Europe’s Defense Conundrum: Why PESCO and Other Initiatives Always Fall Short.

by Andrea Molle.

The European Union has long aspired to bolster its collective security and strategic autonomy. Over the past decade, initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) have been launched to strengthen European defense capabilities. However, these initiatives, while symbolically significant, have failed to provide Europe with a coherent and effective security framework. As geopolitical tensions rise, particularly with an increasingly aggressive Russia and ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, it is time for Europe to acknowledge the fundamental flaws in its current defense approach and consider more radical solutions.

As of March 2025, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) continues to serve as the European Union’s framework for deepening defense collaboration among its member states. Since its inception in 2017, PESCO has expanded to include 26 participating countries, collectively working on 68 collaborative projects aimed at enhancing military capabilities and interoperability. In November 2024, the Council of the European Union approved conclusions on the PESCO Strategic Review, reaffirming PESCO’s pivotal role in advancing defense cooperation. This review emphasized the need to adapt PESCO to the evolving geopolitical landscape and underscored the importance of addressing existing challenges to bolster its effectiveness.

Despite these efforts, PESCO continues to face significant hurdles. Many projects have encountered delays due to inadequate financial and practical planning, leading to discussions about reviving or retiring underperforming initiatives. Furthermore, divergent national interests and varying interpretations of strategic autonomy among member states have impeded cohesive progress. For instance, Poland has expressed concerns that PESCO could potentially undermine NATO or weaken security cooperation with the United States, both of which are vital for the security of NATO’s Eastern Flank.

To enhance the effectiveness of PESCO, the EU has opened certain projects to third-party participation. Notably, Canada, Norway, and the United States have been involved in the “Military Mobility” project since December 2021, with the United Kingdom joining in November 2022. Canada has also been invited to participate in the “Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations” project as of February 2023. This inclusion aims to leverage external expertise and resources to strengthen PESCO initiatives. In August 2024, Switzerland received approval to participate in two PESCO projects: “Military Mobility” and “Cyber Ranges Federation.” This move is intended to enhance Switzerland’s national defense capabilities while adhering to its neutrality obligations.

Looking ahead, the ongoing PESCO Strategic Review, set to conclude by the end of 2025, offers an opportunity to reshape the framework to better address contemporary security challenges. The review aims to reinvigorate PESCO by refining its objectives, improving project management, and ensuring that collaborative efforts yield tangible military advancements. In summary, while PESCO has made strides in fostering defense cooperation within the EU, it continues to grapple with bureaucratic inefficiencies, divergent national priorities, and varying levels of commitment among member states. The outcomes of the current strategic review and the inclusion of third-party participants will be crucial in determining PESCO’s future efficacy in enhancing Europe’s defense posture.

Similarly, the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017, serves as a pivotal instrument in bolstering the European Union’s defense research and innovation. For the 2021-2027 period, the EDF has been allocated a budget of approximately €8 billion, with €2.7 billion dedicated to collaborative defense research and €5.3 billion earmarked for capability development projects. Recognizing the need for enhanced defense capabilities, the European Commission has proposed a substantial increase in defense funding. In March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans for a €150 billion defense fund, aiming to encourage member states to invest in military capabilities with the support of EU-backed loans. This initiative underscores the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense posture in response to evolving geopolitical challenges.

The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is another crucial mechanism designed to harmonize national defense planning and investments among EU member states. CARD provides a comprehensive overview of the EU defense landscape, identifying collaborative opportunities and facilitating cooperation. However, the 2024 CARD report indicates that, despite progress in defense spending and cooperation, significant room for improvement remains. Member states are encouraged to take decisive actions to sustain investments and enhance the efficiency of their armed forces.

In addition to the EDF and CARD, several other key European defense initiatives and agencies contribute to enhancing the European Union’s defense capabilities. Established in 2004, the European Defence Agency supports EU member states in improving their defense capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as a facilitator for collaborative defense projects, the EDA serves as a hub for European defense cooperation, covering a broad spectrum of defense-related activities.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the EU’s framework for defense and crisis management, forming a main component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP enables the EU to undertake operational missions outside its borders, utilizing both civilian and military assets to ensure peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security. The EU is also exploring the development of a new satellite network to reduce dependence on U.S. military intelligence. This initiative aims to enhance the EU’s capability to detect threats and coordinate military actions, providing more frequent updates and greater autonomy in intelligence gathering. These initiatives and agencies collectively contribute to a more integrated and robust European defense framework, addressing both current and emerging security challenges.

Compounding the challenges faced by these initiatives is the EU’s continued reliance on NATO as its primary security guarantor. While European leaders often speak of “strategic autonomy,” the reality is that Europe remains dependent on American military power. The war in Ukraine has underscored NATO’s irreplaceable role in European security, with the United States providing the bulk of military aid and strategic coordination. This reliance on NATO creates a paradox: while the EU desires greater defense independence, it is unwilling or unable to develop the necessary capabilities to make that independence meaningful. Attempts to establish a credible European defense identity, such as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France, have made little progress due to the competing priorities of member states.

To address these shortcomings, Europe must reconsider its defense strategy with bold, pragmatic solutions. First, a genuine commitment to defense spending is necessary. The EU should set binding defense investment targets akin to increasing NATO’s GDP requirement. ReArm Europe is a step in the right direction, but a common European military budget, funded through EU-wide mechanisms, could help overcome fragmentation in defense procurement and capability development.

Secondly, we must understand that establishing a fully integrated EU army has long been considered politically unfeasible due to concerns over national sovereignty and the complexity of aligning diverse military structures. However, recent developments indicate a shift toward more cohesive European defense capabilities. In March 2022, the EU introduced the Strategic Compass, outlining the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) by 2025. This modular force aims to mobilize up to 5,000 personnel, incorporating modified EU battlegroups and additional forces from member states.

French President Emmanuel Macron has also been a vocal proponent of strengthening EU defense mechanisms. In April 2024, he proposed the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2025, emphasizing the need for a “European Defense Initiative” to develop strategic concepts and capabilities, particularly in air defense and long-range operations. Despite these initiatives, several challenges persist. Nations like Germany face difficulties in recruiting and preparing their armed forces, particularly among younger generations who may prioritize work-life balance over military commitments.

Finally, enhancing Europe’s security necessitates a comprehensive approach that integrates institutional military frameworks and civilian preparedness. While the idea of an EU-wide right to self-defense akin to the United States’ Second Amendment is culturally and legally complex, Europe has been advancing initiatives to bolster civilian resilience and preparedness. In conclusion, Europe’s security environment is deteriorating, and its current defense initiatives are ill-equipped to handle the challenges ahead. PESCO, the EDF, and CARD have failed to deliver a credible path toward strategic autonomy. If Europe is serious about defending itself, it must embrace more ambitious solutions, including increased defense spending, operational integration, and a legal framework that empowers both states and citizens in matters of security. Without such measures, European defense will remain a fragmented and ineffective patchwork, leaving the continent vulnerable in an increasingly hostile world.

The evolution of Irregular Warfare and a roadmap for the future

by Andrea Molle.

Irregular Warfare (IW) has been a persistent feature of conflict throughout history, evolving in response to shifting political, technological, and social dynamics. In the United States joint doctrine, it is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” and in U.S. law as “Department of Defense activities not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals. ” Broadly is a form of warfare that seeks to undermine an adversary’s power through asymmetric tactics, IW has taken many forms, from guerrilla warfare to cyber-enabled operations. While much of the modern discussion on IW is heavily influenced by Western experiences—particularly those of the United States—examining a broader array of historical and contemporary cases is essential for understanding how it should evolve to meet future security challenges.

Historically, IW has been the weapon of the weaker party in a conflict, whether insurgents fighting colonial powers, resistance movements opposing occupation, or non-state actors challenging state authority. Early examples include the guerrilla tactics employed by the Spanish against Napoleon’s forces in the Peninsular War (1808–1814) and the asymmetric strategies used by indigenous groups against European colonial armies.

In the 20th century, IW became a dominant feature of conflicts worldwide, especially in decolonization struggles. The Vietnamese resistance against French and later American forces showcased the effectiveness of a combination of guerrilla tactics, political warfare, and conventional operations. Similarly, Mao Zedong’s protracted warfare strategy in China emphasized the importance of mobilizing the population, blending political ideology with military action to wear down a stronger adversary over time.

The Cold War era saw both superpowers engaged in IW through proxy wars, support for insurgencies, and counterinsurgency operations. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the U.S. conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate the challenges of fighting irregular opponents with conventional military means. These cases highlight the importance of understanding local dynamics, political legitimacy, and the limits of military power in irregular conflicts.

Today, IW has expanded beyond traditional insurgencies and guerrilla movements to include cyber warfare, information warfare, and hybrid threats. Non-state actors like ISIS and hybrid threats from state actors, such as Russia’s use of proxy forces and disinformation campaigns in Ukraine, illustrate the evolving nature of IW. The role of technology, particularly artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber capabilities, has fundamentally altered how IW is conducted.

However, a critical shortcoming in current IW studies is the Western-centric focus that often disregards the rich and varied experiences of other regions. For example, Hezbollah’s asymmetric warfare strategies against Israel, the Houthis’ use of drones and missiles in Yemen, and the FARC’s long-running insurgency in Colombia offer valuable lessons in the adaptability and resilience of irregular forces. Examining how African nations counter insurgencies, such as Nigeria’s struggle against Boko Haram, or how India has dealt with insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, could provide fresh perspectives on counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies.

To effectively address the challenges of future IW, a shift in strategic thinking is required. Policymakers and military strategists should consider the following:

Expanding the Knowledge Base Beyond Western Experiences: IW research and doctrine must incorporate insights from diverse global conflicts. The experiences of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian actors in both insurgency and counterinsurgency provide critical lessons for adaptability and resilience in IW.

Leveraging Emerging Technologies: Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and cyber warfare will shape the future of IW. Adversaries are already integrating AI-driven propaganda, deepfakes, and cyber sabotage into their IW arsenals. Developing countermeasures and proactive strategies will be crucial.

Emphasizing Political and Societal Aspects: As history has shown, IW is not just about military force but also about winning the political and social battles. Future IW strategies must integrate political warfare, information operations, and economic tools to counter adversaries effectively.

Strengthening Resilience and Defense Against Hybrid Warfare: Given the rise of hybrid threats blending conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics, nations must adopt a comprehensive security approach that involves military, civilian, and private sector collaboration.

Prioritizing Local Partnerships and Cultural Awareness: Future IW efforts should emphasize local partnerships, recognizing that solutions to irregular conflicts are often context-specific. Training programs, intelligence gathering, and military operations should incorporate deep cultural and historical understanding.

To effectively evolve IW strategies, a structured roadmap should be implemented as soon as possible. Such a roadmap should begin with a dedicated phase of research and analysis over the couple of years. This period would focus on conducting extensive studies of non-Western IW experiences, integrating their lessons into military and policy training programs, and establishing international working groups composed of experts from diverse regions. Predictive models, for example leveraging AI and big data, would be developed to anticipate IW trends and potential threats, ensuring that future strategies remain adaptive and forward-thinking.

Following this foundational research, the next two to three years should be dedicated to revising policy and military doctrines. This would involve updating operational guidelines to incorporate insights from hybrid and cyber warfare, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms among allied nations, and refining legal and ethical frameworks to address the complexities of IW, particularly in cyberspace and information operations. As adversaries continue to evolve their tactics, policymakers must ensure that legal frameworks remain robust yet adaptable to emerging challenges.

Next, ample efforts should shift toward capability building and training. Specialized IW training programs would be established to focus on non-Western case studies and hybrid warfare tactics, preparing military and intelligence personnel for diverse operational environments. Technological advancements would be integrated into these programs, with investments in AI-driven intelligence analysis, autonomous systems, and cyber defense. Moreover, partnerships between governments, academia, and the private sector would be fostered to develop innovative countermeasures against disinformation campaigns and digital propaganda.

Beyond the foundational years, the focus would be on full operational integration and continuous adaptation. Flexible operational structures would be implemented, allowing rapid adjustments to emerging IW threats. Regular multinational IW exercises would be conducted to test and refine strategies in real-world scenarios. Additionally, an ongoing review process would be established, ensuring that IW doctrines and tactics evolve in response to technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. By maintaining this adaptive cycle, nations would be better positioned to counter the irregular threats of the future while remaining resilient against hybrid warfare challenges.

In conclusion, Irregular Warfare is an enduring and evolving form of conflict that demands continuous adaptation. The Western-centric approach to IW has provided valuable insights, but future strategies must incorporate a broader spectrum of global experiences to remain effective. As technology, geopolitical dynamics, and warfare methods evolve, IW must also transform, emphasizing adaptability, comprehensive security approaches, and a deeper understanding of non-Western conflict experiences. Only by embracing these changes can nations effectively counter the irregular threats of the future.

The Five Eyes Alliance and the Erosion of Trust under Trump’s Policy

by Andrea Molle.

The Five Eyes alliance, formed in the aftermath of World War II, stands as one of the world’s most powerful intelligence-sharing networks. Comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Five Eyes represents a rare example of international cooperation in the shadowy world of intelligence and security. Its members share classified data, conduct joint operations, and regularly assess global threats. In doing so, they provide each other with the critical information necessary to protect national interests, prevent terrorism, and respond to military challenges.

For nearly eight decades, the Five Eyes nations have operated on the bedrock of mutual trust. This trust has allowed them to cooperate seamlessly, sharing not just intelligence but also strategic priorities. However, recent developments under the leadership of Donald Trump have raised concerns that this partnership may be on the verge of collapse.

Since the beginning of his current tenure, Trump’s policies and rhetoric have cast a long shadow over U.S. relations with its closest allies. His decision to withdraw military and intelligence support from Ukraine, for instance, signaled a dramatic shift in American foreign policy. This withdrawal, which came amid growing Russian aggression, has left U.S. allies perplexed and anxious about the reliability of the United States as a partner. While Trump’s decision was ostensibly driven by a desire to focus on American interests, it has further strained trust among the Five Eyes nations.

Indeed, as the U.S. pulls back from its commitments, countries like the UK and Canada are left scrambling to fill the gap. There are already plans for European powers increasing defense spending and stepping up aid to Ukraine. But the larger question looms: what does it mean for the Five Eyes when one of its founding members, the U.S., signals that it no longer shares the same level of commitment to the alliance’s common goals?

The roots of the problem lie not just in Trump’s controversial foreign policy decisions but also in his reckless handling of sensitive information. Several instances, including the leaking of classified material to foreign leaders and his mishandling of documents, have led to doubts about the United States’ reliability in safeguarding intelligence. If the U.S. can’t protect its own classified data, how can it be trusted to handle the secrets of its Five Eyes allies?

This has had a ripple effect across the alliance. Countries that were once eager to share intelligence with the U.S. now find themselves questioning whether doing so is worth the risk. British and Canadian officials have expressed concern that their intelligence may be mishandled or misused, with severe consequences for national security. And perhaps even more troubling is the growing sense that the U.S. is no longer prioritizing the long-term security of its allies. The Five Eyes has always operated on the principle of “shared risk”; when one partner is compromised, all partners feel the impact.

Trump’s “America First” rhetoric has also contributed to a shift in global power dynamics, as the U.S. increasingly turns inward. Under his leadership, the U.S. has not only reduced its support for traditional alliances like NATO but has also shown little regard for the broader international order. The consequences of this approach are not just theoretical—they are already being felt. European leaders, particularly in the UK, have been forced to reconsider their security arrangements. Some are even contemplating the possibility of forming alternative alliances without the U.S. in response to Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy.

For countries like the UK, this is a particularly difficult dilemma. The Five Eyes alliance has been the cornerstone of British intelligence operations for decades, providing unparalleled access to U.S. intelligence capabilities. But in light of Trump’s erratic behavior, there is now a growing realization that Britain may need to diversify its intelligence partnerships to safeguard its security interests. This could lead to a realignment of alliances, with European powers seeking closer ties with NATO members outside of the U.S. or even exploring cooperation with other global players.

The fallout from Trump’s policies is also evident in his approach to global conflicts. His withdrawal of support for Ukraine, for example, has left European nations in an uncomfortable position. With the U.S. retreating from the battlefield, NATO members like the UK and France have had to take a more active role in supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. This has led to an increased sense of uncertainty among Five Eyes partners about the reliability of the U.S. as an ally. If the U.S. is willing to abandon its commitments to one of its closest allies in the face of Russian expansionism, what will happen when the next global crisis emerges?

There is also the looming issue of U.S.-China relations, which has further complicated the Five Eyes’ ability to maintain cohesion. Trump’s approach to China—characterized by a trade war and attempts to undermine Beijing’s technological rise—has pushed the U.S. closer to a confrontation with China. This, in turn, has forced Five Eyes nations to take sides. While Australia and the U.K. have supported the U.S. stance on China, countries like Canada and New Zealand have shown a reluctance to take a hardline approach, partly due to their economic ties with China. This divide could undermine the shared intelligence framework that has been the hallmark of the Five Eyes, especially as global power dynamics shift.

As we look ahead, the future of the Five Eyes alliance is uncertain. The increasing unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy under Trump—coupled with concerns about intelligence mishandling and diplomatic isolationism—has left many wondering if the alliance can continue in its current form. If the U.S. remains unwilling or unable to reaffirm its commitments to its allies, the Five Eyes may need to undergo a significant transformation. The alliance could evolve to rely more heavily on its European members, with new arrangements forged outside of the U.S. orbit. In conclusion, while the Five Eyes alliance has been a powerful force in global security for decades, the current state of U.S. policy under Donald Trump has placed this partnership at risk. If trust continues to erode, the very foundations of the alliance could crumble, forcing its members to chart a new course. The question remains: can the Five Eyes remain united in the face of a changing world order, or will they be forced to adapt to a future without the United States at its core?

Macron’s call to rearm and the redefinition of Europe’s identity

by Andrea Molle

(Cover photo by Guillaume Périgois on Unsplash)

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for Europe to rearm is not just a wake-up call; it is a defining moment for the continent’s security and its role in global geopolitics. By declaring that Europe can no longer “live off the dividends of peace,” Macron has acknowledged a reality that many European leaders have long preferred to ignore. The world has changed, and the post-Cold War assumption that European security could be outsourced to the United States is no longer viable. The time for mote strategic autonomy has arrived.

At the heart of Macron’s message is the growing threat posed by Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine, combined with broader Russian efforts to destabilize Europe, underscores the urgency of the situation. The U.S. has been a crucial ally, but its political landscape is shifting, and future administrations may not be as committed to European security as in the past. Macron’s suggestion that France’s nuclear deterrence could be extended to European allies represents a fundamental shift in strategy—one that could redefine the European security framework. Not a free gift, and of course not the sharing of operational control, but a bid to the leadership of such a framework.

This shift is particularly interesting given France’s historical posture on defence. Since Charles de Gaulle’s presidency, France has pursued an independent defence strategy, emphasizing national sovereignty over reliance on NATO. In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command, asserting that France should control its own military policy rather than be subordinate to U.S. leadership. Though France rejoined NATO’s command structure in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, its nuclear deterrence has always remained strictly under national control. Macron’s willingness to even discuss extending France’s nuclear umbrella marks a significant departure from this traditional stance, signaling a new era in European defence, but at the same time is a return to the Gaullist paradigm.

The implications of this shift extend beyond France. The European Union is already exploring massive investments in defence, potentially mobilizing hundreds of billions of euros. This move signals an intent to reduce reliance on NATO, or at the very least, to establish a stronger European pillar within the alliance. If successful, this transformation could alter the balance of global power, making Europe a more independent actor on the world stage.

Italy finds itself at a crossroads in this new paradigm, and the clock is ticking. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has stressed the importance of Western unity, warning that division would be “fatal for everyone.” Italy, historically cautious in its defence spending, may now be compelled to significantly increase its military budget. Furthermore, as discussions around European nuclear deterrence evolve, Italy could be forced to reconsider its own strategic policies. Should it align itself more closely with France’s vision, will it maintain its traditional reliance on US’s nuclear umbrella, will Rome opt to create its own “Deterrence Force”?

Regardless, Macron’s speech was not just about military spending; it was about reshaping Europe’s identity. The era of European complacency in defence matters is over. The question now is whether European leaders, particularly in Italy, are willing to rise to the occasion and assume the responsibilities that come with true strategic autonomy. If they fail to act, the cost may not only be Europe’s security but its place in the world order itself.

Europe at a Crossroads: Can It Defend Itself Without the U.S.?

by Andrea Molle.

As geopolitical tensions mount and the possibility of a U.S. partial or complete withdrawal from NATO looms, Europe faces an urgent question: Can it defend itself without American support? The answer, while not impossible, comes with staggering costs and a long, uncertain road to military independence.

For decades, Europe has free-ridden on the United States as the backbone of its defense strategy. Washington provides not only nuclear deterrence but also logistical, technological, and intelligence capabilities that European nations struggle to replicate on their own. A U.S. exit from NATO would leave Europe with a security void requiring a dramatic increase in military spending and political cohesion—both of which are far from guaranteed.

The numbers are sobering. Today, the combined defense budgets of the European Union and the United Kingdom stand at roughly $380 billion per year. Yet, experts estimate that to compensate for the loss of U.S. capabilities, Europe would need to invest an additional $300-$400 billion upfront in military expansion. To sustain this, European countries would have to increase their annual defense spending to 3-4% of GDP, up from the current 1.5-2%.

For Italy, the challenge is particularly stark. Currently allocating around 1.5% of GDP to defense, approximately €30 billion per year, Rome would likely need to double its spending to €60 billion annually to maintain a credible security posture. This is no small feat for a nation with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 140%, where defense spending has historically taken a backseat to social and economic priorities.

Nonetheless, Italy is a crucial NATO player, given its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, without U.S. support, it would face serious gaps in naval power, air superiority, and intelligence capabilities. Italy would need to expand its fleet, requiring investments of at least €20-30 billion in additional aircraft carriers, submarines, and destroyers to safeguard Mediterranean security. Rome relies heavily on U.S.-built F-35s and missile systems, and a post-NATO scenario would necessitate either an expensive push for indigenous production or deeper reliance on France and Germany. Additionally, Italy currently hosts U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO’s sharing program. If that ends, it faces the difficult decision of whether to invest in its own nuclear deterrent—an economically and politically fraught prospect—or depend on France’s arsenal for protection. Relying on France’s nuclear arsenal would be a precarious option for Italy, as the two countries do not share many strategic interests, and such dependence could subordinate Rome to Paris, undermining Italy’s autonomy in defense matters and limiting its ability to act independently on the international stage. This would further complicate Italy’s foreign policy, as it would have to align more closely with French priorities, which may not always coincide with its own.

Beyond the financial and technological hurdles, the issue of personnel looms large. European armed forces have shrunk significantly since the end of the Cold War, with many nations shifting toward smaller, professional armies rather than mass conscription. Italy, like much of Europe, would need to rapidly expand its military ranks to meet the demands of a self-sufficient defense. This means not only recruiting more soldiers but also training and retaining skilled personnel in key areas such as cyber warfare, intelligence, and logistics. Without the manpower to operate and maintain an expanded military infrastructure, even the most advanced weapons systems would be of little use. Conscription, once abandoned, may need to be reconsidered—a politically sensitive but perhaps necessary step if Europe is to sustain long-term military readiness.

Moreover, building an autonomous European defense system would take decades. In the short term, the first five years would require a rush to increase budgets and reconfigure alliances, though Europe would remain highly vulnerable. In the medium term, within five to ten years, a functional but weaker alternative to NATO could emerge, with expanded joint operations and rapid procurement of new defense assets. Over the long term, within ten to twenty years, a fully independent European defense force could be operational, though fragmentation, inefficiencies, and economic strains would remain challenges.

Beyond financial constraints, European nations—Italy included—struggle with political division on military issues. Germany has only recently begun reversing decades of defense underinvestment, while Italy has long faced public skepticism over military expansion. Without strong political will and decisive leadership, Europe’s path to defense autonomy will be slow and disjointed. The economic burden is another major concern. While France and Germany might absorb higher defense costs, countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece may find it nearly impossible without significant sacrifices in other areas, such as infrastructure, social programs, and energy investment.

Another possibility is for Rome to ensure continued American military and strategic support. However, an alignment with Washington would alienate some of Italy’s European partners who may favor a more autonomous defense framework, potentially dooming European unity. Furthermore, it would reinforce Italy’s dependence on the U.S. for security, leaving it vulnerable to the shifting priorities of U.S. foreign policy while limiting its influence within the European Union on defense and security issues. Regardless of the chosen option, this would mark a radical shift in military strategy, involving increased defense spending, naval expansion, and a potential reassessment of its role in nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, political fragmentation and economic limitations could make replacing NATO’s capabilities an uphill battle. Europe must now decide: Will it take defense into its own hands, or will it remain vulnerable in an increasingly volatile world? One thing is certain—without U.S. support, the cost of security will skyrocket, and for nations like Italy, the stakes have never been higher.

Wagner rebooted

by Andrea Molle
(AI-generated cover picture)

As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.

In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a paramilitary extension of the Russian state.

Despite these changes, Wagner has retained its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous financial independence.

The group’s activities in Ukraine have also changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.

Relationship with the Russian Government
The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.

The turning point in this relationship came in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May 2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.

This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.

Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure, forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units, others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established under state supervision.

However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.

Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.

As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner financial autonomy.

In practical terms, this meant that Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of individual commanders.

The transformation of Wagner from a semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a “PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military forces.

In Africa, Wagner has continued its security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya, often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative to Western military assistance.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian operations in Africa.

In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.

Current Operations
The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.

In the CAR, Wagner operatives have entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018, initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking to overthrow Touadéra.

Beyond military operations, Wagner has established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of the country’s defense infrastructure.

Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial powers such as France.

Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.

Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services, Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy, fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.

Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic arenas, such as the United Nations.

Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya, and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the direct supervision of the Russian government.

Leadership and Command Structure
After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).

With the group now firmly under Kremlin control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin, were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances. In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.

Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency
The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.

To replenish its ranks, Wagner has reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel, special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded, with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.

Armaments and Equipment
Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.

In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones, particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.

Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.

Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.

In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.

Moscow, image by jacqueline macou on Pixabay

Strategic Outlook
With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.

Additionally, there are reports that Moscow is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.

Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.

With its new leadership, sustained recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control, Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.

In the coming months, Wagner is expected to continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.

Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy
In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.

The restructuring of Wagner under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.

With Wagner now firmly integrated into state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with official Russian military assets when necessary.

The continued deployment of Wagner forces in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy. By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable alternative to Western security partnerships.

Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains available for future military engagements.

Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.

Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.

This approach would allow Moscow to retain the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a cost-effective and politically manageable way.

Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence, secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.

The Philippines: A Geopolitical Linchpin in the Indo-Pacific and Italy’s Strategic Opportunity

by Andrea Molle.

The Philippines, long considered a crucial geopolitical player in Southeast Asia, has increasingly found itself at the center of the escalating competition between the United States and China. As Beijing’s “eleven-dash line” advances the country’s assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea and beyond, and Washington intensifies its Indo-Pacific strategy, Manila is playing an outsized role in shaping regional security dynamics.

For Italy, which has traditionally focused its foreign policy on Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean, the evolving Indo-Pacific landscape presents an opportunity to redefine its global engagement via a more deliberate military and civilian presence in the Philippines archipelago. The Philippines’ strategic location at the crossroads of the Pacific and South China Sea makes it an invaluable ally for both regional and global powers. Situated on key maritime trade routes, it serves as a gateway between the Pacific and the economic heartlands of East Asia. More importantly, the archipelago provides crucial logistical and military advantages, particularly in countering China’s aggressive territorial expansion in disputed waters and the threat to Taiwan.

Beijing’s expansive claims over the South China Sea, including its militarization of artificial islands and the interruption of several fishing routes, have directly challenged Philippine sovereignty. Despite an international tribunal ruling in 2016 that invalidated China’s claims, Beijing continues to push its interests aggressively. In response, Manila has sought to reinforce its defense ties with Washington, reopening strategic bases to U.S. forces and deepening its security cooperation with regional partners such as Japan and Australia. The Philippines has actively participated in a series of international naval drills with countries including the United States, Australia, Japan, and France. These exercises, conducted within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, aim to enhance defense coordination and interoperability. China has expressed objections to these activities, viewing them as destabilizing. Manila also signed a defense agreement with Canada to bolster joint military exercises.

This move aligns with the Philippines’ strategy to strengthen defense partnerships amid rising tensions in the South China Sea. At the same time, the Philippines faces a delicate balancing act. While it values U.S. security guarantees, its economic interdependence with China complicates the equation. Beijing remains a key trade partner, a major source of investment, and an influential actor in the region’s economic architecture. This tension between security and economic interests highlights the broader struggle many Southeast Asian nations face in navigating the U.S.-China rivalry. While the Philippines is enhancing its defense collaborations with the U.S. and other allies, it continues to engage diplomatically with China. For instance, during a recent meeting with Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed gratitude for Cambodia’s pardon of 13 Filipino women, highlighting the Philippines’ efforts to maintain positive relations within the region. Washington’s renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, particularly through initiatives like AUKUS, the Quad, and enhanced security cooperation with ASEAN countries, aims to counterbalance China’s rising influence.

For the United States, the Philippines represents a critical anchor in its regional security framework. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between Manila and Washington facilitates American access to key military installations, ensuring a forward presence that can deter Chinese encroachments and enhance maritime security. Additionally, the growing U.S. military footprint in the region serves as a deterrent against any potential escalation in Taiwan—a key flashpoint in U.S.-China tensions. The Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan makes it a vital logistical hub should conflict arise, further solidifying its importance in Washington’s strategic calculus.

But what about Italy? Italy, as a key European power, has traditionally maintained a limited presence in the Indo-Pacific. However, given the increasing global significance of the region and the close ties currently defining its relationship with Washington, Rome should reassess its strategic engagement. However, while France and the UK have already enhanced their naval and economic involvement in the Indo-Pacific, Italy has yet to fully articulate its role. Italy’s economic interests align with a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The region is a critical market for Italian exports, including defense technology, maritime equipment, and infrastructure development. Strengthening economic and security ties with the Philippines could provide a strategic gateway for broader engagement in ASEAN, where Italy holds observer status. On the security front, Italy could enhance naval cooperation with the Philippines by participating in joint maritime exercises, providing coast guard training, and supporting regional efforts to maintain freedom of navigation. Italy’s advanced defense industry could also contribute to modernizing the Philippines’ military capabilities.

Diplomatically, Italy should leverage its EU partnerships to push for a more coherent European Indo-Pacific strategy, ensuring that Europe remains a relevant player in the region’s geopolitical balance. Supporting ASEAN-led security mechanisms and advocating for adherence to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), would further cement Italy’s role as a constructive actor. In conclusion, the Philippines’ geopolitical significance in the Indo-Pacific is undeniable. As the U.S. pivots to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness, Manila finds itself at the heart of a strategic competition that will shape the future of global order. For Italy, engaging more proactively in the Indo-Pacific—particularly through stronger ties with the Philippines—represents an opportunity to diversify its foreign policy and assert itself as a relevant player in one of the world’s most dynamic regions. By deepening economic, security, and diplomatic ties, Italy can contribute to a more stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific while expanding its own strategic footprint in an increasingly multipolar world.

Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.

by Andrea Molle.

After the withdrawal of the last French military mission, Italy remains the only European country with a significant presence in the Sahel. This opens several opportunities but also presents various challenges that Rome will have to address with as integrated a strategy as possible. Italy indeed has a significant military presence in sub-Saharan Africa, with several missions aimed at ensuring security, combating terrorism, and supporting the stability of the region. These missions see Rome engaged in Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Gulf of Guinea, both through bilateral operations and within the framework of EU, NATO, and UN missions. Italy maintains a military presence in Niger as part of the “MISIN” mission (Bilateral Support Mission in the Republic of Niger), launched in 2018 with the aim of supporting local authorities in contrasting terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime. The operation fits into Italy’s broader commitment in the Sahel, aimed at ensuring stability and security in the region, countering threats that can also impact Europe, such as irregular migration flows.

The Italian mission in Niger primarily focuses on training and mentoring local security forces to improve their operational capabilities. Italian military personnel, drawing from various branches of the Armed Forces, provide courses on combat techniques, special operations, surveillance, and border control. Additionally, logistical and medical support is an essential component of the operation. The Italian contingent in Niger consists of several hundred units, with the possibility of deploying up to 470 soldiers, 130 vehicles, and aircraft for logistical and reconnaissance needs. Italy has established its operational base in Niamey, the capital of Niger, collaborating with local authorities and other international partners, including the United States and previously France. The operation is also part of a broader cooperation framework between Italy and Niger, which includes development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the African country. However, the political situation in Niger is unstable, with the recent 2023 coup leading to a review of relations between the Nigerien government and Western states, including Italy.

Despite the geopolitical uncertainties, the Italian mission in Niger remains a key part of Italy’s defense and security strategy in the Sahel, contributing to the stabilization of a region crucial for the geopolitical and economic balance of both the region and Europe. Beyond Niger, Italy also maintains a limited military presence in neighboring Chad, focusing mainly on liaison, training, and supporting international missions in the Sahel region. This commitment is part of a broader multilateral cooperation effort aimed at combating terrorism, stabilizing the area, and strengthening local security forces’ capabilities. Italy’s activities in Chad work in synergy with operations led by international organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the G5 Sahel, providing strategic and operational support through intelligence sharing, military training, and coordination with other military contingents in the area. Lastly, Italy participates in several initiatives to improve the country’s border security, prevent arms trafficking, and counter radicalization, all key elements for the stability of Chad and the Sahel region as a whole.

The Italian approach is distinguished by a strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, promoting not only security but also the development and resilience of local communities. Italy also established a military base in Djibouti, the Italian Support Military Base (BMIS), operational since 2013. Located strategically in the Horn of Africa, the BMIS serves as a logistics and operations hub, developing intelligence capabilities for Italian armed forces engaged in missions in the East Africa region and the Indian Ocean. This base is a key infrastructure supporting anti-piracy operations, contributing to the security of shipping routes and the patrolling of international waters. It also provides logistical and operational support to various Italian and European missions in the region, including Italy’s participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation (against piracy in the Gulf of Aden) and the EUTM Somalia mission, dedicated to training Somali armed forces.

The presence of the BMIS also allows for the rapid deployment of Italian units in case of emergencies or crises in the area, strengthening Italy’s role in the security and stabilization of the Horn of Africa. The base hosts military personnel and advanced support infrastructure, allowing maintenance of vehicles, supplies, and assistance to Italian forces and allied missions. In addition to military aspects, the BMIS also represents a point of cooperation with local Djiboutian authorities, helping to strengthen diplomatic relations between Italy and Djibouti and support regional security, stability, and development initiatives. Italy maintains a significant presence in Somalia, actively contributing to the country’s security and stabilization through two main international missions. These are the EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission in Somalia), an EU mission active since 2010, aimed at training and mentoring the Somali National Army (SNA) to strengthen its operational capabilities and enable the Somali government to deal with internal security threats, particularly from the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.

Italy plays a leading role in this mission, providing military instructors, advisors, and strategic support. Italian personnel are involved in training Somali officers in tactical, strategic, and logistical aspects, as well as promoting international humanitarian law principles. The goal is to build a professional and efficient Somali army capable of ensuring the country’s security autonomously. In addition to military training, the mission focuses on the development of Somali military leadership and strengthening defense institutions, contributing to the creation of a more effective command and control chain. The other operation, called Operation Atalanta, is a naval mission of the European Union (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) launched in 2008, aimed at combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting merchant navy ships, and ensuring the safety of strategic maritime routes.

Italy actively participates in the operation with naval units, helicopters, and military personnel, performing patrols and providing escorts for commercial and humanitarian ships, particularly those of the World Food Programme (WFP) heading to Somalia. The Italian Navy has played a prominent role in the mission, contributing to the deterrence of piracy and maintaining security in international waters. Operation Atalanta has had a significant impact, drastically reducing pirate attacks and strengthening cooperation among international naval forces. Italy, in addition to its operational contribution, has frequently held high-level commands within the mission, confirming its commitment to global maritime security. In addition to participating in these missions, Italy maintains strong historical and diplomatic ties with Somalia, a country that was an Italian colony until the mid-20th century. Italy’s commitment goes beyond the military aspect, encompassing development cooperation, humanitarian support, and initiatives for political stabilization.

Through the EUTM Somalia and Operation Atalanta missions, Italy significantly contributes to the security and stability of the Horn of Africa, consolidating its role as a key actor in international operations in the region. Finally, with Operation Gabinia, Italy has committed to strengthening maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a crucial area for international oil and goods traffic, but also one of the regions most affected by maritime piracy. The deployment of Italian naval units aims to combat piracy, protect commercial ships (particularly those flying the Italian flag), and ensure the security of maritime infrastructure critical to global economic interests. All these operations are part of a broader Italian engagement in the region, which includes economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation with several West African countries.

Italy is working to develop strategic partnerships that include development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the countries involved, thereby contributing to their stability and reducing the root causes of instability and forced migration. Key areas of intervention include training local security forces, border control, combating illicit trafficking (drugs, weapons, humans), and the fight against jihadist terrorism, which represents a growing threat in the Sahel region. Strengthening local security and intelligence capabilities is critical to counter groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), who exploit institutional weaknesses and ethnic tensions to expand their influence.

An additional objective that Italy will need to pursue more decisively in the future is containing the growing geopolitical penetration of Russia and China in the region. Moscow has strengthened its military and political presence through paramilitary groups like the Wagner Group, providing support to authoritarian regimes and military juntas in exchange for natural resources and strategic bases. Beijing, on the other hand, continues to expand its economic influence through significant infrastructure and financial investments, often through debt mechanisms that bind local governments to Chinese interests. In the face of these developments, Italy, in coordination with the United States and other NATO partners, will need to strengthen its political-military presence, intensify cooperation with local governments, and promote alternative development models based on sustainability and the economic self-determination of African countries.

Italy’s commitment to West Africa is therefore increasingly seen as a delicate balance between security, diplomacy, development cooperation, and the protection of national and European strategic interests.

MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract

The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information—summarized under the acronym MDHM (misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech)—represents one of the most critical challenges of the digital age, with profound consequences for social cohesion, political stability, and global security. This study examines the distinctive characteristics of each phenomenon and their interconnected impact, highlighting how they contribute to the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and political instability. Artificial intelligence emerges as a crucial resource for combating MDHM, offering advanced tools for detecting manipulated content and monitoring disinformation networks. However, the same technology also fuels new threats, such as the creation of deepfakes and the generation of automated content that amplifies the reach and sophistication of disinformation. This paradox underscores the need for the ethical and strategic use of emerging technologies. The study proposes a multidimensional approach to addressing MDHM, structured around three main pillars: critical education, with school programs and public campaigns to enhance media literacy; regulation of digital platforms, aimed at balancing the removal of harmful content with the protection of freedom of expression; and global collaboration, ensuring a coordinated response to a transnational threat. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the importance of concerted efforts among governments, technology companies, and civil society to mitigate the destabilizing effects of MDHM and safeguard democracy, security, and trust in information

The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information is one of the most complex and dangerous challenges of the digital age, with significant repercussions on social, political, and cultural balance. The phenomena known as misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech—collectively summarized under the acronym MDHM—represent distinct yet closely interconnected manifestations of this issue. A thorough understanding of their specificities is essential for developing effective strategies to contain and counter the threats these phenomena pose to social cohesion and institutional stability.

Definitions and Distinctions

Misinformation: False information shared without the intent to cause harm. For example, the unintentional sharing of unverified news on social media.

Disinformation: Information deliberately created to deceive, harm, or manipulate individuals, social groups, organizations, or nations. An example would be the intentional dissemination of false news to influence public opinion or destabilize institutions.

Malinformation: Information based on factual content but used out of context to mislead, cause harm, or manipulate. For instance, the release of personal data with the intent to damage someone’s reputation.

Hate Speech: Expressions that incite hatred against individuals or groups based on characteristics such as race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.

Impact on Society

The spread of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech poses a critical challenge to the stability of modern societies. These phenomena, amplified by the speed and global reach of digital media, have significant consequences that manifest across various social, political, and cultural domains. Among the most notable effects are the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and heightened security threats.

Erosion of Trust

False or manipulated information directly undermines the credibility of public institutions, the media, and even the scientific community. When individuals are inundated with a constant flow of contradictory or blatantly false news, the inevitable result is a widespread crisis of trust. No source is spared from suspicion—not even the most authoritative journalists or the most transparent government bodies. This process weakens the very foundations of society, fostering a climate of uncertainty that, over time, can turn into alienation.

A striking example can be observed in the democratic process, where disinformation strikes with particular intensity. Manipulative campaigns spreading falsehoods about voting procedures or candidates have a devastating effect on electoral integrity. This not only fuels suspicion and distrust in democratic institutions but also creates a sense of disillusionment among citizens, further alienating them from active participation.

The consequences become even more evident in the management of global crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the wave of conspiracy theories and the dissemination of unverified remedies significantly hindered public health efforts. Disinformation fueled unfounded fears and skepticism toward vaccines, slowing the global response to the crisis and exacerbating the virus’s spread.

However, this erosion of trust extends beyond the individual level. Its repercussions impact society as a whole, fragmenting it. Social bonds, already weakened by preexisting divisions, become even more vulnerable to manipulation. This creates fertile ground for further conflicts and instability, isolating institutions and increasing the risk of a society unable to respond to collective challenges.

Social Polarization

Disinformation campaigns thrive on exploiting existing societal divisions, amplifying them with the aim of making them insurmountable. These phenomena, driven by targeted strategies and enhanced by digital platforms, intensify social conflict and undermine the possibility of dialogue, paving the way for ever-deepening polarization.

The amplification of divisions is perhaps the most visible result of disinformation. Information manipulation is used to radicalize political, cultural, or religious opinions, constructing narratives of opposition between “us” and “them.” In contexts of ethnic tensions, for example, malinformation—spread with the intent to distort historical events or exploit current political issues—exacerbates perceived differences between social groups. These existing contrasts are magnified until they crystallize into identity conflicts that are difficult to resolve.

Adding to this is the effect of so-called “information bubbles” created by digital platform algorithms. These systems, designed to maximize user engagement, present content that reinforces their preexisting opinions, limiting exposure to alternative perspectives. This phenomenon, known as the “filter bubble,” not only entrenches biases but isolates individuals within a media reality that thrives on continuous confirmation, hindering the understanding of differing viewpoints.

The polarization fueled by MDHM extends beyond ideology. In many cases, the radicalization of opinions translates into concrete actions: protests, clashes between groups, and, in extreme cases, armed conflicts. Civil wars and social crises are often the culmination of a spiral of division originating from divisive narratives disseminated through disinformation and hate speech.

Ultimately, the polarization generated by MDHM not only undermines social dialogue but also erodes the foundations of collective cohesion. In such a context, finding shared solutions to common problems becomes impossible. What remains is a climate of perpetual conflict, where “us versus them” replaces any attempt at collaboration, making society more fragile and vulnerable.

Threat to Security

In conflict contexts, MDHM emerges as a powerful and dangerous weapon, capable of destabilizing societies and institutions with devastating implications for both collective and individual security. Disinformation, coupled with hate speech, fuels a cycle of violence and political instability, threatening peace and compromising human rights. Concrete examples of how these dynamics unfold not only illustrate the severity of the problem but also highlight the urgency for effective responses.

Propaganda and Destabilization.One of the most insidious uses of disinformation is propaganda and destabilization. States and non-state actors exploit these practices as tools of hybrid warfare, aimed at undermining the morale of opposing populations and fomenting internal divisions. In recent geopolitical scenarios, the spread of false information has generated confusion and panic, slowing institutional response capabilities. This planned and systematic strategy goes beyond disorienting public opinion; it strikes at the very heart of social cohesion.

Hate Speech as a Precursor to Violence.Hate speech, amplified by digital platforms, often serves as a precursor to mass violence. A tragic example is the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, preceded by an online hate campaign that progressively dehumanized this ethnic minority, laying the groundwork for persecution and massacres. These episodes demonstrate how entrenched hate speech can translate into systematic violent actions, with irreparable consequences for the communities involved.

Individual Impacts.On an individual level, the effects of MDHM are deeply destructive. Phenomena such as doxxing—the public release of personal information with malicious intent—directly endanger the physical and psychological safety of victims. This type of attack not only exposes individuals to threats and assaults but also amplifies a sense of vulnerability that extends far beyond the incident itself, undermining trust in the system as a whole.

The cumulative impact of these dynamics undermines overall social stability, creating deep fractures that demand immediate and coordinated responses. Addressing MDHM is not merely a matter of defending against disinformation but an essential step in preserving peace, protecting human rights, and ensuring global security in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable world.

Mitigation Strategies

Combating the MDHM phenomenon requires a comprehensive and coordinated response capable of addressing its multifaceted nature. Given the complex and devastating impact these phenomena have on society, mitigation strategies must be developed with a multidimensional approach, combining education, collaboration among various stakeholders, and an appropriate regulatory framework.

Education and Awareness

The first and most effective line of defense against MDHM lies in education and the promotion of widespread media literacy. In a global context where information circulates at unprecedented speeds and often without adequate oversight, the ability of citizens to identify and critically analyze the content they consume becomes an essential skill. Only through increased awareness can the negative effects of disinformation be curbed and a more resilient society built.

Critical thinking is the foundation of this strategy. Citizens must be empowered to distinguish reliable information from false or manipulated content. This process requires the adoption of educational tools that teach how to verify sources, identify signs of manipulation, and analyze the context of news. This effort goes beyond simple training: it is about fostering a culture of verification and constructive skepticism—essential elements in countering informational manipulation.

Schools play a crucial role in this battle. They must become the primary setting for teaching media literacy, preparing new generations to navigate the complex digital landscape conscientiously. Integrating these teachings into educational curricula is no longer optional but essential. Through practical workshops, real-case analysis, and simulations, young people can develop the skills needed to recognize manipulated content and understand the implications of spreading false information.

However, education must not be limited to young people. Adults, who are often more exposed and vulnerable to disinformation, must also be engaged through public awareness campaigns. These initiatives, delivered through both traditional and digital media, should highlight the most common techniques used to spread false content and emphasize the societal consequences of these phenomena. An informed citizen, aware of the risks and able to recognize them, becomes a powerful asset in the fight against disinformation.

Investing in education and awareness is not just a preventive measure but a cornerstone in combating MDHM. A population equipped with critical tools is less susceptible to manipulation, thereby helping to strengthen social cohesion and the stability of democratic institutions. This path, though requiring constant and coordinated effort, represents one of the most effective responses to one of the most insidious threats of our time.

Cross-Sector Collaboration

The complexity of the MDHM phenomenon is such that no single actor can effectively address it alone. It is a global challenge requiring a collective and coordinated response in which governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), tech companies, and civil society collaborate to develop shared strategies. Only through synergistic efforts can the destabilizing effects of this threat be mitigated.

Government institutions must take a leading role. Governments are tasked with creating effective regulations and safe environments for the exchange of information, ensuring that these measures balance two fundamental aspects: combating harmful content and protecting freedom of expression. Excessive control risks veering into censorship, undermining the democratic principles being safeguarded. The approach must be transparent, targeted, and adaptable to the evolution of technologies and disinformation dynamics.

Tech companies, particularly social media platforms, play a central role in this challenge. They bear significant responsibility in countering MDHM, as they are the primary channels through which these dynamics propagate. They must invest in developing advanced algorithms capable of identifying and removing harmful content promptly and effectively. However, the effectiveness of interventions must not come at the expense of users’ freedom of expression. Transparency in moderation criteria, data management, and reporting mechanisms is essential to maintain user trust and prevent abuse.

Alongside these actors, NGOs and civil society serve as intermediaries. NGOs can act as a bridge between institutions and citizens by providing verified and reliable information, monitoring disinformation phenomena, and promoting awareness initiatives. These organizations also have the capacity to operate locally, better understanding the specific dynamics of certain communities and tailoring counter-strategies to their needs.

Lastly, fostering public-private partnerships is essential. Collaboration between the public and private sectors is crucial for sharing resources, knowledge, and technological tools to combat MDHM. Companies can offer innovative solutions, while governments can provide the regulatory framework and support needed to implement them. This synergy allows disinformation to be addressed with a broader and more integrated approach, combining technical expertise with monitoring and intervention capabilities.

The response to MDHM cannot be fragmented or limited to a single sector. Only through cross-sectoral and global collaboration can the consequences of these phenomena be mitigated, protecting institutions, citizens, and society as a whole.

Role of Advanced Technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Context of MDHM

Emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), play a crucial role in the context of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech. AI represents a double-edged sword: on one hand, it offers powerful tools to identify and combat the spread of harmful content; on the other, it fuels new threats, making disinformation tools more sophisticated and harder to detect.

Automatic Detection

Artificial intelligence has revolutionized the way we address disinformation, introducing advanced detection systems capable of quickly identifying false or harmful content. In a digital landscape where the volume of data generated daily is immense, human monitoring alone is no longer sufficient. AI-powered tools are therefore essential for managing this complexity, providing timely and precise responses.

Among the most significant innovations are machine learning algorithms, which form the core of automatic detection systems. These algorithms use machine learning techniques to analyze vast amounts of data, looking for patterns that indicate the presence of manipulated or false content. Trained on datasets containing examples of previously identified disinformation, these systems can recognize common features such as sensationalist headlines, emotionally charged language, or altered images. The effectiveness of these tools lies in their ability to adapt to new manipulation patterns, continually improving their performance.

Another critical area is source verification. AI-based tools can compare online information with reliable sources, identifying discrepancies and facilitating the work of fact-checkers. This accelerates verification processes, enabling more efficient counteraction against false content before it reaches a wide audience.

AI is also pivotal in tackling one of the most sophisticated threats: deepfakes, which will be discussed further below. Using advanced techniques, AI can analyze manipulated videos and images, detecting anomalies in facial movements, lip synchronization, or overall visual quality. Companies like Adobe and Microsoft are developing tools dedicated to verifying the authenticity of visual content, providing a concrete response to a technology easily exploited for malicious purposes.

Monitoring hate speech is another area where AI proves valuable. Through natural language processing (NLP) algorithms, texts can be analyzed in real time to identify expressions of hate speech. These systems not only categorize content but also prioritize interventions, ensuring rapid and effective responses to the most severe cases. In a context where hate speech can quickly escalate into real-world violence, the ability to intervene promptly is crucial.

Lastly, AI can detect and analyze disinformation networks. By examining social interactions, AI can identify patterns suggesting coordinated campaigns, such as the simultaneous dissemination of similar messages by linked accounts. This functionality is particularly useful for exposing orchestrated operations, whether political or social, aimed at destabilizing public trust or manipulating opinions.

In summary, artificial intelligence is an indispensable tool for addressing disinformation and hate speech. However, like any technology, it requires ethical and responsible use. Only through transparent and targeted implementation can the full potential of AI be harnessed to protect the integrity of information and social cohesion.

Content Generation

While artificial intelligence is a valuable resource for countering disinformation, it also contributes to making the MDHM phenomenon even more dangerous by providing tools for creating false and manipulated content with unprecedented levels of sophistication. This dual nature makes AI both a powerful and insidious technology.

A prime example is the aforementioned deepfakes, generated using technologies based on generative adversarial networks (GANs). These tools enable the creation of highly realistic videos and images in which individuals appear to say or do things that never occurred. Deepfakes severely undermine trust in visual information, which was once considered tangible evidence of reality. Their use extends beyond trust issues: they can be deployed for defamation campaigns, public opinion manipulation, or destabilization in already fragile political contexts. The ability to create alternative visual realities poses a direct threat to the credibility of visual sources and social cohesion.

Similarly, automatically generated texts from advanced language models, such as GPT, have opened new frontiers in disinformation. These systems can produce articles, comments, and social media posts that appear entirely authentic, making it extremely difficult to distinguish machine-generated content from that created by real individuals. Unsurprisingly, these tools are already being used to power botnets—automated networks that spread polarizing or entirely false narratives, often aiming to manipulate opinions and fuel social conflicts.

Another crucial aspect is the scalability of disinformation. AI-driven automation allows for the creation and dissemination of false content on a massive scale, exponentially amplifying its impact. For instance, a single malicious actor can use these tools to generate thousands of variations of a false message, further complicating detection efforts. In mere moments, manipulated content can be disseminated globally, reaching millions of people before any intervention is possible.

Finally, AI provides tools for content obfuscation, making manipulated messages even harder to detect. Advanced algorithms can make minor but strategic modifications to texts or images, bypassing traditional monitoring systems. This adaptability poses an ongoing challenge for developers of countermeasures, who must continually update their tools to keep pace with new manipulation techniques.

In conclusion, artificial intelligence, with its ability to generate highly sophisticated content, represents a double-edged sword in the MDHM landscape. Without proper regulation and ethical use, it risks accelerating the spread of disinformation, further eroding public trust in information and destabilizing society. Addressing this threat requires awareness and appropriate tools, combining technological innovation with ethical principles to limit the effects of this dangerous evolution.

Challenges and Opportunities

The use of artificial intelligence in the fight against MDHM represents one of the most promising yet complex frontiers of the digital era. While AI offers extraordinary opportunities to counter the spread of harmful information, it also presents significant challenges, underscoring the need for an ethical and strategic approach.

Opportunities Offered by AI

Among its most relevant advantages is AI’s ability to analyze data in real time. This capability makes it possible to anticipate disinformation campaigns by identifying signals before they spread on a large scale. Such proactive measures can reduce the impact of these phenomena by enabling timely interventions to mitigate damage.

Another key advantage is the use of advanced tools to certify the authenticity of content. Technologies developed by leading organizations allow verification of the origin and integrity of digital data, restoring trust among users. In a context where visual and textual manipulation is increasingly sophisticated, these solutions serve as an essential bulwark against informational chaos.

AI also streamlines fact-checking activities. Automating verification processes reduces the workload on human operators, accelerating responses to the spread of false content. This not only enhances efficiency but also allows human resources to focus on particularly complex or sensitive cases.

Challenges of AI in Combating MDHM

However, the same technologies that offer these opportunities can also be exploited for malicious purposes. Tools designed to combat disinformation can be manipulated to increase the sophistication of attacks, creating content that is even harder to detect. This paradox highlights the importance of rigorous oversight and responsible use of these technologies.

The difficulty in distinguishing between authentic and manipulated content is another critical challenge. As disinformation techniques evolve, algorithms must be continuously updated to remain effective. This requires not only technological investments but also ongoing collaboration among experts from various fields.

Finally, the inherent biases in AI models cannot be overlooked. Poorly designed algorithms or those trained on unrepresentative datasets risk removing legitimate content or failing to detect certain forms of disinformation. Such errors not only compromise the effectiveness of operations but can also undermine trust in the system itself.

Conclusions

Artificial intelligence is a strategic resource in the fight against misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech, but it also presents a complex challenge. Its ambivalence as both a defensive and offensive tool demands conscious and responsible use. On one hand, it offers innovative solutions to detect and counter manipulated content; on the other, it enables the creation of increasingly sophisticated disinformation, amplifying risks to social and institutional stability.

MDHM (Misinformation, Disinformation, Hate Speech, and Malinformation) is not an isolated or temporary phenomenon but a systemic threat undermining the foundations of social cohesion and global security. Its proliferation fuels a vicious cycle where the erosion of trust, social polarization, and security threats reinforce each other. When disinformation contaminates the flow of information, trust in institutions, the media, and even science crumbles. This phenomenon not only fosters alienation and uncertainty but also diminishes citizens’ ability to actively participate in democratic life.

Social polarization, amplified by information manipulation, is a direct consequence of this dynamic. Divisive narratives and polarizing content, driven by algorithms prioritizing engagement over accuracy, fragment the social fabric and make dialogue impossible. In a “us versus them” climate, political, cultural, and ethnic divisions become insurmountable barriers.

From a security perspective, MDHM represents a global threat. Disinformation campaigns orchestrated by states or non-state actors destabilize entire regions, incite violence, and fuel armed conflicts. The use of hate speech as a dehumanizing tool has demonstrated its destructive potential in various contexts, contributing to a climate of collective and individual vulnerability.

Addressing this challenge requires an integrated approach that combines education, regulation, and global cooperation.

Promoting critical education: Media literacy must be a priority. Educating citizens to recognize and counter disinformation is the first step toward building a resilient society. Educational programs and awareness campaigns should equip people with the tools needed to navigate the complex informational landscape.

Strengthening the regulation of digital platforms: Technology companies can no longer remain passive observers. Clear and transparent standards for managing harmful content are essential, while also ensuring respect for freedom of expression. Independent oversight can ensure a balance between security and fundamental rights.

Encouraging global collaboration: The transnational nature of MDHM requires a coordinated response. Governments, private companies, and international organizations must work together to share resources, develop innovative technologies, and combat disinformation campaigns on a global scale.

Only through concerted action can the devastating effects of MDHM be mitigated, paving the way for a more resilient and informed society. The future of democracy, social cohesion, and security depends on our collective ability to face this threat with determination, foresight, and responsibility.

The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The recent conquest of Damascus by the jihadist leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a turning point in the political-military balance of the Middle East. After thirteen years of civil war against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria now finds itself in the most critical phase of its contemporary history: the rise to power of the Islamists led by al-Jolani, previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, sets the country on the path to becoming an “Islamic State” destined to reshape regional dynamics. Once again, the jihadist factor emerges as a destabilizing element with potentially global repercussions.

The Israeli occupation of the Golan: a preventive and strategic maneuver
The Islamist advance in Syria, and the consequent loss of centralized control from Damascus, create a power vacuum in which radical groups and external actors seeking geostrategic advantages can proliferate. Israel’s action—specifically, the consolidation of its occupation of the Golan Heights—must be understood in this context. It is not yet another expansionist incursion, but a defensive and preventive maneuver. On the one hand, Tel Aviv aims to prevent jihadist forces from settling along its northern border, directly threatening its security. On the other, Israel’s military presence in the area also serves to protect UN peacekeeping forces, who might otherwise be exposed to attacks by radical groups in the absence of a reliable central authority in Damascus.

The preventive strike against strategic and chemical arsenals
The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq—where conventional and unconventional arsenals fell into the hands of extremist groups—have made it clear that rapid, surgical interventions are necessary. Israel’s preventive strike on Syrian strategic weapons depots, including those suspected of containing chemical agents, seeks to prevent these tools from ending up with jihadists. This is not merely an Israeli interest: if radical groups were to gain access to chemical weapons, the entire region and even the West could suffer the consequences. As highlighted by the latest analyses from the Institute for the Study of War (Iran Update, December 11, 2024), non-state actors’ control of Syrian arsenals opens the door to extremely high-risk scenarios. Israel thus acts with strategic intelligence aimed at preventing future large-scale terrorist attacks.

The Israeli move and the Turkish choice: two sides of the same coin
Israel’s policy in the Golan cannot be viewed in isolation: it is consistent with Turkey’s strategic logic of threat containment through its occupation of parts of northern Syrian territory. Ankara, as demonstrated in the past, intends to maintain a “buffer zone” between the areas under its control and regions inhabited by Syrian Kurds, regarded as a threat due to their connection with the PKK in Turkey. This action not only limits the movement of Kurdish militias, but also serves a dual purpose: curbing Kurdish power and preventing the establishment of Islamist groups hostile to Turkey. Israel’s advance on the Golan and Turkey’s buffer zone are, in different ways, two examples of preventive containment of the jihadist threat.

The rise of Islamists in Syria: the rights dilemma and the Taliban parallel
The Islamist takeover led by al-Jolani and his men cannot be viewed favorably. The reassuring statements regarding minorities, women, and the Christian community sound like mere rhetoric. The history of jihadist movements is well known: the strict application of sharia, the lack of respect for religious and cultural differences, and the elimination of any pluralistic space. As previously seen in Taliban-led Afghanistan, the establishment of an Islamic State under the leadership of recycled ex-al-Qaeda members turned local political force will merely institutionalize a repressive regime contrary to fundamental human rights principles.

The terrorist threat extends to the West
The Islamist victory in Syria, as was the case with the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021, will act as a catalyst for international terrorism. Recent reports show that every advancement of jihadist ideology is accompanied by an increase in attacks and violent propaganda, prompting radicalized or sympathetic individuals to carry out copycat acts in the West. As highlighted by recent analyses in international media (see the 5th Report on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism #ReaCT2024 and Il Giornale), HTS’s success in Syria increases the risk that Europe will become the target of new attacks, inspired or orchestrated by individuals who draw fresh momentum and symbolic legitimacy from al-Jolani’s “victory.” The jihadist media dimension is such that controlling territory—and proclaiming an Islamic State—becomes a powerful message directed at potential supporters and recruits.

Perspectives and conclusions
Al-Jolani’s new Syria is no less dangerous than Assad’s regime. On the contrary, the open adherence to fundamentalist principles, the impending power struggles between Islamist and jihadist groups competing—primarily with the Islamic State—the influence of radical groups, and the absence of an international guarantee system make the situation more unpredictable. Israel’s move in the Golan and Turkey’s strategy in the north reflect a understandable, though partial, response to these threats. The West cannot afford to fall under the illusion of a “pragmatic” al-Jolani: the Islamist and jihadist nature of the new leadership is a fact. Added to this are the risks associated with the availability of strategic and chemical weapons, making the Israeli and Turkish interest in creating buffer zones and conducting preemptive strikes on arsenals tragically sensible. In this scenario—akin to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan—Syria could become an attractive hub for a jihadism now in search of legitimacy and symbolic victories, with direct consequences for Europe as well.

Europe’s Defense Conundrum: Why PESCO and Other Initiatives Always Fall Short.

The evolution of Irregular Warfare and a roadmap for the future

The Five Eyes Alliance and the Erosion of Trust under Trump’s Policy

Macron’s call to rearm and the redefinition of Europe’s identity

Europe at a Crossroads: Can It Defend Itself Without the U.S.?

Wagner rebooted

The Philippines: A Geopolitical Linchpin in the Indo-Pacific and Italy’s Strategic Opportunity

Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.

MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.

Conclusions

The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.

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