The Russian Strategy: offensive (action and interference), defensive, and deterrent. Digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence in global competition.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract.

This article explores the Russian strategy of digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) as fundamental tools in global competition. Initially welcomed, Russian soft diplomacy has experienced fluctuations due to information campaigns that have damaged the country’s international image. In recent years, Russia has developed a “digital diplomacy” to influence international public opinion, leveraging tools like social media to spread polarizing messages and alternative news. At the same time, the country has enhanced its cyber warfare capabilities, considering it an essential component of information operations and a means to achieve an asymmetric military balance against the West. The use of AI amplifies these operations, enabling large-scale disinformation and strengthening espionage techniques and cyber-attacks, with the goal of destabilizing adversaries and consolidating Russian influence on a global scale.

Public Soft diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy and Cyber Operations

At the beginning of the 21^st century, the emergence of Russian public soft diplomacy was met with optimism by both analysts and the international public. However, over time, Russian public diplomacy experienced several fluctuations due to information campaigns that damaged Russia’s global image, particularly after the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. In recent years, the advancement of information technologies and the growing spread of social media have introduced what is known as “digital diplomacy.” This form of communication, first launched by the Obama administration, involves direct dialogue between governments and the online community, known as netizens or cyber citizens, with the goal of influencing public opinion. Initially, digital diplomacy was praised for its ability to exert a significant impact on international public opinion during conflicts, thanks to targeted communication strategies, psychological warfare, and online operations.[1] However, the negative side of digital diplomacy soon became apparent, particularly when some authoritarian regimes began using internet resources to manipulate online traffic with the aim of hindering dissident groups and political opposition.[2]

Another significant aspect related to the digital advancement of information is the increasing use of information warfare, now enhanced by artificial intelligence, which has become a crucial factor in achieving strategic objectives.[3]

Russian strategy and doctrine have always placed great importance on cybersecurity and cyber operations, considering them an essential part of broader information operations. This approach often blurs the line between military and civilian capabilities, as both collaborate within the overall national strategy. Indeed, the main Russian cybersecurity agencies actively participate, even at the highest levels, within the government’s Security Council, which includes members such as the Minister of Defense, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Chief of the General Staff.

The 2015 military doctrine, which preceded the 2016 cybersecurity doctrine, emphasizes the importance of protecting cyberspace as an integral part of Russian national security, assigning this task to the armed forces. In line with this doctrine, in 2017, Russia established “information operations units,” initially designed for the defense of cyberspace, but which quickly took on a broader role, including traditional information activities and psychological operations. The “Main Directorate of the General Staff” (GU), formerly known as the GRU, along with its subordinate commands, such as the 85^th Main Special Services Center (Unit 26165) and the 72^nd Main Special Services Center (Unit 54777), under the direct control of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, is considered the primary entity responsible for offensive cyber operations and influence activities.

The graph in Figure 1 represents the evolution of Russian diplomacy and cyber operations, showing how they have become increasingly influential over time. The time phases are illustrated as follows:

First phase: Early 21st century – Introduction of public soft diplomacy.

Second phase: 2008-2012 – Development of digital diplomacy and initial cyber operations, especially after the Russo-Georgian conflict.

Third phase: 2013-Present – Consolidation and intensification of cyber operations and influence through digital diplomacy, enhanced by artificial intelligence.

The graph highlights a progressive increase in the level of influence of these strategies in the global context.

The Public Diplomacy of Russia: Between Strategy and Mechanisms

Contemporary Russian public diplomacy is based on the foreign policy strategy outlined in 2013. In an article titled “Russia and the Changing World,” published in February 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin defined soft power as a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy objectives without resorting to the use of weapons or other forms of pressure, with particular emphasis on the use of financial leverage.[4]  In line with this vision, the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” approved by Putin in February 2013, states that soft power—a comprehensive set of tools for achieving foreign policy objectives based on the potential of civil society, information, and cultural methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy—has become an essential component of contemporary international relations. However, the intensification of global competition and the increased risk of crises can sometimes lead to the distorted and illegal use of soft power and human rights «to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize political situations, and manipulate public opinion, even through the funding of cultural and human rights projects.»[5]

The quote aptly captures Russia’s attitude towards the concept of soft power, seen as a driving force behind the so-called “color revolutions” and Western activities that Russia perceives as unfavorable to itself. In developing its own public diplomacy, Russia has made extensive use of influence tools to shape the political landscape of third countries.[6]

With these ambitions, in 2010 Russia established two diplomatic agencies: the “Russian World,” focused on promoting the Russian language, and the “Alexander Gorchakov Fund for Public Diplomacy.” Additionally, as early as 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo Division, a federal agency responsible for affairs concerning the Commonwealth of Independent States, compatriots abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation, was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agency focuses on Russians and Russian-speaking communities abroad. In 2020, Rossotrudnichestvo expanded its structure by adding departments dedicated to information and cybersecurity, science and education, and foreign aid.

Overall, the Russian approach to public diplomacy demonstrates a continuous evolution in Moscow’s strategic communication and political marketing, where tools like targeted messages, tweets, and public engagement are becoming increasingly central, both in traditional and digital communication.[7]

Russian influence through the dissemination of information is limited by the low accessibility and penetration of Russian-language content, particularly in Europe and the United States. To overcome this obstacle, Russia is effectively enhancing its capabilities in cyberspace action and penetration. Given the political pressures and the ineffectiveness of traditional Russian cultural diplomacy, digital and data diplomacy is being used as a tool to spread “alternative news” in countries of interest to the Kremlin. In this context, political messages and divisive communications are aimed at polarizing national public opinions through social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, which are used as tools of information warfare by users registered in Russia. Through these means, Russian public diplomacy intensified its efforts during the Covid-19 pandemic, leveraging Russian humanitarian aid to present itself credibly to foreign public opinions. Countries like Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the Middle East, Venezuela in Latin America, and even Italy in the European Union received Russian aid, which was promoted on social networks through a well-organized and effective propaganda campaign.

Information warfare, artificial intelligence: competition with the NATO

As discussed, Russia perceives the West as a threat. This viewpoint was reiterated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, in April 2019, when he emphasized the danger posed by NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders and by Western attempts to destabilize President Putin’s government through the use of “hybrid warfare.”[8]

This perception is further reinforced by the awareness of the weakness of the Russian conventional armed forces, which are considered insufficiently prepared to face a potential conflict with NATO. Russian military leadership strongly believes that it is essential to avoid a conventional war, preferring instead to shift the confrontation to the cyber domain in order to achieve an asymmetric military balance. This strategy is actively pursued by the Kremlin to ensure that Russia gains a military advantage capable of countering NATO’s ambitions without resorting to conventional kinetic force.

The Russian approach can be described as a form of “strategic deterrence,” or as Gerasimov himself has termed it, an “active defense strategy,” known in the West as “hybrid warfare” or “below-threshold activities.” This concept is based on non-kinetic operations aimed at weakening potential adversaries over the long term during peacetime, by creating political and social divisions within them, thereby undermining the resolve and strategic decision-making capabilities of the target state. The primary targets would be strongly anti-Russian countries, particularly those located on NATO’s eastern flank, where Russia could focus intense information warfare to provoke significant political changes. In this way, Russia could pursue its doctrine of “sovereign self-assertion” and gain greater freedom of action in critical regions such as Syria, the Middle East, and Africa. These preventive measures could also serve to hinder any collective NATO decision, including the possibility of direct intervention against Moscow.[9]  In line with this understanding, at the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February 2022, there was a wave of actions aimed at penetrating NATO networks at the start of the conflict— a reasonable precaution from the Russian perspective, given the fear of a possible NATO intervention in support of Kyiv.

Information Warfare and Artificial Intelligence (AI)

As previously mentioned, Gerasimov emphasized the growing importance of information in neutralizing the state’s opponents, both internal and external. According to Gerasimov, “information technologies” are becoming “one of the most promising types of weapons” to be used against other countries. For this reason, he states that “the study of topics related to the preparation and conduct of information actions is the most important task of military science.”

With this approach, Russia has prioritized the development of advanced information operations over the expansion of conventional weapons, such as tanks or missile systems, as today “information technologies” can be significantly enhanced by artificial intelligence (AI).[10] The thinking of the Russian armed forces regarding the development and use of artificial intelligence in the military sector focuses on the advantages it can offer in supporting military operations. These advantages range from the enhancement of autonomous systems and other military technologies to the management of information, particularly at the global strategic level. In this context, artificial intelligence acts as an amplifier, strengthening disinformation operations through the intentional spread of false and misleading information, with the aim of influencing policies and societies and creating large-scale instability through information manipulation and cyber activities.[11]

During the crisis in Ukraine, Russia reportedly conducted a large-scale information operations campaign aimed at influencing public opinion and creating confusion in the information space by spreading a combination of true, partially true, and false information to make it credible. A significant example of these efforts is the more than 65,000 tweets disseminated by fake Russian accounts in the 24 hours following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 on July 17, 2014, with the goal of blaming the incident on the Ukrainian government. Additionally, during the annexation of Crimea, Russian forces reportedly blacked out nine Ukrainian television channels in Crimea, replacing them with Russian broadcasts to silence pro-government Ukrainian media:[12] An event that would confirm the conduct of electronic warfare (EW) actions as an enabling factor for information operations.[13]

The actions mentioned highlight Russia’s determination to improve and intensify its capabilities in the context of cyber warfare, which, within Russian military doctrine, is considered a component of the broader information warfare. The strategic threat posed by cyber warfare enhanced by artificial intelligence will be particularly dangerous, as cyber tools will increasingly be able to generate detailed and credible disinformation (including “deep fakes”[14]) in such volumes that it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish real truth from a vast amount of conflicting information.[15] AI will enable the saturation of the information space with artificial data, creating a “virtual truth” that can confuse and destabilize adversaries, paving the way for a possible “cognitive warfare” that Russia could dominate.

Another crucial aspect of cyber warfare concerns the technical domain: espionage, malware installation, selective destruction, and, particularly, the search for vulnerabilities in adversaries’ IT systems. With the advent of AI, these cyber techniques will become increasingly effective, allowing the weaknesses of opponents’ IT systems to be identified more quickly.[16]

Figure 2. Evolution of the importance of Cybersecurity in Russian Strategy.

Here is a graph that represents the evolution of the importance attributed to cybersecurity and cyber operations in Russian strategy over the years. The graph shows a significant increase in the emphasis on cybersecurity from 2010 to 2020, indicating its growing priority in Russia’s strategic planning.

[1] J. Fieke, Digital Activism in the Middle East: Mapping Issue Networks in Egypt, “Knowledge Management for Development Journal” 6 (1), 2010, pp. 37–52.

[2] N. Tsvetkova, D. Rushchin, (2021), Russia’s Public Diplomacy: From Soft Power to Strategic Communication, Journal of Political Marketing. 20. 1-12. 10.1080/15377857.2020.1869845.

[3] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution in Military Affairs’, The RUSI Journal, 165:3, 2020, pp. 12-21, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514.

[4] V. Putin (2012), Russia and the Changing World, “Rossiyskaya Gaseta”. Accessed October 20, 2020.

[5] A. Sergunin, L. Karabeshkin, Understanding Russia’s Soft Power Strategy, “Politics” 35

(3–4):347–63, 2015.

[6] U.S. Congress. 2015. “U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation

Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”. In: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions (ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).

[7] N. Tsvetkova & D. Rushchin, Russia’s Public Diplomacy…, cit.

[8] V. Gerasimov, Vektory Razvitiya Voyennoy Strategii [“The Vectors of Military Strategic Development”], “Krasnaya Zvezda” [Red Star], 3 aprile 2019, in http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/.

[9] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.

[10] Ivi.

[11] Ivi.

[12] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’, 15 July 2014, p. 31. In: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_Report_15July2014.pdf (ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).

[13] D. McCrory (2021), Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine, “The RUSI Journal”, 2021, pp –.

[14] A Deepfake is a technique that uses artificial intelligence to rework human images. This involves combining and overlaying existing images and videos with other videos or original images through a machine learning technique known as a generative adversarial network (GAN). GANs consist of two neural networks—one generates new data (like fake images or videos), and the other attempts to detect the fake content, improving the quality of the generated content over time. This process allows for the creation of highly realistic, yet entirely fabricated, visual content.

[15] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.

[16] Ivi.

Italy and Japan: seeking a role in the global arena

by Andrea Molle

For some time now, Italy and Japan have started to entertain the idea of increased bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense and security in the Indo-Pacific. Such a trend had emerged fairly recently with Japan’s participation in the Global Combat Air Program, the rebranded Tempest fighter initiative spearheaded by the United Kingdom and the two countries. However, that only seems to have gained momentum in the last few weeks. The relaunch of joint military exercises between the Italian Navy and the Japanese Self-Defense Maritime Force after roughly 20 years of hiatus is a clear sign of the commitment that both countries are putting into forging a robust strategic partnership. For example, at the end of the last month, the Italian Navy sent its new Paolo Thaon di Revel-class offshore patrol vessel “Francesco Morosini” for a five-month deployment in the region during which it was stationed at the Japanese naval base of Yokosuka, where she was involved in operational and logistical activities with their Japanese counterparts, perhaps in preparation of an increasingly likely future integration between the two Navies with regards to deployment, maintenance, and repairing cycles.

Furthermore, as mentioned a few days ago by the Chief of Staff of the JMSDF, Admiral Sakai, the two countries have launched a broad cooperation program for the F-35B STOVL multi-role fighter. Rome has now committed to acquiring up to 60 F-35A CTOL, the conventional landing and take-off variant intended for the Air Force, and 30 F-35B STOVL, the vertical take-off and landing variant designed for the Navy. Tokyo plans to acquire up to 105 F-35A CTOL and 42 F-35B STOVL, which will likely be assigned to the newly refurbished Izumo-class light aircraft carriers. On the other hand, Italy intends to deploy its F-35B STOVL contingent on the flight decks of its flagship Cavour, which is expected to sail the Pacific between late 2023 and early 2024, and her sister aircraft carrier Trieste. Ensuring the interoperability of the two navies would bring a tremendous operational advantage in terms of deployment, maintenance, and scheduled rotation of naval and aerial assets, thus increasing their readiness and deterrence capacity in the Indo-pacific.

Traditionally limited to the Mediterranean Sea, the renewed strategic interest of Italy in Asia is perfectly consistent with the NATO doctrine that defines the security of Europe as dependent from that of East Asia and is viewed with favor both by the two leading powers in the region: the United States and the United Kingdom. Such enhanced cooperation, especially lobbied by London, was also just recently officialized by a recent MoU signed by the Prime Ministers of Japan, Fumio Kishida, and Italy, Giorgia Meloni, that raised the countries’ bilateral cooperation to the level of strategic partnership, thereby creating a permanent consultation mechanism in the domains of foreign and defense policy issues. The new era of cooperation between Tokyo and Rome is also welcomed by Italy’s Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, who, on the sidelines of the recent trilateral meeting with his British and Japanese counterparts, committed the country to explore paths of integration in the cyber-defense, intelligence and training initiatives, and of course, to created joint-ventures in defense R&D.

While Rome seeks to carve for itself a place in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps even at the expenses of other European partners, to match its renewed commitment in North Africa and the Middle East, Tokyo appears to be willing to expand its network of security partners, surely to counterbalance the growth of China but also to reduce its dependence on the United States. Japan is diversifying its defense technology portfolio, up to now almost completely aligned to Washington’s interests, while at the same time presenting itself to the White House as the essential actor to stabilize the Indo-Pacific and keep China at bay.

As for Italy, the current administration appreciates that investing in the region is mandatory within the changing international political framework to preserve the country’s national interest.

What transitioning to a defensive strategy might mean for the Russians in Ukraine.

by Mick Ryan, AM, Strategist, Leader & Author, Retired Army Major General

@WarintheFuture

While the Russian Army’s offensive in the east continues, it is likely in the short term that they will reach the limit of their offensive capability. As such, today I explore what transitioning to a defensive strategy might mean for the Russians in Ukraine.

The Russian Army has been attempting to re-boot its efforts in Ukraine. It fired senior commanders accused of failure, reorganised combat units, begun digging in defensive positions north of Kharkiv & conducted additional strategic missile strikes across Ukraine.

The focus of Russian forces at present is eastern Ukraine, and in particular, securing the Donbas region. Compared to the grand aspirations of Putin in the war’s early days, this is a relatively modest target. And despite scaling back its goals, the Russian military is still struggling to make significant progress in the face of the dogged defence of the Ukrainians, and the massive inflow of western military aid. Thousands of Russians soldiers have been killed or wounded, and hundreds of armoured vehicles destroyed in the east of the country. For all this effort, the Russians have gained little additional territory in the past month.

It is possible, to support their offensive in the east, the Russians may launch attacks in the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions. But, given the scale of the Ukrainian military mobilisation, the amount of western aid, and the demonstrated inability of the Russians to competently undertake large scale operations, this too is unlikely to result in significant breakthroughs. For this reason, it is likely the Russian capacity to continue its offensive operations in Ukraine is close to reaching its high-water mark.

The Ukrainians have corroded the physical, moral and intellectual capacity of the Russian military in Ukraine. The Russian President and military high command will continue to demand advances, but at some point in the next month or two, any capacity of the Russians to do so will be at an end. Too many of the Russian combat units are being frittered away, and too many of their soldiers and junior leaders lack the will to give their ‘last full measure’ for an institution that can’t even feed them properly.

We should not be under any misconception that this means the Russians are defeated, or that they will soon depart from Ukraine. The Russians will simply shift to a defensive strategy in Ukraine. And while this may at first glance appear to simplify the Russian’s problems in Ukraine, the reality is that it raises a new set of challenges.

The four challenges: loosing initiative, governance, insurgency, morale

The first challenge is that they will no longer have the initiative. The Russian Army, in a defensive strategy, will be in a responsive mode. The Ukrainian Army will be able to decide where and when it engages the Russians. In effect, the strategic, operational, and tactical initiative will rest with the Ukrainians. This gives the Ukrainian military high command flexibility about the time, place, strength & sequencing of the inevitable counteroffensives it will conduct to recapture territory.

A second challenge for the Russians is that many of its units will shift from military operations to ‘occupation support’ activities. In effect, soldiers will need to become governors in the areas of Ukraine they still hold and which they seek to convert to Russian colonies. Not only does this bleed off military forces to defend against the Ukrainians, it requires a range of skill sets not normally resident in military institutions, such as civil administration. And, as the Russians found in Syria and Chechnya, it is extraordinarily expensive.

A third challenge for the Russian occupiers, to compound their already massive problems, is that they will probably have to deal with a nascent resistance movement. As the Ukrainians have shown throughout this war, they are a proud, determined, and courageous people. There are already reports of Ukrainian insurgents operating in southern Ukraine. This will only grow with time in areas controlled by the Russians. And the Russians know that these insurgents will be well supported by the West.

Finally, the Russian Army has a problem with morale. In her essay in Foreign Affairs, Dara Massicot(@MassDara) describes a “culture of indifference to its personnel fundamentally compromises the Russian military’s efficacy.” Overlaid with this cultural issue has been multiple reports by intelligence agencies & media about Russian Army desertions, the inability to retrieve its dead and lack of support to military families.

These challenges will only be intensified by a long-term occupation where soldiers are poorly led, and expected to be administrators, chase insurgents and win the hearts and minds of patriotic Ukrainians. And large numbers of Russians will be required for an Army of a occupation – many more than they have currently deployed in Ukraine. The recent Ukrainian decision to cease its defence of the Mariupol steelworks provided a small yet pyrrhic victory for the Russians. But it is unlikely that there will be more of such minor successes for the Russian Army. As their eastern offensive loses momentum, the Russians will inevitably have to transition to a defensive strategy in Ukraine. And in doing do, the Russian Army will confront a new range of difficult challenges ahead.

Perspectives on the AUKUS partnership

   On 15^th September 2021, the US, the UK, and Australia jointly announced the birth of a new trilateral security partnership whereby, in Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s words, “our technology, our scientists, our industry, our defense forces are all working together to deliver a safer and more secure region that ultimately benefits all“; that region being the Indo-Pacific.
   The US so-called ‘pivot to Asia’ is an expression which came to the fore during the Obama administration and which aptly describes how American foreign policy priorities started shifting -i.e. from intervention in the Middle East North Africa- to enhanced military, economic and diplomatic presence further East, with a view to ultimately counter-balance a growing Chinese influence. Some analysts have interpreted the unwavering will to finally disengage from Afghanistan as another step towards acquiring greater posture in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.  
   The new pact’s most immediate consequence has consisted in the Australian Government’s cancellation of a multi-billion dollar deal with France for the supply of diesel-powered submarines, which are now going to be replaced by nuclear-powered ones produced onsite thanks to technology sharing among the three like-minded partners. This abrupt twist which caught the French, as well as Europe, totally off-guard, caused a serious diplomatic row with Paris; many analysts have since been contemplating how this latest crisis may hit long-term transatlantic relations.  

But what is really at stake with this new alliance? And most interestingly, how did the Chinese media react to this news?

We asked some experts in the field to provide their perspectives. Here’s what they told us. 

AUKUS – Chinese media coverage
Dr. Zhan Zhang
Research Fellow, China Media Observatory – Università della Svizzera Italiana (USI)

The same day when Washington announced the creation of the AUKUS, the news was immediately reported in China[1], highlighting the first measure of AUKUS is to work over the next 18 months to figure out how to best deliver the technology of a nuclear-powered submarine. According to the news search result on the Baidu platform on Sept.22 2021[2], within one week, there were around 65 news items headlined AUKUS from various Chinese news outlets[3]. By counting the news headline and the first two lead sentences of all the news articles into the analysis, the keywords map below clearly correspondents the focus of the Chinese narrative under three main themes during the past week:

1. The creation of AUKUS is to counter China: For example, Knews [4] quoted different international news outlets, including the BBC, Reuters, and Deutsche Welle, stating that such a move is the Western allies pushing back on China’s rising power in the military and technology arenas. The voice of Chinese experts on international studies is also quoted in the article, saying that the intention of the creation of AUKUS was evident: to strengthen military deterrence against China and even prepare for a possible military conflict with China.
2. International feedback from other countries, mostly opposing AUKUS: from the collected data, Chinese media discussed the reactions from over 13 different countries, the EU and NATO. France was highlighted the most, as the submarine deal blindsided the French, and Paris is furious about the tearing up of a 56 billion euros contract Australia agreed with Naval Group[5].  Reactions from Malaysia, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, Philippines, Indonesia, India, and the EU followed up, mostly being cautious and worrying as it may accelerate the nuclear weapon arms race in the region (i.e. Malaysia), and some were supporting as it could restore and maintain balance in the region (i.e. Philippines).  
3. China’s official opposition: Chinese media also gave a lot of space to the foreign ministry spokesman Zhao lijian, who commented the agreement as it “seriously undermines regional peace and stability and intensifies the arms race”[6]. China called for the relevant countries to “abandon the outdated Cold War zero-sum mentality and narrow geopolitical concepts”. In the same article, the Chinese Embassy in Australia is also quoted as an official source, advising Australia to “do more things to enhancing mutual trust and strengthening cooperation between the two countries, instead of bringing further damages and tensions against China”.
   

Last but not least, it is very interesting (and strange) that the state-run Xinhua News Agency didn’t record any news about AUKUS, zero results were found both on their official website and from the Factiva Database.

A call for more European engagement 
Dr. Claudio Bertolotti
Director, START InSight

This new cooperation pact with Australia and the UK is coherent with a US long-term strategic vision which started to take shape in 2007 with the establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue -also known as QUAD- involving the United States, India, Japan, and Australia-; however, given its mainly consultative nature, such initiative did not provide practical solutions, nor answers, as it lacked a solid military structure. With the new AUKUS treaty in place, the US will now be provided with a landing place for its Navy but also with allies willing to deploy (nuclear-powered) weapons that, from the point of view of deterrence, are very relevant. Relations with China will further shift towards competition and hint at a potential conflict which, however, won’t suit either of them. As it pertains to Europe, the Biden administration seems to have deliberately bypassed partners with a long-term interest in the Pacific area, like France, while favouring Anglo-Saxon countries with whom it shares the same strategic vision; this is also consistent with the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ alliance (an intelligence-sharing group consisting of five English-speaking democracies -namely the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand- dating back to the Cold War era). Euro-Atlantic relations won’t suffer too much from what is only the latest, in a string of unilateral decisions; however, this situation should encourage Europe to adopt a different approach compared to China’s; one which does not merely contemplate expanding Chinese commercial activities across the Old Continent thanks to the New Silk Road, but is rather bent on widening and increasing European interests and initiatives towards China.  

The AUKUS and Trans-Atlantic relations
Dr. Alessandro Politi
Director, NATO Defence College Foundation

The hullabaloo around the contract rescinded by Australia on 12 conventional attack submarines supplied by France in favour of eight new unspecified nuclear attack submarines (UK Astute class?) in the framework of the AUKUS agreement masks some fundamental. First, the Pacific has been essential for the USA since the Nineteenth century, while France and UK were de facto wiped out from it since 1941. Second, the EU as such has a lot to do with China, but nothing in strategic terms in the Pacific or on arms contracts. Third, France has a meaningful presence in the area, but that is it. Fourth, NATO is for now formulating its intentions on the Indo-Pacific and nothing more.
Of course, soured bilateral relations have a serious impact on wider fora at the political level and the USA with the intelligence Prism affair* and this recent move has dented the confidence of Berlin first and Paris now. Not very useful. We can only hope confidence, the glue of any covenant, might be restored.

AUKUS risks being an implicit weakening of the Quad and does not compensate for Washington’s confirmed absence from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is not just the economy, but chains of flowers are often more obliging than those of steel.

* surveillance programme used by the US National Security Agency (NSA) to collect private electronic data, which was exposed by Edward Snowden.   

AUKUS – a tool in the US symmetrical competitive strategy
Dr. Niccolò Petrelli
author La Grande Strategia e il futuro della competizione USA-Cina

At first glance, the AUKUS pact could be interpreted as a predictable development within the framework of a decades’ old US military strategy addressing potential conflict in the Western Pacific. As a matter of fact, this agreement tells us much more about the nature of the US-China competition strategy. If one takes into consideration the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, the strengthening of the QUAD, as well as the B3W initiative*, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Biden administration is developing a symmetrical competitive strategy aimed at overpowering its opponent by generating and deploying superior resources in each context where it enjoys a solid advantage (such as in the technological and military areas favoured by AUKUS) and resulting in a generalised “preponderance of power”.  

*’ Build Back a Better World’ – an initiative launched by G7 countries in 2021 and based on infrastructure development for poorer countries, as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road  

A security dilemma
Dr. Andrea Molle
Senior Research Fellow, START InSight
Assistant Professor in Political Science, Chapman University

For a Realist, AUKUS is the textbook case of a “security dilemma.” The decision to implement a trilateral pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is justified as a way to increase the alliance security in the Indo-Pacific. However, as predictable, China saw it as a direct threat to its security. Prudently, the Chinese media depicted the Anglo-American move as a forerunner of a new era of political tensions. But the Chinese Government is officially signaling a change of posture, tossing the diplomatic equivalent of a “cease and desist” letter and accusing AUKUS to be the product of a Cold War mentality. Indeed, some commentators see a possibility for AUKUS to start a new Cold War, but there are a few essential differences that must be accounted for in order to forecast possible scenarios. First, the Cold War was a conflict between two superpowers in a now-gone bipolar world. Second, the US and USSR were not as economically and culturally interconnected as China is now with the rest of the world. The two blocs were colliding both ideologically and economically. Finally, the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) reasonably prevented an escalation and kept the “hot” conflict at the level of proxy wars. In the current multipolar system, defined by the downfall of the US as a global hegemon, a long-lasting deadlock like the Cold War is unlikely, and the pendulum will swing between a newfound balance and a regional hot war. The paradoxical result is that AUKUS could potentially decrease global security and stability, turning the current tensions into an out-and-out conflict, maybe by pushing Beijing to force the hand with Taiwan to signal they would not tolerate any meddling in a region they have always considered their backyard.

[1] The U.S., U.K. and Australia announced the establishment of a tripartite security partnership.

People’s Daily Online, 16.09.2021 http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0916/c1002-32228933.html

[2] Baidu is a Chinese multinational technology company that offers the biggest search engine service in China

[3] The number of articles is retrieved on Baidu until 15.00 CET, 22.09.2021.

[4] How powerful is the new military alliance Knews, republished by netease, 16.09.2021: https://www.163.com/dy/article/GK26ANCG0514EGPO.html

[5] AUKUS agreed during G7, but Macron didn’t know anything, m4news, 19.09.2021. http://news.m4.cn/2021-09/1352804.shtml

[6] See above, KNews, 16.09.2021 and British Media worries that AUKUS agreement may anger China. Tencent News 17.09.2021. https://new.qq.com/omn/20210917/20210917A0FA1O00.html