The Philippines: A Geopolitical Linchpin in the Indo-Pacific and Italy’s Strategic Opportunity

by Andrea Molle.

The Philippines, long considered a crucial geopolitical player in Southeast Asia, has increasingly found itself at the center of the escalating competition between the United States and China. As Beijing’s “eleven-dash line” advances the country’s assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea and beyond, and Washington intensifies its Indo-Pacific strategy, Manila is playing an outsized role in shaping regional security dynamics.

For Italy, which has traditionally focused its foreign policy on Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean, the evolving Indo-Pacific landscape presents an opportunity to redefine its global engagement via a more deliberate military and civilian presence in the Philippines archipelago. The Philippines’ strategic location at the crossroads of the Pacific and South China Sea makes it an invaluable ally for both regional and global powers. Situated on key maritime trade routes, it serves as a gateway between the Pacific and the economic heartlands of East Asia. More importantly, the archipelago provides crucial logistical and military advantages, particularly in countering China’s aggressive territorial expansion in disputed waters and the threat to Taiwan.

Beijing’s expansive claims over the South China Sea, including its militarization of artificial islands and the interruption of several fishing routes, have directly challenged Philippine sovereignty. Despite an international tribunal ruling in 2016 that invalidated China’s claims, Beijing continues to push its interests aggressively. In response, Manila has sought to reinforce its defense ties with Washington, reopening strategic bases to U.S. forces and deepening its security cooperation with regional partners such as Japan and Australia. The Philippines has actively participated in a series of international naval drills with countries including the United States, Australia, Japan, and France. These exercises, conducted within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, aim to enhance defense coordination and interoperability. China has expressed objections to these activities, viewing them as destabilizing. Manila also signed a defense agreement with Canada to bolster joint military exercises.

This move aligns with the Philippines’ strategy to strengthen defense partnerships amid rising tensions in the South China Sea. At the same time, the Philippines faces a delicate balancing act. While it values U.S. security guarantees, its economic interdependence with China complicates the equation. Beijing remains a key trade partner, a major source of investment, and an influential actor in the region’s economic architecture. This tension between security and economic interests highlights the broader struggle many Southeast Asian nations face in navigating the U.S.-China rivalry. While the Philippines is enhancing its defense collaborations with the U.S. and other allies, it continues to engage diplomatically with China. For instance, during a recent meeting with Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed gratitude for Cambodia’s pardon of 13 Filipino women, highlighting the Philippines’ efforts to maintain positive relations within the region. Washington’s renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, particularly through initiatives like AUKUS, the Quad, and enhanced security cooperation with ASEAN countries, aims to counterbalance China’s rising influence.

For the United States, the Philippines represents a critical anchor in its regional security framework. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between Manila and Washington facilitates American access to key military installations, ensuring a forward presence that can deter Chinese encroachments and enhance maritime security. Additionally, the growing U.S. military footprint in the region serves as a deterrent against any potential escalation in Taiwan—a key flashpoint in U.S.-China tensions. The Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan makes it a vital logistical hub should conflict arise, further solidifying its importance in Washington’s strategic calculus.

But what about Italy? Italy, as a key European power, has traditionally maintained a limited presence in the Indo-Pacific. However, given the increasing global significance of the region and the close ties currently defining its relationship with Washington, Rome should reassess its strategic engagement. However, while France and the UK have already enhanced their naval and economic involvement in the Indo-Pacific, Italy has yet to fully articulate its role. Italy’s economic interests align with a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The region is a critical market for Italian exports, including defense technology, maritime equipment, and infrastructure development. Strengthening economic and security ties with the Philippines could provide a strategic gateway for broader engagement in ASEAN, where Italy holds observer status. On the security front, Italy could enhance naval cooperation with the Philippines by participating in joint maritime exercises, providing coast guard training, and supporting regional efforts to maintain freedom of navigation. Italy’s advanced defense industry could also contribute to modernizing the Philippines’ military capabilities.

Diplomatically, Italy should leverage its EU partnerships to push for a more coherent European Indo-Pacific strategy, ensuring that Europe remains a relevant player in the region’s geopolitical balance. Supporting ASEAN-led security mechanisms and advocating for adherence to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), would further cement Italy’s role as a constructive actor. In conclusion, the Philippines’ geopolitical significance in the Indo-Pacific is undeniable. As the U.S. pivots to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness, Manila finds itself at the heart of a strategic competition that will shape the future of global order. For Italy, engaging more proactively in the Indo-Pacific—particularly through stronger ties with the Philippines—represents an opportunity to diversify its foreign policy and assert itself as a relevant player in one of the world’s most dynamic regions. By deepening economic, security, and diplomatic ties, Italy can contribute to a more stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific while expanding its own strategic footprint in an increasingly multipolar world.

Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.

by Andrea Molle.

After the withdrawal of the last French military mission, Italy remains the only European country with a significant presence in the Sahel. This opens several opportunities but also presents various challenges that Rome will have to address with as integrated a strategy as possible. Italy indeed has a significant military presence in sub-Saharan Africa, with several missions aimed at ensuring security, combating terrorism, and supporting the stability of the region. These missions see Rome engaged in Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Gulf of Guinea, both through bilateral operations and within the framework of EU, NATO, and UN missions. Italy maintains a military presence in Niger as part of the “MISIN” mission (Bilateral Support Mission in the Republic of Niger), launched in 2018 with the aim of supporting local authorities in contrasting terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime. The operation fits into Italy’s broader commitment in the Sahel, aimed at ensuring stability and security in the region, countering threats that can also impact Europe, such as irregular migration flows.

The Italian mission in Niger primarily focuses on training and mentoring local security forces to improve their operational capabilities. Italian military personnel, drawing from various branches of the Armed Forces, provide courses on combat techniques, special operations, surveillance, and border control. Additionally, logistical and medical support is an essential component of the operation. The Italian contingent in Niger consists of several hundred units, with the possibility of deploying up to 470 soldiers, 130 vehicles, and aircraft for logistical and reconnaissance needs. Italy has established its operational base in Niamey, the capital of Niger, collaborating with local authorities and other international partners, including the United States and previously France. The operation is also part of a broader cooperation framework between Italy and Niger, which includes development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the African country. However, the political situation in Niger is unstable, with the recent 2023 coup leading to a review of relations between the Nigerien government and Western states, including Italy.

Despite the geopolitical uncertainties, the Italian mission in Niger remains a key part of Italy’s defense and security strategy in the Sahel, contributing to the stabilization of a region crucial for the geopolitical and economic balance of both the region and Europe. Beyond Niger, Italy also maintains a limited military presence in neighboring Chad, focusing mainly on liaison, training, and supporting international missions in the Sahel region. This commitment is part of a broader multilateral cooperation effort aimed at combating terrorism, stabilizing the area, and strengthening local security forces’ capabilities. Italy’s activities in Chad work in synergy with operations led by international organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the G5 Sahel, providing strategic and operational support through intelligence sharing, military training, and coordination with other military contingents in the area. Lastly, Italy participates in several initiatives to improve the country’s border security, prevent arms trafficking, and counter radicalization, all key elements for the stability of Chad and the Sahel region as a whole.

The Italian approach is distinguished by a strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, promoting not only security but also the development and resilience of local communities. Italy also established a military base in Djibouti, the Italian Support Military Base (BMIS), operational since 2013. Located strategically in the Horn of Africa, the BMIS serves as a logistics and operations hub, developing intelligence capabilities for Italian armed forces engaged in missions in the East Africa region and the Indian Ocean. This base is a key infrastructure supporting anti-piracy operations, contributing to the security of shipping routes and the patrolling of international waters. It also provides logistical and operational support to various Italian and European missions in the region, including Italy’s participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation (against piracy in the Gulf of Aden) and the EUTM Somalia mission, dedicated to training Somali armed forces.

The presence of the BMIS also allows for the rapid deployment of Italian units in case of emergencies or crises in the area, strengthening Italy’s role in the security and stabilization of the Horn of Africa. The base hosts military personnel and advanced support infrastructure, allowing maintenance of vehicles, supplies, and assistance to Italian forces and allied missions. In addition to military aspects, the BMIS also represents a point of cooperation with local Djiboutian authorities, helping to strengthen diplomatic relations between Italy and Djibouti and support regional security, stability, and development initiatives. Italy maintains a significant presence in Somalia, actively contributing to the country’s security and stabilization through two main international missions. These are the EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission in Somalia), an EU mission active since 2010, aimed at training and mentoring the Somali National Army (SNA) to strengthen its operational capabilities and enable the Somali government to deal with internal security threats, particularly from the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.

Italy plays a leading role in this mission, providing military instructors, advisors, and strategic support. Italian personnel are involved in training Somali officers in tactical, strategic, and logistical aspects, as well as promoting international humanitarian law principles. The goal is to build a professional and efficient Somali army capable of ensuring the country’s security autonomously. In addition to military training, the mission focuses on the development of Somali military leadership and strengthening defense institutions, contributing to the creation of a more effective command and control chain. The other operation, called Operation Atalanta, is a naval mission of the European Union (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) launched in 2008, aimed at combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting merchant navy ships, and ensuring the safety of strategic maritime routes.

Italy actively participates in the operation with naval units, helicopters, and military personnel, performing patrols and providing escorts for commercial and humanitarian ships, particularly those of the World Food Programme (WFP) heading to Somalia. The Italian Navy has played a prominent role in the mission, contributing to the deterrence of piracy and maintaining security in international waters. Operation Atalanta has had a significant impact, drastically reducing pirate attacks and strengthening cooperation among international naval forces. Italy, in addition to its operational contribution, has frequently held high-level commands within the mission, confirming its commitment to global maritime security. In addition to participating in these missions, Italy maintains strong historical and diplomatic ties with Somalia, a country that was an Italian colony until the mid-20th century. Italy’s commitment goes beyond the military aspect, encompassing development cooperation, humanitarian support, and initiatives for political stabilization.

Through the EUTM Somalia and Operation Atalanta missions, Italy significantly contributes to the security and stability of the Horn of Africa, consolidating its role as a key actor in international operations in the region. Finally, with Operation Gabinia, Italy has committed to strengthening maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a crucial area for international oil and goods traffic, but also one of the regions most affected by maritime piracy. The deployment of Italian naval units aims to combat piracy, protect commercial ships (particularly those flying the Italian flag), and ensure the security of maritime infrastructure critical to global economic interests. All these operations are part of a broader Italian engagement in the region, which includes economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation with several West African countries.

Italy is working to develop strategic partnerships that include development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the countries involved, thereby contributing to their stability and reducing the root causes of instability and forced migration. Key areas of intervention include training local security forces, border control, combating illicit trafficking (drugs, weapons, humans), and the fight against jihadist terrorism, which represents a growing threat in the Sahel region. Strengthening local security and intelligence capabilities is critical to counter groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), who exploit institutional weaknesses and ethnic tensions to expand their influence.

An additional objective that Italy will need to pursue more decisively in the future is containing the growing geopolitical penetration of Russia and China in the region. Moscow has strengthened its military and political presence through paramilitary groups like the Wagner Group, providing support to authoritarian regimes and military juntas in exchange for natural resources and strategic bases. Beijing, on the other hand, continues to expand its economic influence through significant infrastructure and financial investments, often through debt mechanisms that bind local governments to Chinese interests. In the face of these developments, Italy, in coordination with the United States and other NATO partners, will need to strengthen its political-military presence, intensify cooperation with local governments, and promote alternative development models based on sustainability and the economic self-determination of African countries.

Italy’s commitment to West Africa is therefore increasingly seen as a delicate balance between security, diplomacy, development cooperation, and the protection of national and European strategic interests.

MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract

The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information—summarized under the acronym MDHM (misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech)—represents one of the most critical challenges of the digital age, with profound consequences for social cohesion, political stability, and global security. This study examines the distinctive characteristics of each phenomenon and their interconnected impact, highlighting how they contribute to the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and political instability. Artificial intelligence emerges as a crucial resource for combating MDHM, offering advanced tools for detecting manipulated content and monitoring disinformation networks. However, the same technology also fuels new threats, such as the creation of deepfakes and the generation of automated content that amplifies the reach and sophistication of disinformation. This paradox underscores the need for the ethical and strategic use of emerging technologies. The study proposes a multidimensional approach to addressing MDHM, structured around three main pillars: critical education, with school programs and public campaigns to enhance media literacy; regulation of digital platforms, aimed at balancing the removal of harmful content with the protection of freedom of expression; and global collaboration, ensuring a coordinated response to a transnational threat. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the importance of concerted efforts among governments, technology companies, and civil society to mitigate the destabilizing effects of MDHM and safeguard democracy, security, and trust in information

The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information is one of the most complex and dangerous challenges of the digital age, with significant repercussions on social, political, and cultural balance. The phenomena known as misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech—collectively summarized under the acronym MDHM—represent distinct yet closely interconnected manifestations of this issue. A thorough understanding of their specificities is essential for developing effective strategies to contain and counter the threats these phenomena pose to social cohesion and institutional stability.

Definitions and Distinctions

Misinformation: False information shared without the intent to cause harm. For example, the unintentional sharing of unverified news on social media.

Disinformation: Information deliberately created to deceive, harm, or manipulate individuals, social groups, organizations, or nations. An example would be the intentional dissemination of false news to influence public opinion or destabilize institutions.

Malinformation: Information based on factual content but used out of context to mislead, cause harm, or manipulate. For instance, the release of personal data with the intent to damage someone’s reputation.

Hate Speech: Expressions that incite hatred against individuals or groups based on characteristics such as race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.

Impact on Society

The spread of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech poses a critical challenge to the stability of modern societies. These phenomena, amplified by the speed and global reach of digital media, have significant consequences that manifest across various social, political, and cultural domains. Among the most notable effects are the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and heightened security threats.

Erosion of Trust

False or manipulated information directly undermines the credibility of public institutions, the media, and even the scientific community. When individuals are inundated with a constant flow of contradictory or blatantly false news, the inevitable result is a widespread crisis of trust. No source is spared from suspicion—not even the most authoritative journalists or the most transparent government bodies. This process weakens the very foundations of society, fostering a climate of uncertainty that, over time, can turn into alienation.

A striking example can be observed in the democratic process, where disinformation strikes with particular intensity. Manipulative campaigns spreading falsehoods about voting procedures or candidates have a devastating effect on electoral integrity. This not only fuels suspicion and distrust in democratic institutions but also creates a sense of disillusionment among citizens, further alienating them from active participation.

The consequences become even more evident in the management of global crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the wave of conspiracy theories and the dissemination of unverified remedies significantly hindered public health efforts. Disinformation fueled unfounded fears and skepticism toward vaccines, slowing the global response to the crisis and exacerbating the virus’s spread.

However, this erosion of trust extends beyond the individual level. Its repercussions impact society as a whole, fragmenting it. Social bonds, already weakened by preexisting divisions, become even more vulnerable to manipulation. This creates fertile ground for further conflicts and instability, isolating institutions and increasing the risk of a society unable to respond to collective challenges.

Social Polarization

Disinformation campaigns thrive on exploiting existing societal divisions, amplifying them with the aim of making them insurmountable. These phenomena, driven by targeted strategies and enhanced by digital platforms, intensify social conflict and undermine the possibility of dialogue, paving the way for ever-deepening polarization.

The amplification of divisions is perhaps the most visible result of disinformation. Information manipulation is used to radicalize political, cultural, or religious opinions, constructing narratives of opposition between “us” and “them.” In contexts of ethnic tensions, for example, malinformation—spread with the intent to distort historical events or exploit current political issues—exacerbates perceived differences between social groups. These existing contrasts are magnified until they crystallize into identity conflicts that are difficult to resolve.

Adding to this is the effect of so-called “information bubbles” created by digital platform algorithms. These systems, designed to maximize user engagement, present content that reinforces their preexisting opinions, limiting exposure to alternative perspectives. This phenomenon, known as the “filter bubble,” not only entrenches biases but isolates individuals within a media reality that thrives on continuous confirmation, hindering the understanding of differing viewpoints.

The polarization fueled by MDHM extends beyond ideology. In many cases, the radicalization of opinions translates into concrete actions: protests, clashes between groups, and, in extreme cases, armed conflicts. Civil wars and social crises are often the culmination of a spiral of division originating from divisive narratives disseminated through disinformation and hate speech.

Ultimately, the polarization generated by MDHM not only undermines social dialogue but also erodes the foundations of collective cohesion. In such a context, finding shared solutions to common problems becomes impossible. What remains is a climate of perpetual conflict, where “us versus them” replaces any attempt at collaboration, making society more fragile and vulnerable.

Threat to Security

In conflict contexts, MDHM emerges as a powerful and dangerous weapon, capable of destabilizing societies and institutions with devastating implications for both collective and individual security. Disinformation, coupled with hate speech, fuels a cycle of violence and political instability, threatening peace and compromising human rights. Concrete examples of how these dynamics unfold not only illustrate the severity of the problem but also highlight the urgency for effective responses.

Propaganda and Destabilization.One of the most insidious uses of disinformation is propaganda and destabilization. States and non-state actors exploit these practices as tools of hybrid warfare, aimed at undermining the morale of opposing populations and fomenting internal divisions. In recent geopolitical scenarios, the spread of false information has generated confusion and panic, slowing institutional response capabilities. This planned and systematic strategy goes beyond disorienting public opinion; it strikes at the very heart of social cohesion.

Hate Speech as a Precursor to Violence.Hate speech, amplified by digital platforms, often serves as a precursor to mass violence. A tragic example is the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, preceded by an online hate campaign that progressively dehumanized this ethnic minority, laying the groundwork for persecution and massacres. These episodes demonstrate how entrenched hate speech can translate into systematic violent actions, with irreparable consequences for the communities involved.

Individual Impacts.On an individual level, the effects of MDHM are deeply destructive. Phenomena such as doxxing—the public release of personal information with malicious intent—directly endanger the physical and psychological safety of victims. This type of attack not only exposes individuals to threats and assaults but also amplifies a sense of vulnerability that extends far beyond the incident itself, undermining trust in the system as a whole.

The cumulative impact of these dynamics undermines overall social stability, creating deep fractures that demand immediate and coordinated responses. Addressing MDHM is not merely a matter of defending against disinformation but an essential step in preserving peace, protecting human rights, and ensuring global security in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable world.

Mitigation Strategies

Combating the MDHM phenomenon requires a comprehensive and coordinated response capable of addressing its multifaceted nature. Given the complex and devastating impact these phenomena have on society, mitigation strategies must be developed with a multidimensional approach, combining education, collaboration among various stakeholders, and an appropriate regulatory framework.

Education and Awareness

The first and most effective line of defense against MDHM lies in education and the promotion of widespread media literacy. In a global context where information circulates at unprecedented speeds and often without adequate oversight, the ability of citizens to identify and critically analyze the content they consume becomes an essential skill. Only through increased awareness can the negative effects of disinformation be curbed and a more resilient society built.

Critical thinking is the foundation of this strategy. Citizens must be empowered to distinguish reliable information from false or manipulated content. This process requires the adoption of educational tools that teach how to verify sources, identify signs of manipulation, and analyze the context of news. This effort goes beyond simple training: it is about fostering a culture of verification and constructive skepticism—essential elements in countering informational manipulation.

Schools play a crucial role in this battle. They must become the primary setting for teaching media literacy, preparing new generations to navigate the complex digital landscape conscientiously. Integrating these teachings into educational curricula is no longer optional but essential. Through practical workshops, real-case analysis, and simulations, young people can develop the skills needed to recognize manipulated content and understand the implications of spreading false information.

However, education must not be limited to young people. Adults, who are often more exposed and vulnerable to disinformation, must also be engaged through public awareness campaigns. These initiatives, delivered through both traditional and digital media, should highlight the most common techniques used to spread false content and emphasize the societal consequences of these phenomena. An informed citizen, aware of the risks and able to recognize them, becomes a powerful asset in the fight against disinformation.

Investing in education and awareness is not just a preventive measure but a cornerstone in combating MDHM. A population equipped with critical tools is less susceptible to manipulation, thereby helping to strengthen social cohesion and the stability of democratic institutions. This path, though requiring constant and coordinated effort, represents one of the most effective responses to one of the most insidious threats of our time.

Cross-Sector Collaboration

The complexity of the MDHM phenomenon is such that no single actor can effectively address it alone. It is a global challenge requiring a collective and coordinated response in which governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), tech companies, and civil society collaborate to develop shared strategies. Only through synergistic efforts can the destabilizing effects of this threat be mitigated.

Government institutions must take a leading role. Governments are tasked with creating effective regulations and safe environments for the exchange of information, ensuring that these measures balance two fundamental aspects: combating harmful content and protecting freedom of expression. Excessive control risks veering into censorship, undermining the democratic principles being safeguarded. The approach must be transparent, targeted, and adaptable to the evolution of technologies and disinformation dynamics.

Tech companies, particularly social media platforms, play a central role in this challenge. They bear significant responsibility in countering MDHM, as they are the primary channels through which these dynamics propagate. They must invest in developing advanced algorithms capable of identifying and removing harmful content promptly and effectively. However, the effectiveness of interventions must not come at the expense of users’ freedom of expression. Transparency in moderation criteria, data management, and reporting mechanisms is essential to maintain user trust and prevent abuse.

Alongside these actors, NGOs and civil society serve as intermediaries. NGOs can act as a bridge between institutions and citizens by providing verified and reliable information, monitoring disinformation phenomena, and promoting awareness initiatives. These organizations also have the capacity to operate locally, better understanding the specific dynamics of certain communities and tailoring counter-strategies to their needs.

Lastly, fostering public-private partnerships is essential. Collaboration between the public and private sectors is crucial for sharing resources, knowledge, and technological tools to combat MDHM. Companies can offer innovative solutions, while governments can provide the regulatory framework and support needed to implement them. This synergy allows disinformation to be addressed with a broader and more integrated approach, combining technical expertise with monitoring and intervention capabilities.

The response to MDHM cannot be fragmented or limited to a single sector. Only through cross-sectoral and global collaboration can the consequences of these phenomena be mitigated, protecting institutions, citizens, and society as a whole.

Role of Advanced Technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Context of MDHM

Emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), play a crucial role in the context of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech. AI represents a double-edged sword: on one hand, it offers powerful tools to identify and combat the spread of harmful content; on the other, it fuels new threats, making disinformation tools more sophisticated and harder to detect.

Automatic Detection

Artificial intelligence has revolutionized the way we address disinformation, introducing advanced detection systems capable of quickly identifying false or harmful content. In a digital landscape where the volume of data generated daily is immense, human monitoring alone is no longer sufficient. AI-powered tools are therefore essential for managing this complexity, providing timely and precise responses.

Among the most significant innovations are machine learning algorithms, which form the core of automatic detection systems. These algorithms use machine learning techniques to analyze vast amounts of data, looking for patterns that indicate the presence of manipulated or false content. Trained on datasets containing examples of previously identified disinformation, these systems can recognize common features such as sensationalist headlines, emotionally charged language, or altered images. The effectiveness of these tools lies in their ability to adapt to new manipulation patterns, continually improving their performance.

Another critical area is source verification. AI-based tools can compare online information with reliable sources, identifying discrepancies and facilitating the work of fact-checkers. This accelerates verification processes, enabling more efficient counteraction against false content before it reaches a wide audience.

AI is also pivotal in tackling one of the most sophisticated threats: deepfakes, which will be discussed further below. Using advanced techniques, AI can analyze manipulated videos and images, detecting anomalies in facial movements, lip synchronization, or overall visual quality. Companies like Adobe and Microsoft are developing tools dedicated to verifying the authenticity of visual content, providing a concrete response to a technology easily exploited for malicious purposes.

Monitoring hate speech is another area where AI proves valuable. Through natural language processing (NLP) algorithms, texts can be analyzed in real time to identify expressions of hate speech. These systems not only categorize content but also prioritize interventions, ensuring rapid and effective responses to the most severe cases. In a context where hate speech can quickly escalate into real-world violence, the ability to intervene promptly is crucial.

Lastly, AI can detect and analyze disinformation networks. By examining social interactions, AI can identify patterns suggesting coordinated campaigns, such as the simultaneous dissemination of similar messages by linked accounts. This functionality is particularly useful for exposing orchestrated operations, whether political or social, aimed at destabilizing public trust or manipulating opinions.

In summary, artificial intelligence is an indispensable tool for addressing disinformation and hate speech. However, like any technology, it requires ethical and responsible use. Only through transparent and targeted implementation can the full potential of AI be harnessed to protect the integrity of information and social cohesion.

Content Generation

While artificial intelligence is a valuable resource for countering disinformation, it also contributes to making the MDHM phenomenon even more dangerous by providing tools for creating false and manipulated content with unprecedented levels of sophistication. This dual nature makes AI both a powerful and insidious technology.

A prime example is the aforementioned deepfakes, generated using technologies based on generative adversarial networks (GANs). These tools enable the creation of highly realistic videos and images in which individuals appear to say or do things that never occurred. Deepfakes severely undermine trust in visual information, which was once considered tangible evidence of reality. Their use extends beyond trust issues: they can be deployed for defamation campaigns, public opinion manipulation, or destabilization in already fragile political contexts. The ability to create alternative visual realities poses a direct threat to the credibility of visual sources and social cohesion.

Similarly, automatically generated texts from advanced language models, such as GPT, have opened new frontiers in disinformation. These systems can produce articles, comments, and social media posts that appear entirely authentic, making it extremely difficult to distinguish machine-generated content from that created by real individuals. Unsurprisingly, these tools are already being used to power botnets—automated networks that spread polarizing or entirely false narratives, often aiming to manipulate opinions and fuel social conflicts.

Another crucial aspect is the scalability of disinformation. AI-driven automation allows for the creation and dissemination of false content on a massive scale, exponentially amplifying its impact. For instance, a single malicious actor can use these tools to generate thousands of variations of a false message, further complicating detection efforts. In mere moments, manipulated content can be disseminated globally, reaching millions of people before any intervention is possible.

Finally, AI provides tools for content obfuscation, making manipulated messages even harder to detect. Advanced algorithms can make minor but strategic modifications to texts or images, bypassing traditional monitoring systems. This adaptability poses an ongoing challenge for developers of countermeasures, who must continually update their tools to keep pace with new manipulation techniques.

In conclusion, artificial intelligence, with its ability to generate highly sophisticated content, represents a double-edged sword in the MDHM landscape. Without proper regulation and ethical use, it risks accelerating the spread of disinformation, further eroding public trust in information and destabilizing society. Addressing this threat requires awareness and appropriate tools, combining technological innovation with ethical principles to limit the effects of this dangerous evolution.

Challenges and Opportunities

The use of artificial intelligence in the fight against MDHM represents one of the most promising yet complex frontiers of the digital era. While AI offers extraordinary opportunities to counter the spread of harmful information, it also presents significant challenges, underscoring the need for an ethical and strategic approach.

Opportunities Offered by AI

Among its most relevant advantages is AI’s ability to analyze data in real time. This capability makes it possible to anticipate disinformation campaigns by identifying signals before they spread on a large scale. Such proactive measures can reduce the impact of these phenomena by enabling timely interventions to mitigate damage.

Another key advantage is the use of advanced tools to certify the authenticity of content. Technologies developed by leading organizations allow verification of the origin and integrity of digital data, restoring trust among users. In a context where visual and textual manipulation is increasingly sophisticated, these solutions serve as an essential bulwark against informational chaos.

AI also streamlines fact-checking activities. Automating verification processes reduces the workload on human operators, accelerating responses to the spread of false content. This not only enhances efficiency but also allows human resources to focus on particularly complex or sensitive cases.

Challenges of AI in Combating MDHM

However, the same technologies that offer these opportunities can also be exploited for malicious purposes. Tools designed to combat disinformation can be manipulated to increase the sophistication of attacks, creating content that is even harder to detect. This paradox highlights the importance of rigorous oversight and responsible use of these technologies.

The difficulty in distinguishing between authentic and manipulated content is another critical challenge. As disinformation techniques evolve, algorithms must be continuously updated to remain effective. This requires not only technological investments but also ongoing collaboration among experts from various fields.

Finally, the inherent biases in AI models cannot be overlooked. Poorly designed algorithms or those trained on unrepresentative datasets risk removing legitimate content or failing to detect certain forms of disinformation. Such errors not only compromise the effectiveness of operations but can also undermine trust in the system itself.

Conclusions

Artificial intelligence is a strategic resource in the fight against misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech, but it also presents a complex challenge. Its ambivalence as both a defensive and offensive tool demands conscious and responsible use. On one hand, it offers innovative solutions to detect and counter manipulated content; on the other, it enables the creation of increasingly sophisticated disinformation, amplifying risks to social and institutional stability.

MDHM (Misinformation, Disinformation, Hate Speech, and Malinformation) is not an isolated or temporary phenomenon but a systemic threat undermining the foundations of social cohesion and global security. Its proliferation fuels a vicious cycle where the erosion of trust, social polarization, and security threats reinforce each other. When disinformation contaminates the flow of information, trust in institutions, the media, and even science crumbles. This phenomenon not only fosters alienation and uncertainty but also diminishes citizens’ ability to actively participate in democratic life.

Social polarization, amplified by information manipulation, is a direct consequence of this dynamic. Divisive narratives and polarizing content, driven by algorithms prioritizing engagement over accuracy, fragment the social fabric and make dialogue impossible. In a “us versus them” climate, political, cultural, and ethnic divisions become insurmountable barriers.

From a security perspective, MDHM represents a global threat. Disinformation campaigns orchestrated by states or non-state actors destabilize entire regions, incite violence, and fuel armed conflicts. The use of hate speech as a dehumanizing tool has demonstrated its destructive potential in various contexts, contributing to a climate of collective and individual vulnerability.

Addressing this challenge requires an integrated approach that combines education, regulation, and global cooperation.

Promoting critical education: Media literacy must be a priority. Educating citizens to recognize and counter disinformation is the first step toward building a resilient society. Educational programs and awareness campaigns should equip people with the tools needed to navigate the complex informational landscape.

Strengthening the regulation of digital platforms: Technology companies can no longer remain passive observers. Clear and transparent standards for managing harmful content are essential, while also ensuring respect for freedom of expression. Independent oversight can ensure a balance between security and fundamental rights.

Encouraging global collaboration: The transnational nature of MDHM requires a coordinated response. Governments, private companies, and international organizations must work together to share resources, develop innovative technologies, and combat disinformation campaigns on a global scale.

Only through concerted action can the devastating effects of MDHM be mitigated, paving the way for a more resilient and informed society. The future of democracy, social cohesion, and security depends on our collective ability to face this threat with determination, foresight, and responsibility.

The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The recent conquest of Damascus by the jihadist leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a turning point in the political-military balance of the Middle East. After thirteen years of civil war against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria now finds itself in the most critical phase of its contemporary history: the rise to power of the Islamists led by al-Jolani, previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, sets the country on the path to becoming an “Islamic State” destined to reshape regional dynamics. Once again, the jihadist factor emerges as a destabilizing element with potentially global repercussions.

The Israeli occupation of the Golan: a preventive and strategic maneuver
The Islamist advance in Syria, and the consequent loss of centralized control from Damascus, create a power vacuum in which radical groups and external actors seeking geostrategic advantages can proliferate. Israel’s action—specifically, the consolidation of its occupation of the Golan Heights—must be understood in this context. It is not yet another expansionist incursion, but a defensive and preventive maneuver. On the one hand, Tel Aviv aims to prevent jihadist forces from settling along its northern border, directly threatening its security. On the other, Israel’s military presence in the area also serves to protect UN peacekeeping forces, who might otherwise be exposed to attacks by radical groups in the absence of a reliable central authority in Damascus.

The preventive strike against strategic and chemical arsenals
The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq—where conventional and unconventional arsenals fell into the hands of extremist groups—have made it clear that rapid, surgical interventions are necessary. Israel’s preventive strike on Syrian strategic weapons depots, including those suspected of containing chemical agents, seeks to prevent these tools from ending up with jihadists. This is not merely an Israeli interest: if radical groups were to gain access to chemical weapons, the entire region and even the West could suffer the consequences. As highlighted by the latest analyses from the Institute for the Study of War (Iran Update, December 11, 2024), non-state actors’ control of Syrian arsenals opens the door to extremely high-risk scenarios. Israel thus acts with strategic intelligence aimed at preventing future large-scale terrorist attacks.

The Israeli move and the Turkish choice: two sides of the same coin
Israel’s policy in the Golan cannot be viewed in isolation: it is consistent with Turkey’s strategic logic of threat containment through its occupation of parts of northern Syrian territory. Ankara, as demonstrated in the past, intends to maintain a “buffer zone” between the areas under its control and regions inhabited by Syrian Kurds, regarded as a threat due to their connection with the PKK in Turkey. This action not only limits the movement of Kurdish militias, but also serves a dual purpose: curbing Kurdish power and preventing the establishment of Islamist groups hostile to Turkey. Israel’s advance on the Golan and Turkey’s buffer zone are, in different ways, two examples of preventive containment of the jihadist threat.

The rise of Islamists in Syria: the rights dilemma and the Taliban parallel
The Islamist takeover led by al-Jolani and his men cannot be viewed favorably. The reassuring statements regarding minorities, women, and the Christian community sound like mere rhetoric. The history of jihadist movements is well known: the strict application of sharia, the lack of respect for religious and cultural differences, and the elimination of any pluralistic space. As previously seen in Taliban-led Afghanistan, the establishment of an Islamic State under the leadership of recycled ex-al-Qaeda members turned local political force will merely institutionalize a repressive regime contrary to fundamental human rights principles.

The terrorist threat extends to the West
The Islamist victory in Syria, as was the case with the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021, will act as a catalyst for international terrorism. Recent reports show that every advancement of jihadist ideology is accompanied by an increase in attacks and violent propaganda, prompting radicalized or sympathetic individuals to carry out copycat acts in the West. As highlighted by recent analyses in international media (see the 5th Report on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism #ReaCT2024 and Il Giornale), HTS’s success in Syria increases the risk that Europe will become the target of new attacks, inspired or orchestrated by individuals who draw fresh momentum and symbolic legitimacy from al-Jolani’s “victory.” The jihadist media dimension is such that controlling territory—and proclaiming an Islamic State—becomes a powerful message directed at potential supporters and recruits.

Perspectives and conclusions
Al-Jolani’s new Syria is no less dangerous than Assad’s regime. On the contrary, the open adherence to fundamentalist principles, the impending power struggles between Islamist and jihadist groups competing—primarily with the Islamic State—the influence of radical groups, and the absence of an international guarantee system make the situation more unpredictable. Israel’s move in the Golan and Turkey’s strategy in the north reflect a understandable, though partial, response to these threats. The West cannot afford to fall under the illusion of a “pragmatic” al-Jolani: the Islamist and jihadist nature of the new leadership is a fact. Added to this are the risks associated with the availability of strategic and chemical weapons, making the Israeli and Turkish interest in creating buffer zones and conducting preemptive strikes on arsenals tragically sensible. In this scenario—akin to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan—Syria could become an attractive hub for a jihadism now in search of legitimacy and symbolic victories, with direct consequences for Europe as well.

The Russian Strategy: offensive (action and interference), defensive, and deterrent. Digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence in global competition.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract.

This article explores the Russian strategy of digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) as fundamental tools in global competition. Initially welcomed, Russian soft diplomacy has experienced fluctuations due to information campaigns that have damaged the country’s international image. In recent years, Russia has developed a “digital diplomacy” to influence international public opinion, leveraging tools like social media to spread polarizing messages and alternative news. At the same time, the country has enhanced its cyber warfare capabilities, considering it an essential component of information operations and a means to achieve an asymmetric military balance against the West. The use of AI amplifies these operations, enabling large-scale disinformation and strengthening espionage techniques and cyber-attacks, with the goal of destabilizing adversaries and consolidating Russian influence on a global scale.

Public Soft diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy and Cyber Operations

At the beginning of the 21^st century, the emergence of Russian public soft diplomacy was met with optimism by both analysts and the international public. However, over time, Russian public diplomacy experienced several fluctuations due to information campaigns that damaged Russia’s global image, particularly after the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. In recent years, the advancement of information technologies and the growing spread of social media have introduced what is known as “digital diplomacy.” This form of communication, first launched by the Obama administration, involves direct dialogue between governments and the online community, known as netizens or cyber citizens, with the goal of influencing public opinion. Initially, digital diplomacy was praised for its ability to exert a significant impact on international public opinion during conflicts, thanks to targeted communication strategies, psychological warfare, and online operations.[1] However, the negative side of digital diplomacy soon became apparent, particularly when some authoritarian regimes began using internet resources to manipulate online traffic with the aim of hindering dissident groups and political opposition.[2]

Another significant aspect related to the digital advancement of information is the increasing use of information warfare, now enhanced by artificial intelligence, which has become a crucial factor in achieving strategic objectives.[3]

Russian strategy and doctrine have always placed great importance on cybersecurity and cyber operations, considering them an essential part of broader information operations. This approach often blurs the line between military and civilian capabilities, as both collaborate within the overall national strategy. Indeed, the main Russian cybersecurity agencies actively participate, even at the highest levels, within the government’s Security Council, which includes members such as the Minister of Defense, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Chief of the General Staff.

The 2015 military doctrine, which preceded the 2016 cybersecurity doctrine, emphasizes the importance of protecting cyberspace as an integral part of Russian national security, assigning this task to the armed forces. In line with this doctrine, in 2017, Russia established “information operations units,” initially designed for the defense of cyberspace, but which quickly took on a broader role, including traditional information activities and psychological operations. The “Main Directorate of the General Staff” (GU), formerly known as the GRU, along with its subordinate commands, such as the 85^th Main Special Services Center (Unit 26165) and the 72^nd Main Special Services Center (Unit 54777), under the direct control of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, is considered the primary entity responsible for offensive cyber operations and influence activities.

Figure 1. Evolution of Russian and Cyber Operations.

The graph in Figure 1 represents the evolution of Russian diplomacy and cyber operations, showing how they have become increasingly influential over time. The time phases are illustrated as follows:

First phase: Early 21st century – Introduction of public soft diplomacy.

Second phase: 2008-2012 – Development of digital diplomacy and initial cyber operations, especially after the Russo-Georgian conflict.

Third phase: 2013-Present – Consolidation and intensification of cyber operations and influence through digital diplomacy, enhanced by artificial intelligence.

The graph highlights a progressive increase in the level of influence of these strategies in the global context.

The Public Diplomacy of Russia: Between Strategy and Mechanisms

Contemporary Russian public diplomacy is based on the foreign policy strategy outlined in 2013. In an article titled “Russia and the Changing World,” published in February 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin defined soft power as a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy objectives without resorting to the use of weapons or other forms of pressure, with particular emphasis on the use of financial leverage.[4] In line with this vision, the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” approved by Putin in February 2013, states that soft power—a comprehensive set of tools for achieving foreign policy objectives based on the potential of civil society, information, and cultural methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy—has become an essential component of contemporary international relations. However, the intensification of global competition and the increased risk of crises can sometimes lead to the distorted and illegal use of soft power and human rights «to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize political situations, and manipulate public opinion, even through the funding of cultural and human rights projects.»[5]

The quote aptly captures Russia’s attitude towards the concept of soft power, seen as a driving force behind the so-called “color revolutions” and Western activities that Russia perceives as unfavorable to itself. In developing its own public diplomacy, Russia has made extensive use of influence tools to shape the political landscape of third countries.[6]

With these ambitions, in 2010 Russia established two diplomatic agencies: the “Russian World,” focused on promoting the Russian language, and the “Alexander Gorchakov Fund for Public Diplomacy.” Additionally, as early as 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo Division, a federal agency responsible for affairs concerning the Commonwealth of Independent States, compatriots abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation, was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agency focuses on Russians and Russian-speaking communities abroad. In 2020, Rossotrudnichestvo expanded its structure by adding departments dedicated to information and cybersecurity, science and education, and foreign aid.

Overall, the Russian approach to public diplomacy demonstrates a continuous evolution in Moscow’s strategic communication and political marketing, where tools like targeted messages, tweets, and public engagement are becoming increasingly central, both in traditional and digital communication.[7]

Russian influence through the dissemination of information is limited by the low accessibility and penetration of Russian-language content, particularly in Europe and the United States. To overcome this obstacle, Russia is effectively enhancing its capabilities in cyberspace action and penetration. Given the political pressures and the ineffectiveness of traditional Russian cultural diplomacy, digital and data diplomacy is being used as a tool to spread “alternative news” in countries of interest to the Kremlin. In this context, political messages and divisive communications are aimed at polarizing national public opinions through social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, which are used as tools of information warfare by users registered in Russia. Through these means, Russian public diplomacy intensified its efforts during the Covid-19 pandemic, leveraging Russian humanitarian aid to present itself credibly to foreign public opinions. Countries like Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the Middle East, Venezuela in Latin America, and even Italy in the European Union received Russian aid, which was promoted on social networks through a well-organized and effective propaganda campaign.

Information warfare, artificial intelligence: competition with the NATO

As discussed, Russia perceives the West as a threat. This viewpoint was reiterated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, in April 2019, when he emphasized the danger posed by NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders and by Western attempts to destabilize President Putin’s government through the use of “hybrid warfare.”[8]

This perception is further reinforced by the awareness of the weakness of the Russian conventional armed forces, which are considered insufficiently prepared to face a potential conflict with NATO. Russian military leadership strongly believes that it is essential to avoid a conventional war, preferring instead to shift the confrontation to the cyber domain in order to achieve an asymmetric military balance. This strategy is actively pursued by the Kremlin to ensure that Russia gains a military advantage capable of countering NATO’s ambitions without resorting to conventional kinetic force.

The Russian approach can be described as a form of “strategic deterrence,” or as Gerasimov himself has termed it, an “active defense strategy,” known in the West as “hybrid warfare” or “below-threshold activities.” This concept is based on non-kinetic operations aimed at weakening potential adversaries over the long term during peacetime, by creating political and social divisions within them, thereby undermining the resolve and strategic decision-making capabilities of the target state. The primary targets would be strongly anti-Russian countries, particularly those located on NATO’s eastern flank, where Russia could focus intense information warfare to provoke significant political changes. In this way, Russia could pursue its doctrine of “sovereign self-assertion” and gain greater freedom of action in critical regions such as Syria, the Middle East, and Africa. These preventive measures could also serve to hinder any collective NATO decision, including the possibility of direct intervention against Moscow.[9] In line with this understanding, at the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February 2022, there was a wave of actions aimed at penetrating NATO networks at the start of the conflict— a reasonable precaution from the Russian perspective, given the fear of a possible NATO intervention in support of Kyiv.

Information Warfare and Artificial Intelligence (AI)

As previously mentioned, Gerasimov emphasized the growing importance of information in neutralizing the state’s opponents, both internal and external. According to Gerasimov, “information technologies” are becoming “one of the most promising types of weapons” to be used against other countries. For this reason, he states that “the study of topics related to the preparation and conduct of information actions is the most important task of military science.”

With this approach, Russia has prioritized the development of advanced information operations over the expansion of conventional weapons, such as tanks or missile systems, as today “information technologies” can be significantly enhanced by artificial intelligence (AI).[10] The thinking of the Russian armed forces regarding the development and use of artificial intelligence in the military sector focuses on the advantages it can offer in supporting military operations. These advantages range from the enhancement of autonomous systems and other military technologies to the management of information, particularly at the global strategic level. In this context, artificial intelligence acts as an amplifier, strengthening disinformation operations through the intentional spread of false and misleading information, with the aim of influencing policies and societies and creating large-scale instability through information manipulation and cyber activities.[11]

During the crisis in Ukraine, Russia reportedly conducted a large-scale information operations campaign aimed at influencing public opinion and creating confusion in the information space by spreading a combination of true, partially true, and false information to make it credible. A significant example of these efforts is the more than 65,000 tweets disseminated by fake Russian accounts in the 24 hours following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 on July 17, 2014, with the goal of blaming the incident on the Ukrainian government. Additionally, during the annexation of Crimea, Russian forces reportedly blacked out nine Ukrainian television channels in Crimea, replacing them with Russian broadcasts to silence pro-government Ukrainian media:[12] An event that would confirm the conduct of electronic warfare (EW) actions as an enabling factor for information operations.[13]

The actions mentioned highlight Russia’s determination to improve and intensify its capabilities in the context of cyber warfare, which, within Russian military doctrine, is considered a component of the broader information warfare. The strategic threat posed by cyber warfare enhanced by artificial intelligence will be particularly dangerous, as cyber tools will increasingly be able to generate detailed and credible disinformation (including “deep fakes”[14]) in such volumes that it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish real truth from a vast amount of conflicting information.[15] AI will enable the saturation of the information space with artificial data, creating a “virtual truth” that can confuse and destabilize adversaries, paving the way for a possible “cognitive warfare” that Russia could dominate.

Another crucial aspect of cyber warfare concerns the technical domain: espionage, malware installation, selective destruction, and, particularly, the search for vulnerabilities in adversaries’ IT systems. With the advent of AI, these cyber techniques will become increasingly effective, allowing the weaknesses of opponents’ IT systems to be identified more quickly.[16]

Figure 2. Evolution of the importance of Cybersecurity in Russian Strategy.

Here is a graph that represents the evolution of the importance attributed to cybersecurity and cyber operations in Russian strategy over the years. The graph shows a significant increase in the emphasis on cybersecurity from 2010 to 2020, indicating its growing priority in Russia’s strategic planning.

[1] J. Fieke, Digital Activism in the Middle East: Mapping Issue Networks in Egypt, “Knowledge Management for Development Journal” 6 (1), 2010, pp. 37–52.

[2] N. Tsvetkova, D. Rushchin, (2021), Russia’s Public Diplomacy: From Soft Power to Strategic Communication, Journal of Political Marketing. 20. 1-12. 10.1080/15377857.2020.1869845.

[3] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution in Military Affairs’, The RUSI Journal, 165:3, 2020, pp. 12-21, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514.

[4] V. Putin (2012), Russia and the Changing World, “Rossiyskaya Gaseta”. Accessed October 20, 2020.

[5] A. Sergunin, L. Karabeshkin, Understanding Russia’s Soft Power Strategy, “Politics” 35

(3–4):347–63, 2015.

[6] U.S. Congress. 2015. “U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation

Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”. In: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions (ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).

[7] N. Tsvetkova & D. Rushchin, Russia’s Public Diplomacy…, cit.

[8] V. Gerasimov, Vektory Razvitiya Voyennoy Strategii [“The Vectors of Military Strategic Development”], “Krasnaya Zvezda” [Red Star], 3 aprile 2019, in http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/.

[9] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.

[10] Ivi.

[11] Ivi.

[12] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’, 15 July 2014, p. 31. In: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_Report_15July2014.pdf (ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).

[13] D. McCrory (2021), Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine, “The RUSI Journal”, 2021, pp –.

[14] A Deepfake is a technique that uses artificial intelligence to rework human images. This involves combining and overlaying existing images and videos with other videos or original images through a machine learning technique known as a generative adversarial network (GAN). GANs consist of two neural networks—one generates new data (like fake images or videos), and the other attempts to detect the fake content, improving the quality of the generated content over time. This process allows for the creation of highly realistic, yet entirely fabricated, visual content.

[15] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.

[16] Ivi.

Terrorism: Islamic State threatens football championships.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The so-called Islamic State, reigniting fears in Europe after the attack in Moscow, has threatened to launch an attack against the four stadiums where the Champions League quarter-finals will be played starting tonight. Al-Azaim, one of ISIS’s propaganda organs, confirmed these intentions by publishing the image of the four stadiums where the first-leg matches will be held – Parc des Princes in Paris, Santiago Bernabeu in Madrid, Metropolitan also in Madrid, and Emirates in London – accompanied by the caption “Kill them all.”

It is necessary to clarify at the outset: ISIS’s experience, as we knew it in Iraq and Syria, ended in June 2014 with the proclamation of the Caliphate by al-Baghdadi and the establishment of the Islamic State. ISIS no longer exists; in its place is the Islamic State. This is not a minor clarification, as it marks the beginning of the post-territorial era of the movement, which we are observing and suffering from today, both in the West and in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the increasingly manifest strength of this group especially in Syria and Afghanistan.

How serious do you think this threat is? We recall a similar alert on March 30 in Germany.

Firstly, in this case, as in most episodes, it is not the Islamic State itself but its affiliated groups that are calling for the fight. And the current one seems not so much a warning as a call to strike, hence not a direct threat. Also, as the recent history of the Islamic State and its franchised affiliates has shown us, when the group strikes, it does so without warning – effectively exploiting the element of surprise to achieve maximum results. What happened in Russia is confirmation of this. However, and this is the second aspect, consistent with attacks in recent years, attributed to or claimed by the Islamic State, it is the appeal to strike that is captured by individuals, or more rarely by small groups, often disorganized or poorly organized, that constitutes the driving force of the group which, as a rule and for obvious opportunity, only claims the successful ones, a small part, not mentioning the more numerous ones that end in failure.

After the attack in Moscow, these threats, and the arrest yesterday in Rome of a Tajik former ISIS militiaman, do you think there are conditions to understand what ISIS’s strategy is? Is it raising its head? Is it regaining strength?

The Islamic State is indeed raising its head, and it is doing so disruptively and effectively, emotionally bringing us back to the terrible years 2015-2017 when Europe was overwhelmed by a series of disruptive events, in turn evoking the emotions of the al-Qaeda attacks in Europe in 2004, in Madrid and London. Today, it is enough to look at Syria, where it was thought – also due to the media spotlight being directed elsewhere – that the Islamic State had been defeated: this is not the case. On the contrary, the progressive increase in Islamic State attacks, continuous and repeated assaults on prisons to free fighters detained by the Syrian regime, the ability to strike essentially anywhere. It is a very loud alarm bell that anticipates a new wave that is self-sustaining: from the rhetoric of the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, to competition with the Taliban, to the increase in affiliates, individuals, and groups from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, to Europe. Not a new Islamic State, but a phenomenon that is awakening.

Russia: bombing at Crocus City Hall. Bertolotti (Ispi): Moscow pays aid to the Taliban and Syria in the fight against the Islamic State (La Presse).

From La Presse, interview by Luca La Mantia.

Go to the Press Release on La Presse.

Listen to Claudio Bertolotti’s commentary on Radio 3i by Laura Zucchetti

Rome, March 23 (LaPresse) – “In Afghanistan, Russia is engaging with the elder faction of the Taliban, contributing to that cycle of intelligence that allows the Taliban themselves to combat the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-Kp),” so the attack in Moscow by the jihadist group “is a way of saying ‘you help the Taliban strike us and we strike you‘.” This was stated to LaPresse by Claudio Bertolotti, researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight, commenting on the attack at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of the Russian capital. Russia, he continues, also has “a specific and well-defined role, on one hand, in the fight against Islamic terrorism” and on the other hand in supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria in countering “all Sunni rebel groups, including those affiliated with the Islamic State.”

Rome, March 23 (LaPresse) – “It’s very difficult to keep under control and prevent an attack like the one that occurred at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of Moscow, claimed by ISIS,” said Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight, to LaPresse. “Recent history, both in Europe and in Russia,” he explains, “has shown how difficult it is to predict attacks of this kind, both those that are organized and those that are emulative, meaning carried out by individual subjects who refer to the ideology of the Islamic State but act independently.”

Rome, Mar 23. (LaPresse) – The United States, Bertolotti emphasizes, had warned about the risk of attacks in Russia “because they have an excellent capability of gathering intelligence information linked to the dialogue with the new Taliban leadership” in Afghanistan, which is “a bitter enemy of the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-KP).” Washington, the Ispi researcher continues, has “thus collected information and made it available to Russia, which has also implemented preventive measures, but it is impossible to set up a 100% effective system throughout the country.”

Rome, Mar 23. (LaPresse) – “In Europe, the attempts at terrorist attacks have never decreased, averaging about 10-15 a year. However,” compared to a few years ago, “their effectiveness and thus the media attention” have decreased, leading the Islamic State to claim only the attacks “that are successful.” This is according to Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight, commenting on the attack at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of Moscow. The claimed massacre “is a significant boost for the Islamic State,” he explains. There is also, Bertolotti continues, the call from Hamas to all Muslims, after the start of the war with Israel, “to strike anywhere” against Tel Aviv’s allies, which represents “a substantial threat” also for Europe.

Rome, Mar 23. (LaPresse) – The Kremlin has “every interest in talking about Kiev’s responsibility” in the attack at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of Moscow, later claimed by ISIS, “because this allows to confirm the threat posed by Ukraine in front of the Russian public opinion.” This is according to Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight. “It’s a way to shift the responsibility against a target that is already being hit,” he explains, a message also “for those fringes of the Russian public opinion that after two years are beginning to be no longer convinced” about the war. Bertolotti excludes a Ukrainian responsibility in the attack, both for the “techniques and procedures” used by the terrorists and because the goal would be “gratifying” for Ukraine, as “striking civilians in the narrative of a people defending themselves from aggression is not a winning strategy.”

China and Russia response to NATO’s increased attention to the Pacific ocean

by Andrea Molle.

The Sino-Russian response to NATO diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, including the recent Italian efforts, was not long in coming. After the rumors of a new liaison office of the Alliance opening in Japan were confirmed, a hypothesis deliberately omitted from the official statement following Vilnius, the two countries have announced the beginning of a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan. The Sea of Japan is a crucial strategic theater for China and Russia. In particular, the Straits of Soya, Tsushima, and Tsugaru have essential implications for the national security of Beijing and Moscow. On Saturday, China’s Defense Minister said that Russian naval and air forces would participate in the “Northern/Interaction” military exercises organized by the Northern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

It should be noted that military relations between the two countries are nothing but new; for example, since 2018, China has regularly participated in major Russian exercises, including “Vostok 2018”, “Tsentr-2019,” and “Kavkaz-2020”. In August 2021, Russia also participated in the “Western/Interaction” exercises conducted in northwestern China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the first in which China invited foreign militaries. In 2022, Beijing sent contingents of its land, naval, and air forces to Russia to participate in the “Vostok 2022” exercises, which took place in 13 Russian sites and various areas of interest in the Sea of Japan.

However, this latest joint training campaign, which adds to the joint patrol activity of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea by the two Armed Forces, which began last June, seems a leap towards a fully committed strategic partnership. The Chinese Ministry of Defense stressed that while these joint exercises have an operational purpose, i.e., to improve the necessary capabilities to secure strategic sea routes, the development of closer military imposes China and Russia as the absolute guarantors of peace and stability in the region.

Several military experts also predict that these training activities will increase in the future, also thanks to a rotation between all five PLA commands, which could affect different strategic theaters and conflict scenarios, among which, of course, Taiwan.

Details about the Russian naval contingent are not yet known, but the Chinese squad includes the Qiqihar and Guiyang missile destroyers, the Zaozhuang and Rizhao missile frigates, and the supply ship Taihu, which set sail from the port of Qingdao, located in the Shandong province in eastern China.

Italy and Japan: seeking a role in the global arena

by Andrea Molle

For some time now, Italy and Japan have started to entertain the idea of increased bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense and security in the Indo-Pacific. Such a trend had emerged fairly recently with Japan’s participation in the Global Combat Air Program, the rebranded Tempest fighter initiative spearheaded by the United Kingdom and the two countries. However, that only seems to have gained momentum in the last few weeks. The relaunch of joint military exercises between the Italian Navy and the Japanese Self-Defense Maritime Force after roughly 20 years of hiatus is a clear sign of the commitment that both countries are putting into forging a robust strategic partnership. For example, at the end of the last month, the Italian Navy sent its new Paolo Thaon di Revel-class offshore patrol vessel “Francesco Morosini” for a five-month deployment in the region during which it was stationed at the Japanese naval base of Yokosuka, where she was involved in operational and logistical activities with their Japanese counterparts, perhaps in preparation of an increasingly likely future integration between the two Navies with regards to deployment, maintenance, and repairing cycles.

Furthermore, as mentioned a few days ago by the Chief of Staff of the JMSDF, Admiral Sakai, the two countries have launched a broad cooperation program for the F-35B STOVL multi-role fighter. Rome has now committed to acquiring up to 60 F-35A CTOL, the conventional landing and take-off variant intended for the Air Force, and 30 F-35B STOVL, the vertical take-off and landing variant designed for the Navy. Tokyo plans to acquire up to 105 F-35A CTOL and 42 F-35B STOVL, which will likely be assigned to the newly refurbished Izumo-class light aircraft carriers. On the other hand, Italy intends to deploy its F-35B STOVL contingent on the flight decks of its flagship Cavour, which is expected to sail the Pacific between late 2023 and early 2024, and her sister aircraft carrier Trieste. Ensuring the interoperability of the two navies would bring a tremendous operational advantage in terms of deployment, maintenance, and scheduled rotation of naval and aerial assets, thus increasing their readiness and deterrence capacity in the Indo-pacific.

Traditionally limited to the Mediterranean Sea, the renewed strategic interest of Italy in Asia is perfectly consistent with the NATO doctrine that defines the security of Europe as dependent from that of East Asia and is viewed with favor both by the two leading powers in the region: the United States and the United Kingdom. Such enhanced cooperation, especially lobbied by London, was also just recently officialized by a recent MoU signed by the Prime Ministers of Japan, Fumio Kishida, and Italy, Giorgia Meloni, that raised the countries’ bilateral cooperation to the level of strategic partnership, thereby creating a permanent consultation mechanism in the domains of foreign and defense policy issues. The new era of cooperation between Tokyo and Rome is also welcomed by Italy’s Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, who, on the sidelines of the recent trilateral meeting with his British and Japanese counterparts, committed the country to explore paths of integration in the cyber-defense, intelligence and training initiatives, and of course, to created joint-ventures in defense R&D.

While Rome seeks to carve for itself a place in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps even at the expenses of other European partners, to match its renewed commitment in North Africa and the Middle East, Tokyo appears to be willing to expand its network of security partners, surely to counterbalance the growth of China but also to reduce its dependence on the United States. Japan is diversifying its defense technology portfolio, up to now almost completely aligned to Washington’s interests, while at the same time presenting itself to the White House as the essential actor to stabilize the Indo-Pacific and keep China at bay.

As for Italy, the current administration appreciates that investing in the region is mandatory within the changing international political framework to preserve the country’s national interest.

SIMTERRORISM – Modeling Religious Terrorism in Populations impacted by Climate Change

A book by Andrea Molle

available in our catalogue on Amazon (click for sample)

This volume examines the combined effects of risk propensity, relative deprivation, and social learning of deviance on the collective grievance within a religious population under the assumption of civil unrest caused by extreme climatic events. We designed an agent-based model to demonstrate how greater or lesser amounts of grievance towards political authority are likely to create an ideal en-vironment for organized violence to emerge when resources are threatened by climate change.

Scholars have tried to formulate a generally accepted definition of religious terrorism for almost four decades, but its investigation is still controversial, especially in the context of the emerging study of the political and social consequences of climatic events. This particular form of terrorism is nevertheless highly diffuse and observed to be coming from smaller clubs of radicalized individuals instead of main-stream religious groups. However, we find that doctrinal explanations appear irrelevant in explaining how terrorist cells emerge and organize themselves.

The Philippines: A Geopolitical Linchpin in the Indo-Pacific and Italy’s Strategic Opportunity

Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.

MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.

Conclusions

The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.

The Russian Strategy: offensive (action and interference), defensive, and deterrent. Digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence in global competition.

Terrorism: Islamic State threatens football championships.

Russia: bombing at Crocus City Hall. Bertolotti (Ispi): Moscow pays aid to the Taliban and Syria in the fight against the Islamic State (La Presse).

China and Russia response to NATO’s increased attention to the Pacific ocean

Italy and Japan: seeking a role in the global arena

SIMTERRORISM – Modeling Religious Terrorism in Populations impacted by Climate Change

A book by Andrea Molle

available in our catalogue on Amazon (click for sample)

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