The article
examines the main threats to Italian national security attributed to Russia,
focusing on three strategic areas: cyber security, disinformation, and
espionage. Russia emerges as one of the primary challenges for Italy in the
cyber domain due to its ability to carry out targeted attacks aimed at
acquiring sensitive information or disrupting critical infrastructure.
Similarly, Moscow’s systematic use of disinformation serves as a tool to
influence public opinion and political decisions in Italy, leveraging social
media and traditional media to disseminate false or manipulated content. The
issue of espionage is framed within the context of bilateral cooperation
initiatives such as the 2020 operation “From Russia with Love,”
during which risks related to the collection of sensitive information under the
guise of healthcare assistance came to light. This aspect ties into emblematic
cases such as the arrest of Walter Biot, an officer of the Italian Navy,
accused of espionage on behalf of Russia. The article highlights the need for
multidimensional counterstrategies to address these threats, combining advanced
technologies, international cooperation, and enhanced institutional resilience.
Emergency situations, crises, and vulnerabilities: the perfect ground for emerging threats
The
dynamics of international relations and global policies profoundly affect the
competition between state and non-state actors, influencing political, social,
and economic sectors. The assertiveness demonstrated by certain countries in
the international arena is also contributing to redefining power balances at
both regional and global levels. Events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the energy crisis are already leaving
a lasting impact, both for Italy and many other nations, with significant
effects in economic and social spheres.
The
COVID-19 pandemic severely tested Italy, exposing systemic vulnerabilities and
latent critical issues. It triggered an unprecedented health crisis, with an
exponential increase in infections and deaths, coupled with an overload on the
healthcare system. This was accompanied by an economic and social crisis
characterized by rising unemployment and a contraction in consumer spending,
direct consequences of restrictive measures such as lockdowns, which led to the
closure of numerous productive activities.
Before
the full effects of the pandemic could be absorbed, the conflict in Ukraine
broke out on February 24, 2022, initiated by the Russian invasion. This war
sparked a new economic crisis, exacerbated by rising raw material costs and
reduced trade flows. At the same time, it caused an international political
crisis, with the imposition of sanctions against Russia and challenges in
energy supplies for many European countries.
The
resulting energy crisis further worsened the economic situation, leading to a
significant increase in the prices of primary resources and challenges in
energy access. These factors directly impacted the Italian economy, reducing
the competitiveness of national businesses.
This
context highlights the complexity of international relations and the volatility
of alliances and rivalries, underscoring the unpredictability of events capable
of disrupting access to energy resources and influencing their availability and
prices. Such dynamics have substantial repercussions across social, political,
and economic domains, underscoring the need for careful and strategic
management of these global phenomena (Bertolotti, 2023).
Emerging threats to Italy’s security and Russia’s capabilities (and lines of action).
Italy’s security and defense are increasingly challenged by a range of
emerging threats that manifest across various domains within the global
context. Among these, cybercrime stands out as
one of the most critical challenges. With the growing reliance on digital
technologies, Italy’s critical infrastructure and businesses have become
increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. These attacks, often executed using
sophisticated methods, aim to steal sensitive information or compromise
systems, causing significant damage. Russia, in particular, is considered one
of the primary sources of these threats, leveraging cyberspace for espionage
activities and interference in strategic infrastructure.
Industrial espionage poses an additional risk, targeting the flagship sectors of Italy’s
production system and national expertise. In a highly competitive global
environment, industries such as automotive, aerospace, defense, and energy are
particularly exposed to such practices. Advanced technologies and cutting-edge
innovations are frequently targeted by these attacks, with strategic
consequences for the country’s competitiveness.
Italy’s national healthcare system is also
vulnerable. Cyberattacks in this sector can disrupt essential services,
jeopardize the personal data of patients and staff, and result in significant
economic losses for healthcare organizations. These actions can have a
devastating impact on public health, further exacerbating emergency situations.
Disinformation and propaganda represent another emerging threat, with the potential to manipulate
public opinion through the dissemination of false or distorted information.
Social media and traditional media are often exploited to create confusion and
uncertainty, influencing political decisions and hindering crisis management.
In an already fragile context, marked by the effects of the pandemic and the
energy crisis, such dynamics can deepen social divisions, undermining stability
and national cohesion.
Finally, the energy crisis emerges as a
significant threat. Dependence on external resources and rising raw material
prices have a direct impact on the Italian economy and the competitiveness of
its businesses, complicating emergency management and decision-making processes
for authorities (Bertolotti, 2023).
Russia’s Role
Russia positions itself as a key actor in the landscape of emerging
threats to Italy. With extensive capabilities in cyber operations, Moscow
employs advanced technologies to conduct hacking activities, deploy
sophisticated malware, and exploit phishing and social engineering techniques.
These tools, often supported by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups linked
to the Russian government, enable interference with protected systems and the
acquisition of strategic information.
In the geopolitical arena, Russia has developed an integrated approach
to strategic communication and digital diplomacy. As described by President
Vladimir Putin in 2012, soft power is used to
achieve foreign policy objectives without direct reliance on military tools.
Organizations such as the “Russian World” and the “Gorchakov
Fund of Public Diplomacy,” along with the Rossotrudnichestvo agency, play
a central role in this strategy, operating through the dissemination of
targeted information and alternative narratives on social networks.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia intensified its propaganda efforts
through the delivery of humanitarian aid to various countries, including Italy.
These initiatives, communicated strategically through social media, were used
to consolidate Russia’s influence on the international stage. This approach
enabled the Kremlin to gain favor in strategic regions such as the Balkans, the
Middle East, and Latin America, as well as within the European Union.
The combination of disinformation, propaganda, and cyber capabilities
makes Russia a central actor in the dynamics of emerging threats, with
significant impacts on global security and stability. For Italy, addressing
these challenges requires coordinated and targeted strategies to protect
critical infrastructure, safeguard social cohesion, and strengthen national
resilience.
Inviting the spy into the house: the “From Russia with Love” operation. An analysis of dynamics and implications.
During
the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian Army’s 7th Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Regiment “Cremona”
(CBRN) was engaged, between March and May 2020, in sanitization and
decontamination activities. This effort included supporting reception centers
for individuals arriving from abroad and sanitizing over 180 facilities in
Lombardy. These operations also involved a Russian contingent sent as part of
the “From Russia with Love” operation, which led to the creation of
nine joint Italian-Russian task forces (Senate of the Republic, Doc. CLXIV no.
31, p. 85). Initially focused on the Bergamo province, the operation revealed
vulnerabilities related to information collection by external actors, raising
concerns that the aid offered could be used as a pretext to breach national
security boundaries.
The
Russian mission involved 104 personnel, including prominent epidemiologists
Natalia Y. Pshenichnaya and Aleksandr V. Semenov. However, the Russian presence
was subject to limitations: the original proposal of 400 personnel was reduced
to 100 by the then-Minister of Defense, Lorenzo Guerini. Additionally, General
Luciano Portolano, Commander of the Joint Operations Command, rejected requests
to extend Russian operations to strategic sites such as military bases and
government offices, including the Ghedi base (Brescia), used by NATO. The
operations were restricted to hospitals and care facilities. During these
activities, the Russian contingent made multiple attempts to collect virus
samples and offered financial incentives to Italian researchers to obtain
scientific data. A notable example was an offer of €250,000 to a director at
Rome’s Spallanzani Hospital, which promoted the Russian vaccine “Sputnik”
at the expense of the Italian “Reithera” project (Jacoboni, 2022).
The Context and Controversies.
The
agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Italian Prime Minister
Giuseppe Conte was reached via telephone on March 21, 2020. However, the
Russian intervention, perceived by Italy as a “blank check,” was
carried out in an uncoordinated manner without adequately consulting the
Italian government. The Russian contribution included military experts,
specialists in biological and chemical threats, and technical units for the
study of pathogens, but it lacked equipment specifically designed to detect
COVID-19.
The
sites chosen by the Russian contingent for sanitization raised concerns, as
many were located near sensitive infrastructure, such as NATO bases housing
nuclear arsenals. These factors led the Italian government to prematurely
terminate the operation, viewing it as a potential national security risk.
Role of Russian Epidemiologists.
A
notable aspect of the operation was the unauthorized presence of two Russian
epidemiologists, Pshenichnaya and Semenov, both affiliated with
Rospotrebnadzor, the Russian agency responsible for pandemic management. The
two had previously worked in Wuhan and stated that their mission’s objective
was to gain insight into how COVID-19 was being managed in other countries.
However, two months after their departure from Italy, they published a report
highly critical of Italy’s pandemic management (Santarelli, 2022), raising
questions about the true purpose of their presence (Bertolotti, 2023).
Final considerations.
The
“From Russia with Love” operation raises questions about the
management of international aid in emergency contexts and the risks associated
with national security. While the Russian intervention was officially presented
as a humanitarian contribution, multiple actions suggest it may have also
served as a tool for gathering strategic information and consolidating Moscow’s
geopolitical influence. These dynamics highlight the importance of rigorous coordination
and careful risk assessment in international cooperation during crisis
situations.
Analysis of the Russian operation in Italy: a hybrid warfare strategy.
The
Russian military intervention in Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic represents
a practical example of the application of so-called “hybrid warfare,”
employed by Moscow to gain a temporary strategic advantage within the context
of the global health emergency (Santarelli, 2022). Unlike China, which limited
its support to consultations via videoconference, Italy welcomed and granted
significant operational freedom to Russian military personnel. This allowed
them to gather valuable information on the management and spread of the virus,
which was later utilized for both domestic and international propaganda
campaigns, including the promotion of the Russian vaccine “Sputnik
V.”
The
Russian operation appeared to pursue three main objectives. First, the
acquisition of strategic information through espionage activities, aiming to
develop a pandemic management strategy based on knowledge obtained in Italy.
Second, domestic and international propaganda, designed to showcase Russia’s
progress and promote the adoption of the “Sputnik” vaccine by other
countries, including Italy. Third, an “information warfare” campaign
aimed at discrediting Italy’s handling of the health crisis, leveraging
contributions and statements from prominent Russian epidemiologists.
Implications for National Security.
The
“From Russia with Love” operation underscores the need for a thorough
assessment of national security implications in emergency situations. This case
provides a concrete example of how external actors can exploit critical
contexts to infiltrate intelligence networks, gather strategic data, or
penetrate national security systems. Under the guise of humanitarian
assistance, such operations can undermine internal stability and bolster the
geopolitical influence of third countries.
Italy’s
experience highlights the importance of maintaining strict oversight and establishing
clear boundaries in international collaborations during emergencies to mitigate
risks to the integrity and security of the state (Bertolotti, 2023).
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The Trump-Zelensky Call on Peace in Ukraine: Reading Between the Lines
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The statement released following the telephone conversation was coordinated and aligned, practically identical. From the shared acknowledgment of the significance of the negotiations held in Jeddah to the decision to accept an unconditional ceasefire—a move that effectively amounts to yielding to Russia. This scenario—of an exhausted Ukraine deprived of territories conquered by Moscow—is precisely what we have been anticipating for at least two years, though discussion of it has been avoided in favor of an idealistic, unrealistic narrative focused solely on Ukraine’s complete liberation. Unfortunately.
However, there is a subtle difference between Washington’s and Kyiv’s statements: Zelensky reiterated the need to strengthen air defense. Trump agreed with this necessity but highlighted that he would do his best to find a response to this requirement within Europe. By doing so, he effectively passed the responsibility to the Europeans—or at least reminded the EU of a role it verbally claims but that Washington has practically filled since the beginning. Perhaps not economically, but certainly regarding the supply of weapons and equipment. Moreover, while Zelensky did not mention it, Trump suggested the possibility of transferring ownership of Ukraine’s energy sector to U.S. companies. This is an interesting point, as it could serve as a deterrent to any future aggressive claims from Moscow.
In practical terms, Ukraine has absorbed the blow, yielding to U.S. demands, having no real alternative.
Therefore, the scenario emerging on the horizon is a diminished Ukraine—territorially reduced, depleted of natural resources, and deprived of any realistic possibility of NATO membership, though not necessarily excluded from the European Union. This outcome would be highly advantageous for Russia, which does not view the EU as an insurmountable obstacle.
Europe’s Defense Conundrum: Why PESCO and Other Initiatives Always Fall Short.
by Andrea Molle.
The European Union has long aspired to
bolster its collective security and strategic autonomy. Over the past decade,
initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European
Defence Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) have
been launched to strengthen European defense capabilities. However, these
initiatives, while symbolically significant, have failed to provide Europe with
a coherent and effective security framework. As geopolitical tensions rise,
particularly with an increasingly aggressive Russia and ongoing instability in
the Middle East and North Africa, it is time for Europe to acknowledge the
fundamental flaws in its current defense approach and consider more radical
solutions.
As of March 2025, Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) continues to serve as the European Union’s framework for
deepening defense collaboration among its member states. Since its inception in
2017, PESCO has expanded to include 26 participating countries, collectively
working on 68 collaborative projects aimed at enhancing military capabilities
and interoperability. In November 2024, the Council of the European Union
approved conclusions on the PESCO Strategic Review, reaffirming PESCO’s pivotal
role in advancing defense cooperation. This review emphasized the need to adapt
PESCO to the evolving geopolitical landscape and underscored the importance of
addressing existing challenges to bolster its effectiveness.
Despite these efforts, PESCO continues to
face significant hurdles. Many projects have encountered delays due to
inadequate financial and practical planning, leading to discussions about
reviving or retiring underperforming initiatives. Furthermore, divergent
national interests and varying interpretations of strategic autonomy among
member states have impeded cohesive progress. For instance, Poland has
expressed concerns that PESCO could potentially undermine NATO or weaken
security cooperation with the United States, both of which are vital for the
security of NATO’s Eastern Flank.
To enhance the effectiveness of PESCO, the
EU has opened certain projects to third-party participation. Notably, Canada,
Norway, and the United States have been involved in the “Military
Mobility” project since December 2021, with the United Kingdom joining in
November 2022. Canada has also been invited to participate in the “Network
of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations” project as of
February 2023. This inclusion aims to leverage external expertise and resources
to strengthen PESCO initiatives. In August 2024, Switzerland received approval
to participate in two PESCO projects: “Military Mobility” and
“Cyber Ranges Federation.” This move is intended to enhance
Switzerland’s national defense capabilities while adhering to its neutrality
obligations.
Looking ahead, the ongoing PESCO Strategic
Review, set to conclude by the end of 2025, offers an opportunity to reshape
the framework to better address contemporary security challenges. The review
aims to reinvigorate PESCO by refining its objectives, improving project
management, and ensuring that collaborative efforts yield tangible military
advancements. In summary, while PESCO has made strides in fostering defense
cooperation within the EU, it continues to grapple with bureaucratic inefficiencies,
divergent national priorities, and varying levels of commitment among member
states. The outcomes of the current strategic review and the inclusion of
third-party participants will be crucial in determining PESCO’s future efficacy
in enhancing Europe’s defense posture.
Similarly, the European Defence Fund (EDF),
established in 2017, serves as a pivotal instrument in bolstering the European
Union’s defense research and innovation. For the 2021-2027 period, the EDF has
been allocated a budget of approximately €8 billion, with €2.7 billion
dedicated to collaborative defense research and €5.3 billion earmarked for
capability development projects. Recognizing the need for enhanced defense
capabilities, the European Commission has proposed a substantial increase in
defense funding. In March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
announced plans for a €150 billion defense fund, aiming to encourage member
states to invest in military capabilities with the support of EU-backed loans.
This initiative underscores the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense
posture in response to evolving geopolitical challenges.
The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
(CARD) is another crucial mechanism designed to harmonize national defense
planning and investments among EU member states. CARD provides a comprehensive
overview of the EU defense landscape, identifying collaborative opportunities
and facilitating cooperation. However, the 2024 CARD report indicates that,
despite progress in defense spending and cooperation, significant room for
improvement remains. Member states are encouraged to take decisive actions to
sustain investments and enhance the efficiency of their armed forces.
In addition to the EDF and CARD, several
other key European defense initiatives and agencies contribute to enhancing the
European Union’s defense capabilities. Established in 2004, the European
Defence Agency supports EU member states in improving their defense
capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as a facilitator for
collaborative defense projects, the EDA serves as a hub for European defense
cooperation, covering a broad spectrum of defense-related activities.
The Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) is the EU’s framework for defense and crisis management, forming a main
component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP
enables the EU to undertake operational missions outside its borders, utilizing
both civilian and military assets to ensure peacekeeping, conflict prevention,
and strengthening international security. The EU is also exploring the
development of a new satellite network to reduce dependence on U.S. military
intelligence. This initiative aims to enhance the EU’s capability to detect
threats and coordinate military actions, providing more frequent updates and
greater autonomy in intelligence gathering. These initiatives and agencies
collectively contribute to a more integrated and robust European defense
framework, addressing both current and emerging security challenges.
Compounding the challenges faced by these
initiatives is the EU’s continued reliance on NATO as its primary security
guarantor. While European leaders often speak of “strategic
autonomy,” the reality is that Europe remains dependent on American
military power. The war in Ukraine has underscored NATO’s irreplaceable role in
European security, with the United States providing the bulk of military aid
and strategic coordination. This reliance on NATO creates a paradox: while the
EU desires greater defense independence, it is unwilling or unable to develop
the necessary capabilities to make that independence meaningful. Attempts to
establish a credible European defense identity, such as the European
Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France, have made little progress due to
the competing priorities of member states.
To address these shortcomings, Europe must
reconsider its defense strategy with bold, pragmatic solutions. First, a
genuine commitment to defense spending is necessary. The EU should set binding
defense investment targets akin to increasing NATO’s GDP requirement. ReArm
Europe is a step in the right direction, but a common European military budget,
funded through EU-wide mechanisms, could help overcome fragmentation in defense
procurement and capability development.
Secondly, we must understand that establishing
a fully integrated EU army has long been considered politically unfeasible due
to concerns over national sovereignty and the complexity of aligning diverse
military structures. However, recent developments indicate a shift toward more
cohesive European defense capabilities. In March 2022, the EU introduced the
Strategic Compass, outlining the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC)
by 2025. This modular force aims to mobilize up to 5,000 personnel,
incorporating modified EU battlegroups and additional forces from member
states.
French President Emmanuel Macron has also
been a vocal proponent of strengthening EU defense mechanisms. In April 2024,
he proposed the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2025,
emphasizing the need for a “European Defense Initiative” to develop
strategic concepts and capabilities, particularly in air defense and long-range
operations. Despite these initiatives, several challenges persist. Nations like
Germany face difficulties in recruiting and preparing their armed forces,
particularly among younger generations who may prioritize work-life balance
over military commitments.
Finally, enhancing Europe’s security
necessitates a comprehensive approach that integrates institutional military
frameworks and civilian preparedness. While the idea of an EU-wide right to
self-defense akin to the United States’ Second Amendment is culturally and
legally complex, Europe has been advancing initiatives to bolster civilian
resilience and preparedness.
In conclusion, Europe’s security environment is
deteriorating, and its current defense initiatives are ill-equipped to handle
the challenges ahead. PESCO, the EDF, and CARD have failed to deliver a
credible path toward strategic autonomy. If Europe is serious about defending
itself, it must embrace more ambitious solutions, including increased defense
spending, operational integration, and a legal framework that empowers both
states and citizens in matters of security. Without such measures, European
defense will remain a fragmented and ineffective patchwork, leaving the
continent vulnerable in an increasingly hostile world.
Macron’s call to rearm and the redefinition of Europe’s identity
French
President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for Europe to rearm is not just a
wake-up call; it is a defining moment for the continent’s security and its role
in global geopolitics. By declaring that Europe can no longer “live off
the dividends of peace,” Macron has acknowledged a reality that many
European leaders have long preferred to ignore. The world has changed, and the
post-Cold War assumption that European security could be outsourced to the
United States is no longer viable. The time for mote strategic autonomy has
arrived.
At the heart of Macron’s message is the growing threat posed by Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine, combined with broader Russian efforts to destabilize Europe, underscores the urgency of the situation. The U.S. has been a crucial ally, but its political landscape is shifting, and future administrations may not be as committed to European security as in the past. Macron’s suggestion that France’s nuclear deterrence could be extended to European allies represents a fundamental shift in strategy—one that could redefine the European security framework. Not a free gift, and of course not the sharing of operational control, but a bid to the leadership of such a framework.
The Financial Times
This shift is particularly interesting given France’s historical posture on defence. Since Charles de Gaulle’s presidency, France has pursued an independent defence strategy, emphasizing national sovereignty over reliance on NATO. In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command, asserting that France should control its own military policy rather than be subordinate to U.S. leadership. Though France rejoined NATO’s command structure in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, its nuclear deterrence has always remained strictly under national control. Macron’s willingness to even discuss extending France’s nuclear umbrella marks a significant departure from this traditional stance, signaling a new era in European defence, but at the same time is a return to the Gaullist paradigm.
The implications of this shift extend beyond France. The European Union is already exploring massive investments in defence, potentially mobilizing hundreds of billions of euros. This move signals an intent to reduce reliance on NATO, or at the very least, to establish a stronger European pillar within the alliance. If successful, this transformation could alter the balance of global power, making Europe a more independent actor on the world stage.
Italy finds itself at a crossroads in this new paradigm, and the clock is ticking. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has stressed the importance of Western unity, warning that division would be “fatal for everyone.” Italy, historically cautious in its defence spending, may now be compelled to significantly increase its military budget. Furthermore, as discussions around European nuclear deterrence evolve, Italy could be forced to reconsider its own strategic policies. Should it align itself more closely with France’s vision, will it maintain its traditional reliance on US’s nuclear umbrella, will Rome opt to create its own “Deterrence Force”?
Regardless, Macron’s speech was not just about military spending; it was about reshaping Europe’s identity. The era of European complacency in defence matters is over. The question now is whether European leaders, particularly in Italy, are willing to rise to the occasion and assume the responsibilities that come with true strategic autonomy. If they fail to act, the cost may not only be Europe’s security but its place in the world order itself.
Europe at a Crossroads: Can It Defend Itself Without the U.S.?
by Andrea Molle.
As geopolitical tensions mount and the
possibility of a U.S. partial or complete withdrawal from NATO looms, Europe
faces an urgent question: Can it defend itself without American support? The
answer, while not impossible, comes with staggering costs and a long, uncertain
road to military independence.
For decades, Europe has free-ridden on the
United States as the backbone of its defense strategy. Washington provides not
only nuclear deterrence but also logistical, technological, and intelligence
capabilities that European nations struggle to replicate on their own. A U.S.
exit from NATO would leave Europe with a security void requiring a dramatic
increase in military spending and political cohesion—both of which are far from
guaranteed.
The numbers are sobering. Today, the
combined defense budgets of the European Union and the United Kingdom stand at
roughly $380 billion per year. Yet, experts estimate that to compensate for the
loss of U.S. capabilities, Europe would need to invest an additional $300-$400
billion upfront in military expansion. To sustain this, European countries
would have to increase their annual defense spending to 3-4% of GDP, up from
the current 1.5-2%.
For Italy, the challenge is particularly
stark. Currently allocating around 1.5% of GDP to defense, approximately €30
billion per year, Rome would likely need to double its spending to €60 billion
annually to maintain a credible security posture. This is no small feat for a nation
with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 140%, where defense spending has
historically taken a backseat to social and economic priorities.
Nonetheless, Italy is a crucial NATO
player, given its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, without
U.S. support, it would face serious gaps in naval power, air superiority, and
intelligence capabilities. Italy would need to expand its fleet, requiring
investments of at least €20-30 billion in additional aircraft carriers,
submarines, and destroyers to safeguard Mediterranean security. Rome relies
heavily on U.S.-built F-35s and missile systems, and a post-NATO scenario would
necessitate either an expensive push for indigenous production or deeper
reliance on France and Germany. Additionally, Italy currently hosts U.S.
nuclear weapons under NATO’s sharing program. If that ends, it faces the
difficult decision of whether to invest in its own nuclear deterrent—an
economically and politically fraught prospect—or depend on France’s arsenal for
protection. Relying on France’s nuclear arsenal would be a precarious option
for Italy, as the two countries do not share many strategic interests, and such
dependence could subordinate Rome to Paris, undermining Italy’s autonomy in
defense matters and limiting its ability to act independently on the
international stage. This would further complicate Italy’s foreign policy, as
it would have to align more closely with French priorities, which may not
always coincide with its own.
Beyond the financial and technological
hurdles, the issue of personnel looms large. European armed forces have shrunk
significantly since the end of the Cold War, with many nations shifting toward
smaller, professional armies rather than mass conscription. Italy, like much of
Europe, would need to rapidly expand its military ranks to meet the demands of
a self-sufficient defense. This means not only recruiting more soldiers but
also training and retaining skilled personnel in key areas such as cyber
warfare, intelligence, and logistics. Without the manpower to operate and
maintain an expanded military infrastructure, even the most advanced weapons
systems would be of little use. Conscription, once abandoned, may need to be
reconsidered—a politically sensitive but perhaps necessary step if Europe is to
sustain long-term military readiness.
Moreover, building an autonomous European
defense system would take decades. In the short term, the first five years
would require a rush to increase budgets and reconfigure alliances, though
Europe would remain highly vulnerable. In the medium term, within five to ten
years, a functional but weaker alternative to NATO could emerge, with expanded
joint operations and rapid procurement of new defense assets. Over the long
term, within ten to twenty years, a fully independent European defense force
could be operational, though fragmentation, inefficiencies, and economic
strains would remain challenges.
Beyond financial constraints, European
nations—Italy included—struggle with political division on military issues.
Germany has only recently begun reversing decades of defense underinvestment,
while Italy has long faced public skepticism over military expansion. Without
strong political will and decisive leadership, Europe’s path to defense
autonomy will be slow and disjointed. The economic burden is another major
concern. While France and Germany might absorb higher defense costs, countries
like Italy, Spain, and Greece may find it nearly impossible without significant
sacrifices in other areas, such as infrastructure, social programs, and energy
investment.
Another possibility is for Rome to ensure
continued American military and strategic support. However, an alignment with
Washington would alienate some of Italy’s European partners who may favor a
more autonomous defense framework, potentially dooming European unity.
Furthermore, it would reinforce Italy’s dependence on the U.S. for security,
leaving it vulnerable to the shifting priorities of U.S. foreign policy while
limiting its influence within the European Union on defense and security
issues. Regardless of the chosen option, this would mark a radical shift in
military strategy, involving increased defense spending, naval expansion, and a
potential reassessment of its role in nuclear deterrence.
In conclusion, political fragmentation and
economic limitations could make replacing NATO’s capabilities an uphill battle.
Europe must now decide: Will it take defense into its own hands, or will it
remain vulnerable in an increasingly volatile world? One thing is
certain—without U.S. support, the cost of security will skyrocket, and for
nations like Italy, the stakes have never been higher.
Abstract Over the course of 2023 and 2024, several European countries grew increasingly concerned about the involvement of teenagers and minors in terror-related crimes and extremist activities. If, on the one hand, attacks are still largely carried out by men just under the age of 30, on the other, online radicalization is having an unprecedented impact on kids; as such, it represents a demanding challenge for law enforcement and professionals working in the field of prevention. Keywords Radicalization, Terrorism
On the evening of Saturday, 2nd March, 2024, in a central district of Zürich, a fifteen-year-old Swiss boy of Tunisian origin seriously stabs an Orthodox Jew walking nearby. In the hours following the attack, a pre-recorded video message emerges online, in which the boy, who calls himself a “soldier of the Caliphate” and swears allegiance to the Islamic State, declares that he acted in response to the latter’s appeal to target “the Jews and Christians and their criminal allies”, and he in turn incites others to take the initiative (1).
This event took place within a global context which has been marked by a significant increase in anti-Semitism following Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack on 7th October, 2023 to which Israel responded by putting Gaza to fire and sword. The tragic loss of civilian lives has fuelled jihadi and extremist narratives more in general, as well as igniting an intense social polarization of the kind we see play out, often violently, in the streets, on university campuses and the internet; a climate with a strong potential for radicalization and mobilization, accentuated by intense misinformation, to which children under the age of 15 are also subjected (2).
The Swiss Confederation – that was already hit by two jihadist stabbing attacks back in 2020 in Morges and Lugano, where an adult man and woman respectively, lashed out at randomly chosen victims – is suddenly confronted with a trend which characterized the universe of violent extremism and radicalization in Europe for some years now: that is, individuals involved in these phenomena keep getting younger and younger.
In 2021, British statistics already highlighted a significant increase in the arrests of children under the age of 18 on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes, with a prevalence of far-right ideology (3). Percentages continued to rise till they reached their highest peak so far in 2023 when, out of the total number of people who were detained, almost 19% concerned teenagers under the age of 17 (4).
Boys’ and girls’ attraction to jihadism is consistent with the events that unfolded around the middle of the past decade, at the height of ISIS’ territorial expansion; at that time too, the Old Continent saw numerous teenagers buy into the Islamic State’s plans and narrative, setting out on a journey to Syria and Iraq; like British teenager Shamima Begum, who left London in 2015, at the age of 15, with two friends, and who’s currently stuck in a detention camp in Syria, where the families of ex-combatants are held. Her case became emblematic and controversial following the authorities’ decision to deprive her of British citizenship -which made her stateless- despite arguments that she might be a victim of indoctrination and perhaps even trafficking (5).
Very young people committed acts of jihadist violence after ISIS, as of 2014, started encouraging those who could not make it to the Middle East, to rise up in their respective countries and with all means available; which would also usher in the so-called “lone wolves” season -a somewhat misleading definition, considering the contacts and networks that regularly pop up in investigations-. This strategic move by the Caliphate permanently changed the terrorists’ modus operandi, enhancing the autonomy of individuals and allowing the Islamic State, when confronted with operational difficulties, to continue projecting an image of strength by claiming ‘successful’ actions carried out by its own sym-pathizers.
A study of Islamist attacks which occurred in Europe between 2014 and 2017 shows that teenagers and children were involved in just under a quarter of jihadist events, both successful and foiled; the phenomenon mainly affected France, Germany and the United King-dom (6).
An event similar to the one which happened in Zürich had previously taken place in Marseille in 2016, when a 15-year-old of Kurdish origin attacked a Jewish teacher near the school where he taught.
More recent cases were the brutal killing, in November 2020, on the outskirts of Paris, of Prof. Samuel Paty by an 18-year-old Russian of Chechen origin (the attack followed a violent Islamist social media campaign which had been unleashed against the teacher over the previous days) or again, the stabbing of a high school teacher in Arras, in October 2023, by a 20-year-old radicalized youth from Ingushetia. After this latest attack, French anti-terrorism prosecutor Jean-François Ricard stated that over three years (in other words, since 2020) a growing propensity, on the part of youth, for planning violent action had been noted (7).
It should be underlined that successful attacks largely remain a prerogative of adults; START InSight’s database, which traces the profiles of jihadists who spring to action, indicates that the median age of those who have struck Europe over the past nine years (2014-2023) is 26: a figure that varies over time – from 24 years of age in 2016, to 30 in 2019) – and which appears slightly on the rise in 2023, settling at 28.5 years of age.
Figure 1 age of jihadist attackers in Europe, 2014-2023 (START InSight’s database)
More generally, we can see that 7% of terrorists were under the age of 19 (with signs of a progressive decrease in minors!); 38% were between 19 and 26 years of age; 41.5% between 27 and 35 years of age and, finally, 13.5% were over 35.
A previous study by the University of Applied Sciences of Zürich (ZHAW, 2019), based on the available information pertaining to 130 different jihadist cases which had been dealt with by the Federal Intelligence Service over the previous ten years, indicated that individuals whose radicalisation process started under the age of 20 represented 18%, while for minors this figure dropped to 6% (8), hinting at the time at a somewhat ‘marginal’ problem.
However, in the Canton of Vaud, where a prevention programme has been in place since 2018, over 40% of the cases the authorities dealt with involve minors (9). Moreover, Christian Dussey, the head of Swiss Intelligence, recently declared that the jihadist radicalization of minors today affects the Confederation in (even) greater proportions than other European states (10). Shortly after the attack in Zürich, six other boys between the ages of 15 and 18 were arrested in the French-speaking and German-speaking regions of Switzerland; they were in contact with peers in Germany, France and Belgium and some among them apparently intended to carry out attacks, in Switzerland as well. According to reports, over the first 9 months of 2024, Swiss Police had to intervene in 11 cases of young people who were radicalised; an 11-year-old boy was also arrested (11). Terrorism expert Peter Neumann pointed out that overall, in Europe, since October 2023, two-thirds of all arrests involved children between the ages of 13 and 19 (12).
In England and Wales, from April 2022 to March 2023, over 60% of the cases referred to the Prevent programme – which requires professionals in the public sector, especially schools, to report suspected radicalisation of all kinds – concerned individuals aged 20 and below; 31% did not reach the age of 14. But while most of the cases did not require to be further supported through the programme – almost half of the most serious ones involved children between the ages of 11 and 15 (13).
“Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terror-ism Offenders” is a comprehensive study published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR, King’s College London, 2023), which examines the activities of 43 juveniles convicted of terrorism-related offences across all ideologies in England and Wales since 2016 (14); its authors warn against underestimating the role of children; although no child managed to commit an attack in the period under their consideration, and despite the fact that the most common crime consisted in possession of extremist material, this research indicates that almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing acts of terrorism and that kids can act as “amplifiers” and “innovators”. Minors can create and disseminate their own propaganda, recruit others and plan attacks. Factors related to age, such as naivety or lack of experience and organizational skills likely played a role in disrupting their projects.
This resourcefulness on the part of youngsters characterised the extremist landscape in recent years: in 2020, it was brought to light that the Feuerkrieg Division, a far-right online group with terrorist intents and members in various countries, from the United States to Lithuania, was headed by a 13-year-old Estonian (he was 11, at the time of its foundation in 2018). Several teenagers within the group were actively planning attacks (15).
In March 2024 in Liverpool, a 20-year-old left-wing anarchist was sentenced to 13 years in prison; among other things, he planned to kill 50 people and dedicated a weapons and bomb making manual to “misfits, social nobodies, anarchists, [and] terrorists past and future, who want to fight for freedom against the government” (16).
The emancipation of extremism A number of studies and investigations have analysed how groups, movements and individuals -especially jihadists or those belonging to the vast galaxy of the far-right- have been capable of seizing and exploiting the opportunities progressively offered by the Internet and the evolving technologies, in order to forward their ideologies, approach potential recruits and sympathizers, disseminate magazines and practical guides for aspiring attackers, as well as adapting and diversifying their communication also according to gender. This includes the use of AI to quickly process propaganda images and videos with a strong and ‘immediate’ aesthetic and emotional impact, that only a decade ago would have required the meticulous contribution of a team while today it can rely on the work of a single person (17).
Over time, the ways of producing, consuming and sharing propaganda, as well as the identities of those involved in these activities, have substantially changed.
The advent of social media around the mid-2000s, in particular, made access to and spread of extremist material easy and fast; people can establish long-distance relationships and consistently interact, to the point that, researcher Jacob Ware writes in his essay on this topic, “the radicalization process now infiltrated every aspect of a subject’s life, and a radicalizer could project influence into a living room or bedroom” (18).
Ware explains that we are today facing the third generation of online (social media) radicalization, when individuals do not merely act autonomously, but they promote themselves and their own actions.
Terrorist groups (those with a solid internal hierarchy) have become less relevant, while ideologies are more fluid. In #ReaCT2022, media scholar Michael Krona, referring to the jihadist context, had already spoken of online supporters who seem less inclined to tie themselves to a single organization, and who rather ” promote wider ideological interpretations and build their own brand, rather than strictly enhancing the brand of IS.” (19).
Today, the production of extremist propaganda and narrative – and incitement to action too – are no longer a prerogative of terrorist movements’ media arms, but an operation which sees the contribution of a large base of followers and militants in contact with each other. A ‘grid’ that can extend from one continent to the other. A 2022 joint international investigation by journalists who infiltrated an online network of neo-Nazi teenagers points out how the advantage of this network -but the same observation could apply to others as well- lies in its loose, mobile structure, which hinges on the participation of individuals scattered around the world: “all they need is a computer, a mobile phone and a bedroom. And all they have in common is their ideology and their hatred: towards Jews, political figures, journalists” (20).
The image of teenagers radicalising in the privacy of their bedrooms seems recurring; yet the latter can today be considered more of a control room than a shelter where vulnerable and isolated boys (or girls) fall prey to ill-intentioned recruiters. The aforementioned British study on juveniles convicted of terrorism underlines the need to overcome the stereotype which sees children as mere “pawns” in the hands of adults; when active within an extremist online context which thrives on anonymity, the “weight” and effect of, by instance, their actions and posts, is identical to that of all the other users.
These online ‘fighters’, who are now mainly digital natives, show a strong potential in ensuring the constant promotion of extremist ideas – a pro-ISIS media campaign specifically urges these “one-person armies” and “Internet mujahideen” not to give up. (21). The ability to selectively use different social media and encrypted messaging apps to communicate, exchange information, encourage each other, discuss violence, attacks and targets, and to migrate from platform to platform with a view to escaping the axe of big tech and joint police operations aimed at ridding the Internet of terrorist content, make them an asset difficult to counter.
In brief, the current era is characterized by an ’emancipated’, widespread and decentralised type of extremism, which is based on ‘free initiative’; within this ecosystem, “everyone can be replaced”(22) and all attackers can turn into a source of inspiration for others; whether it’s Brenton Tarrant, a right-wing extremist who, in 2019, at the age of 28, attacked two mosques killing over 50 people in Christchurch, New Zealand; whether it’s Elliott Rodger who, in 2014, at the age of 22, committed a misogynistic massacre in California and is now celebrated by violent incels; or again, whether it’s the 15-year-old Swiss perpetrator of the Zürich attack, whose gesture is praised by IS’ acolytes. A few days after the event, researchers from the Counter Extremism Project spotted half a dozen Tik-Tok profiles celebrating the Swiss jihadist (23).
The radicalisation of violence When defining the current context in which teenage extremism occurs, analysts and media have sometimes resorted to the expression ‘TikTok-jihad’ or ‘TikTok terrorism’. Indeed, social media, gaming platforms and encrypted chats are now thought to represent the main tools of radicalisation. They should not, however, be simply viewed as communication ‘channels’ that can get a message across to potential new supporters. Rather, they should be acknowledged as ‘spaces’ where interaction, socialisation and engagement take place; these terms and concepts are vital when trying to understand a ‘world’ that does not merely consist in a galaxy of violent politico-religious ideologies but is also inhabited by sub-cultures which youth helped expand (like the incel movement, or the Siege culture). In other words, this environment consists in communities with their own values, behavioural norms, linguistic and aesthetic codes; and for teens, who might be struggling to find their own identity and place in the world, or might harbour feelings of rebellion, or might be weighed down by personal vulnerabilities that can result from family conflicts, bullying or racism, such sense of belonging plays an important role.
Over the past few years researchers and intelligence professionals have been drawing attention to the fact that psychological problems and commitment to violence tend to precede ideology on the path to extremism; appetite for power in social relationships, a desire for revenge, or to take centre stage, vent personal frus-trations (24), are all considered strong enough motivations in contributing to youth radicalisation, a process that sees personal grievances overlap with socio-political battles. All these aspects combined with algorithms that reward provocative content and the trivialization of hatred, help lowering the threshold for accessing extremism.
In this complex and ever-evolving scenario, assessing risks associated to radicalized individuals in the real world can be particularly difficult, especially if they are minors, and despite the awareness that radicalisation consists in a personal and reversible path that does not necessarily lead to terrorism (25).
Notes 1) In Video Uploaded To Internet, Teenage Stabber Of Jew In Zü-rich Swears Allegiance To Islamic State (ISIS), Calls On Mus-lims To Target Jews And Christians Everywhere, MEMRI, Spe-cial Dispatch No. 11166, 4 March 2024 https://www.memri.org/reports/video-uploaded-internet-teenage-stabber-jew-z%C3%BCrich-swears-allegiance-islamic-state-isis 2) Symonds, T., Gaza war creating a radicalisation moment, senior UK police officer says, BBC News , 19th January 2024 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-68035172 3) Counter- Terrorism Policing, Upward trend in children arrest-ed for terrorism offences, News, 9th June 2022 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/upward-trend-in-children-arrested-for-terrorism-offences/ 4) Counter-Terrorism Policing, Number of young people arrested for terrorism offences hits record high, News, 15th March 2024 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/number-of-young-people-arrested-for-terrorism-offences-hits-record-high/ 5) Sabbagh, D., Shamima Begum a victim of trafficking when she left Britain for Syria, court told, The Guardian, 24th October 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/24/shamima-begum-victim-of-trafficking-when-she-left-uk-for-syria-court-told 6) Simcox, R., European Islamist Plots and Attacks Since 2014 — and How the U.S. Can Help Prevent Them, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3236, 1st August 2017 ; see also: Bourebka, M., Overlooked and underrated? The role of youth and women in preventing violent extremism, CIDOB, Notes internationals, 240, 11/2020: “In the European con-text, as of 2016, the fastest-growing age group amongst the radical-ised individuals in Europe was 12- to 17-year-olds” 7) de la Ruffie, E., Attentat: des mineurs radicalisés, « un phéno-mène nouveau » et « inquiétant », selon le procureur anti-terroriste, Le Journal du Dimanche, November 7, 2023 https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/attentat-des-mineurs-radicalises-un-phenomene-nouveau-et-inquietant-selon-le-procureur-antiterroriste-139493 8) Sulmoni, C., Radicalizzazione jihadista e prevenzione. Aggiornamenti dalla Svizzera, START InSight https://www.startinsight.eu/tag/zhaw/ 9) How the Islamic State group is courting minors on video game platforms, RTS, 27 May 2024 https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/2024/article/comment-le-groupe-etat-islamique-courtise-les-mineurs-sur-les-plateformes-de-jeux-video-28516132.html 10) Rhyn, L., and Knellwolf, T., «Die Schweiz hat überdurchschnittlich viele Fälle radikalisierter Jugendlicher», Tages-Anzeiger, 22 August 2024 https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch-geheimdienst-chef-sieht-sicherheit-der-schweiz-in-gefahr-665955949850 11) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, SEIDI-SERA, RSI, September 6, 2024 https://www.rsi.ch/info/ticino-grigioni-e-insubria/%E2%80%9CMinorenni-radicalizzati-ma-non-per-forza-terroristi%E2%80%9D–2246363.html 12) Ernst, A., Terrorismus in Europa: «Es gibt genügend Hinweise, dass sich etwas Grösseres ankündigt»“, NZZ, 23 August 2024 https://www.nzz.ch/international/terrorismus-in-europa-die-tik-tok-generation-peter-r-neumann-ld.1844746 13) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Pro-gramme, April 2022 to March 2023. Home Office Official Statistics, 14th December 2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2022-to-march-2023#demographic 14) Rose, H., and Vale, G., Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terrorism Offenders, ICSR, London, 2023 15) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/ 16) Gardham, D., Jacob Graham: Left-wing anarchist jailed for 13 years over terror offences after declaring he wanted to kill at least 50 people, Sky News, 19th March 2024 https://news.sky.com/story/jacob-graham-left-wing-anarchist-jailed-for-13-years-over-terror-offences-after-declaring-he-wanted-to-kill-at-least-50-people-13097584 17) Katz, R., SITE Special Report: Extremist Movements are Thriving as AI Tech Proliferates, SITE Intelligence Group, 16th May 2024 https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Articles-and-Analysis/extremist-movements-are-thriving-as-ai-tech-proliferates.html 18) Ware, J., The Third Generation of Online Radicalization, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 16th June 2023 https://extremism.gwu.edu/third-generation-online-radicalization 19) Krona, M., Online jihadist communities build their brands and expand the terrorist universe by creating new entities, Re-aCT2022, Report on Terrorism and Radicalism in Europe, N.3, Year 3, ed. START InSight (Lugano) https://www.startinsight.eu/react2022-n-3-anno-3/ 20) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/ 21) Pro-Islamic State (ISIS) Social Media Campaign Calling For ‘Media Jihad’ Expands To TikTok, Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, MEMRI, 22nd June 2023 https://www.memri.org/jttm/pro-islamic-state-isis-social-media-campaign-calling-media-jihad-expands-tiktok 22) See: Death Weapons 23) Extremist Content Online: Pro-ISIS TikTok Users Celebrate Accused Attacker In Zurich Stabbing, Counter Extremism Pro-ject, 11 March 2024 https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-pro-isis-tiktok-users-celebrate-accused-attacker-zurich-stabbing 24) “IS recruitment is not portrayed as violent enlistment for a political-religious cause but as a platform for venting frustrations with parents, teachers and society. It offers an outlet for their mundane lives and a chance at dubious “15 minutes of fame”, in: Av-rahami, Z., TikTok jihad: Online radicalization threat looms over Europe, Ynetnews.com, 10th August 2024 https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjgiduh9c 25) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, cit.
Chiara Sulmoni, BA, MA, Presidente e Coordinatrice editoriale di START InSight, Lugano, (Svizzera), ha conseguito un BA e un MA in Italian Studies c/o UCL (University College London) e un MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies c/o SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, London). Giornalista e producer, ha lavorato alla realizzazione di documentari e reportage per la radio / TV in particolare su temi legati al mondo arabo e islamico, Afghanistan e Pakistan, conflitti, radicalizzazione di matrice islamista. Dal 17 aprile 2019, è Co-Direttore di ReaCT – Osservatorio nazionale sul Radicalismo e il Contrasto al Terrorismo (Roma-Milano-Lugano).
Jihadist Terrorism in Europe and Mediterranean Dynamics: Historical, Social, and Operational Evolution in an Era of Global Changes
by Claudio Bertolotti, Director, START InSight, ReaCT
Abstract This article investigates terrorism beyond its traditional definitions; it examines its evolution within the geographical borders of Europe, it emphasizes its historical roots, individual and collective motivations, and operational adaptation, sharing the reasons why a revision of the very definition of terrorism is now necessary, and why it ought to be understood as an effect of violence, rather than an act which is merely organized for political ends. Analyzing the data provided by START InSight’s database, the article focuses on EU countries which are constantly affected by the trajectories of jihadism and the consequent challenges for collective security, while contributing to the academic debate with a multidimensional perspective on terrorism which considers its historical, socio-political and cultural aspects.
Keywords Jihadism, Functional blockade, Terrorism
1. Terrorism as a political and social phenomenon which evolves over time in response to the changing dynamics of competition between individuals, groups, and states. Contemporary terrorism, deeply rooted in a complex historical evolution, represents a widespread ideological threat. The threat of jihadist terrorism is particularly significant today and is linked to the historical, conflictual dynamics of international relations and competition in the Middle East and Africa, and to the violence stemming from a radical interpretation of Islam. This conflictual dynamic is increasingly associated with groups’ and individuals’ search for identity through the cultural opposition of a significant segment of second and third-generation immi-grants from the Maghreb living in Europe. We are discussing a fragmented jihadist galaxy characterized by various ideologies and practical approaches, prompting a reconsideration of the concept of contemporary terrorism, which emerges as a social phenomenon distinct from previous forms of terrorism.
This necessary reflection invites us to consider a paradigm shift in the very definition of terrorism, no longer to be understood as an action aimed at achieving political results through violence, hence in its intentions. Instead, terrorism should be seen as the effect of applied violence: it is terrorism, insofar it is a manifestation of violence, without an organization behind it. It is terrorism due to the manifestation, not organization.
Within the same jihadist galaxy, terrorism imposes itself as an instrument of struggle, resistance, and domination, employing various degrees and models of violence: from individual acts to organized, inspired, and insurgent terrorism, of the kind we became acquainted with in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that we now observe in its early manifestations in the Gaza Strip, where the Israel Defense Forces are engaging Hamas (Bertolotti, 2024).
The Afghan experience, which the author of this article has thoroughly studied for many years, combined with the wave of violence following Hamas’s call for strikes against Israel and its allies, has played a decisive role in the resurgence of inspired and emulative terrorism globally. The latter, on the one hand, is based on the victorious experience of the Taliban against the West; on the other, on the anger channeled through Hamas’s communication strategy, which finds resonance in some ideologized Western minorities, conflating Hamas’s violent and terrorist agenda with the legitimate Palestinian cause. Events in international relations are exploited by jihadist rhetoric to demonstrate the righteousness and validity of jihad, and thus of terrorism as a tool of struggle, victory, and justice.
Today, after and alongside Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, the it’s conflict dynamics in the Middle East and Hamas’s media-amplified terrorism that play this role of ideological and mass involvement drive. This results in emulative forms of violence, which terrorism against Israel has partly provoked and could increasingly provoke in Europe, as well as in North African countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel.
2. Trends and Dynamics: Numbers Decline, but the Threat of Terrorism Persists – An Analysis of Attacks from 2014 to 2023 Looking at the past five years, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend from a quantitative perspective, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-Isis/Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2024, 92 attacks (12 in 2023 and 2024 – situation at 20.09.2024), both successful and unsuccessful, were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland: 99 attacks were recorded in the previous period 2014-2018 (12 in 2015).
In the wake of major terrorist events in Europe in the name of the Islamic State group, and subsequently likely related to galvanizing elements following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the call from Hamas, 206 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2024, of which 70 were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 249 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 died in action), 446 victims were killed, and 2,558 were injured (START InSight database).
Both in 2023 and 2024, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks recorded in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by other attacks which took place over the previous days, which raised the figure to the high levels of previous years: from 17% of total emulative actions in 2022 to 58% in 2023 (56% in 2021). 2023 also confirmed an established trend in the phenomenon’s evolution, with an almost exclusive predominance of individual, unorganized actions, generally improvised, progressively replacing structured and coordinated actions characterizing the European urban “battlefield” of 2015-2017 (totality of actions in 2023 and 97% of actions recorded the previous year).
Data from START InSight’s database of jihadist events in Europe
Knives and blades Terrorists are increasingly using knives for a variety of reasons related to practical, ideological, and strategic factors:
Ease of access: Knives are readily available and do not require advanced technical skills to use. Unlike firearms or explosives, which may require logistics or technical knowledge, knives are common in every household or store.
Discretion: A knife can be carried easily without raising suspicion, unlike more conspicuous or dangerous weapons. This allows the attacker to approach victims or locations without being noticed immediately.
Terror effect: Knife attacks, often conducted in public or crowded spaces, have a strong psychological impact on the population. The close and brutal nature of a knife attack amplifies fear among those present and in the media, creating a significant symbolic effect.
Individual attacks: In recent years, many terrorist organizations have encouraged individual or “lone wolf” attacks. Knife attacks are ideal for this type of action, as they require minimal planning and can be carried out by a single person without the need for a complex organizational network.
Weapon control: In many countries, firearm laws are very strict, making it difficult to obtain guns or rifles. Knives, on the other hand, are less regulated and can be legally purchased almost anywhere.
Inspiration model: Successful knife attacks, like those in various European cities in recent years, have inspired other extremists to replicate this type of action, following the narrative that it is an effective and relatively simple means of spreading terror. In summary, the growing use of knives by terrorists is linked to their accessibility, ease of use, discretion, and effectiveness in creating panic and fear among the population (Molle, 2024).
3. Profiles of “European” Terrorists Jihadist terrorism is predominantly a male phenomenon: out of 295 attackers, 97% are male (10 women); contrary to 2020, when 3 female attackers participated in terrorist actions, the 2021-2023 triennium saw no direct participation from them. Identified terrorists (men and women) whose demographic data were disclosed have a median age of 26 years: a figure that varies over time (from 24 in 2016 to 30 in 2019), recording an increase in age in the last analyzed period, delivering a figure of 28.5 years in 2023. The study of the profile of 200 individuals about whom there’s sufficient demographic information draws a very interesting picture: 7% of terrorists are under 19 years old (with a reduction in minors over time), 38% are between 19 and 26, 41.5% are between 27 and 35, and 13.5% are over 35and 13.5% are over 35. These data confirm an in-creasing relevance over time, of the 19-35 age group, with a reduction in minors involved in terrorist attacks over the same period.
93% of the individuals who carried out a terrorist attacks, for whom we have complete information, were “immigrants” (first, second, and third generation), both regular and irregular. 45% of the 155 terrorists, out of a total of 237, who were analyzed in START InSight’s database are first-generation regular immigrants; 28% are descendants of immigrants (second or third generation); irregular immigrants are 26%: a figure which has grown over time, from 25% in 2020, to 50% in 2021, to 67% in 2023, indicating a significant change in the nature of terrorists, with an increasing presence of first-generation attackers (overall 71% of total terrorists). Significant is also the figure related to 7% of European-origin citizens converted to Islam (a slight decline compared to the average of previous years). Overall, 73% of terrorists are legally resident in Europe, while the role of irregular immigrants emerges with a ratio of about 1 in 4 terrorists (the ratio was 1:6 until 2020). In 4% of events, there were children/minors (7) among the attackers, a figure which has decreased.
Ethno-national Dimension of Terrorists in Europe The phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe affects some specific national and ethnic groups more significantly than others. There is a clear proportional relationship between the main groups of immigrants and terrorists, highlighted by the nationality of terrorists or their families of origin, which reflects the size of foreign communities in Europe. In particular, the Maghreb origin prevails: the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan (especially in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy) and Algerian (in France). The phenomenon of radicalization has been particularly evident in Belgium and France, where large Moroccan and Algerian-origin communities have seen a significant number of young people join jihadist groups. In France, for example, a significant portion of terrorists involved in recent attacks came from families of Algerian and Moroccan origin, reflecting the historical presence and size of these communities in the country (Bertolotti, 2023).
Recidivists and Terrorists Already Known to Intelligence The role of recidivists (re-offenders) has grown over time. These are individuals already convicted of terrorism who have committed violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some cases, even within prison facilities. This trend shows a 3% recidivism rate among terrorists who struck in 2018 (1 case), 7% (2) in 2019, 27% (6) in 2020, and 25% (3) in 2023. This situation confirms the social danger of individuals who, although incarcerated, delay the implementation of terrorist actions. This phenomenon suggests an increased likelihood of terrorist attacks in the coming years, parallel to the release of many detainees for terrorism-related offenses.
START InSight highlighted a significant trend regarding terrorist actions carried out by individuals already known to law enforcement or European intelligence. In 2021, such cases represented 44% of the total, while in 2020, they were 54%. This is a significant increase compared to the 10% recorded in 2019 and the 17% of 2018. In 2023 this figure grew to 75%, supporting the concerns of institutions tasked with countering violent phenomena.
Individuals with previous detentions (even for non-terrorism-related offenses) in 2021 confirmed a certain stability in participation in terrorist actions by individuals with a prison record, with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year (33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018, and 12% in 2017); which seems to confirm that, despite a significantly lower figure in 2023 (8%), prison spaces can be identified as potential radicalization hubs.
4. What is the real destructive capacity of terrorism? To understand terrorism comprehensively, one must analyze it on three distinct levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategy involves the use of resources to achieve long-term war goals. Tactics focus on deploying forces in combat to secure specific victories in battles. The operational level bridges the two, coordinating tactical actions to meet strategic objectives. This synthesis, at its core, highlights the importance of human resources in conducting military actions.
Strategic Success Is Marginal Strategic success in terrorist actions, defined as achieving significant structural impacts like national and international air/rail traffic disruptions, military mobilizations, or broad legislative interventions, has decreased from 16% to 13%. This is still considered high given the limited organizational and financial efforts by terrorist groups or individuals. Over the years, strategic success rates have shown a declining trend, highlighting a gradual reduction in capacity and effectiveness: 75% in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in 2019, 12% in 2020, and 6% in 2021. Since 2022, strategic success has not been achieved by terrorist attacks; effectively confirming an ongoing process of normalizing terrorism.
Media Attention is Decreasing Media attention towards terrorist attacks is decreasing. Strategically, attacks received international media coverage in 75% of the cases and 95% nationally. Operations by commando and team-raid units received full media coverage. This media success significantly influenced the recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihadist fighters, peaking during periods of high-intensity terrorist actions (2016-2017). However, the effects of media coverage on recruitment efforts diminishes over time due to two main reasons: firstly, a prevalence of low-intensity actions compared to high-intensity ones, which have decreased, while low and medium-intensity actions have significantly increased from 2017 to 2021, with a notable rise in medium-intensity actions in 2023. Secondly, the public has become gradually less emotionally sensitive to terrorism, particularly low and medium-intensity events.
Despite concerns, Tactical Level Concerns but Is Not a Priority for Terrorism Assuming the goal of actions is to cause the enemy’s death (with security forces as targets in 35% of cases), this was achieved on average in 50% of the cases between 2004 and 2023. However, the long timeframe significantly impacts the margin of error. An analysis of the 2014-2023 period, shows a worsening trend in the terrorists’ desired effects, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an increase in failed actions, at least until 2022, when tactical success stabilized at 33%, which is consistent with 2016 data. 2023 is an outlier. Data from the last six years show that in 2016, tactical success was achieved in 31% of cases, with 6% failed acts. In 2017, success rose to 40%, with a 20% failure rate. In 2018, success dropped to 33%, while failed attacks doubled to 42%. In 2019, success further fell to 25%, then rose to 33% in 2020-2022. This trend, interpreted as a dual effect of reduced terrorist operational capacity and increased European security responsiveness, shows a 2023 rate of 50% actions achieving tactical success, i.e., causing at least one fatality.
Operational Success: The “Functional Blockade” Even when a terrorist attack fails, it produces significant results: it heavily engages armed forces and police, distracting them from routine activities or preventing them from intervening for public welfare. It can also disrupt or overload healthcare services, limit, slow down, divert, or stop urban, air, and naval mobility, and hinder the regular conduct of daily, commercial, and professional activities, harming affected communities. This effectively reduces technological advantages, operational potential, and resilience capacity. Overall, it inflicts direct and indirect damage, regardless of causing fatalities. Limiting citizens’ freedom is a measurable result of these actions. Essentially, terrorism’s success, even without causing fatalities, lies in imposing economic and social costs on society and influencing behaviours over time in terms of security measures or restrictions imposed by political and public safety authorities. This phenomenon is known as a “functional blockade.” Despite the increasingly reduced operational capacity of terrorism, the “functional blockade” remains one of the most important results achieved by terrorists, regardless of tacti-cal success (killing at least one target). From 2004 to the present, terrorism has proven effective in achieving the a “functional blockade” in 80% of cases, peaking at 92% in 2020 and 89% in 2021. This impressive result, obtained with limited resources, confirms the advantageous cost-benefit ratio in favour of terrorism, despite a progressive loss of capacity that saw the “functional blockade” drop to 78% in 2022 and 67% in 2023.
5. Recruitment Capacity and Operational Strategies The Islamic State, having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq (2013-2017), can no longer send its terrorists to Europe due to the loss of direct external operational projection capacity. However, the group has not lost its power of attraction, which demonstrates its ability to develop indirect recruitment, based on the “posthumous” recognition of individuals who successfully carry out individual terrorist actions. For these reasons, the threat remains significant, thanks to the presence and actions of lone actors, often improvised and driven by emulation, without direct links to the organization.
While the Islamic State continues to impose itself ideologically as the main jihadist threat, particularly exploiting the territorial control and financial resources of its Afghan franchise, the Islamic State Khorasan, it is evident that it cannot replicate the overwhelming appeal of the “caliphate” in 2014-2017. The novelty advantage and consequent appeal, particularly towards the youth, have diminished. Additionally, the European Union has significantly reduced its vulnerabilities legislatively and operationally, with more emphasis on counterterrorism than preventive action.
Concerns persist regarding emulative effects and the “call to arms” related to international events that can induce individuals to act in the name of jihad. The most significant event in 2021, which continues to fuel transnational jihad, was the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. This victory fed diverse jihadist propaganda with the message that “victory is the result of continuous struggle” and created competition among jihadi groups engaged in exclusively local struggles and those like the Islamic State, which promote jihad as a relentless global struggle. This competitive dynamic includes actions associated with the Israel-Hamas war and the jihadist call to violence, where Islamic State followers and Hamas supporters have vied for battlefield successes and consequent media attention.
In this continually evolving scenario, attention must be paid to jihadist strength in the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Rwanda, and Mozambique, in order to counter the emergence of new “caliphates” or “wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe. In prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic State boasts of its spread in Africa, in a competitive / collaborative relationship with its Afghan franchise. It highlights how the aim of combating the presence and spread of Christianity will lead to the group’s expansion in other areas of the continent. In places like the Ma-ghreb, the Mashreq, and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s activity focuses on intra-Muslim sectarian struggle. In Africa, its presence has become part of a Muslim-Christian conflict, strengthened by propaganda centred on stopping Muslims from converting to Christianity through the work of “missionaries” and the pretext of humanitarian aid. Violence, kidnappings, and the kill-ing of missionary clergy, attacks on NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso to the Congo, as well as attacks on Christian communities, are all part and parcel of this context.
From North Africa to the Sahel: A Look at “Mediterranean” Terrorism Looking at North Africa, the region continues to face threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State, and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who have travelled to Iraq or Syria. The unnoticed return of these fighters to their home countries following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat poses additional security challenges. In recent years, lone actors and small cells have carried out a series of deadly attacks in various North African states, proving difficult to detect. The Sahel is becoming a new center of jihadist terrorism, with a significant increase in victims in 2023. However, the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has seen a 42% decrease in victims over the past three years. North Africa, in particular, is witnessing a steady reduction in extremist violence, with the number of violent attacks returning to pre-IS levels. In 2022, North Africa saw a 14-fold decrease in victims com-pared to 2015, with Morocco being the safest country in the region, while Egypt remains one of the most affected by terrorism. Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia fall between these extremes with medium to low terrorism impact.
The Sahel and the Maghreb are politically, economically, and security-wise connected. The presence of terrorist groups exploiting ethnic tensions, climate challenges, and lack of public services has turned this region into a hub of jihadist activity, with the risk of spreading the terrorist threat to other areas.
Instability in the Sahel has already affected West Africa and the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are active. This situation could also involve North Africa, jeopardizing the progress made in prevention, counterterrorism, and deradicalization in some countries of the region.
Considering that North African countries are both emigration and transit countries for migratory flows to Europe, this raises the question of possible jihadist contamination or transfer. Monitoring the evolution of a phenomenon in the process of consolidation, which finds its lifeblood in the Mediterranean area, is therefore paramount.
Claudio Bertolotti, ISPI, START InSight’s Director and Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism (ReaCT). Claudio Bertolotti holds a Ph.D. and serves as the Executive Director of START InSight. From 2014 to 2023, he was a senior researcher with the “5+5 Defense Initiative.” He graduated in Contemporary History, specialized in Sociology of Islam, and earned a doctorate in Sociology and Political Science, focusing on International Relations. His work focuses on crisis areas, national strategic interests, national security, the Mediterranean, intercultural dialogue, and, in particular, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, jihadism, and migration flows. Since April 17, 2019, he has been the Executive Director of ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalism and Counter-Terrorism (Rome-Milan-Lugano). Since September 30, 2021, he has been a member of the Committee on Human and Civil Rights at the Regional Council of Piedmont. He is the author of several works, including Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban Warfare between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence (START InSight, 2024), Immigration and Terrorism (START InSight, 2020), Contemporary Afghanistan. Inside the Longest War (CASD, 2019), and Shahid: Analysis of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan (FrancoAngeli, 2010). Corresponding with the Author: claudio.bertolotti@startinsight.eu.
Bibliography Bertolotti, C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight ed., Lugano. Bertolotti, C. (2023), Unraveling the Evolution of Terrorism in Europe: Left-Wing, Far-Right, Anarchist, and Individual Terrorism, and the Role of Immigrants in Jihadist Terrorism within the European Union (Correlation and Regression Analysis), pp. 77-87, in #ReaCT2023, 4th Report on Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization in Europe, START InSight ed., Lugano, ISBN 978-88-322-94-18-7, ISSN 2813-1037 (print), ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Weaponizing Chaos: Exploring Militant Accelerationism from the Far-Left to the Far-Right
By Andrea Molle, Associate Professor, Chapman University
Abstract Militant accelerationism is defined by the Accelerationism Research Consortium as a set of strategies aimed at exacerbating social divisions to hasten the collapse of society, often through violent means. This phenomenon is not confined to a single poli-tical ideology, being present in both the far-right and far-left, though manifesting in different forms. Far-right accelerationism primarily opposes equality, viewing it as a threat to the natural social order, and seeks to precipitate the collapse of liberal de-mocracies through polarization and political violence. From a geopolitical perspective, nations like Russia and China might support such movements to destabilize the West and undermine the legitimacy of the liberal democratic model, thereby reinfor-cing their authoritarian positions. On the other hand, far-left accelerationism originates from Marxism, aiming to accelerate the downfall of capitalism to trigger a proletarian revolution. These dynamics represent a growing threat to international security, as they exploit internal tensions and social divisions to promote global instability.
The Accelerationism Research Consortium, a research initiative specializing in the study of militant accelerationism, defines it as a collection of tactics and strategies aimed at intensifying latent social divisions, often through violent means, in order to expedite the collapse of society. Accelerationism does not necessarily align with a specific political ideology and can be observed on both the extreme left and extreme right of the political spectrum. However, there are distinctions between the two.
For instance, far-right militant accelerationism does not concern itself with critiquing modern capitalism or postcolonialism, but rather focuses on countering the contemporary pursuit of equality, which is perceived as a manifestation of societal decay and a threat to the established social order based on inequality, which is considered the “natural order.” In order to safeguard or reinstate this “natural order,” far-right militant accelerationism seeks to create circumstances that would lead to the downfall of the existing liberal and democratic system, such as through a “race war” or a civil war. Militant accelerationism functions as a platform for political action with the objective of hastening the downfall of liberal and capitalist societies. Its core strategy involves disseminating contradictory and problematic political ideologies through various means, such as promoting polarization or engaging in political violence. This form of terrorism aims to create social emergencies and crises, ultimately incapacitating and dismantling social institutions.
From an International Relations and Security Studies perspective it is noticeable that this goal aligns with the objectives of hostile nations. Russia and China, for example, may support militant accelerationism regardless of its political ideology alignment in the West for several strategic reasons. Firstly, fostering chaos and division within Western nations serves to undermine their stability and global influence, thereby potentially strengthening the position of Russia and China on the world stage. By exacerbating existing societal tensions and polarizations, these countries can create distrac-tions for Western governments, diverting their attention and resources away from global issues such as Ukraine or Taiwan. Secondly, supporting accelerationist groups aligns with Russia and China’s broader objectives of challenging the Western liberal democratic model. By promoting extremist ideologies that reject democratic norms and institutions, such as militant accelerationism, these countries seek to delegitimize Western values and weaken the appeal of democracy as a political system globally. This tactic can help bolster the perceived legitimacy of authoritarian regimes like those in Russia and China, presenting them as stable alternatives to Western democracies. Moreover, fostering internal strife in Western countries can serve as a form of retaliation or deterrence against perceived Western interference in the domestic affairs of Russia and China. By supporting militant accelerationism, these countries can retaliate against Western sanctions, criticisms of human rights abuses, or support for opposition movements within Russia and China. Additionally, by highlighting the internal divisions and societal unrest in Western nations, Russia and China can dissuade Western governments from intervening in their domestic affairs or pursuing aggressive foreign policies against them.
1. Far-left militant accelerationism Accelerationism, as a concept, originated from Marxism and the belief that by intensifying the detrimental forces within capitalism, its eventual destruction and subsequent liberation through revolution can be achieved. Left-wing terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. They may also advocate for environmental or animal rights, hold pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs, or support decentralized social and political systems like anarchism. In terms of incidents, the number of fatal incidents attributed to far-left ideologies is fluctuating. The global peak of revolutionary accelerationist leftist violence occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. However, until 2012, there were still four times as many far-left terrorist incidents compared to far-right incidents. In recent years, particularly in 2019 and 2020, the number of far-right and far-left incidents has been roughly equal. As per more recent times, the situation has started to differ between Europe and the United States. In Europe, far-left attacks started again to be more prevalent. German organizations such as the Engel – Guntermann and the Hammerbande have a clear focus on targeting right-wing extremists or individuals perceived as such. However, there is a noticeable shift in their approach, as they are increasingly engaging in activities that extend beyond local conflicts with the right-wing extremist milieu. The collaboration between group members and non-Germans in carrying out attacks suggests a growing connection to external groups. This interconnectedness among left-wing extremist networks in Europe has the potential to influence their strategies and the specific targets they choose.
In the United States, according to the Anti-Defamation League, only 6% of the 443 registered extremist fatalities between 2012 and 2021 were linked to far-left ideologies. In comparison, 75% were linked to far-right beliefs, and 20% were linked to Islamist beliefs. It is important to note that all the casualties related to far-left ideologies in the US were associated with Black nationalism, which the ADL categorizes as left-wing extremism. Overall, the violent threat posed by left-wing extremists in the US remains relatively small whereas in Europe it is increasing. The trend has been confirmed by several authorities. For example, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) report in 2022 that 80% of the successfully executed attacks were carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups.
Globally, movements affiliated with far-left ideologies include Antifa groups, as well as environmental or animal issue groups like the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front. There are also various far-left alternative media outlets, such as The Grayzone or Breakthrough News, and organizations like the Party for Socialism and Liberation or Workers World Party. These entities may occasionally express sympathy towards authoritarian regimes perceived as hostile to the West and embrace conspiracy theories. While these platforms may not overtly endorse violence, their content and campaigns actively advocate for authoritarian ideologies within mainstream audiences, thereby eroding the credibility of human rights and democracy advocates and promoting polarization. The Grayzone, a far-left media outlet, exemplifies this concerning trend. Established in 2015 by journalist Max Blumenthal shortly after a trip to Moscow, this media platform consistently adopts an ostensibly anti-imperialist stance, frequently defending Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, and Venezuela’s Maduro for their purported resistance against US dominance. Furthermore, it denies the occurrence of the Uyghur genocide and chemical gas attacks in Syria. Blumenthal himself has participated in anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine rallies, and currently plays a highly active role in the Pro-Hamas/Pro-Palestinian movement, which poses a significant and alarming new challenge to national security.
1.1. The use of Internet by far-left militant accelerationism The exploration of the online far-left culture is a topic that is often overlooked. This particular faction, which exists on the fringes of the broader left, positions itself as being against various ideologies and groups such as the alt-right, political correctness, social justice warriors, and centrists and liberal-democratic stances. Despite its ideological roots and the tendency of the left to look down on popular online culture, it employs similar tactics to the online alt-right, including the use of humor, memes, Twitter trolling, and open hostility. However, it remains firmly rooted in progressive leftist ideology. Referred to by various names such as the “alt-left,” the “vulgar left,” or the “Dirtbag Left,” this origin of this movement is attributed to Amber A’Lee Frost, a writer, podcaster, and activist based in Brooklyn. Her podcast Chapo Trap House, associated closely with this movement, employs comedy and irony in a shock jock style, while also criticizing both the Democratic and Republican parties. Other media outlets and individuals connected to the dirtbag left include TrueAnon and Red Scare, which are also loosely associated with the BlueAnon movement, a leftist counterpart to the well-known QAnon phenomenon.
2. Far-right militant accelerationism Initially, militant accelerationism was not primarily associated with far-right extremism. However, it gradually found its way into this milieu through two significant avenues. Firstly, in the 1990s, British philosopher Nick Land developed a right-leaning libertarian version of accelerationism after studying the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on left-wing accelerationism and incorporating his own interpretation of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Two decades later, during the early 2010s, Land’s ideas gained traction among the emerging “alt-right” movement, which became deeply interested in his anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic concept of “neo-reaction.” The second and most influ-ential pathway through which accelerationism infiltrated the far-right was the publication of the book Siege, which compiled newsletter posts written by American neo-Nazi James Mason. Mason, a follower of Charles Mason, has been involved in various neo-Nazi organizations in the United States since the late 1960s. He had personal connections with prominent far-right leaders, including George Lincoln Rockwell, the leader of the American Nazi Party, and William Pierce, the author of the novel The Turner Diaries, which inspired the 1995 terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. Mason was also influenced by Joseph Tommasi, the leader of the National Socialist Liberation Front, a group inspired by leftist organizations and urban guerrilla warfare. Tommasi advocated for the creation of chaos through terrorism as a means to destabilize the political order in the United States.
Mason created the newsletter Siege, published from 1980 to 1986, as a platform to express his disapproval of the stance taken by American far-right extremism. Within the pages of his publication, he incorporated elements of antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories, specifically focusing on a “Jewish world conspiracy” that aimed to execute a “white genocide.” This concept, now labeled as the “Great Replacement,” contributed to the development of the “deep state” myth, spawning the bipartisan trope of a “Zionist Occupied Government” in America. In his book, Mason also argued that the prevailing social order had become so deeply corrupted that established organizations like the American Nazi Party, with their conventional methods of political engagement, had become ineffective in their pursuit of liberating the “white race.” According to Mason, progress could only be achieved through revolutionary, violent, means carried out by individuals and the estab-lishment of a National Socialist “New Order” would require the destruction of society. Far-right militant ac-celerationism, as a subtype of apocalyptic terrorism, draws heavily on antisemitic tropes, including concepts like “white genocide” and the “Great Replacement Theory. Moreover, it leverages perceived traditional knowledge and cultural codes to rationalize their anti-modern beliefs and to target individuals they hold responsible for societal decay. Consequently, accelerationism can be viewed as a quasi-religion, as evidenced by its resemblances and intermingling with groups like the Branch Davidians, whose eschatology mirrors similar dynamics.
Screenshot from a PBS documentary aired on August 7th, 2018
2.1. The use of Internet by far-right militant accelerationism In the United States, adherents of far-right ideologies recognized the potential of the internet as early as the 1980s. They understood that online platforms offered an unparalleled opportunity to disseminate their message to a broader audience without the constraints imposed by traditional media. Notably, David Duke, a prominent figure in the US far-right extremist movement and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, lauded the internet as an ideal platform for a “white revolution.” The advent of online communication played a significant role in the rise of Siege, particularly during the mid-2010s when the “alt-right” gained prominence. This movement embraced militant action strategies, which were further amplified in the aftermath of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, USA, in August 2017. The events surrounding the rally, including the tragic killing of counter-protestor Heather Heyer, sparked intense debates within the American far-right extremist community. Mason’s critique of demonstrations and his advocacy for militant accelerationism resonated widely within these discussions. Consequently, following the Charlottesville events, the hashtag #ReadSiege gained traction both domestically and within the transnational far-right online discourse.
As today, the risk associated with militant accelerationism is primarily monitored in North America, with only a limited number of European analysts actively keeping tabs on its activities. The globalization of far-right militant accelerationism during the 2010s has given rise to various trajectories, all closely intertwined with digital spaces, which should raise concerns. One prominent platform for far-right militant accelerationism was the English-language Iron March, which operated from 2011 to 2017 and served as a breeding ground for accelerationist groups. This forum attracted a diverse range of militant far-right extremists who felt marginalized by other far-right internet forums like Stormfront, established in 1996, or were dissatisfied with the offerings of existing far-right organizations targeted at the youth. Within the Iron March forum, members cultivated their own subculture of far-right militant accelerationism, characterized by key texts and a distinct aesthetic featuring logos inspired by Waffen SS symbols and black and white skull masks. The administrators of Iron March actively encouraged transnational online communication and facilitated regional and local networking among members beyond the confines of the digital realm. Notably, a far-right extremist terrorist network emerged among the users of Iron March, which remains active to this day. Iron March’s influence extended beyond the development of its far-right extremist subculture, as it placed significant emphasis on taking action. Consequently, several accelerationist groups, including National Action (UK), Feuerkrieg Division (USA), and Antipodean Resistance (2016), were established as offshoots of this forum. It is also important to recognize that Iron March merely marked the beginning of this phenomenon.
3. The manosphere Despite a general decline in public activities among far-right militant accelerationists during the COVID-19 pandemic, their digital efforts have significantly increased since the spring of 2022. Consequently, the number of prevented attacks has also risen. The primary trends that originated within these tightly knit online communities during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s remain relevant within the global social network they have evolved into. Notably, new online spaces continuously emerge, often bearing little resemblance to formal, traditional far-right extremist organizations. These decentralized networks, organized in cells, foster sub-cultures defined by their cultural codes, such as memes, and constantly adapt to enhance their relevance in the public sphere. They have now permeated other online realms, including gaming platforms, and rely on the broader internet troll culture. They propagate through the manosphere, a collection of communities centered around radical anti-feminism and the conspiracy theory milieu, where individuals seek “the truth” or embrace the “Red Pill” ideology. These networks thrive in “politically incorrect” boards, forming a transnational subculture that revolves around both ironic and serious far-right extremist, misogynistic, antisemitic, and misanthropic content. Of particular interest is the manosphere, which has attracted the attention of accelerationists due to its rapid growth and potential for real-world violent outbursts.
Despite being referred to as a collective noun, the manosphere encompasses four distinct subcultures: men’s rights activists who view feminist policies as detrimental to men’s rights, incels (involuntary celibates) who hold women responsible for their lack of opportunities and social status, separatists who believe in a feminist conspiracy to dismantle masculinity and advocate for complete segregation between genders, and the seductive type who objectify women and promote the acceptance of rape culture. These emerging subcultures also align themselves with existing digital hate cultures that have already established their presence on various platforms, thereby bolstering their recruitment efforts.
4. When left and right join forces It is important to acknowledge that accelerationist groups primarily act as opportunists and will seize any opportunity to infiltrate a popular movement. This has been evident in various instances throughout history. For instance, in 2020, the far-right anti-government Boogaloo movement attempted to associate themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement by claiming shared goals. Similarly, in the 2000s, the far-left Black Blocs successfully exploited popular protests against the G8 leaders. During the pandemic, both far-left and far-right groups united against lockdown measures. In these contexts, stochastic violence has also surfaced, manifesting as sporadic acts of aggression, intimidation, or property destruction. While such gatherings ostensibly advocated against vaccination mandates and perceived infringements on personal freedoms, they often attracted individuals with extremist inclinations from both the far-left and far-right ends of the political spectrum. Amidst the commotion of these events, lone actors or small factions have engaged in acts of random (stochastic) violence, ranging from verbal harassment to physical violence, aimed at sowing chaos and instilling fear. Far-right extremists have exploited these rallies to propagate anti-government sentiment and amplify distrust in public health institutions, while far-left had view them as opportunities to challenge corporate interests and in particular Big-Pharma. The unpredictable nature of stochastic violence in this context not only poses immediate safety concerns but also underscores the broader societal polarization and radicalization fueling such events.
In the current political environment, these groups are now aligning themselves with the pro-Palestine movement. The pro-Palestine movement has gained significant support in recent weeks, with numerous protesters taking to the streets worldwide to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, this surge in support has also created an environment where various groups, including far-left, far-right accelerationists, and antise-mitic organizations, attempt to associate themselves with the mainstream pro-Palestine movement. This has resulted in a confusing web of claims and widespread dissemination of misinformation. One way these groups exploit the pro-Palestine movement is by adopt-ing its language to criticize the actions of the Israeli government in Gaza. However, they then utilize this platform to promote anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and stereotypes. The right-wing factions often reference the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, baselessly claiming that Jewish individuals purposefully facilitate migration into Western countries to replace white people. On the other hand, the left-wing factions attack liberal democracies and market-based economies by invoking references to Zionism and colonialism. Across the United States and Europe, far-right and far-left extremists have capitalized on the growing anger towards the Israeli government as an opportunity to spread anti-semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist conspiracy theories. Their intention is to legitimize these ideas within mainstream discourse and attract new recruits.
5. Main takeaways Both the far-left and the far-right militant accelerationist groups possess a digital evolutionary advantage due to the transformations in the online media landscape, which have created new avenues for radicalization. These accelerationists have also strategically utilized algorithms to target susceptible individuals for recruitment. Unlike their BBS predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s, which mirrored real-life communities, today’s platforms are characterized by the “attention economy” and “dopamine addiction.” Posts that fail to attract sufficient attention are gradually phased out from the front page to make room for particularly captivating posts, effectively turning extremism into a chemical dependency. Moreover, far-left and far-right violence is increasingly intertwined, creating a classic “security dilemma.” These characteristics further amplify the perilous nature of this phenomenon and should require active monitoring and intervention.
Stochastic violence is a disturbing tactic employed by political extremists, characterized by its unpredictable and random nature. Unlike organized violence with clear targets and objectives, stochastic violence aims to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear and uncertainty by striking seemingly at random. This strategy often involves lone actors or small groups carrying out acts of violence without direct coordination with a larger organization, making it difficult for authorities to anticipate or prevent. The perpetrators may be motivated by extreme ideologies or grievances, using violence as a means to spread terror and advance their agenda. Stochastic violence poses a significant challenge to counterterrorism efforts, as it can be difficult to detect and preemptively address the underlying radicalization that fuels such attacks. Moreover, its unpredictable nature amplifies the psychological impact on communities, fostering fear and distrust while undermining social cohesion. Addressing stochastic violence requires a multifaceted approach that addresses not only the im-mediate security concerns but also the underlying societal factors that contribute to extremism and radicalization.
Militant accelerationism has emerged as a tool for hostile foreign countries like Russia and China to sow chaos and destabilize Western nations from within. These nations may clandestinely support or manipulate extremist groups subscribing to accelerationist doctrines to exacerbate existing social tensions and exploit vulnerabilities in democratic systems. For instance, Russia has been accused of utilizing online platforms to amplify divisive narratives and support far-right accelerationist movements in Europe and the United States, aiming to undermine trust in democratic institutions and foster internal discord. Similarly, China has been implicated in funding and promoting extremist factions to exploit societal fault lines in Western societies, thereby weakening their cohesion and global influence. Such exploitation of militant accelerationism underscores the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors and fringe ideologies become instruments in the geopolitical strategies of hostile nations. Overall, Russia and China may support militant accelerationist groups in the West as part of a multifaceted strategy to weaken their adversaries, challenge Western values and institutions, and advance their own geopolitical interests on the global stage. In conclusion, the risk of accelerated terrorism is clear and significant as we head into 2024, and it could even escalate further in the run-up to the US presidential election or the next European elections. Disgruntled individuals and armed extremist groups are likely to continue resorting to violence in order to spark a revolution and prevent what they perceive as the “deep state” from manipulating elections and enslave them. The current clash of conflicting narratives, present in nearly every aspect of political discourse, worsened by partisan divides and amplified on social media, will continue to hinder governments’ efforts to address the threat of domestic terrorism. The current atmosphere is alarmingly reminiscent of the period preceding events like the “years of lead” or the Oklahoma City bombing. Back then, extremist rhetoric urged supposed patriots or revolutionaries, like Timothy McVeigh or Mario Moretti, to protect their fellow citizens from what they saw as a corrupt government backed by a wealthy elite. Today, there are potentially many more individuals like them, and we cannot afford to wait for another series of tragic events before decisive action is taken against this threat.
Andrea Molle, Ph.D., FRAS, Senior Research Fellow, Orange (California, Stati Uniti). Quantitative and computational social scientist. Since 2012, he has been an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an Associate Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Society at Chapman University. From 2006 to 2008, he was a JSPS Fellow in Anthropology at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan).
#ReaCT2024 – Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe
Introduction by Claudio Bertolotti, Executive Director, ReaCT Observatory
As the Director of the Observatory on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism in Europe (ReaCT), I am both pleased and honored to present, for the fifth consecutive year, our annual research and analysis report on terrorism and radicalisation in Europe. Building on the foundation laid by the previous four editions, #ReaCT2024 – 5th Report on Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe is the result of the dedication and perseverance of researchers, academics, and professionals who, employing different approaches, methods, and perspectives, contribute to a multidisciplinary effort aimed at defining the origins, causes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of a multifaceted phenomenon that traditional analytical methodologies can no longer adequately encapsulate within merely descriptive and indicative definitions. It is now well-established, as we thoroughly anticipated at the beginning of our research and editorial journey in 2020, that social deviance increasingly overlaps with or is associated with phenomena of radical violence, often characterized by individual participation and imitative behavior with a significant “spectacular” ambition, falling within increasingly compartmentalized ideological or identity spheres.
In line with the trajectory established thus far, the Report presents itself as a unique combination of a scientific journal and a collective volume, with contributions from various authors, researchers, and collaborators who have generously dedicated their time, experience, and knowledge. Without exception, ReaCT’s board and I, express our deepest gratitude for their invaluable field research contributions and their immense intellectual efforts. I would also like to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense for reaffirming their confidence and trust in the Observatory I direct by granting patronage to the Report’s presentation events.
What insights does the ongoing research of the Observatory yield?
Over the past five years, within the broader context of historical and operational evolution, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-ISIS/ Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2023, 80 attacks (12 in 2023) were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, both successful and failed, compared to 99 in the previous period from 2014 to 2018 (12 in 2015). Following the major terrorist events in Europe associated with the Islamic State group, and subsequently in probable relation to galvanizing factors following the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan, and Hamas’ call for war against Israel, 194 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2023, 70 of which were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 237 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 of whom died in action), 440 victims were killed, and 2,539 were injured (START InSight database). In 2023, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by previous attacks, bringing the figure to levels similar to those of previous years.
The 2024 Report also delves into the issue of the Islamic State in Khorasan and the potential threat to Europe, with particular attention to jihad returning from the Sahel to North Africa.
Broadening the scope, #ReaCT2024 focuses on the variables of terrorism and the characteristics of anti-system manifestations, highlighting the need to analyze an extremely dynamic phenomenon based on the spaces of action and, on a paradigmatic level, to urgently move towards a shared definition of terrorism. Another topic explored is “lone wolf terrorism,” understood as a multifaceted and fragmented phenomenon, influenced by the role of social networks, collective dynamics, clusters, and online waves and communities, along with the evolution of forms of extremism that are “young, autonomous, and emancipated.”
In this constantly evolving context, the phenomena of radicalization and extremism in digital ecosystems, new technologies, and artificial intelligence, as well as digital hate speech as precursors to extremist violence, are examined. The report also provides a thorough analysis of militant accelerationism, from the far left to the far right, and the intriguing hypothesis of “armed chaos.” On the level of prevention, substantial attention is devoted to the analysis of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), providing a thorough assessment of its successes, limitations, and failures in terms of policies and practices. The focus is placed on the vexed question: will radicals ever fully de-radicalize? Significant space is also allocated to the emergence of new extremisms that carry anti-democratic demands, inviting readers to reflect on the evolution of these phenomena through two specific case studies: the first explores the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism through the contribution of security forces in Portugal; the second addresses the systemic gender discrimination in Afghanistan under the Islamist Taliban government, discussing the phenomenon of gender apartheid. In conclusion, this year’s contribution reaffirms the Observatory’s ambition to bear witness to the strength and dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners in the ongoing fight against the evolving phenomena of violent social deviance, radicalism, and terrorism. As the Director of the Observatory, my hope is that the findings and insights contained in this Report will increasingly contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders committed to working together to prevent and counter violent extremism. I would like to extend my gratitude to all the Authors who, through their commendable work, have once again contributed to the realization of #ReaCT2024.
A special thanks goes, as always, to START InSight, whose support has enabled the international publication and distribution of our annual report. Lastly, I wish to honor the memory of our friend Marco Cochi, a serious and capable researcher, who was taken from us too soon.
Terrorism: Islamic State threatens football championships.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The so-called Islamic State, reigniting fears in Europe after the attack in Moscow, has threatened to launch an attack against the four stadiums where the Champions League quarter-finals will be played starting tonight. Al-Azaim, one of ISIS’s propaganda organs, confirmed these intentions by publishing the image of the four stadiums where the first-leg matches will be held – Parc des Princes in Paris, Santiago Bernabeu in Madrid, Metropolitan also in Madrid, and Emirates in London – accompanied by the caption “Kill them all.”
It is necessary to clarify at the outset: ISIS’s experience, as we knew it in Iraq and Syria, ended in June 2014 with the proclamation of the Caliphate by al-Baghdadi and the establishment of the Islamic State. ISIS no longer exists; in its place is the Islamic State. This is not a minor clarification, as it marks the beginning of the post-territorial era of the movement, which we are observing and suffering from today, both in the West and in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the increasingly manifest strength of this group especially in Syria and Afghanistan.
How serious do you think this threat is? We recall a similar alert on March 30 in Germany.
Firstly, in this case, as in most episodes, it is not the Islamic State itself but its affiliated groups that are calling for the fight. And the current one seems not so much a warning as a call to strike, hence not a direct threat. Also, as the recent history of the Islamic State and its franchised affiliates has shown us, when the group strikes, it does so without warning – effectively exploiting the element of surprise to achieve maximum results. What happened in Russia is confirmation of this. However, and this is the second aspect, consistent with attacks in recent years, attributed to or claimed by the Islamic State, it is the appeal to strike that is captured by individuals, or more rarely by small groups, often disorganized or poorly organized, that constitutes the driving force of the group which, as a rule and for obvious opportunity, only claims the successful ones, a small part, not mentioning the more numerous ones that end in failure.
After the attack in Moscow, these threats, and the arrest yesterday in Rome of a Tajik former ISIS militiaman, do you think there are conditions to understand what ISIS’s strategy is? Is it raising its head? Is it regaining strength?
The Islamic State is indeed raising its head, and it is doing so disruptively and effectively, emotionally bringing us back to the terrible years 2015-2017 when Europe was overwhelmed by a series of disruptive events, in turn evoking the emotions of the al-Qaeda attacks in Europe in 2004, in Madrid and London. Today, it is enough to look at Syria, where it was thought – also due to the media spotlight being directed elsewhere – that the Islamic State had been defeated: this is not the case. On the contrary, the progressive increase in Islamic State attacks, continuous and repeated assaults on prisons to free fighters detained by the Syrian regime, the ability to strike essentially anywhere. It is a very loud alarm bell that anticipates a new wave that is self-sustaining: from the rhetoric of the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, to competition with the Taliban, to the increase in affiliates, individuals, and groups from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, to Europe. Not a new Islamic State, but a phenomenon that is awakening.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
🔴📚 OUT SOON! #ReaCT2023 Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe | Start Insight ⬇ 16 articles by different authors discuss current trends and numbers. Available in Italian and English startinsight.eu/en/out-soon-r…
🔴@cbertolotti1 a FanPage sulle varie ipotesi dell'attacco👉"(...) non si tratterebbe di droni in grado di fare danni significativi, ma piuttosto di una tipologia di equipaggiamento in grado di fare danni limitati con l'obiettivo di portare l'attenzione mediatica sulla questione" twitter.com/cbertolotti1/s…
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