Young and emancipated extremism
by Chiara Sulmoni, President, START InSight
Abstract
Over the course of 2023 and 2024, several European countries grew increasingly concerned about the involvement of teenagers and minors in terror-related crimes and extremist activities. If, on the one hand, attacks are still largely carried out by men just under the age of 30, on the other, online radicalization is having an unprecedented impact on kids; as such, it represents a demanding challenge for law enforcement and professionals working in the field of prevention.
Keywords
Radicalization, Terrorism
On the evening of Saturday, 2nd March, 2024, in a central district of Zürich, a fifteen-year-old Swiss boy of Tunisian origin seriously stabs an Orthodox Jew walking nearby. In the hours following the attack, a pre-recorded video message emerges online, in which the boy, who calls himself a “soldier of the Caliphate” and swears allegiance to the Islamic State, declares that he acted in response to the latter’s appeal to target “the Jews and Christians and their criminal allies”, and he in turn incites others to take the initiative (1).
This event took place within a global context which has been marked by a significant increase in anti-Semitism following Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack on 7th October, 2023 to which Israel responded by putting Gaza to fire and sword. The tragic loss of civilian lives has fuelled jihadi and extremist narratives more in general, as well as igniting an intense social polarization of the kind we see play out, often violently, in the streets, on university campuses and the internet; a climate with a strong potential for radicalization and mobilization, accentuated by intense misinformation, to which children under the age of 15 are also subjected (2).
The Swiss Confederation – that was already hit by two jihadist stabbing attacks back in 2020 in Morges and Lugano, where an adult man and woman respectively, lashed out at randomly chosen victims – is suddenly confronted with a trend which characterized the universe of violent extremism and radicalization in Europe for some years now: that is, individuals involved in these phenomena keep getting younger and younger.
In 2021, British statistics already highlighted a significant increase in the arrests of children under the age of 18 on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes, with a prevalence of far-right ideology (3). Percentages continued to rise till they reached their highest peak so far in 2023 when, out of the total number of people who were detained, almost 19% concerned teenagers under the age of 17 (4).
Boys’ and girls’ attraction to jihadism is consistent with the events that unfolded around the middle of the past decade, at the height of ISIS’ territorial expansion; at that time too, the Old Continent saw numerous teenagers buy into the Islamic State’s plans and narrative, setting out on a journey to Syria and Iraq; like British teenager Shamima Begum, who left London in 2015, at the age of 15, with two friends, and who’s currently stuck in a detention camp in Syria, where the families of ex-combatants are held. Her case became emblematic and controversial following the authorities’ decision to deprive her of British citizenship -which made her stateless- despite arguments that she might be a victim of indoctrination and perhaps even trafficking (5).
Very young people committed acts of jihadist violence after ISIS, as of 2014, started encouraging those who could not make it to the Middle East, to rise up in their respective countries and with all means available; which would also usher in the so-called “lone wolves” season -a somewhat misleading definition, considering the contacts and networks that regularly pop up in investigations-. This strategic move by the Caliphate permanently changed the terrorists’ modus operandi, enhancing the autonomy of individuals and allowing the Islamic State, when confronted with operational difficulties, to continue projecting an image of strength by claiming ‘successful’ actions carried out by its own sym-pathizers.
A study of Islamist attacks which occurred in Europe between 2014 and 2017 shows that teenagers and children were involved in just under a quarter of jihadist events, both successful and foiled; the phenomenon mainly affected France, Germany and the United King-dom (6).
An event similar to the one which happened in Zürich had previously taken place in Marseille in 2016, when a 15-year-old of Kurdish origin attacked a Jewish teacher near the school where he taught.
More recent cases were the brutal killing, in November 2020, on the outskirts of Paris, of Prof. Samuel Paty by an 18-year-old Russian of Chechen origin (the attack followed a violent Islamist social media campaign which had been unleashed against the teacher over the previous days) or again, the stabbing of a high school teacher in Arras, in October 2023, by a 20-year-old radicalized youth from Ingushetia. After this latest attack, French anti-terrorism prosecutor Jean-François Ricard stated that over three years (in other words, since 2020) a growing propensity, on the part of youth, for planning violent action had been noted (7).
It should be underlined that successful attacks largely remain a prerogative of adults; START InSight’s database, which traces the profiles of jihadists who spring to action, indicates that the median age of those who have struck Europe over the past nine years (2014-2023) is 26: a figure that varies over time – from 24 years of age in 2016, to 30 in 2019) – and which appears slightly on the rise in 2023, settling at 28.5 years of age.
More generally, we can see that 7% of terrorists were under the age of 19 (with signs of a progressive decrease in minors!); 38% were between 19 and 26 years of age; 41.5% between 27 and 35 years of age and, finally, 13.5% were over 35.
A previous study by the University of Applied Sciences of Zürich (ZHAW, 2019), based on the available information pertaining to 130 different jihadist cases which had been dealt with by the Federal Intelligence Service over the previous ten years, indicated that individuals whose radicalisation process started under the age of 20 represented 18%, while for minors this figure dropped to 6% (8), hinting at the time at a somewhat ‘marginal’ problem.
However, in the Canton of Vaud, where a prevention programme has been in place since 2018, over 40% of the cases the authorities dealt with involve minors (9). Moreover, Christian Dussey, the head of Swiss Intelligence, recently declared that the jihadist radicalization of minors today affects the Confederation in (even) greater proportions than other European states (10). Shortly after the attack in Zürich, six other boys between the ages of 15 and 18 were arrested in the French-speaking and German-speaking regions of Switzerland; they were in contact with peers in Germany, France and Belgium and some among them apparently intended to carry out attacks, in Switzerland as well. According to reports, over the first 9 months of 2024, Swiss Police had to intervene in 11 cases of young people who were radicalised; an 11-year-old boy was also arrested (11). Terrorism expert Peter Neumann pointed out that overall, in Europe, since October 2023, two-thirds of all arrests involved children between the ages of 13 and 19 (12).
In England and Wales, from April 2022 to March 2023, over 60% of the cases referred to the Prevent programme – which requires professionals in the public sector, especially schools, to report suspected radicalisation of all kinds – concerned individuals aged 20 and below; 31% did not reach the age of 14. But while most of the cases did not require to be further supported through the programme – almost half of the most serious ones involved children between the ages of 11 and 15 (13).
“Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terror-ism Offenders” is a comprehensive study published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR, King’s College London, 2023), which examines the activities of 43 juveniles convicted of terrorism-related offences across all ideologies in England and Wales since 2016 (14); its authors warn against underestimating the role of children; although no child managed to commit an attack in the period under their consideration, and despite the fact that the most common crime consisted in possession of extremist material, this research indicates that almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing acts of terrorism and that kids can act as “amplifiers” and “innovators”. Minors can create and disseminate their own propaganda, recruit others and plan attacks. Factors related to age, such as naivety or lack of experience and organizational skills likely played a role in disrupting their projects.
This resourcefulness on the part of youngsters characterised the extremist landscape in recent years: in 2020, it was brought to light that the Feuerkrieg Division, a far-right online group with terrorist intents and members in various countries, from the United States to Lithuania, was headed by a 13-year-old Estonian (he was 11, at the time of its foundation in 2018). Several teenagers within the group were actively planning attacks (15).
In March 2024 in Liverpool, a 20-year-old left-wing anarchist was sentenced to 13 years in prison; among other things, he planned to kill 50 people and dedicated a weapons and bomb making manual to “misfits, social nobodies, anarchists, [and] terrorists past and future, who want to fight for freedom against the government” (16).
The emancipation of extremism
A number of studies and investigations have analysed how groups, movements and individuals -especially jihadists or those belonging to the vast galaxy of the far-right- have been capable of seizing and exploiting the opportunities progressively offered by the Internet and the evolving technologies, in order to forward their ideologies, approach potential recruits and sympathizers, disseminate magazines and practical guides for aspiring attackers, as well as adapting and diversifying their communication also according to gender. This includes the use of AI to quickly process propaganda images and videos with a strong and ‘immediate’ aesthetic and emotional impact, that only a decade ago would have required the meticulous contribution of a team while today it can rely on the work of a single person (17).
Over time, the ways of producing, consuming and sharing propaganda, as well as the identities of those involved in these activities, have substantially changed.
The advent of social media around the mid-2000s, in particular, made access to and spread of extremist material easy and fast; people can establish long-distance relationships and consistently interact, to the point that, researcher Jacob Ware writes in his essay on this topic, “the radicalization process now infiltrated every aspect of a subject’s life, and a radicalizer could project influence into a living room or bedroom” (18).
Ware explains that we are today facing the third generation of online (social media) radicalization, when individuals do not merely act autonomously, but they promote themselves and their own actions.
Terrorist groups (those with a solid internal hierarchy) have become less relevant, while ideologies are more fluid. In #ReaCT2022, media scholar Michael Krona, referring to the jihadist context, had already spoken of online supporters who seem less inclined to tie themselves to a single organization, and who rather ” promote wider ideological interpretations and build their own brand, rather than strictly enhancing the brand of IS.” (19).
Today, the production of extremist propaganda and narrative – and incitement to action too – are no longer a prerogative of terrorist movements’ media arms, but an operation which sees the contribution of a large base of followers and militants in contact with each other. A ‘grid’ that can extend from one continent to the other.
A 2022 joint international investigation by journalists who infiltrated an online network of neo-Nazi teenagers points out how the advantage of this network -but the same observation could apply to others as well- lies in its loose, mobile structure, which hinges on the participation of individuals scattered around the world: “all they need is a computer, a mobile phone and a bedroom. And all they have in common is their ideology and their hatred: towards Jews, political figures, journalists” (20).
The image of teenagers radicalising in the privacy of their bedrooms seems recurring; yet the latter can today be considered more of a control room than a shelter where vulnerable and isolated boys (or girls) fall prey to ill-intentioned recruiters. The aforementioned British study on juveniles convicted of terrorism underlines the need to overcome the stereotype which sees children as mere “pawns” in the hands of adults; when active within an extremist online context which thrives on anonymity, the “weight” and effect of, by instance, their actions and posts, is identical to that of all the other users.
These online ‘fighters’, who are now mainly digital natives, show a strong potential in ensuring the constant promotion of extremist ideas – a pro-ISIS media campaign specifically urges these “one-person armies” and “Internet mujahideen” not to give up. (21). The ability to selectively use different social media and encrypted messaging apps to communicate, exchange information, encourage each other, discuss violence, attacks and targets, and to migrate from platform to platform with a view to escaping the axe of big tech and joint police operations aimed at ridding the Internet of terrorist content, make them an asset difficult to counter.
In brief, the current era is characterized by an ’emancipated’, widespread and decentralised type of extremism, which is based on ‘free initiative’; within this ecosystem, “everyone can be replaced”(22) and all attackers can turn into a source of inspiration for others; whether it’s Brenton Tarrant, a right-wing extremist who, in 2019, at the age of 28, attacked two mosques killing over 50 people in Christchurch, New Zealand; whether it’s Elliott Rodger who, in 2014, at the age of 22, committed a misogynistic massacre in California and is now celebrated by violent incels; or again, whether it’s the 15-year-old Swiss perpetrator of the Zürich attack, whose gesture is praised by IS’ acolytes. A few days after the event, researchers from the Counter Extremism Project spotted half a dozen Tik-Tok profiles celebrating the Swiss jihadist (23).
The radicalisation of violence
When defining the current context in which teenage extremism occurs, analysts and media have sometimes resorted to the expression ‘TikTok-jihad’ or ‘TikTok terrorism’. Indeed, social media, gaming platforms and encrypted chats are now thought to represent the main tools of radicalisation. They should not, however, be simply viewed as communication ‘channels’ that can get a message across to potential new supporters. Rather, they should be acknowledged as ‘spaces’ where interaction, socialisation and engagement take place; these terms and concepts are vital when trying to understand a ‘world’ that does not merely consist in a galaxy of violent politico-religious ideologies but is also inhabited by sub-cultures which youth helped expand (like the incel movement, or the Siege culture). In other words, this environment consists in communities with their own values, behavioural norms, linguistic and aesthetic codes; and for teens, who might be struggling to find their own identity and place in the world, or might harbour feelings of rebellion, or might be weighed down by personal vulnerabilities that can result from family conflicts, bullying or racism, such sense of belonging plays an important role.
Over the past few years researchers and intelligence professionals have been drawing attention to the fact that psychological problems and commitment to violence tend to precede ideology on the path to extremism; appetite for power in social relationships, a desire for revenge, or to take centre stage, vent personal frus-trations (24), are all considered strong enough motivations in contributing to youth radicalisation, a process that sees personal grievances overlap with socio-political battles. All these aspects combined with algorithms that reward provocative content and the trivialization of hatred, help lowering the threshold for accessing extremism.
In this complex and ever-evolving scenario, assessing risks associated to radicalized individuals in the real world can be particularly difficult, especially if they are minors, and despite the awareness that radicalisation consists in a personal and reversible path that does not necessarily lead to terrorism (25).
Notes
1) In Video Uploaded To Internet, Teenage Stabber Of Jew In Zü-rich Swears Allegiance To Islamic State (ISIS), Calls On Mus-lims To Target Jews And Christians Everywhere, MEMRI, Spe-cial Dispatch No. 11166, 4 March 2024 https://www.memri.org/reports/video-uploaded-internet-teenage-stabber-jew-z%C3%BCrich-swears-allegiance-islamic-state-isis
2) Symonds, T., Gaza war creating a radicalisation moment, senior UK police officer says, BBC News , 19th January 2024 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-68035172
3) Counter- Terrorism Policing, Upward trend in children arrest-ed for terrorism offences, News, 9th June 2022 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/upward-trend-in-children-arrested-for-terrorism-offences/
4) Counter-Terrorism Policing, Number of young people arrested for terrorism offences hits record high, News, 15th March 2024 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/number-of-young-people-arrested-for-terrorism-offences-hits-record-high/
5) Sabbagh, D., Shamima Begum a victim of trafficking when she left Britain for Syria, court told, The Guardian, 24th October 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/24/shamima-begum-victim-of-trafficking-when-she-left-uk-for-syria-court-told
6) Simcox, R., European Islamist Plots and Attacks Since 2014 — and How the U.S. Can Help Prevent Them, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3236, 1st August 2017 ; see also: Bourebka, M., Overlooked and underrated? The role of youth and women in preventing violent extremism, CIDOB, Notes internationals, 240, 11/2020: “In the European con-text, as of 2016, the fastest-growing age group amongst the radical-ised individuals in Europe was 12- to 17-year-olds”
7) de la Ruffie, E., Attentat: des mineurs radicalisés, « un phéno-mène nouveau » et « inquiétant », selon le procureur anti-terroriste, Le Journal du Dimanche, November 7, 2023 https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/attentat-des-mineurs-radicalises-un-phenomene-nouveau-et-inquietant-selon-le-procureur-antiterroriste-139493
8) Sulmoni, C., Radicalizzazione jihadista e prevenzione. Aggiornamenti dalla Svizzera, START InSight https://www.startinsight.eu/tag/zhaw/
9) How the Islamic State group is courting minors on video game platforms, RTS, 27 May 2024 https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/2024/article/comment-le-groupe-etat-islamique-courtise-les-mineurs-sur-les-plateformes-de-jeux-video-28516132.html
10) Rhyn, L., and Knellwolf, T., «Die Schweiz hat überdurchschnittlich viele Fälle radikalisierter Jugendlicher», Tages-Anzeiger, 22 August 2024 https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch-geheimdienst-chef-sieht-sicherheit-der-schweiz-in-gefahr-665955949850
11) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, SEIDI-SERA, RSI, September 6, 2024 https://www.rsi.ch/info/ticino-grigioni-e-insubria/%E2%80%9CMinorenni-radicalizzati-ma-non-per-forza-terroristi%E2%80%9D–2246363.html
12) Ernst, A., Terrorismus in Europa: «Es gibt genügend Hinweise, dass sich etwas Grösseres ankündigt»“, NZZ, 23 August 2024 https://www.nzz.ch/international/terrorismus-in-europa-die-tik-tok-generation-peter-r-neumann-ld.1844746
13) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Pro-gramme, April 2022 to March 2023. Home Office Official Statistics, 14th December 2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2022-to-march-2023#demographic
14) Rose, H., and Vale, G., Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terrorism Offenders, ICSR, London, 2023
15) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/
16) Gardham, D., Jacob Graham: Left-wing anarchist jailed for 13 years over terror offences after declaring he wanted to kill at least 50 people, Sky News, 19th March 2024 https://news.sky.com/story/jacob-graham-left-wing-anarchist-jailed-for-13-years-over-terror-offences-after-declaring-he-wanted-to-kill-at-least-50-people-13097584
17) Katz, R., SITE Special Report: Extremist Movements are Thriving as AI Tech Proliferates, SITE Intelligence Group, 16th May 2024 https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Articles-and-Analysis/extremist-movements-are-thriving-as-ai-tech-proliferates.html
18) Ware, J., The Third Generation of Online Radicalization, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 16th June 2023 https://extremism.gwu.edu/third-generation-online-radicalization
19) Krona, M., Online jihadist communities build their brands and expand the terrorist universe by creating new entities, Re-aCT2022, Report on Terrorism and Radicalism in Europe, N.3, Year 3, ed. START InSight (Lugano) https://www.startinsight.eu/react2022-n-3-anno-3/
20) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/
21) Pro-Islamic State (ISIS) Social Media Campaign Calling For ‘Media Jihad’ Expands To TikTok, Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, MEMRI, 22nd June 2023 https://www.memri.org/jttm/pro-islamic-state-isis-social-media-campaign-calling-media-jihad-expands-tiktok
22) See: Death Weapons
23) Extremist Content Online: Pro-ISIS TikTok Users Celebrate Accused Attacker In Zurich Stabbing, Counter Extremism Pro-ject, 11 March 2024 https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-pro-isis-tiktok-users-celebrate-accused-attacker-zurich-stabbing
24) “IS recruitment is not portrayed as violent enlistment for a political-religious cause but as a platform for venting frustrations with parents, teachers and society. It offers an outlet for their mundane lives and a chance at dubious “15 minutes of fame”, in: Av-rahami, Z., TikTok jihad: Online radicalization threat looms over Europe, Ynetnews.com, 10th August 2024 https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjgiduh9c
25) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, cit.
Chiara Sulmoni, BA, MA, Presidente e Coordinatrice editoriale di START InSight, Lugano, (Svizzera), ha conseguito un BA e un MA in Italian Studies c/o UCL (University College London) e un MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies c/o SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, London). Giornalista e producer, ha lavorato alla realizzazione di documentari e reportage per la radio / TV in particolare su temi legati al mondo arabo e islamico, Afghanistan e Pakistan, conflitti, radicalizzazione di matrice islamista. Dal 17 aprile 2019, è Co-Direttore di ReaCT – Osservatorio nazionale sul Radicalismo e il Contrasto al Terrorismo (Roma-Milano-Lugano).
