostering fear and distrust while undermining social cohesion. Addressing stochastic violence requires a multifaceted approach that addresses not only the im-mediate security concerns but also the underlying societal factors that contribute to extremism and radicalization.
Militant accelerationism has emerged as a tool for hostile foreign countries like Russia and China to sow chaos and destabilize Western nations from within. These nations may clandestinely support or manipulate extremist groups subscribing to accelerationist doctrines to exacerbate existing social tensions and exploit vulnerabilities in democratic systems. For instance, Russia has been accused of utilizing online platforms to amplify divisive narratives and support far-right accelerationist movements in Europe and the United States, aiming to undermine trust in democratic institutions and foster internal discord. Similarly, China has been implicated in funding and promoting extremist factions to exploit societal fault lines in Western societies, thereby weakening their cohesion and global influence. Such exploitation of militant accelerationism underscores the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors and fringe ideologies become instruments in the geopolitical strategies of hostile nations. Overall, Russia and China may support militant accelerationist groups in the West as part of a multifaceted strategy to weaken their adversaries, challenge Western values and institutions, and advance their own geopolitical interests on the global stage. In conclusion, the risk of accelerated terrorism is clear and significant as we head into 2024, and it could even escalate further in the run-up to the US presidential election or the next European elections. Disgruntled individuals and armed extremist groups are likely to continue resorting to violence in order to spark a revolution and prevent what they perceive as the “deep state” from manipulating elections and enslave them. The current clash of conflicting narratives, present in nearly every aspect of political discourse, worsened by partisan divides and amplified on social media, will continue to hinder governments’ efforts to address the threat of domestic terrorism. The current atmosphere is alarmingly reminiscent of the period preceding events like the “years of lead” or the Oklahoma City bombing. Back then, extremist rhetoric urged supposed patriots or revolutionaries, like Timothy McVeigh or Mario Moretti, to protect their fellow citizens from what they saw as a corrupt government backed by a wealthy elite. Today, there are potentially many more individuals like them, and we cannot afford to wait for another series of tragic events before decisive action is taken against this threat.
Andrea Molle, Ph.D., FRAS, Senior Research Fellow, Orange (California, Stati Uniti). Quantitative and computational social scientist. Since 2012, he has been an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an Associate Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Society at Chapman University. From 2006 to 2008, he was a JSPS Fellow in Anthropology at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan).
#ReaCT2024 – Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe
Introduction by Claudio Bertolotti, Executive Director, ReaCT Observatory
As the Director of the Observatory on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism in Europe (ReaCT), I am both pleased and honored to present, for the fifth consecutive year, our annual research and analysis report on terrorism and radicalisation in Europe. Building on the foundation laid by the previous four editions, #ReaCT2024 – 5th Report on Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe is the result of the dedication and perseverance of researchers, academics, and professionals who, employing different approaches, methods, and perspectives, contribute to a multidisciplinary effort aimed at defining the origins, causes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of a multifaceted phenomenon that traditional analytical methodologies can no longer adequately encapsulate within merely descriptive and indicative definitions. It is now well-established, as we thoroughly anticipated at the beginning of our research and editorial journey in 2020, that social deviance increasingly overlaps with or is associated with phenomena of radical violence, often characterized by individual participation and imitative behavior with a significant “spectacular” ambition, falling within increasingly compartmentalized ideological or identity spheres.
In line with the trajectory established thus far, the Report presents itself as a unique combination of a scientific journal and a collective volume, with contributions from various authors, researchers, and collaborators who have generously dedicated their time, experience, and knowledge. Without exception, ReaCT’s board and I, express our deepest gratitude for their invaluable field research contributions and their immense intellectual efforts. I would also like to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense for reaffirming their confidence and trust in the Observatory I direct by granting patronage to the Report’s presentation events.
What insights does the ongoing research of the Observatory yield?
Over the past five years, within the broader context of historical and operational evolution, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-ISIS/ Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2023, 80 attacks (12 in 2023) were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, both successful and failed, compared to 99 in the previous period from 2014 to 2018 (12 in 2015). Following the major terrorist events in Europe associated with the Islamic State group, and subsequently in probable relation to galvanizing factors following the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan, and Hamas’ call for war against Israel, 194 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2023, 70 of which were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 237 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 of whom died in action), 440 victims were killed, and 2,539 were injured (START InSight database). In 2023, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by previous attacks, bringing the figure to levels similar to those of previous years.
The 2024 Report also delves into the issue of the Islamic State in Khorasan and the potential threat to Europe, with particular attention to jihad returning from the Sahel to North Africa.
Broadening the scope, #ReaCT2024 focuses on the variables of terrorism and the characteristics of anti-system manifestations, highlighting the need to analyze an extremely dynamic phenomenon based on the spaces of action and, on a paradigmatic level, to urgently move towards a shared definition of terrorism. Another topic explored is “lone wolf terrorism,” understood as a multifaceted and fragmented phenomenon, influenced by the role of social networks, collective dynamics, clusters, and online waves and communities, along with the evolution of forms of extremism that are “young, autonomous, and emancipated.”
In this constantly evolving context, the phenomena of radicalization and extremism in digital ecosystems, new technologies, and artificial intelligence, as well as digital hate speech as precursors to extremist violence, are examined. The report also provides a thorough analysis of militant accelerationism, from the far left to the far right, and the intriguing hypothesis of “armed chaos.” On the level of prevention, substantial attention is devoted to the analysis of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), providing a thorough assessment of its successes, limitations, and failures in terms of policies and practices. The focus is placed on the vexed question: will radicals ever fully de-radicalize? Significant space is also allocated to the emergence of new extremisms that carry anti-democratic demands, inviting readers to reflect on the evolution of these phenomena through two specific case studies: the first explores the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism through the contribution of security forces in Portugal; the second addresses the systemic gender discrimination in Afghanistan under the Islamist Taliban government, discussing the phenomenon of gender apartheid. In conclusion, this year’s contribution reaffirms the Observatory’s ambition to bear witness to the strength and dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners in the ongoing fight against the evolving phenomena of violent social deviance, radicalism, and terrorism. As the Director of the Observatory, my hope is that the findings and insights contained in this Report will increasingly contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders committed to working together to prevent and counter violent extremism. I would like to extend my gratitude to all the Authors who, through their commendable work, have once again contributed to the realization of #ReaCT2024.
A special thanks goes, as always, to START InSight, whose support has enabled the international publication and distribution of our annual report. Lastly, I wish to honor the memory of our friend Marco Cochi, a serious and capable researcher, who was taken from us too soon.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
🔴📚 OUT SOON! #ReaCT2023 Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe | Start Insight ⬇ 16 articles by different authors discuss current trends and numbers. Available in Italian and English startinsight.eu/en/out-soon-r…
🔴@cbertolotti1 a FanPage sulle varie ipotesi dell'attacco👉"(...) non si tratterebbe di droni in grado di fare danni significativi, ma piuttosto di una tipologia di equipaggiamento in grado di fare danni limitati con l'obiettivo di portare l'attenzione mediatica sulla questione" twitter.com/cbertolotti1/s…
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