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Trump and the Alien Enemies Act of 1798: The Deportation of Venezuelan Gang Members as “Irregular Warfare”.

by Andrea Molle.

The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 is a federal law that grants the U.S. president the authority to detain or deport non-citizens from nations deemed hostile during times of war. Enacted on July 6, 1798, as part of the broader Alien and Sedition Acts, its primary purpose was to safeguard national security amid potential conflicts.

In the late 18th century, tensions between the United States and France escalated, leading to fears of espionage and internal subversion. To address these concerns, the Federalist-controlled Congress passed four laws collectively known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. These included the Naturalization Act, which in the past extended the residency requirement for U.S. citizenship from five to fourteen years; the Alien Friends Act, which authorized the president to deport any non-citizen deemed dangerous to national security; the Alien Enemies Act, which empowered the president to detain or deport male citizens of a hostile nation, aged fourteen and above, during times of war; and the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to publish “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” against the government or its officials. Unlike the other three acts, which were either repealed or expired by 1802, the Alien Enemies Act remains in effect today, albeit in a modified form. Its enduring presence in U.S. law continues to evoke discussions about civil liberties and the balance between national security and individual rights.

Throughout U.S. history, the Alien Enemies Act has only been invoked during significant conflicts. During the War of 1812, it was applied to British nationals residing in the United States. In World War I, it targeted citizens of Germany and its allies. In World War II, it was used to justify the internment of Japanese, German, and Italian nationals, as well as Japanese American citizens, marking one of the most controversial applications of the act. In each instance, the act facilitated the detention, relocation, or deportation of individuals based on their nationality during wartime.

In March 2025, President Donald Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act to expedite the deportation of Venezuelan migrants suspected of gang affiliations, specifically targeting the Tren de Aragua gang. This marked an unprecedented peacetime application of the act, as the United States is not officially at war with Venezuela. While not able to stop the beginning of the deportations, a federal judge issued a fourteen-day restraining order, opening to legal debates about the scope and applicability of the act in contemporary contexts.

The invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to deport Venezuelan gang members suggests that the Trump administration is framing gang activity as a form of irregular warfare. This aligns with previous steps taken to classify certain Cartels as terrorist organizations, a move that reflects a broader shift in how non-state actors engaged in organized crime are perceived within U.S. national security policy. By treating criminal organizations as actors in irregular warfare rather than mere criminal enterprises, the administration is likely seeking to expand the legal and military tools available to combat them.

Irregular warfare is typically understood as conflict involving non-state actors who use asymmetric tactics, including insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, to challenge state authority. Drug cartels and transnational gangs, while not ideological insurgencies in the traditional sense, do engage in violence, territorial control, and economic exploitation that destabilize regions and threaten U.S. national security. By equating gang activity with irregular warfare, the administration could justify stronger measures such as military intervention, intelligence operations, and the application of wartime authorities, including expedited deportations and potentially indefinite detentions.

Indeed, there are several potential benefits to this approach. First, it allows for a more aggressive and coordinated response to criminal organizations that operate across borders and have ties to terrorist networks. If cartels and transnational gangs are treated as threats on par with insurgencies, then the full weight of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies can be applied to dismantle them. This could lead to increased security along the U.S.-Mexico border and in urban areas affected by gang violence, potentially reducing crime and drug-related deaths. It may also pressure foreign governments, such as Mexico and Venezuela, to take stronger action against criminal groups operating within their borders.

However, there are also significant risks and potential negative consequences. Legally, the broad application of wartime authorities in a peacetime context could set a dangerous precedent, eroding civil liberties and due process protections. The use of the Alien Enemies Act against individuals who are not affiliated with a recognized enemy state raises concerns about its constitutionality and the potential for racial or ethnic profiling. Additionally, expanding the concept of irregular warfare to include gang activity could militarize domestic law enforcement, leading to increased use of force, potential human rights violations, and strained relationships between communities and government authorities.

On an international level, treating cartels and gangs as terrorist organizations or enemy combatants could escalate tensions with foreign governments. If the U.S. begins targeting these groups through military or intelligence operations, it could be seen as an infringement on national sovereignty, particularly in Latin America. Countries like Mexico have already resisted U.S. efforts to designate cartels as terrorist organizations, fearing that it could justify unilateral U.S. military action within their borders. This approach could also provoke retaliation from the criminal organizations themselves, increasing violence against American citizens and law enforcement personnel.

In conclusion, while the classification of gang activity as irregular warfare may offer tactical advantages in the fight against organized crime, it carries profound legal, ethical, and geopolitical risks that need to be thoroughly assessed. A careful balance must be struck between ensuring national security and upholding the rule of law, civil liberties, and international cooperation. On top of that, the long-term consequences of redefining criminal organizations as military threats could reshape U.S. policy in ways that may be difficult to control or reverse.


The Trump-Zelensky Call on Peace in Ukraine: Reading Between the Lines

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The statement released following the telephone conversation was coordinated and aligned, practically identical. From the shared acknowledgment of the significance of the negotiations held in Jeddah to the decision to accept an unconditional ceasefire—a move that effectively amounts to yielding to Russia. This scenario—of an exhausted Ukraine deprived of territories conquered by Moscow—is precisely what we have been anticipating for at least two years, though discussion of it has been avoided in favor of an idealistic, unrealistic narrative focused solely on Ukraine’s complete liberation. Unfortunately.

However, there is a subtle difference between Washington’s and Kyiv’s statements: Zelensky reiterated the need to strengthen air defense. Trump agreed with this necessity but highlighted that he would do his best to find a response to this requirement within Europe. By doing so, he effectively passed the responsibility to the Europeans—or at least reminded the EU of a role it verbally claims but that Washington has practically filled since the beginning. Perhaps not economically, but certainly regarding the supply of weapons and equipment. Moreover, while Zelensky did not mention it, Trump suggested the possibility of transferring ownership of Ukraine’s energy sector to U.S. companies. This is an interesting point, as it could serve as a deterrent to any future aggressive claims from Moscow.

In practical terms, Ukraine has absorbed the blow, yielding to U.S. demands, having no real alternative.

Therefore, the scenario emerging on the horizon is a diminished Ukraine—territorially reduced, depleted of natural resources, and deprived of any realistic possibility of NATO membership, though not necessarily excluded from the European Union. This outcome would be highly advantageous for Russia, which does not view the EU as an insurmountable obstacle.


Europe’s Defense Conundrum: Why PESCO and Other Initiatives Always Fall Short.

by Andrea Molle.

The European Union has long aspired to bolster its collective security and strategic autonomy. Over the past decade, initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) have been launched to strengthen European defense capabilities. However, these initiatives, while symbolically significant, have failed to provide Europe with a coherent and effective security framework. As geopolitical tensions rise, particularly with an increasingly aggressive Russia and ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, it is time for Europe to acknowledge the fundamental flaws in its current defense approach and consider more radical solutions.

As of March 2025, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) continues to serve as the European Union’s framework for deepening defense collaboration among its member states. Since its inception in 2017, PESCO has expanded to include 26 participating countries, collectively working on 68 collaborative projects aimed at enhancing military capabilities and interoperability. In November 2024, the Council of the European Union approved conclusions on the PESCO Strategic Review, reaffirming PESCO’s pivotal role in advancing defense cooperation. This review emphasized the need to adapt PESCO to the evolving geopolitical landscape and underscored the importance of addressing existing challenges to bolster its effectiveness.

Despite these efforts, PESCO continues to face significant hurdles. Many projects have encountered delays due to inadequate financial and practical planning, leading to discussions about reviving or retiring underperforming initiatives. Furthermore, divergent national interests and varying interpretations of strategic autonomy among member states have impeded cohesive progress. For instance, Poland has expressed concerns that PESCO could potentially undermine NATO or weaken security cooperation with the United States, both of which are vital for the security of NATO’s Eastern Flank.

To enhance the effectiveness of PESCO, the EU has opened certain projects to third-party participation. Notably, Canada, Norway, and the United States have been involved in the “Military Mobility” project since December 2021, with the United Kingdom joining in November 2022. Canada has also been invited to participate in the “Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations” project as of February 2023. This inclusion aims to leverage external expertise and resources to strengthen PESCO initiatives. In August 2024, Switzerland received approval to participate in two PESCO projects: “Military Mobility” and “Cyber Ranges Federation.” This move is intended to enhance Switzerland’s national defense capabilities while adhering to its neutrality obligations.

Looking ahead, the ongoing PESCO Strategic Review, set to conclude by the end of 2025, offers an opportunity to reshape the framework to better address contemporary security challenges. The review aims to reinvigorate PESCO by refining its objectives, improving project management, and ensuring that collaborative efforts yield tangible military advancements. In summary, while PESCO has made strides in fostering defense cooperation within the EU, it continues to grapple with bureaucratic inefficiencies, divergent national priorities, and varying levels of commitment among member states. The outcomes of the current strategic review and the inclusion of third-party participants will be crucial in determining PESCO’s future efficacy in enhancing Europe’s defense posture.

Similarly, the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017, serves as a pivotal instrument in bolstering the European Union’s defense research and innovation. For the 2021-2027 period, the EDF has been allocated a budget of approximately €8 billion, with €2.7 billion dedicated to collaborative defense research and €5.3 billion earmarked for capability development projects. Recognizing the need for enhanced defense capabilities, the European Commission has proposed a substantial increase in defense funding. In March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans for a €150 billion defense fund, aiming to encourage member states to invest in military capabilities with the support of EU-backed loans. This initiative underscores the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense posture in response to evolving geopolitical challenges.

The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is another crucial mechanism designed to harmonize national defense planning and investments among EU member states. CARD provides a comprehensive overview of the EU defense landscape, identifying collaborative opportunities and facilitating cooperation. However, the 2024 CARD report indicates that, despite progress in defense spending and cooperation, significant room for improvement remains. Member states are encouraged to take decisive actions to sustain investments and enhance the efficiency of their armed forces.

In addition to the EDF and CARD, several other key European defense initiatives and agencies contribute to enhancing the European Union’s defense capabilities. Established in 2004, the European Defence Agency supports EU member states in improving their defense capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as a facilitator for collaborative defense projects, the EDA serves as a hub for European defense cooperation, covering a broad spectrum of defense-related activities.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the EU’s framework for defense and crisis management, forming a main component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP enables the EU to undertake operational missions outside its borders, utilizing both civilian and military assets to ensure peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security. The EU is also exploring the development of a new satellite network to reduce dependence on U.S. military intelligence. This initiative aims to enhance the EU’s capability to detect threats and coordinate military actions, providing more frequent updates and greater autonomy in intelligence gathering. These initiatives and agencies collectively contribute to a more integrated and robust European defense framework, addressing both current and emerging security challenges.

Compounding the challenges faced by these initiatives is the EU’s continued reliance on NATO as its primary security guarantor. While European leaders often speak of “strategic autonomy,” the reality is that Europe remains dependent on American military power. The war in Ukraine has underscored NATO’s irreplaceable role in European security, with the United States providing the bulk of military aid and strategic coordination. This reliance on NATO creates a paradox: while the EU desires greater defense independence, it is unwilling or unable to develop the necessary capabilities to make that independence meaningful. Attempts to establish a credible European defense identity, such as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France, have made little progress due to the competing priorities of member states.

To address these shortcomings, Europe must reconsider its defense strategy with bold, pragmatic solutions. First, a genuine commitment to defense spending is necessary. The EU should set binding defense investment targets akin to increasing NATO’s GDP requirement. ReArm Europe is a step in the right direction, but a common European military budget, funded through EU-wide mechanisms, could help overcome fragmentation in defense procurement and capability development.

Secondly, we must understand that establishing a fully integrated EU army has long been considered politically unfeasible due to concerns over national sovereignty and the complexity of aligning diverse military structures. However, recent developments indicate a shift toward more cohesive European defense capabilities. In March 2022, the EU introduced the Strategic Compass, outlining the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) by 2025. This modular force aims to mobilize up to 5,000 personnel, incorporating modified EU battlegroups and additional forces from member states.

French President Emmanuel Macron has also been a vocal proponent of strengthening EU defense mechanisms. In April 2024, he proposed the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2025, emphasizing the need for a “European Defense Initiative” to develop strategic concepts and capabilities, particularly in air defense and long-range operations. Despite these initiatives, several challenges persist. Nations like Germany face difficulties in recruiting and preparing their armed forces, particularly among younger generations who may prioritize work-life balance over military commitments.

Finally, enhancing Europe’s security necessitates a comprehensive approach that integrates institutional military frameworks and civilian preparedness. While the idea of an EU-wide right to self-defense akin to the United States’ Second Amendment is culturally and legally complex, Europe has been advancing initiatives to bolster civilian resilience and preparedness. In conclusion, Europe’s security environment is deteriorating, and its current defense initiatives are ill-equipped to handle the challenges ahead. PESCO, the EDF, and CARD have failed to deliver a credible path toward strategic autonomy. If Europe is serious about defending itself, it must embrace more ambitious solutions, including increased defense spending, operational integration, and a legal framework that empowers both states and citizens in matters of security. Without such measures, European defense will remain a fragmented and ineffective patchwork, leaving the continent vulnerable in an increasingly hostile world.


Trump’s strategy: pressuring Iran to target China.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The Trump administration has decided to intensify its maximum-pressure policy against Iran by directly targeting the country’s oil sector and related logistical infrastructure. Recent U.S. actions aim to significantly reduce Iranian oil exports, especially to China, thereby limiting Tehran’s ability to finance destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East. The State Department has imposed new sanctions on three companies involved in facilitating illicit transfers of Iranian oil through ship-to-ship (STS) naval operations conducted outside port limits in Southeast Asia. At the same time, three vessels involved in these activities have been identified and declared blocked properties.

These measures aim to interrupt the financial flows that enable Tehran to sustain its nuclear and missile programs and support regional terrorist groups. Simultaneously, the Treasury Department has directly targeted Iran’s Petroleum Minister, Mohsen Paknejad, a central figure in Iranian oil operations, accused of using national energy resources to support the regime’s illicit activities.

Several companies engaged in the transportation and sale of Iranian oil, particularly to China, have also been sanctioned. The sanctioned companies operated vessels registered in various countries, concealing the true origin of the transported oil by disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to evade international monitoring. Among these companies are PT. Bintang Samudra Utama (Bintang), Shipload Maritime Pte. Ltd., and PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama (Gianira), which respectively managed the vessels CELEBES, MALILI, and MARINA VISION. These ships were involved in a significant STS transfer operation of Iranian oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.

Analysts emphasize that this strategy reflects a well-established U.S. tactic aimed not only at cutting off Tehran’s primary economic resources but also at deterring third-party companies and countries from collaborating, directly or indirectly, with the Iranian regime. Such sanctions create a strong deterrent effect, raising costs and risks for international operators seeking to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Economically and strategically, this intensified pressure seeks to progressively eliminate Iran’s oil revenues, thereby weakening the regime’s ability to finance its conventional armed forces as well as affiliated militias and groups considered by Washington as primary sources of regional instability.

The escalation of sanctions is likely to heighten international tensions further. However, it underscores the Trump administration’s resolve to maintain its maximum-pressure policy, ultimately aiming to compel Iran to reassess its regional strategies and ambitions in nuclear and missile development.


The evolution of Irregular Warfare and a roadmap for the future

by Andrea Molle.

Irregular Warfare (IW) has been a persistent feature of conflict throughout history, evolving in response to shifting political, technological, and social dynamics. In the United States joint doctrine, it is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” and in U.S. law as “Department of Defense activities not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals. ” Broadly is a form of warfare that seeks to undermine an adversary’s power through asymmetric tactics, IW has taken many forms, from guerrilla warfare to cyber-enabled operations. While much of the modern discussion on IW is heavily influenced by Western experiences—particularly those of the United States—examining a broader array of historical and contemporary cases is essential for understanding how it should evolve to meet future security challenges.

Historically, IW has been the weapon of the weaker party in a conflict, whether insurgents fighting colonial powers, resistance movements opposing occupation, or non-state actors challenging state authority. Early examples include the guerrilla tactics employed by the Spanish against Napoleon’s forces in the Peninsular War (1808–1814) and the asymmetric strategies used by indigenous groups against European colonial armies.

In the 20th century, IW became a dominant feature of conflicts worldwide, especially in decolonization struggles. The Vietnamese resistance against French and later American forces showcased the effectiveness of a combination of guerrilla tactics, political warfare, and conventional operations. Similarly, Mao Zedong’s protracted warfare strategy in China emphasized the importance of mobilizing the population, blending political ideology with military action to wear down a stronger adversary over time.

The Cold War era saw both superpowers engaged in IW through proxy wars, support for insurgencies, and counterinsurgency operations. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the U.S. conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate the challenges of fighting irregular opponents with conventional military means. These cases highlight the importance of understanding local dynamics, political legitimacy, and the limits of military power in irregular conflicts.

Today, IW has expanded beyond traditional insurgencies and guerrilla movements to include cyber warfare, information warfare, and hybrid threats. Non-state actors like ISIS and hybrid threats from state actors, such as Russia’s use of proxy forces and disinformation campaigns in Ukraine, illustrate the evolving nature of IW. The role of technology, particularly artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber capabilities, has fundamentally altered how IW is conducted.

However, a critical shortcoming in current IW studies is the Western-centric focus that often disregards the rich and varied experiences of other regions. For example, Hezbollah’s asymmetric warfare strategies against Israel, the Houthis’ use of drones and missiles in Yemen, and the FARC’s long-running insurgency in Colombia offer valuable lessons in the adaptability and resilience of irregular forces. Examining how African nations counter insurgencies, such as Nigeria’s struggle against Boko Haram, or how India has dealt with insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, could provide fresh perspectives on counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies.

To effectively address the challenges of future IW, a shift in strategic thinking is required. Policymakers and military strategists should consider the following:

Expanding the Knowledge Base Beyond Western Experiences: IW research and doctrine must incorporate insights from diverse global conflicts. The experiences of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian actors in both insurgency and counterinsurgency provide critical lessons for adaptability and resilience in IW.

Leveraging Emerging Technologies: Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and cyber warfare will shape the future of IW. Adversaries are already integrating AI-driven propaganda, deepfakes, and cyber sabotage into their IW arsenals. Developing countermeasures and proactive strategies will be crucial.

Emphasizing Political and Societal Aspects: As history has shown, IW is not just about military force but also about winning the political and social battles. Future IW strategies must integrate political warfare, information operations, and economic tools to counter adversaries effectively.

Strengthening Resilience and Defense Against Hybrid Warfare: Given the rise of hybrid threats blending conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics, nations must adopt a comprehensive security approach that involves military, civilian, and private sector collaboration.

Prioritizing Local Partnerships and Cultural Awareness: Future IW efforts should emphasize local partnerships, recognizing that solutions to irregular conflicts are often context-specific. Training programs, intelligence gathering, and military operations should incorporate deep cultural and historical understanding.

To effectively evolve IW strategies, a structured roadmap should be implemented as soon as possible. Such a roadmap should begin with a dedicated phase of research and analysis over the couple of years. This period would focus on conducting extensive studies of non-Western IW experiences, integrating their lessons into military and policy training programs, and establishing international working groups composed of experts from diverse regions. Predictive models, for example leveraging AI and big data, would be developed to anticipate IW trends and potential threats, ensuring that future strategies remain adaptive and forward-thinking.

Following this foundational research, the next two to three years should be dedicated to revising policy and military doctrines. This would involve updating operational guidelines to incorporate insights from hybrid and cyber warfare, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms among allied nations, and refining legal and ethical frameworks to address the complexities of IW, particularly in cyberspace and information operations. As adversaries continue to evolve their tactics, policymakers must ensure that legal frameworks remain robust yet adaptable to emerging challenges.

Next, ample efforts should shift toward capability building and training. Specialized IW training programs would be established to focus on non-Western case studies and hybrid warfare tactics, preparing military and intelligence personnel for diverse operational environments. Technological advancements would be integrated into these programs, with investments in AI-driven intelligence analysis, autonomous systems, and cyber defense. Moreover, partnerships between governments, academia, and the private sector would be fostered to develop innovative countermeasures against disinformation campaigns and digital propaganda.

Beyond the foundational years, the focus would be on full operational integration and continuous adaptation. Flexible operational structures would be implemented, allowing rapid adjustments to emerging IW threats. Regular multinational IW exercises would be conducted to test and refine strategies in real-world scenarios. Additionally, an ongoing review process would be established, ensuring that IW doctrines and tactics evolve in response to technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. By maintaining this adaptive cycle, nations would be better positioned to counter the irregular threats of the future while remaining resilient against hybrid warfare challenges.

In conclusion, Irregular Warfare is an enduring and evolving form of conflict that demands continuous adaptation. The Western-centric approach to IW has provided valuable insights, but future strategies must incorporate a broader spectrum of global experiences to remain effective. As technology, geopolitical dynamics, and warfare methods evolve, IW must also transform, emphasizing adaptability, comprehensive security approaches, and a deeper understanding of non-Western conflict experiences. Only by embracing these changes can nations effectively counter the irregular threats of the future.


The Five Eyes Alliance and the Erosion of Trust under Trump’s Policy

by Andrea Molle.

The Five Eyes alliance, formed in the aftermath of World War II, stands as one of the world’s most powerful intelligence-sharing networks. Comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Five Eyes represents a rare example of international cooperation in the shadowy world of intelligence and security. Its members share classified data, conduct joint operations, and regularly assess global threats. In doing so, they provide each other with the critical information necessary to protect national interests, prevent terrorism, and respond to military challenges.

For nearly eight decades, the Five Eyes nations have operated on the bedrock of mutual trust. This trust has allowed them to cooperate seamlessly, sharing not just intelligence but also strategic priorities. However, recent developments under the leadership of Donald Trump have raised concerns that this partnership may be on the verge of collapse.

Since the beginning of his current tenure, Trump’s policies and rhetoric have cast a long shadow over U.S. relations with its closest allies. His decision to withdraw military and intelligence support from Ukraine, for instance, signaled a dramatic shift in American foreign policy. This withdrawal, which came amid growing Russian aggression, has left U.S. allies perplexed and anxious about the reliability of the United States as a partner. While Trump’s decision was ostensibly driven by a desire to focus on American interests, it has further strained trust among the Five Eyes nations.

Indeed, as the U.S. pulls back from its commitments, countries like the UK and Canada are left scrambling to fill the gap. There are already plans for European powers increasing defense spending and stepping up aid to Ukraine. But the larger question looms: what does it mean for the Five Eyes when one of its founding members, the U.S., signals that it no longer shares the same level of commitment to the alliance’s common goals?

The roots of the problem lie not just in Trump’s controversial foreign policy decisions but also in his reckless handling of sensitive information. Several instances, including the leaking of classified material to foreign leaders and his mishandling of documents, have led to doubts about the United States’ reliability in safeguarding intelligence. If the U.S. can’t protect its own classified data, how can it be trusted to handle the secrets of its Five Eyes allies?

This has had a ripple effect across the alliance. Countries that were once eager to share intelligence with the U.S. now find themselves questioning whether doing so is worth the risk. British and Canadian officials have expressed concern that their intelligence may be mishandled or misused, with severe consequences for national security. And perhaps even more troubling is the growing sense that the U.S. is no longer prioritizing the long-term security of its allies. The Five Eyes has always operated on the principle of “shared risk”; when one partner is compromised, all partners feel the impact.

Trump’s “America First” rhetoric has also contributed to a shift in global power dynamics, as the U.S. increasingly turns inward. Under his leadership, the U.S. has not only reduced its support for traditional alliances like NATO but has also shown little regard for the broader international order. The consequences of this approach are not just theoretical—they are already being felt. European leaders, particularly in the UK, have been forced to reconsider their security arrangements. Some are even contemplating the possibility of forming alternative alliances without the U.S. in response to Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy.

For countries like the UK, this is a particularly difficult dilemma. The Five Eyes alliance has been the cornerstone of British intelligence operations for decades, providing unparalleled access to U.S. intelligence capabilities. But in light of Trump’s erratic behavior, there is now a growing realization that Britain may need to diversify its intelligence partnerships to safeguard its security interests. This could lead to a realignment of alliances, with European powers seeking closer ties with NATO members outside of the U.S. or even exploring cooperation with other global players.

The fallout from Trump’s policies is also evident in his approach to global conflicts. His withdrawal of support for Ukraine, for example, has left European nations in an uncomfortable position. With the U.S. retreating from the battlefield, NATO members like the UK and France have had to take a more active role in supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. This has led to an increased sense of uncertainty among Five Eyes partners about the reliability of the U.S. as an ally. If the U.S. is willing to abandon its commitments to one of its closest allies in the face of Russian expansionism, what will happen when the next global crisis emerges?

There is also the looming issue of U.S.-China relations, which has further complicated the Five Eyes’ ability to maintain cohesion. Trump’s approach to China—characterized by a trade war and attempts to undermine Beijing’s technological rise—has pushed the U.S. closer to a confrontation with China. This, in turn, has forced Five Eyes nations to take sides. While Australia and the U.K. have supported the U.S. stance on China, countries like Canada and New Zealand have shown a reluctance to take a hardline approach, partly due to their economic ties with China. This divide could undermine the shared intelligence framework that has been the hallmark of the Five Eyes, especially as global power dynamics shift.

As we look ahead, the future of the Five Eyes alliance is uncertain. The increasing unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy under Trump—coupled with concerns about intelligence mishandling and diplomatic isolationism—has left many wondering if the alliance can continue in its current form. If the U.S. remains unwilling or unable to reaffirm its commitments to its allies, the Five Eyes may need to undergo a significant transformation. The alliance could evolve to rely more heavily on its European members, with new arrangements forged outside of the U.S. orbit. In conclusion, while the Five Eyes alliance has been a powerful force in global security for decades, the current state of U.S. policy under Donald Trump has placed this partnership at risk. If trust continues to erode, the very foundations of the alliance could crumble, forcing its members to chart a new course. The question remains: can the Five Eyes remain united in the face of a changing world order, or will they be forced to adapt to a future without the United States at its core?


Macron’s call to rearm and the redefinition of Europe’s identity

by Andrea Molle

(Cover photo by Guillaume Périgois on Unsplash)

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for Europe to rearm is not just a wake-up call; it is a defining moment for the continent’s security and its role in global geopolitics. By declaring that Europe can no longer “live off the dividends of peace,” Macron has acknowledged a reality that many European leaders have long preferred to ignore. The world has changed, and the post-Cold War assumption that European security could be outsourced to the United States is no longer viable. The time for mote strategic autonomy has arrived.

At the heart of Macron’s message is the growing threat posed by Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine, combined with broader Russian efforts to destabilize Europe, underscores the urgency of the situation. The U.S. has been a crucial ally, but its political landscape is shifting, and future administrations may not be as committed to European security as in the past. Macron’s suggestion that France’s nuclear deterrence could be extended to European allies represents a fundamental shift in strategy—one that could redefine the European security framework. Not a free gift, and of course not the sharing of operational control, but a bid to the leadership of such a framework.

The Financial Times

This shift is particularly interesting given France’s historical posture on defence. Since Charles de Gaulle’s presidency, France has pursued an independent defence strategy, emphasizing national sovereignty over reliance on NATO. In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command, asserting that France should control its own military policy rather than be subordinate to U.S. leadership. Though France rejoined NATO’s command structure in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, its nuclear deterrence has always remained strictly under national control. Macron’s willingness to even discuss extending France’s nuclear umbrella marks a significant departure from this traditional stance, signaling a new era in European defence, but at the same time is a return to the Gaullist paradigm.

The implications of this shift extend beyond France. The European Union is already exploring massive investments in defence, potentially mobilizing hundreds of billions of euros. This move signals an intent to reduce reliance on NATO, or at the very least, to establish a stronger European pillar within the alliance. If successful, this transformation could alter the balance of global power, making Europe a more independent actor on the world stage.

Italy finds itself at a crossroads in this new paradigm, and the clock is ticking. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has stressed the importance of Western unity, warning that division would be “fatal for everyone.” Italy, historically cautious in its defence spending, may now be compelled to significantly increase its military budget. Furthermore, as discussions around European nuclear deterrence evolve, Italy could be forced to reconsider its own strategic policies. Should it align itself more closely with France’s vision, will it maintain its traditional reliance on US’s nuclear umbrella, will Rome opt to create its own “Deterrence Force”?

Regardless, Macron’s speech was not just about military spending; it was about reshaping Europe’s identity. The era of European complacency in defence matters is over. The question now is whether European leaders, particularly in Italy, are willing to rise to the occasion and assume the responsibilities that come with true strategic autonomy. If they fail to act, the cost may not only be Europe’s security but its place in the world order itself.


Europe at a Crossroads: Can It Defend Itself Without the U.S.?

by Andrea Molle.

As geopolitical tensions mount and the possibility of a U.S. partial or complete withdrawal from NATO looms, Europe faces an urgent question: Can it defend itself without American support? The answer, while not impossible, comes with staggering costs and a long, uncertain road to military independence.

For decades, Europe has free-ridden on the United States as the backbone of its defense strategy. Washington provides not only nuclear deterrence but also logistical, technological, and intelligence capabilities that European nations struggle to replicate on their own. A U.S. exit from NATO would leave Europe with a security void requiring a dramatic increase in military spending and political cohesion—both of which are far from guaranteed.

The numbers are sobering. Today, the combined defense budgets of the European Union and the United Kingdom stand at roughly $380 billion per year. Yet, experts estimate that to compensate for the loss of U.S. capabilities, Europe would need to invest an additional $300-$400 billion upfront in military expansion. To sustain this, European countries would have to increase their annual defense spending to 3-4% of GDP, up from the current 1.5-2%.

For Italy, the challenge is particularly stark. Currently allocating around 1.5% of GDP to defense, approximately €30 billion per year, Rome would likely need to double its spending to €60 billion annually to maintain a credible security posture. This is no small feat for a nation with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 140%, where defense spending has historically taken a backseat to social and economic priorities.

Nonetheless, Italy is a crucial NATO player, given its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, without U.S. support, it would face serious gaps in naval power, air superiority, and intelligence capabilities. Italy would need to expand its fleet, requiring investments of at least €20-30 billion in additional aircraft carriers, submarines, and destroyers to safeguard Mediterranean security. Rome relies heavily on U.S.-built F-35s and missile systems, and a post-NATO scenario would necessitate either an expensive push for indigenous production or deeper reliance on France and Germany. Additionally, Italy currently hosts U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO’s sharing program. If that ends, it faces the difficult decision of whether to invest in its own nuclear deterrent—an economically and politically fraught prospect—or depend on France’s arsenal for protection. Relying on France’s nuclear arsenal would be a precarious option for Italy, as the two countries do not share many strategic interests, and such dependence could subordinate Rome to Paris, undermining Italy’s autonomy in defense matters and limiting its ability to act independently on the international stage. This would further complicate Italy’s foreign policy, as it would have to align more closely with French priorities, which may not always coincide with its own.

Beyond the financial and technological hurdles, the issue of personnel looms large. European armed forces have shrunk significantly since the end of the Cold War, with many nations shifting toward smaller, professional armies rather than mass conscription. Italy, like much of Europe, would need to rapidly expand its military ranks to meet the demands of a self-sufficient defense. This means not only recruiting more soldiers but also training and retaining skilled personnel in key areas such as cyber warfare, intelligence, and logistics. Without the manpower to operate and maintain an expanded military infrastructure, even the most advanced weapons systems would be of little use. Conscription, once abandoned, may need to be reconsidered—a politically sensitive but perhaps necessary step if Europe is to sustain long-term military readiness.

Moreover, building an autonomous European defense system would take decades. In the short term, the first five years would require a rush to increase budgets and reconfigure alliances, though Europe would remain highly vulnerable. In the medium term, within five to ten years, a functional but weaker alternative to NATO could emerge, with expanded joint operations and rapid procurement of new defense assets. Over the long term, within ten to twenty years, a fully independent European defense force could be operational, though fragmentation, inefficiencies, and economic strains would remain challenges.

Beyond financial constraints, European nations—Italy included—struggle with political division on military issues. Germany has only recently begun reversing decades of defense underinvestment, while Italy has long faced public skepticism over military expansion. Without strong political will and decisive leadership, Europe’s path to defense autonomy will be slow and disjointed. The economic burden is another major concern. While France and Germany might absorb higher defense costs, countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece may find it nearly impossible without significant sacrifices in other areas, such as infrastructure, social programs, and energy investment.

Another possibility is for Rome to ensure continued American military and strategic support. However, an alignment with Washington would alienate some of Italy’s European partners who may favor a more autonomous defense framework, potentially dooming European unity. Furthermore, it would reinforce Italy’s dependence on the U.S. for security, leaving it vulnerable to the shifting priorities of U.S. foreign policy while limiting its influence within the European Union on defense and security issues. Regardless of the chosen option, this would mark a radical shift in military strategy, involving increased defense spending, naval expansion, and a potential reassessment of its role in nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, political fragmentation and economic limitations could make replacing NATO’s capabilities an uphill battle. Europe must now decide: Will it take defense into its own hands, or will it remain vulnerable in an increasingly volatile world? One thing is certain—without U.S. support, the cost of security will skyrocket, and for nations like Italy, the stakes have never been higher.