As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.
In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s
death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its
leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A
number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while
others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state
structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with
the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a
paramilitary extension of the Russian state.
Despite these changes, Wagner has retained
its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been
deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group
remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali,
and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource
extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian
state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with
greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous
financial independence.
The group’s activities in Ukraine have also
changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture
of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the
restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian
military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where
Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the
post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a
more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its
operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.
Relationship with the Russian Government The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.
The turning point in this relationship came
in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had
been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian
state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May
2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while
an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which
handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining
illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long
functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.
This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.
Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which
Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the
catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although
the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian
government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure,
forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While
some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units,
others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established
under state supervision.
However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.
Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.
As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct
Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD
and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence
service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian
military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions
aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s
financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations
while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner
financial autonomy.
In practical terms, this meant that Wagner
no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the
Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions
abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s
primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up
allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making
processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s
activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of
individual commanders.
The transformation of Wagner from a
semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its
role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a
“PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates
with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its
influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military
forces.
In Africa, Wagner has continued its
security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya,
often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements
in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with
access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen
its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative
to Western military assistance.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s
legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s
regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting
that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control
over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian
operations in Africa.
In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat
role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner
fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist
roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence
has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.
Current Operations The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.
In the CAR, Wagner operatives have
entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President
Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018,
initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has
since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries
have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including
the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking
to overthrow Touadéra.
Beyond military operations, Wagner has
established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold
and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to
operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back
to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global
operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient
in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR
government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting
government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of
the country’s defense infrastructure.
Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends
beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in
propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives
while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is
widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing
materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial
powers such as France.
Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.
Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta
continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable
alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services,
Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s
natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the
CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy,
fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country
from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the
only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.
Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are
part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in
Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as
a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure
valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s
involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging
Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating
strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic
arenas, such as the United Nations.
Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been
reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya,
and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of
Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death
of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence
in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the
direct supervision of the Russian government.
Leadership and Command Structure After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).
With the group now firmly under Kremlin
control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals
closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of
Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin,
were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances.
In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including
high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring
that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic
interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for
overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in
Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking
Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with
overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.
Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.
To replenish its ranks, Wagner has
reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel,
special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine,
Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded,
with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian
MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.
Armaments and Equipment Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.
In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has
retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting
vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower
for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units
have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones,
particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.
Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.
Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.
In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.
Strategic Outlook With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.
Additionally, there are reports that Moscow
is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller
PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow
Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s
expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.
Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes
in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully
state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian
military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most
infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned
with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.
With its new leadership, sustained
recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains
a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control,
Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader
military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa
and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging
Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.
In the coming months, Wagner is expected to
continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited
presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian
military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger
emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.
Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.
The restructuring of Wagner under the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the
Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military
forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often
pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the
Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to
state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s
foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as
Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.
With Wagner now firmly integrated into
state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and
its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian
military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to
dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to
paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with
official Russian military assets when necessary.
The continued deployment of Wagner forces
in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy.
By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as
the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand
its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing
access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with
critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable
alternative to Western security partnerships.
Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces
continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime,
and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing
conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its
peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated
into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains
available for future military engagements.
Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.
Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.
This approach would allow Moscow to retain
the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced
diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a
powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By
maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can
continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a
cost-effective and politically manageable way.
Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a
direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s
approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension
of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence,
secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic
importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an
essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will
remain a formidable force on the global stage.
Zizians, the rise of the vegan cult: from philosophy to violence
by Andrea Molle.
The recent arrest of Jack LaSota, known
online as “Ziz,” has brought attention to the enigmatic and dangerous
group called the Zizians. Once an obscure internet subculture, it has now been
thrust into the public eye as authorities uncover disturbing details about the
group’s ideology and its links to violent crimes. Under LaSota’s leadership,
the Zizians have evolved from a niche philosophical movement into an organized
and radicalized network, willing to engage in extreme actions to further its
beliefs.
This cult-like organization has been
implicated in violent incidents across the United States, including deadly
confrontations with law enforcement, targeted attacks, and aggressive protests.
Reports suggest that its members adhere to a rigid, almost apocalyptic
worldview, combining radical veganism, anarchism, transhumanism, and a deep
distrust of established institutions. The group’s activities, from online
proselytization to real-world aggression, raise urgent questions about its
origins, recruitment methods, and the broader implications of its growing
influence. As investigations continue, authorities and analysts face the
challenge of dismantling a decentralized movement that thrives on the internet.
The Zizians exemplify how ideological extremism, fueled by online
radicalization, can spill over into real-world violence, posing a unique and
evolving threat to public safety.
The group traces its origins to the San
Francisco Bay Area, where in 2016, Jack LaSota began publishing a blog under
the pseudonym “Ziz.” Initially, LaSota’s writings attracted a niche
audience, particularly within online circles interested in philosophy, artificial
intelligence, and radical social theories. Over time, her ideas evolved into a
more complex and controversial ideology, drawing in followers and forming the
foundation of what is now the Zizian movement. LaSota, a transgender woman,
delved into unconventional theories about human consciousness, proposing that
the brain’s hemispheres could possess distinct values and even separate gender
identities, often existing in internal conflict. She framed this as a
fundamental struggle within individuals, one that could be “resolved”
through personal transformation and ideological commitment. This perspective
resonated with some online communities, but it also fostered a more rigid and
dogmatic worldview among her followers.
LaSota’s discourse expanded into political
and ethical domains, incorporating radical veganism, anarchism, and extreme
opposition to mainstream rationalist communities—particularly those concerned
with artificial intelligence and existential risk. She criticized these groups
for what she perceived as moral cowardice and an unwillingness to take direct
action against perceived threats. This opposition became a defining
characteristic of Zizian ideology, shaping the group’s adversarial stance
against the rationalist movement and its institutions.
The eclectic mix of beliefs that emerged
gave the Zizians a distinct ideological identity. What began as an online
intellectual pursuit morphed into an action-oriented movement, increasingly
militant in nature. The group’s shift from fringe philosophy to violent action
became evident in 2019, marking a turning point in its evolution. That year,
LaSota and several associates were arrested during a protest outside a Northern
California retreat center hosting a rationalist event. What started as an
ideological dispute over artificial intelligence ethics quickly escalated into
direct action, characterized by aggressive tactics such as physical
confrontations, property damage, and attempts to disrupt the event. This
incident signaled a disturbing shift from intellectual critique to militancy,
setting the stage for more extreme actions in subsequent years.
By 2020, the Zizians had attracted
individuals not only ideologically aligned but also willing to engage in
direct, sometimes violent action. In one notable case, a Zizian-affiliated
individual was arrested in Portland, Oregon, after setting fire to a research
facility linked to AI development. The attack, classified as arson, was framed
by the perpetrator as a “preemptive strike” against artificial
intelligence systems they believed posed an existential threat to humanity.
In 2021, a coordinated harassment campaign
targeted key figures in the rationalist and effective altruism communities.
Several prominent researchers received death threats, and at least one
rationalist blogger’s home was vandalized with Zizian slogans. While no direct
physical violence was involved, the campaign demonstrated the group’s
increasing willingness to engage in intimidation tactics.
The escalation continued in 2022, when a
group of Zizians staged a break-in at a biotech laboratory in San Diego,
allegedly to “liberate” animals used in testing. Security footage
showed masked individuals wearing tactical gear, further indicating the group’s
militarization. Though no injuries were reported, the break-in resulted in
extensive property damage, and several members were arrested.
In 2023, violence took a deadlier turn. A
Zizian member was implicated in the attempted murder of a computer scientist in
Boston, a researcher advocating AI safety protocols. The suspect, who had
posted several online manifestos aligning with LaSota’s theories, was
apprehended before the attack could be carried out. However, the incident
reinforced concerns that the Zizians were moving beyond property crimes and
harassment into targeted physical violence.
These incidents paved the way for outright
bloodshed in 2025. In January of that year, U.S. Border Patrol Agent David
Maland was fatally shot during a traffic stop in Vermont. The assailants,
linked to the Zizians, were found with tactical gear and weaponry, underscoring
the group’s operational capabilities and the seriousness of the threat they
posed. Another shocking act of violence occurred in Vallejo, California, where
landlord Curtis Lind was brutally stabbed. Investigations revealed connections
between the suspects and the Zizian network, highlighting the group’s expanding
geographic reach and its growing disregard for human life in pursuit of its
ideological goals.
The pattern of escalation, from online
radicalization to targeted violence, demonstrates the Zizians’ transformation
into a dangerous extremist movement. What started as an obscure philosophical
discourse has now become an organized threat, with real-world consequences that
authorities are struggling to contain.
While the Zizians originated in the United
States, their influence now extends beyond American borders. Their activities
and network have gained footholds in various European countries, sparking alarm
about the group’s global reach and impact. Individuals like German national
Felix Bauckholt, implicated in violent activities associated with the Zizians,
demonstrate the group’s ability to infiltrate and operate across national
borders. Bauckholt’s involvement signals a broader trend of the group’s international
appeal or organization, suggesting a transnational network that facilitates
coordination and ideologically driven violence.
In Europe, authorities are reporting
Zizian-inspired actions in several countries. In the United Kingdom, there have
been instances of radicalization tied to the group’s ideology. France, with its
history of radical movements, has also seen individuals align themselves with
Zizian ideals, heightening concerns about the potential for organized extremist
attacks. Furthermore, countries such as Italy and Spain have become critical
points for recruitment and logistical support, with their porous borders and
diverse political climates making them susceptible to external ideological
movements like the Zizians. These nations’ connections may involve financial
networks, online propaganda campaigns, and logistical support that enable
actions across Europe.
The growing international dimension of
Zizian influence raises several critical concerns. Law enforcement and
intelligence agencies across Europe are increasingly collaborating to track the
group’s activities, share intelligence, and prevent further escalation. The
rise of this transnational extremist network highlights the need for enhanced
cooperation between nations to counter the threat of globalized radical
movements. The Zizians’ ability to inspire or directly coordinate actions
beyond the United States underscores the evolving nature of modern extremism
and the growing complexity of combating transnational threats.
The Zizians exemplify how online
radicalization can give rise to extremist movements in the digital age. Central
to their operations was the digital presence of key figures like LaSota, whose
online platforms became gathering places for like-minded individuals drawn to
the group’s violent ideology. These platforms allowed LaSota and others to
disseminate propaganda, ideologically charged materials, and violent rhetoric,
creating an echo chamber where extremism could flourish without traditional
geographic limitations.
LaSota’s online influence served as a nexus
for isolated individuals who, driven by shared grievances or radical
ideologies, could find solidarity and reinforcement in each other’s beliefs.
This virtual space allowed members of the Zizian network to coordinate actions,
share strategies, and mobilize others toward radicalization. Through encrypted
communications, private chat rooms, and social media platforms, the Zizians
could organize discreetly and spread their messages far beyond what was
previously possible.
The reach of online radicalization cannot
be overstated. For many, exposure to extremist content online acts as a
catalyst for radical thinking, sometimes evolving into violent intentions. The
anonymity and unregulated nature of digital platforms, especially on the dark
web, facilitate the spread of extremist ideologies while bypassing traditional
monitoring and control mechanisms.
This underscores the growing importance of
vigilance in monitoring online spaces to prevent the incubation of such
dangerous movements. The Zizians’ ability to thrive in these virtual spaces
highlights the necessity for law enforcement, social media companies, and
governments to collaborate in identifying and neutralizing online
radicalization efforts. This requires not only enhanced tracking of extremist
content but also a proactive strategy of engagement, where tech platforms are
empowered to detect and remove harmful materials before they gain traction.
Moreover, the Zizians’ use of digital tools
to recruit, radicalize, and plan violent actions illustrates the urgency of
adopting more sophisticated countermeasures in cyberspace. This includes
improving online content moderation, fostering digital literacy programs to
combat extremism, and raising awareness of the dangers of radicalization. The
lessons learned from observing the Zizians and similar groups should drive
global efforts to regulate digital platforms and prevent them from becoming
breeding grounds for violence, helping to stem the tide of online
radicalization before it can manifest in real-world harm.
The emergence of the Zizians, rising from
the shadows of obscure online forums to orchestrating real-world acts of
violence, serves as a chilling reminder of the potential dangers posed by
unchecked extremist ideologies in the digital age. What began as an online
fringe movement quickly evolved into a transnational network capable of
mobilizing individuals across borders, turning virtual radicalization into
tangible, violent actions. This escalation underscores the urgent need to
address the broader issue of how extremist ideologies can thrive in the digital
realm, often going unnoticed until it’s too late.
The Zizians’ ability to recruit,
radicalize, and coordinate violence online highlights significant
vulnerabilities in our current systems of monitoring and regulation. It serves
as a potent warning that the digital space, with its vast anonymity and global
reach, can be harnessed by malicious actors to spread hate and incite violence.
Therefore, it is essential for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
increase vigilance, while governments and international organizations implement
proactive policies that limit extremist groups’ ability to flourish in these
unregulated spaces.
Policymakers must collaborate with tech companies
to establish robust frameworks for monitoring online content, while also
developing counter-radicalization strategies that are effective and
non-invasive. Social media platforms must take greater responsibility in
identifying and removing extremist materials before they gain traction.
However, these efforts must be balanced with the protection of free speech and
individual rights, which presents a complex challenge requiring nuanced
solutions.
Furthermore, society at large has a vital
role in preventing the radicalization of vulnerable individuals. Educational
initiatives that promote digital literacy, critical thinking, and awareness of
online extremism are crucial in empowering individuals to recognize and resist
harmful ideologies. Community-based efforts to foster inclusion, tolerance, and
dialogue can help counteract the divisive rhetoric that fuels radical movements
like the Zizians.
Ultimately, the rise of the Zizians serves
as a wake-up call, urging us to confront the evolving nature of extremism in
the digital era. The collective responsibility of law enforcement,
policymakers, tech companies, and the public is essential in ensuring that the
digital age does not become a breeding ground for such threats. Only through
continued vigilance, cooperation, and innovation can we hope to combat the
growing menace of online radicalization and protect society from the
devastating consequences of extremist violence.
The Philippines: A Geopolitical Linchpin in the Indo-Pacific and Italy’s Strategic Opportunity
by Andrea Molle.
The Philippines, long considered a crucial
geopolitical player in Southeast Asia, has increasingly found itself at the
center of the escalating competition between the United States and China. As
Beijing’s “eleven-dash line” advances the country’s assertive foreign policy in
the South China Sea and beyond, and Washington intensifies its Indo-Pacific
strategy, Manila is playing an outsized role in shaping regional security
dynamics.
For Italy, which has traditionally focused
its foreign policy on Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean, the evolving
Indo-Pacific landscape presents an opportunity to redefine its global
engagement via a more deliberate military and civilian presence in the
Philippines archipelago. The Philippines’ strategic location at the crossroads
of the Pacific and South China Sea makes it an invaluable ally for both
regional and global powers. Situated on key maritime trade routes, it serves as
a gateway between the Pacific and the economic heartlands of East Asia. More
importantly, the archipelago provides crucial logistical and military
advantages, particularly in countering China’s aggressive territorial expansion
in disputed waters and the threat to Taiwan.
Beijing’s expansive claims over the South
China Sea, including its militarization of artificial islands and the
interruption of several fishing routes, have directly challenged Philippine
sovereignty. Despite an international tribunal ruling in 2016 that invalidated
China’s claims, Beijing continues to push its interests aggressively. In
response, Manila has sought to reinforce its defense ties with Washington,
reopening strategic bases to U.S. forces and deepening its security cooperation
with regional partners such as Japan and Australia. The Philippines has actively participated in
a series of international naval drills with countries including the United
States, Australia, Japan, and France. These exercises, conducted within the
Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, aim to enhance defense coordination and
interoperability. China has expressed objections to these activities, viewing
them as destabilizing. Manila also signed a defense agreement with Canada to
bolster joint military exercises.
This move aligns with the Philippines’
strategy to strengthen defense partnerships amid rising tensions in the South
China Sea. At the same time, the Philippines faces a delicate balancing act.
While it values U.S. security guarantees, its economic interdependence with
China complicates the equation. Beijing remains a key trade partner, a major
source of investment, and an influential actor in the region’s economic
architecture. This tension between security and economic interests highlights
the broader struggle many Southeast Asian nations face in navigating the
U.S.-China rivalry. While the Philippines is enhancing its defense
collaborations with the U.S. and other allies, it continues to engage
diplomatically with China. For instance, during a recent meeting with
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
expressed gratitude for Cambodia’s pardon of 13 Filipino women, highlighting
the Philippines’ efforts to maintain positive relations within the region. Washington’s
renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, particularly through initiatives like AUKUS,
the Quad, and enhanced security cooperation with ASEAN countries, aims to
counterbalance China’s rising influence.
For the United States, the Philippines
represents a critical anchor in its regional security framework. The Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between Manila and Washington facilitates
American access to key military installations, ensuring a forward presence that
can deter Chinese encroachments and enhance maritime security. Additionally,
the growing U.S. military footprint in the region serves as a deterrent against
any potential escalation in Taiwan—a key flashpoint in U.S.-China tensions. The
Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan makes it a vital logistical hub should
conflict arise, further solidifying its importance in Washington’s strategic
calculus.
But what about Italy? Italy, as a key
European power, has traditionally maintained a limited presence in the
Indo-Pacific. However, given the increasing global significance of the region
and the close ties currently defining its relationship with Washington, Rome
should reassess its strategic engagement. However, while France and the UK have
already enhanced their naval and economic involvement in the Indo-Pacific,
Italy has yet to fully articulate its role. Italy’s economic interests align
with a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The region is a critical market for
Italian exports, including defense technology, maritime equipment, and
infrastructure development. Strengthening economic and security ties with the
Philippines could provide a strategic gateway for broader engagement in ASEAN,
where Italy holds observer status. On the security front, Italy could enhance
naval cooperation with the Philippines by participating in joint maritime
exercises, providing coast guard training, and supporting regional efforts to
maintain freedom of navigation. Italy’s advanced defense industry could also
contribute to modernizing the Philippines’ military capabilities.
Diplomatically, Italy should leverage its
EU partnerships to push for a more coherent European Indo-Pacific strategy,
ensuring that Europe remains a relevant player in the region’s geopolitical
balance. Supporting ASEAN-led security mechanisms and advocating for adherence
to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), would further cement Italy’s role as a constructive actor. In
conclusion, the Philippines’ geopolitical significance in the Indo-Pacific is
undeniable. As the U.S. pivots to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness,
Manila finds itself at the heart of a strategic competition that will shape the
future of global order. For Italy, engaging more proactively in the
Indo-Pacific—particularly through stronger ties with the Philippines—represents
an opportunity to diversify its foreign policy and assert itself as a relevant
player in one of the world’s most dynamic regions.
By deepening economic, security, and diplomatic
ties, Italy can contribute to a more stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific while
expanding its own strategic footprint in an increasingly multipolar world.
The Perils of a War Between Israel and Jordan
by Andrea Molle.
A war between Israel and Jordan remains an
unlikely but potentially catastrophic scenario. Since signing a peace treaty in
1994, the two countries have maintained diplomatic and security cooperation,
making armed conflict seem improbable. However, the Middle East is a region
where tensions can escalate unexpectedly, and in the event of war, the
consequences would be far-reaching, extending beyond the immediate battlefield
and reshaping regional and global dynamics.
Militarily, Israel holds an overwhelming
advantage. Its state-of-the-art air force, advanced missile defense systems,
and cyber warfare capabilities make it one of the most formidable militaries in
the world. Jordan’s military, while professional and well-trained, lacks the
offensive power and technological sophistication to sustain a prolonged war
against Israel. While Jordan’s mountainous terrain could offer some defensive
advantages, its key cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to Israeli
airstrikes.
Conversely, Israeli population centers such
as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would be within range of Jordanian missiles, but
Israel’s Iron Dome and other missile defense systems would likely neutralize
most of these threats. If war were to break out under a U.S. administration led
by Donald Trump, the geopolitical landscape would shift dramatically. Trump has
a history of unwavering support for Israel, having moved the U.S. embassy to
Jerusalem and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights during his
first term. In the event of conflict, Washington would likely side decisively
with Israel, providing military assistance, blocking diplomatic efforts to
restrain Israeli actions, and exerting pressure on Jordan to de-escalate.
This approach could embolden Israeli
leadership, reducing the incentive for a swift resolution and increasing the
likelihood of a drawn-out conflict. At the same time, such a stance would
further alienate Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would face the
difficult choice of supporting Jordan diplomatically while maintaining their
fragile ties with Israel. The economic consequences of such a war would be
devastating. Jordan, already reliant on foreign aid and economic cooperation
with Israel, would suffer greatly, facing trade disruptions, infrastructure
destruction, and economic collapse. While Israel has a more resilient economy,
a prolonged war would still create market instability, harm the tourism
industry, and disrupt vital sectors such as technology and defense.
A broader escalation could also lead to
rising oil prices and regional economic turmoil, further complicating global
markets. Beyond conventional military and economic consequences, one of the
most dangerous ripple effects of such a conflict would be the resurgence of
international terrorism. History has shown that war and instability in the
Middle East create fertile ground for jihadist organizations, and a war between
Israel and Jordan would likely open the door for extremist groups to exploit the
chaos. ISIS-K, an already growing threat, could seize the moment to expand its
influence, launching attacks in both Israel and Jordan while using the war as a
recruitment tool. The instability could also encourage terrorist attacks in
Western nations, as radicalized individuals respond to the conflict with
violence abroad. The specter of a global wave of terrorism, fueled by the war,
could reshape security policies worldwide and force governments to divert
resources toward counterterrorism efforts. The possible outcomes of such a
conflict vary in severity. A short, intense war could lead to a quick
diplomatic resolution, with the United States or regional powers stepping in to
mediate a ceasefire.
However, if the war dragged on and external
actors such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Palestinian militant groups became
involved, the situation could spiral into a broader regional conflict. Jordan
itself could face internal instability, with the monarchy weakened by war and
at risk of an uprising or coup. In the worst-case scenario, the war could
trigger a new era of instability, empowering extremist groups and reshaping
alliances across the region. Ultimately, a war between Israel and Jordan would
be disastrous for both countries and the broader Middle East. The strategic,
economic, and security costs far outweigh any potential gains, making a
full-scale conflict unlikely.
However, as history has shown, political
miscalculations, external provocations, or shifting alliances can sometimes
push nations toward unintended wars. While outright conflict remains
improbable, the risks of border tensions, proxy confrontations, and diplomatic
crises should not be underestimated. The only real solution is continued
dialogue and diplomatic engagement, as the alternative—a war with unpredictable
and devastating consequences—would be a tragedy for the entire region.
Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.
by Andrea Molle.
After the withdrawal of the last French military
mission, Italy remains the only European country with a significant presence in
the Sahel. This opens several opportunities but also presents various
challenges that Rome will have to address with as integrated a strategy as
possible. Italy indeed has a significant military presence in sub-Saharan
Africa, with several missions aimed at ensuring security, combating terrorism,
and supporting the stability of the region. These missions see Rome engaged in
Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Gulf of Guinea, both through bilateral
operations and within the framework of EU, NATO, and UN missions. Italy maintains
a military presence in Niger as part of the “MISIN” mission
(Bilateral Support Mission in the Republic of Niger), launched in 2018 with the
aim of supporting local authorities in contrasting terrorism, human
trafficking, and organized crime. The operation fits into Italy’s broader
commitment in the Sahel, aimed at ensuring stability and security in the
region, countering threats that can also impact Europe, such as irregular
migration flows.
The Italian mission in Niger primarily
focuses on training and mentoring local security forces to improve their
operational capabilities. Italian military personnel, drawing from various
branches of the Armed Forces, provide courses on combat techniques, special
operations, surveillance, and border control. Additionally, logistical and
medical support is an essential component of the operation. The Italian
contingent in Niger consists of several hundred units, with the possibility of
deploying up to 470 soldiers, 130 vehicles, and aircraft for logistical and
reconnaissance needs. Italy has established its operational base in Niamey, the
capital of Niger, collaborating with local authorities and other international
partners, including the United States and previously France. The operation is
also part of a broader cooperation framework between Italy and Niger, which
includes development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve
the economic and social conditions of the African country. However, the
political situation in Niger is unstable, with the recent 2023 coup leading to
a review of relations between the Nigerien government and Western states,
including Italy.
Despite the geopolitical uncertainties, the
Italian mission in Niger remains a key part of Italy’s defense and security
strategy in the Sahel, contributing to the stabilization of a region crucial
for the geopolitical and economic balance of both the region and Europe. Beyond
Niger, Italy also maintains a limited military presence in neighboring Chad,
focusing mainly on liaison, training, and supporting international missions in
the Sahel region. This commitment is part of a broader multilateral cooperation
effort aimed at combating terrorism, stabilizing the area, and strengthening
local security forces’ capabilities. Italy’s activities in Chad work in synergy
with operations led by international organizations such as the European Union,
the United Nations, and the G5 Sahel, providing strategic and operational
support through intelligence sharing, military training, and coordination with
other military contingents in the area. Lastly, Italy participates in several initiatives
to improve the country’s border security, prevent arms trafficking, and counter
radicalization, all key elements for the stability of Chad and the Sahel region
as a whole.
The Italian approach is distinguished by a
strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, promoting not only security but
also the development and resilience of local communities. Italy also established
a military base in Djibouti, the Italian Support Military Base (BMIS),
operational since 2013. Located strategically in the Horn of Africa, the BMIS
serves as a logistics and operations hub, developing intelligence capabilities
for Italian armed forces engaged in missions in the East Africa region and the
Indian Ocean. This base is a key infrastructure supporting anti-piracy
operations, contributing to the security of shipping routes and the patrolling
of international waters. It also provides logistical and operational support to
various Italian and European missions in the region, including Italy’s
participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation (against piracy in the Gulf of
Aden) and the EUTM Somalia mission, dedicated to training Somali armed forces.
The presence of the BMIS also allows for
the rapid deployment of Italian units in case of emergencies or crises in the
area, strengthening Italy’s role in the security and stabilization of the Horn
of Africa. The base hosts military personnel and advanced support
infrastructure, allowing maintenance of vehicles, supplies, and assistance to
Italian forces and allied missions. In addition to military aspects, the BMIS
also represents a point of cooperation with local Djiboutian authorities,
helping to strengthen diplomatic relations between Italy and Djibouti and
support regional security, stability, and development initiatives. Italy
maintains a significant presence in Somalia, actively contributing to the
country’s security and stabilization through two main international missions.
These are the EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission in Somalia), an EU
mission active since 2010, aimed at training and mentoring the Somali National
Army (SNA) to strengthen its operational capabilities and enable the Somali
government to deal with internal security threats, particularly from the
terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Italy plays a leading role in this mission,
providing military instructors, advisors, and strategic support. Italian
personnel are involved in training Somali officers in tactical, strategic, and
logistical aspects, as well as promoting international humanitarian law
principles. The goal is to build a professional and efficient Somali army capable
of ensuring the country’s security autonomously. In addition to military
training, the mission focuses on the development of Somali military leadership
and strengthening defense institutions, contributing to the creation of a more
effective command and control chain. The other operation, called Operation
Atalanta, is a naval mission of the European Union (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) launched
in 2008, aimed at combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean,
protecting merchant navy ships, and ensuring the safety of strategic maritime
routes.
Italy actively participates in the
operation with naval units, helicopters, and military personnel, performing
patrols and providing escorts for commercial and humanitarian ships,
particularly those of the World Food Programme (WFP) heading to Somalia. The
Italian Navy has played a prominent role in the mission, contributing to the
deterrence of piracy and maintaining security in international waters.
Operation Atalanta has had a significant impact, drastically reducing pirate
attacks and strengthening cooperation among international naval forces. Italy,
in addition to its operational contribution, has frequently held high-level
commands within the mission, confirming its commitment to global maritime
security. In addition to participating in these missions, Italy maintains
strong historical and diplomatic ties with Somalia, a country that was an
Italian colony until the mid-20th century. Italy’s commitment goes beyond the
military aspect, encompassing development cooperation, humanitarian support,
and initiatives for political stabilization.
Through the EUTM Somalia and Operation
Atalanta missions, Italy significantly contributes to the security and
stability of the Horn of Africa, consolidating its role as a key actor in
international operations in the region. Finally, with Operation Gabinia, Italy
has committed to strengthening maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a
crucial area for international oil and goods traffic, but also one of the
regions most affected by maritime piracy. The deployment of Italian naval units
aims to combat piracy, protect commercial ships (particularly those flying the
Italian flag), and ensure the security of maritime infrastructure critical to
global economic interests. All these operations are part of a broader Italian
engagement in the region, which includes economic, military, and diplomatic
cooperation with several West African countries.
Italy is working to develop strategic
partnerships that include development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and
investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the countries
involved, thereby contributing to their stability and reducing the root causes
of instability and forced migration. Key areas of intervention include training
local security forces, border control, combating illicit trafficking (drugs,
weapons, humans), and the fight against jihadist terrorism, which represents a
growing threat in the Sahel region. Strengthening local security and
intelligence capabilities is critical to counter groups such as Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
(ISGS), who exploit institutional weaknesses and ethnic tensions to expand
their influence.
An additional objective that Italy will
need to pursue more decisively in the future is containing the growing
geopolitical penetration of Russia and China in the region. Moscow has
strengthened its military and political presence through paramilitary groups
like the Wagner Group, providing support to authoritarian regimes and military
juntas in exchange for natural resources and strategic bases. Beijing, on the
other hand, continues to expand its economic influence through significant
infrastructure and financial investments, often through debt mechanisms that
bind local governments to Chinese interests. In the face of these developments,
Italy, in coordination with the United States and other NATO partners, will
need to strengthen its political-military presence, intensify cooperation with
local governments, and promote alternative development models based on
sustainability and the economic self-determination of African countries.
Italy’s commitment to West Africa is
therefore increasingly seen as a delicate balance between security, diplomacy,
development cooperation, and the protection of national and European strategic
interests.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
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