Macron’s call to rearm and the redefinition of Europe’s identity

by Andrea Molle

(Cover photo by Guillaume Périgois on Unsplash)

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for Europe to rearm is not just a wake-up call; it is a defining moment for the continent’s security and its role in global geopolitics. By declaring that Europe can no longer “live off the dividends of peace,” Macron has acknowledged a reality that many European leaders have long preferred to ignore. The world has changed, and the post-Cold War assumption that European security could be outsourced to the United States is no longer viable. The time for mote strategic autonomy has arrived.

At the heart of Macron’s message is the growing threat posed by Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine, combined with broader Russian efforts to destabilize Europe, underscores the urgency of the situation. The U.S. has been a crucial ally, but its political landscape is shifting, and future administrations may not be as committed to European security as in the past. Macron’s suggestion that France’s nuclear deterrence could be extended to European allies represents a fundamental shift in strategy—one that could redefine the European security framework. Not a free gift, and of course not the sharing of operational control, but a bid to the leadership of such a framework.

This shift is particularly interesting given France’s historical posture on defence. Since Charles de Gaulle’s presidency, France has pursued an independent defence strategy, emphasizing national sovereignty over reliance on NATO. In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command, asserting that France should control its own military policy rather than be subordinate to U.S. leadership. Though France rejoined NATO’s command structure in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, its nuclear deterrence has always remained strictly under national control. Macron’s willingness to even discuss extending France’s nuclear umbrella marks a significant departure from this traditional stance, signaling a new era in European defence, but at the same time is a return to the Gaullist paradigm.

The implications of this shift extend beyond France. The European Union is already exploring massive investments in defence, potentially mobilizing hundreds of billions of euros. This move signals an intent to reduce reliance on NATO, or at the very least, to establish a stronger European pillar within the alliance. If successful, this transformation could alter the balance of global power, making Europe a more independent actor on the world stage.

Italy finds itself at a crossroads in this new paradigm, and the clock is ticking. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has stressed the importance of Western unity, warning that division would be “fatal for everyone.” Italy, historically cautious in its defence spending, may now be compelled to significantly increase its military budget. Furthermore, as discussions around European nuclear deterrence evolve, Italy could be forced to reconsider its own strategic policies. Should it align itself more closely with France’s vision, will it maintain its traditional reliance on US’s nuclear umbrella, will Rome opt to create its own “Deterrence Force”?

Regardless, Macron’s speech was not just about military spending; it was about reshaping Europe’s identity. The era of European complacency in defence matters is over. The question now is whether European leaders, particularly in Italy, are willing to rise to the occasion and assume the responsibilities that come with true strategic autonomy. If they fail to act, the cost may not only be Europe’s security but its place in the world order itself.

Europe at a Crossroads: Can It Defend Itself Without the U.S.?

by Andrea Molle.

As geopolitical tensions mount and the possibility of a U.S. partial or complete withdrawal from NATO looms, Europe faces an urgent question: Can it defend itself without American support? The answer, while not impossible, comes with staggering costs and a long, uncertain road to military independence.

For decades, Europe has free-ridden on the United States as the backbone of its defense strategy. Washington provides not only nuclear deterrence but also logistical, technological, and intelligence capabilities that European nations struggle to replicate on their own. A U.S. exit from NATO would leave Europe with a security void requiring a dramatic increase in military spending and political cohesion—both of which are far from guaranteed.

The numbers are sobering. Today, the combined defense budgets of the European Union and the United Kingdom stand at roughly $380 billion per year. Yet, experts estimate that to compensate for the loss of U.S. capabilities, Europe would need to invest an additional $300-$400 billion upfront in military expansion. To sustain this, European countries would have to increase their annual defense spending to 3-4% of GDP, up from the current 1.5-2%.

For Italy, the challenge is particularly stark. Currently allocating around 1.5% of GDP to defense, approximately €30 billion per year, Rome would likely need to double its spending to €60 billion annually to maintain a credible security posture. This is no small feat for a nation with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 140%, where defense spending has historically taken a backseat to social and economic priorities.

Nonetheless, Italy is a crucial NATO player, given its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, without U.S. support, it would face serious gaps in naval power, air superiority, and intelligence capabilities. Italy would need to expand its fleet, requiring investments of at least €20-30 billion in additional aircraft carriers, submarines, and destroyers to safeguard Mediterranean security. Rome relies heavily on U.S.-built F-35s and missile systems, and a post-NATO scenario would necessitate either an expensive push for indigenous production or deeper reliance on France and Germany. Additionally, Italy currently hosts U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO’s sharing program. If that ends, it faces the difficult decision of whether to invest in its own nuclear deterrent—an economically and politically fraught prospect—or depend on France’s arsenal for protection. Relying on France’s nuclear arsenal would be a precarious option for Italy, as the two countries do not share many strategic interests, and such dependence could subordinate Rome to Paris, undermining Italy’s autonomy in defense matters and limiting its ability to act independently on the international stage. This would further complicate Italy’s foreign policy, as it would have to align more closely with French priorities, which may not always coincide with its own.

Beyond the financial and technological hurdles, the issue of personnel looms large. European armed forces have shrunk significantly since the end of the Cold War, with many nations shifting toward smaller, professional armies rather than mass conscription. Italy, like much of Europe, would need to rapidly expand its military ranks to meet the demands of a self-sufficient defense. This means not only recruiting more soldiers but also training and retaining skilled personnel in key areas such as cyber warfare, intelligence, and logistics. Without the manpower to operate and maintain an expanded military infrastructure, even the most advanced weapons systems would be of little use. Conscription, once abandoned, may need to be reconsidered—a politically sensitive but perhaps necessary step if Europe is to sustain long-term military readiness.

Moreover, building an autonomous European defense system would take decades. In the short term, the first five years would require a rush to increase budgets and reconfigure alliances, though Europe would remain highly vulnerable. In the medium term, within five to ten years, a functional but weaker alternative to NATO could emerge, with expanded joint operations and rapid procurement of new defense assets. Over the long term, within ten to twenty years, a fully independent European defense force could be operational, though fragmentation, inefficiencies, and economic strains would remain challenges.

Beyond financial constraints, European nations—Italy included—struggle with political division on military issues. Germany has only recently begun reversing decades of defense underinvestment, while Italy has long faced public skepticism over military expansion. Without strong political will and decisive leadership, Europe’s path to defense autonomy will be slow and disjointed. The economic burden is another major concern. While France and Germany might absorb higher defense costs, countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece may find it nearly impossible without significant sacrifices in other areas, such as infrastructure, social programs, and energy investment.

Another possibility is for Rome to ensure continued American military and strategic support. However, an alignment with Washington would alienate some of Italy’s European partners who may favor a more autonomous defense framework, potentially dooming European unity. Furthermore, it would reinforce Italy’s dependence on the U.S. for security, leaving it vulnerable to the shifting priorities of U.S. foreign policy while limiting its influence within the European Union on defense and security issues. Regardless of the chosen option, this would mark a radical shift in military strategy, involving increased defense spending, naval expansion, and a potential reassessment of its role in nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, political fragmentation and economic limitations could make replacing NATO’s capabilities an uphill battle. Europe must now decide: Will it take defense into its own hands, or will it remain vulnerable in an increasingly volatile world? One thing is certain—without U.S. support, the cost of security will skyrocket, and for nations like Italy, the stakes have never been higher.