The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The recent conquest of Damascus by the jihadist leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a turning point in the political-military balance of the Middle East. After thirteen years of civil war against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria now finds itself in the most critical phase of its contemporary history: the rise to power of the Islamists led by al-Jolani, previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, sets the country on the path to becoming an “Islamic State” destined to reshape regional dynamics. Once again, the jihadist factor emerges as a destabilizing element with potentially global repercussions.
The Israeli occupation of the Golan: a preventive and strategic maneuver The Islamist advance in Syria, and the consequent loss of centralized control from Damascus, create a power vacuum in which radical groups and external actors seeking geostrategic advantages can proliferate. Israel’s action—specifically, the consolidation of its occupation of the Golan Heights—must be understood in this context. It is not yet another expansionist incursion, but a defensive and preventive maneuver. On the one hand, Tel Aviv aims to prevent jihadist forces from settling along its northern border, directly threatening its security. On the other, Israel’s military presence in the area also serves to protect UN peacekeeping forces, who might otherwise be exposed to attacks by radical groups in the absence of a reliable central authority in Damascus.
The preventive strike against strategic and chemical arsenals The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq—where conventional and unconventional arsenals fell into the hands of extremist groups—have made it clear that rapid, surgical interventions are necessary. Israel’s preventive strike on Syrian strategic weapons depots, including those suspected of containing chemical agents, seeks to prevent these tools from ending up with jihadists. This is not merely an Israeli interest: if radical groups were to gain access to chemical weapons, the entire region and even the West could suffer the consequences. As highlighted by the latest analyses from the Institute for the Study of War (Iran Update, December 11, 2024), non-state actors’ control of Syrian arsenals opens the door to extremely high-risk scenarios. Israel thus acts with strategic intelligence aimed at preventing future large-scale terrorist attacks.
The Israeli move and the Turkish choice: two sides of the same coin Israel’s policy in the Golan cannot be viewed in isolation: it is consistent with Turkey’s strategic logic of threat containment through its occupation of parts of northern Syrian territory. Ankara, as demonstrated in the past, intends to maintain a “buffer zone” between the areas under its control and regions inhabited by Syrian Kurds, regarded as a threat due to their connection with the PKK in Turkey. This action not only limits the movement of Kurdish militias, but also serves a dual purpose: curbing Kurdish power and preventing the establishment of Islamist groups hostile to Turkey. Israel’s advance on the Golan and Turkey’s buffer zone are, in different ways, two examples of preventive containment of the jihadist threat.
The rise of Islamists in Syria: the rights dilemma and the Taliban parallel The Islamist takeover led by al-Jolani and his men cannot be viewed favorably. The reassuring statements regarding minorities, women, and the Christian community sound like mere rhetoric. The history of jihadist movements is well known: the strict application of sharia, the lack of respect for religious and cultural differences, and the elimination of any pluralistic space. As previously seen in Taliban-led Afghanistan, the establishment of an Islamic State under the leadership of recycled ex-al-Qaeda members turned local political force will merely institutionalize a repressive regime contrary to fundamental human rights principles.
The terrorist threat extends to the West The Islamist victory in Syria, as was the case with the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021, will act as a catalyst for international terrorism. Recent reports show that every advancement of jihadist ideology is accompanied by an increase in attacks and violent propaganda, prompting radicalized or sympathetic individuals to carry out copycat acts in the West. As highlighted by recent analyses in international media (see the 5th Report on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism #ReaCT2024 and Il Giornale), HTS’s success in Syria increases the risk that Europe will become the target of new attacks, inspired or orchestrated by individuals who draw fresh momentum and symbolic legitimacy from al-Jolani’s “victory.” The jihadist media dimension is such that controlling territory—and proclaiming an Islamic State—becomes a powerful message directed at potential supporters and recruits.
Perspectives and conclusions Al-Jolani’s new Syria is no less dangerous than Assad’s regime. On the contrary, the open adherence to fundamentalist principles, the impending power struggles between Islamist and jihadist groups competing—primarily with the Islamic State—the influence of radical groups, and the absence of an international guarantee system make the situation more unpredictable. Israel’s move in the Golan and Turkey’s strategy in the north reflect a understandable, though partial, response to these threats. The West cannot afford to fall under the illusion of a “pragmatic” al-Jolani: the Islamist and jihadist nature of the new leadership is a fact. Added to this are the risks associated with the availability of strategic and chemical weapons, making the Israeli and Turkish interest in creating buffer zones and conducting preemptive strikes on arsenals tragically sensible. In this scenario—akin to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan—Syria could become an attractive hub for a jihadism now in search of legitimacy and symbolic victories, with direct consequences for Europe as well.
The Fall of Damascus and the Crumbling of the Iranian Resistance Axis.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
Bashar al-Assad’s Syria no longer exists.
Syria, a land with a millennia-old history, is currently undergoing a moment of epochal and unforeseen upheaval. After nearly fourteen years of a bloody conflict—one woven through with international and regional interests—the longstanding dominance of the Assad family, unbroken for over half a century, now appears to be nearing its end. Bashar al Assad, who succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, is currently portrayed as a leader on the run, while the Islamist insurgents, advancing from both the north and the south, are ominously pressing at the gates of Damascus.
International reports, including those cited by outlets such as MSN and NPR, depict a scenario of rapid disintegration of the regime’s political and military apparatus. The lightning advance of the Islamist formations led by HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, began roughly ten days ago in Idlib near the Turkish border and has shattered what were once considered unassailable fortifications. Aleppo, Hama, and Homs—long regarded as regime strongholds and pillars of the “Resistance Axis,” an alliance uniting Syria, Iran, affiliated armed groups, and Russia—have fallen. The apparent withdrawal of Russian support has further accelerated the collapse of a system built on authoritarian control and external backing.
Meanwhile, rumors abound about Assad’s fate. Some sources already claim he is in exile, with Tehran as a potential safe haven. In the United States, speculation suggests he is no longer in the Syrian capital, and there is even talk of his possible presence in Moscow or Doha. The presidential office attempts to deny such claims, insisting that the raìs remains in Damascus, but trust in these assertions appears to have waned drastically.
As Lorenzo Trombette (ANSA) reports, Doha has become the stage for high-level diplomatic consultations. While the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, and Turkey confer in Qatar, a Western “quartet”—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—has met with European Union representatives and UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. From these meetings has emerged the intent to initiate, as early as next week in Geneva, a post-Assad political transition process. This path aims to involve figures from the Assad system who have not been directly implicated in the regime’s worst atrocities, along with some representatives of armed opposition groups, in order to prevent new bloodshed and forestall institutional collapse. The goal is to preserve the Syrian state—distinguished from the disintegrating regime—and offer the population a prospect of stability.
The prospective, albeit indirect, inclusion of figures linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the Geneva talks signals an unprecedented flexibility. Although HTS has been labeled a terrorist organization by various Western powers, its mediated involvement through lesser groups associated with it appears to be a compromise aimed at forging a negotiating framework that could lead to a lasting agreement.
The sudden downfall of Assad is accompanied by the fragmentation of the Resistance Axis. Iran, a longtime supporter of the Damascus government, may now opt for a more cautious stance, focusing on its strategic interests along the coast and in territories home to ancient Shiite-Alawite clans historically loyal to the Assad family. Russia, preoccupied on multiple international fronts, seems less inclined to maintain its support, paving the way for a more uncertain scenario.
As the Islamist insurgents reach the outskirts of Damascus, the imminent collapse of the regime throws open the doors of symbolic places of repression: the notorious prisons of Adra and Saydnaya. Within these facilities, thousands of dissidents, activists, and political opponents have been detained and disappeared over the decades. Their fate, long shrouded in silence, may now be revealed, potentially marking one of the first symbolic steps of a new chapter in Syrian history.
The entire Middle East is feeling the repercussions of this upheaval. Assad’s fall affects not only Syria’s borders but also has implications for Lebanon, Iraq, and even relations between Israel and Iran. In a context where sectarian, ethnic, and political tensions have never been fully resolved, the region will be forced to reassess its balance of power. The international community, through its gatherings from Doha to Geneva, must now tackle a crucial challenge: managing a transfer of power that, from a secular dictatorial regime, may yield to an Islamist surge capable of reigniting jihadist violence.
In short, Syria risks becoming another Afghanistan: similar dynamics, worrisome prospects linked to international jihadism that, originating in Syria, could threaten the region and the West. What is even more concerning is the role Turkey might play, having supported the regime’s downfall through direct assistance to the Islamists of HTS—an organization whose roots trace back to al-Qaida and ISIS—and how it may now seek to leverage its influence in the Middle East and North Africa.
Syria. Al-Jolani’s Advance on Damascus: A New Front of Unease for Iran, Russia, and Israel.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
From the interview by Francesco De Leo on Radio Radicale – Spazio Transnazionale (episode of December 7, 2024).
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, born Ahmed Al Sharaa, is the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group active in the Syrian civil war and still designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. Originally affiliated with Al Qaeda and known as the head of Jabhat Al Nusra, Jolani started out as a radical jihadist sent to Syria in 2011 with funding and support from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—who would later become the world’s most wanted terrorist—to establish Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch.
Over the years, he has transformed both his image and his strategy. At first, he announced a formal break from Al Qaeda, then focused primarily on toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime and controlling key areas such as Idlib Province. This “break” was widely viewed as a tactical move aimed at avoiding direct international attacks against transnational jihadist formations.
At the same time, Jolani also changed his appearance and public rhetoric. He traded in his camouflage fatigues for a blazer and Western-style shirt, presenting himself as a moderate Syrian revolutionary fighting the Damascus regime rather than waging a global war against the West. In recent interviews, he has minimized references to global jihad, instead emphasizing Syria’s “liberation” and the role of HTS as a local force committed to ensuring security and governance for millions of people living under its control.
Despite this rebranding strategy and his attempt to appear as a more pragmatic interlocutor, Jolani remains an extremely controversial figure, undoubtedly tied to insurgent jihadism and one of its foremost leaders today. He has a past deeply rooted in international jihadist networks and currently leads an organization still considered terrorist by Washington. His trajectory is that of a leader seeking to distance himself from transnational extremism in order to gain local and possibly international legitimacy, positioning himself as a revolutionary political actor rather than a jihadist leader.
The Situation on the Ground Syrian rebels are advancing toward Damascus with Turkish support and are besieging Homs, a strategic hub en route to the Mediterranean and a regime stronghold. While Russia, Turkey, and Iran are set to meet in Doha to negotiate a possible political transition excluding Assad, on the ground pro-Iranian forces seem to be retreating, and Russia appears weakened and no longer proactive, as the UN reports a massive wave of displaced people. Rebel leader al-Jolani claims the right to use any means against the regime but promises not to persecute minorities. We shall see. Meanwhile, a pleased Erdogan openly announces Damascus as his next objective, while Iran, Syria, and Iraq declare their unity against “terrorism.” In the country’s south, anti-government groups are moving north, easily taking positions abandoned by fleeing loyalists, and the Druze communities of Suwayda are creating a semi-autonomous region. Meanwhile, Lebanon is closing its borders for fear of the conflict spilling over, and clashes continue between pro-Turkish forces and Kurdish militias.
Concerns for Iran and Israel
It is certain that, given the current situation, this is a problem for Iran, as well as for Russia, and also for Israel: all are watching developments with deep concern. For Moscow, it’s a major issue related to maintaining its naval mobility in the Mediterranean. For Tehran, it’s a question of the overall stability of the “Axis of Resistance” since the fall of Syria could block the vital link with Lebanon, and therefore with Hezbollah. Perhaps the Doha agreements aim to find a mediated solution that would allow Iran to maintain control over a strip of Syrian territory essential for connecting with Hezbollah.
What about Israel? Israel is very worried because the presence of a weak Syrian regime is, for it, the best-case scenario; the fall of Syria under Islamist control could open a new front of additional instability along its borders. Not to mention that “al-Jolani” takes his name from the Golan, currently occupied by Israel, and he has always held openly anti-Western and anti-Israeli positions.
Jihadist Terrorism in Europe and Mediterranean Dynamics: Historical, Social, and Operational Evolution in an Era of Global Changes
by Claudio Bertolotti, Director, START InSight, ReaCT
Abstract This article investigates terrorism beyond its traditional definitions; it examines its evolution within the geographical borders of Europe, it emphasizes its historical roots, individual and collective motivations, and operational adaptation, sharing the reasons why a revision of the very definition of terrorism is now necessary, and why it ought to be understood as an effect of violence, rather than an act which is merely organized for political ends. Analyzing the data provided by START InSight’s database, the article focuses on EU countries which are constantly affected by the trajectories of jihadism and the consequent challenges for collective security, while contributing to the academic debate with a multidimensional perspective on terrorism which considers its historical, socio-political and cultural aspects.
Keywords Jihadism, Functional blockade, Terrorism
1. Terrorism as a political and social phenomenon which evolves over time in response to the changing dynamics of competition between individuals, groups, and states. Contemporary terrorism, deeply rooted in a complex historical evolution, represents a widespread ideological threat. The threat of jihadist terrorism is particularly significant today and is linked to the historical, conflictual dynamics of international relations and competition in the Middle East and Africa, and to the violence stemming from a radical interpretation of Islam. This conflictual dynamic is increasingly associated with groups’ and individuals’ search for identity through the cultural opposition of a significant segment of second and third-generation immi-grants from the Maghreb living in Europe. We are discussing a fragmented jihadist galaxy characterized by various ideologies and practical approaches, prompting a reconsideration of the concept of contemporary terrorism, which emerges as a social phenomenon distinct from previous forms of terrorism.
This necessary reflection invites us to consider a paradigm shift in the very definition of terrorism, no longer to be understood as an action aimed at achieving political results through violence, hence in its intentions. Instead, terrorism should be seen as the effect of applied violence: it is terrorism, insofar it is a manifestation of violence, without an organization behind it. It is terrorism due to the manifestation, not organization.
Within the same jihadist galaxy, terrorism imposes itself as an instrument of struggle, resistance, and domination, employing various degrees and models of violence: from individual acts to organized, inspired, and insurgent terrorism, of the kind we became acquainted with in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that we now observe in its early manifestations in the Gaza Strip, where the Israel Defense Forces are engaging Hamas (Bertolotti, 2024).
The Afghan experience, which the author of this article has thoroughly studied for many years, combined with the wave of violence following Hamas’s call for strikes against Israel and its allies, has played a decisive role in the resurgence of inspired and emulative terrorism globally. The latter, on the one hand, is based on the victorious experience of the Taliban against the West; on the other, on the anger channeled through Hamas’s communication strategy, which finds resonance in some ideologized Western minorities, conflating Hamas’s violent and terrorist agenda with the legitimate Palestinian cause. Events in international relations are exploited by jihadist rhetoric to demonstrate the righteousness and validity of jihad, and thus of terrorism as a tool of struggle, victory, and justice.
Today, after and alongside Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, the it’s conflict dynamics in the Middle East and Hamas’s media-amplified terrorism that play this role of ideological and mass involvement drive. This results in emulative forms of violence, which terrorism against Israel has partly provoked and could increasingly provoke in Europe, as well as in North African countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel.
2. Trends and Dynamics: Numbers Decline, but the Threat of Terrorism Persists – An Analysis of Attacks from 2014 to 2023 Looking at the past five years, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend from a quantitative perspective, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-Isis/Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2024, 92 attacks (12 in 2023 and 2024 – situation at 20.09.2024), both successful and unsuccessful, were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland: 99 attacks were recorded in the previous period 2014-2018 (12 in 2015).
In the wake of major terrorist events in Europe in the name of the Islamic State group, and subsequently likely related to galvanizing elements following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the call from Hamas, 206 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2024, of which 70 were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 249 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 died in action), 446 victims were killed, and 2,558 were injured (START InSight database).
Both in 2023 and 2024, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks recorded in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by other attacks which took place over the previous days, which raised the figure to the high levels of previous years: from 17% of total emulative actions in 2022 to 58% in 2023 (56% in 2021). 2023 also confirmed an established trend in the phenomenon’s evolution, with an almost exclusive predominance of individual, unorganized actions, generally improvised, progressively replacing structured and coordinated actions characterizing the European urban “battlefield” of 2015-2017 (totality of actions in 2023 and 97% of actions recorded the previous year).
Data from START InSight’s database of jihadist events in Europe
Knives and blades Terrorists are increasingly using knives for a variety of reasons related to practical, ideological, and strategic factors:
Ease of access: Knives are readily available and do not require advanced technical skills to use. Unlike firearms or explosives, which may require logistics or technical knowledge, knives are common in every household or store.
Discretion: A knife can be carried easily without raising suspicion, unlike more conspicuous or dangerous weapons. This allows the attacker to approach victims or locations without being noticed immediately.
Terror effect: Knife attacks, often conducted in public or crowded spaces, have a strong psychological impact on the population. The close and brutal nature of a knife attack amplifies fear among those present and in the media, creating a significant symbolic effect.
Individual attacks: In recent years, many terrorist organizations have encouraged individual or “lone wolf” attacks. Knife attacks are ideal for this type of action, as they require minimal planning and can be carried out by a single person without the need for a complex organizational network.
Weapon control: In many countries, firearm laws are very strict, making it difficult to obtain guns or rifles. Knives, on the other hand, are less regulated and can be legally purchased almost anywhere.
Inspiration model: Successful knife attacks, like those in various European cities in recent years, have inspired other extremists to replicate this type of action, following the narrative that it is an effective and relatively simple means of spreading terror. In summary, the growing use of knives by terrorists is linked to their accessibility, ease of use, discretion, and effectiveness in creating panic and fear among the population (Molle, 2024).
3. Profiles of “European” Terrorists Jihadist terrorism is predominantly a male phenomenon: out of 295 attackers, 97% are male (10 women); contrary to 2020, when 3 female attackers participated in terrorist actions, the 2021-2023 triennium saw no direct participation from them. Identified terrorists (men and women) whose demographic data were disclosed have a median age of 26 years: a figure that varies over time (from 24 in 2016 to 30 in 2019), recording an increase in age in the last analyzed period, delivering a figure of 28.5 years in 2023. The study of the profile of 200 individuals about whom there’s sufficient demographic information draws a very interesting picture: 7% of terrorists are under 19 years old (with a reduction in minors over time), 38% are between 19 and 26, 41.5% are between 27 and 35, and 13.5% are over 35and 13.5% are over 35. These data confirm an in-creasing relevance over time, of the 19-35 age group, with a reduction in minors involved in terrorist attacks over the same period.
93% of the individuals who carried out a terrorist attacks, for whom we have complete information, were “immigrants” (first, second, and third generation), both regular and irregular. 45% of the 155 terrorists, out of a total of 237, who were analyzed in START InSight’s database are first-generation regular immigrants; 28% are descendants of immigrants (second or third generation); irregular immigrants are 26%: a figure which has grown over time, from 25% in 2020, to 50% in 2021, to 67% in 2023, indicating a significant change in the nature of terrorists, with an increasing presence of first-generation attackers (overall 71% of total terrorists). Significant is also the figure related to 7% of European-origin citizens converted to Islam (a slight decline compared to the average of previous years). Overall, 73% of terrorists are legally resident in Europe, while the role of irregular immigrants emerges with a ratio of about 1 in 4 terrorists (the ratio was 1:6 until 2020). In 4% of events, there were children/minors (7) among the attackers, a figure which has decreased.
Ethno-national Dimension of Terrorists in Europe The phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe affects some specific national and ethnic groups more significantly than others. There is a clear proportional relationship between the main groups of immigrants and terrorists, highlighted by the nationality of terrorists or their families of origin, which reflects the size of foreign communities in Europe. In particular, the Maghreb origin prevails: the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan (especially in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy) and Algerian (in France). The phenomenon of radicalization has been particularly evident in Belgium and France, where large Moroccan and Algerian-origin communities have seen a significant number of young people join jihadist groups. In France, for example, a significant portion of terrorists involved in recent attacks came from families of Algerian and Moroccan origin, reflecting the historical presence and size of these communities in the country (Bertolotti, 2023).
Recidivists and Terrorists Already Known to Intelligence The role of recidivists (re-offenders) has grown over time. These are individuals already convicted of terrorism who have committed violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some cases, even within prison facilities. This trend shows a 3% recidivism rate among terrorists who struck in 2018 (1 case), 7% (2) in 2019, 27% (6) in 2020, and 25% (3) in 2023. This situation confirms the social danger of individuals who, although incarcerated, delay the implementation of terrorist actions. This phenomenon suggests an increased likelihood of terrorist attacks in the coming years, parallel to the release of many detainees for terrorism-related offenses.
START InSight highlighted a significant trend regarding terrorist actions carried out by individuals already known to law enforcement or European intelligence. In 2021, such cases represented 44% of the total, while in 2020, they were 54%. This is a significant increase compared to the 10% recorded in 2019 and the 17% of 2018. In 2023 this figure grew to 75%, supporting the concerns of institutions tasked with countering violent phenomena.
Individuals with previous detentions (even for non-terrorism-related offenses) in 2021 confirmed a certain stability in participation in terrorist actions by individuals with a prison record, with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year (33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018, and 12% in 2017); which seems to confirm that, despite a significantly lower figure in 2023 (8%), prison spaces can be identified as potential radicalization hubs.
4. What is the real destructive capacity of terrorism? To understand terrorism comprehensively, one must analyze it on three distinct levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategy involves the use of resources to achieve long-term war goals. Tactics focus on deploying forces in combat to secure specific victories in battles. The operational level bridges the two, coordinating tactical actions to meet strategic objectives. This synthesis, at its core, highlights the importance of human resources in conducting military actions.
Strategic Success Is Marginal Strategic success in terrorist actions, defined as achieving significant structural impacts like national and international air/rail traffic disruptions, military mobilizations, or broad legislative interventions, has decreased from 16% to 13%. This is still considered high given the limited organizational and financial efforts by terrorist groups or individuals. Over the years, strategic success rates have shown a declining trend, highlighting a gradual reduction in capacity and effectiveness: 75% in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in 2019, 12% in 2020, and 6% in 2021. Since 2022, strategic success has not been achieved by terrorist attacks; effectively confirming an ongoing process of normalizing terrorism.
Media Attention is Decreasing Media attention towards terrorist attacks is decreasing. Strategically, attacks received international media coverage in 75% of the cases and 95% nationally. Operations by commando and team-raid units received full media coverage. This media success significantly influenced the recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihadist fighters, peaking during periods of high-intensity terrorist actions (2016-2017). However, the effects of media coverage on recruitment efforts diminishes over time due to two main reasons: firstly, a prevalence of low-intensity actions compared to high-intensity ones, which have decreased, while low and medium-intensity actions have significantly increased from 2017 to 2021, with a notable rise in medium-intensity actions in 2023. Secondly, the public has become gradually less emotionally sensitive to terrorism, particularly low and medium-intensity events.
Despite concerns, Tactical Level Concerns but Is Not a Priority for Terrorism Assuming the goal of actions is to cause the enemy’s death (with security forces as targets in 35% of cases), this was achieved on average in 50% of the cases between 2004 and 2023. However, the long timeframe significantly impacts the margin of error. An analysis of the 2014-2023 period, shows a worsening trend in the terrorists’ desired effects, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an increase in failed actions, at least until 2022, when tactical success stabilized at 33%, which is consistent with 2016 data. 2023 is an outlier. Data from the last six years show that in 2016, tactical success was achieved in 31% of cases, with 6% failed acts. In 2017, success rose to 40%, with a 20% failure rate. In 2018, success dropped to 33%, while failed attacks doubled to 42%. In 2019, success further fell to 25%, then rose to 33% in 2020-2022. This trend, interpreted as a dual effect of reduced terrorist operational capacity and increased European security responsiveness, shows a 2023 rate of 50% actions achieving tactical success, i.e., causing at least one fatality.
Operational Success: The “Functional Blockade” Even when a terrorist attack fails, it produces significant results: it heavily engages armed forces and police, distracting them from routine activities or preventing them from intervening for public welfare. It can also disrupt or overload healthcare services, limit, slow down, divert, or stop urban, air, and naval mobility, and hinder the regular conduct of daily, commercial, and professional activities, harming affected communities. This effectively reduces technological advantages, operational potential, and resilience capacity. Overall, it inflicts direct and indirect damage, regardless of causing fatalities. Limiting citizens’ freedom is a measurable result of these actions. Essentially, terrorism’s success, even without causing fatalities, lies in imposing economic and social costs on society and influencing behaviours over time in terms of security measures or restrictions imposed by political and public safety authorities. This phenomenon is known as a “functional blockade.” Despite the increasingly reduced operational capacity of terrorism, the “functional blockade” remains one of the most important results achieved by terrorists, regardless of tacti-cal success (killing at least one target). From 2004 to the present, terrorism has proven effective in achieving the a “functional blockade” in 80% of cases, peaking at 92% in 2020 and 89% in 2021. This impressive result, obtained with limited resources, confirms the advantageous cost-benefit ratio in favour of terrorism, despite a progressive loss of capacity that saw the “functional blockade” drop to 78% in 2022 and 67% in 2023.
5. Recruitment Capacity and Operational Strategies The Islamic State, having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq (2013-2017), can no longer send its terrorists to Europe due to the loss of direct external operational projection capacity. However, the group has not lost its power of attraction, which demonstrates its ability to develop indirect recruitment, based on the “posthumous” recognition of individuals who successfully carry out individual terrorist actions. For these reasons, the threat remains significant, thanks to the presence and actions of lone actors, often improvised and driven by emulation, without direct links to the organization.
While the Islamic State continues to impose itself ideologically as the main jihadist threat, particularly exploiting the territorial control and financial resources of its Afghan franchise, the Islamic State Khorasan, it is evident that it cannot replicate the overwhelming appeal of the “caliphate” in 2014-2017. The novelty advantage and consequent appeal, particularly towards the youth, have diminished. Additionally, the European Union has significantly reduced its vulnerabilities legislatively and operationally, with more emphasis on counterterrorism than preventive action.
Concerns persist regarding emulative effects and the “call to arms” related to international events that can induce individuals to act in the name of jihad. The most significant event in 2021, which continues to fuel transnational jihad, was the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. This victory fed diverse jihadist propaganda with the message that “victory is the result of continuous struggle” and created competition among jihadi groups engaged in exclusively local struggles and those like the Islamic State, which promote jihad as a relentless global struggle. This competitive dynamic includes actions associated with the Israel-Hamas war and the jihadist call to violence, where Islamic State followers and Hamas supporters have vied for battlefield successes and consequent media attention.
In this continually evolving scenario, attention must be paid to jihadist strength in the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Rwanda, and Mozambique, in order to counter the emergence of new “caliphates” or “wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe. In prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic State boasts of its spread in Africa, in a competitive / collaborative relationship with its Afghan franchise. It highlights how the aim of combating the presence and spread of Christianity will lead to the group’s expansion in other areas of the continent. In places like the Ma-ghreb, the Mashreq, and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s activity focuses on intra-Muslim sectarian struggle. In Africa, its presence has become part of a Muslim-Christian conflict, strengthened by propaganda centred on stopping Muslims from converting to Christianity through the work of “missionaries” and the pretext of humanitarian aid. Violence, kidnappings, and the kill-ing of missionary clergy, attacks on NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso to the Congo, as well as attacks on Christian communities, are all part and parcel of this context.
From North Africa to the Sahel: A Look at “Mediterranean” Terrorism Looking at North Africa, the region continues to face threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State, and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who have travelled to Iraq or Syria. The unnoticed return of these fighters to their home countries following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat poses additional security challenges. In recent years, lone actors and small cells have carried out a series of deadly attacks in various North African states, proving difficult to detect. The Sahel is becoming a new center of jihadist terrorism, with a significant increase in victims in 2023. However, the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has seen a 42% decrease in victims over the past three years. North Africa, in particular, is witnessing a steady reduction in extremist violence, with the number of violent attacks returning to pre-IS levels. In 2022, North Africa saw a 14-fold decrease in victims com-pared to 2015, with Morocco being the safest country in the region, while Egypt remains one of the most affected by terrorism. Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia fall between these extremes with medium to low terrorism impact.
The Sahel and the Maghreb are politically, economically, and security-wise connected. The presence of terrorist groups exploiting ethnic tensions, climate challenges, and lack of public services has turned this region into a hub of jihadist activity, with the risk of spreading the terrorist threat to other areas.
Instability in the Sahel has already affected West Africa and the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are active. This situation could also involve North Africa, jeopardizing the progress made in prevention, counterterrorism, and deradicalization in some countries of the region.
Considering that North African countries are both emigration and transit countries for migratory flows to Europe, this raises the question of possible jihadist contamination or transfer. Monitoring the evolution of a phenomenon in the process of consolidation, which finds its lifeblood in the Mediterranean area, is therefore paramount.
Claudio Bertolotti, ISPI, START InSight’s Director and Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism (ReaCT). Claudio Bertolotti holds a Ph.D. and serves as the Executive Director of START InSight. From 2014 to 2023, he was a senior researcher with the “5+5 Defense Initiative.” He graduated in Contemporary History, specialized in Sociology of Islam, and earned a doctorate in Sociology and Political Science, focusing on International Relations. His work focuses on crisis areas, national strategic interests, national security, the Mediterranean, intercultural dialogue, and, in particular, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, jihadism, and migration flows. Since April 17, 2019, he has been the Executive Director of ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalism and Counter-Terrorism (Rome-Milan-Lugano). Since September 30, 2021, he has been a member of the Committee on Human and Civil Rights at the Regional Council of Piedmont. He is the author of several works, including Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban Warfare between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence (START InSight, 2024), Immigration and Terrorism (START InSight, 2020), Contemporary Afghanistan. Inside the Longest War (CASD, 2019), and Shahid: Analysis of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan (FrancoAngeli, 2010). Corresponding with the Author: claudio.bertolotti@startinsight.eu.
Bibliography Bertolotti, C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight ed., Lugano. Bertolotti, C. (2023), Unraveling the Evolution of Terrorism in Europe: Left-Wing, Far-Right, Anarchist, and Individual Terrorism, and the Role of Immigrants in Jihadist Terrorism within the European Union (Correlation and Regression Analysis), pp. 77-87, in #ReaCT2023, 4th Report on Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization in Europe, START InSight ed., Lugano, ISBN 978-88-322-94-18-7, ISSN 2813-1037 (print), ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Iron Swords: The New Challenges of Ground Offensives in the Israel-Hamas War.
Introduction to the Urban Evolution of the
Conflict
No environment presents more formidable challenges for
military forces than urban areas. Urban warfare is uniquely destructive, yet
military forces frequently find themselves ill-prepared for the specific
difficulties of operating in densely populated battlefields and often cannot
avoid being drawn into the severe realities of urban combat. In their book
“Understanding Urban Warfare“,
Liam Collins and John Spencer highlight the distinct challenges posed by urban
warfare. These include the limiting effects of three-dimensional terrain on
various weapon systems, the numerous enemy firing points along urban
communication routes (such as streets, alleys, and avenues), and the crucial
need to minimize civilian casualties, protect critical infrastructure, and
preserve cultural heritage (Collins & Spencer, 2022). Urban areas, serving
as battlefields, provide diverse and often unpredictable maneuvering options
based on the type of urban environment, whether it be a megalopolis,
metropolitan city, peripheral town, conurbation, or even a smart city, each
with characteristics that significantly impact military operations.
As I highlighted in my latest volume on urban warfare
in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Gaza
Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia,
strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale (English
title: “Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban War between Israel and
Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial
Intelligence”), many of the most recent urban battles – from the Battle of
Mogadishu in 1993 to the Second Battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, the Battle
of Shusha in 2020 during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and also Mariupol in
2022 and Bakhmut in 2023 in the Russo-Ukrainian War – provide us with trends
and lessons learned to better understand urban warfare. In an increasingly
urbanized world, the future nature of conflict will also be increasingly urban.
The Israeli Approach to Urban Combat: The Lesson from
Gaza
On the tactical level, Israeli soldiers last
engaged in a major ground battle in 2014 when Israel deployed its troops inside
Gaza. Strategically, however, since then the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have
focused on countering potential threats from Iran rather than the immediate
neighbor. This overall strategic shift has effectively distracted the Israeli
armed forces from a substantial but different nature of threat.
Conversely, Hamas has militarily strengthened
since 2008/2009, when it first faced an Israeli ground assault. Back then,
Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, consisted of 16,000
militiamen and approximately 2,000 troops specialized in combat. This was in
stark contrast to the situation on the eve of the 2023 offensive when,
according to the IDF, Hamas could rely on a force of 40,000 elite fighters, an
arsenal of drones, and about 30,000 rockets. This significant arsenal
overwhelmed the Iron Dome system on October 7, 2023, leading to a saturation
point where the number of rockets fired by Hamas exceeded the system’s
defensive capacity, prompting the United States to urgently send reinforcements
(Bertolotti, 2024).
With the launch of the ground offensive of
Operation Iron Swords, the Israeli
Defense Forces engaged in the urban area of Gaza, the most densely populated
part of the Strip, initiating a new phase of the conflict focused mainly on
urban warfare, including subterranean combat. Engineering units conducted
breaching operations to access tunnels, allowing specialized underground combat
units to overpower the enemy (Schalit, 2023).
As part of their defense strategy, Hamas
engineers had an extensive network of tactical tunnels at their disposal; some
interconnected, others isolated. Many, as previously argued, were dug to a
depth safe from aerial bombing, while others were closer to the surface for
quick access or exit. Furthermore, Hamas prepared tunnels and “mouse
holes” to allow fighters to move covertly between buildings and attack
Israeli soldiers before disappearing again (Schalit, 2023). In addition to
these tactical advantages for troop movement, Palestinian engineers also set up
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – some hidden in walls to detonate as
armored vehicles passed, larger ones buried under roads or rubble piles, and
some with tunnel traps designed to lure and strike Israeli soldiers engaged in
hostage search and rescue operations.
Urban warfare is extremely slow.
The war entered a critical phase with the entry
of units into the urban perimeter of Gaza, where the Israeli army, equipped
with top-tier urban combat skills, faced an enemy determined to fight to the
last, having prepared for years for that confrontation. A battle that took
place in an environment favorable to the defender (Schalit, 2023).
Combat experiences in urban areas, such as those
in Mosul, Iraq, and Marawi, Philippines between 2016 and 2017, offer important
lessons. In Mosul, a 100,000-strong Iraqi contingent supported by the United
States took nine months to neutralize a group of Islamic State militants in a
fortified city, suffering the loss of 8,000 men and numerous military equipment
due to improvised explosive devices. Similarly, in Marawi, Filipino forces took
five months to overcome Islamic State-Maute militants, facing the harsh reality
of being able to take control of only one building per day due to the constant
risk of ambushes and hidden explosives. These scenarios underscore the complex
challenges of urban combat and the resilience required to overcome them.
The Three Levels of Challenge in Urban Warfare
As previously mentioned, urban warfare is one of
the most complex and multifaceted challenges an army can face. This type of
conflict is distinguished by its intensity and profound implications not only
tactically but also perceptually and ethically.
Perceptually, urban warfare highlights a marked
contrast between the expectations of a society inclined towards moderation and
the pursuit of ethically acceptable conduct in conflict, and the brutal reality
of urban combat, where the costs in terms of human lives, material destruction,
and loss of international legitimacy can be devastating. This discrepancy
creates a form of cognitive dissonance, making it difficult for modern armies,
anchored in the values of liberal societies, to adequately prepare for the
inherent brutality of this type of combat.
Tactically, urban warfare scenarios present a
series of unique difficulties, which we have partly illustrated. Combat in
densely built environments involves the risk of long-range attacks via drones
or improvised explosive devices, significantly increasing the danger for forces
on the ground. The urban environment facilitates the adversaries’ ability to
hide and set ambushes, creating a climate of constant uncertainty. Maneuvering
troops are exposed to high risks, with their firepower diluted by the need to
disperse among buildings, often with reduced visibility. Additionally, the
degradation of sensor and communication systems, essential for coordinating
operations, poses a significant problem.
Ethically and morally, the presence of civilians
in the urban theater of war introduces significant dilemmas. Civilians
disproportionately suffer the consequences of the conflict, both directly as
victims of the fighting and indirectly due to displacement and epidemics
resulting from the destruction of urban infrastructure. Military commanders
face the delicate dilemma of proportionality, having to balance the need to act
for the safety of their soldiers with the responsibility to avoid civilian
harm, in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This balance is
further complicated by the presence of civilians who can use electronic devices
and social media, those who may be hostile or resist unarmed, and the
psychological and political weight these decisions impose on commanders,
potentially influencing their judgment and choices.
The Evolution of the Technical and Tactical
Capabilities of the Israeli Forces
The Israeli armed forces have historically faced
numerous challenges in the urban context of Gaza, particularly after the 2005
withdrawal, with military operations in 2008 and subsequent ones in 2014; different
periods in which the Israeli forces learned valuable lessons. Politically,
Jerusalem recognized the crucial importance of gaining public favor, both
internationally and domestically. Militarily, it became evident that air power
alone is never sufficient, leading to a redefinition of the capabilities and
organization of ground forces, particularly regarding the acquisition and
deployment of robust armored vehicles and the application of innovative
techniques, tactics, and procedures aimed at managing underground threats.
As a direct consequence of these lessons, the
IDF equipped itself with some of the best technologies for urban operations;
among these are tanks and armored personnel carriers, considered among the
safest in the world. The Israeli arsenal also includes the armored
“Doobi” D9 bulldozers from Caterpillar, designed to demolish
buildings and create safe pathways in potentially mined environments, thus
reducing the risk of ambushes and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.
These powerful machines, which can also be remotely operated, have been
controversial due to their use in demolishing homes, which some interpret as
punitive measures.
However, the operational use of the D9s,
contrary to the criticisms which fit into a broader context of instrumental
opposition, involves creating safe pathways through hazardous areas, partially
destroying buildings to create alternative routes, and building protective
barriers around strategic areas to consolidate territorial gains by military
units. This approach reflects a combination of strength and ingenuity, marking
the continued evolution of Israeli military strategies in the face of the unique
challenges of urban warfare.
The Israeli army, within its vast arsenal of specialized vehicles, also possesses
a particular vehicle, the “Puma,” dedicated to neutralizing
minefields and countering improvised explosive devices. Equipped with an
elaborate mine clearance system called “IED Carpet,[1] ” the “Puma” can
detonate or neutralize hidden explosive devices through controlled explosions
with rockets. Beyond this cutting-edge technology, the vehicles used by the
engineering units are equipped with devices capable of disrupting circuits or
transmissions used for controlled activation of IEDs, some of which include the
“Thor” system that uses precision lasers to trigger devices from a
distance (Schalit, 2023).
In the realm of subterranean combat, the Israeli
army boasts specialized units, such as the Sarayet Yahalom elements, trained in
detecting, maneuvering, and destroying tunnels. These special forces use
special explosive charges, drones, and underground robots to conduct their
operations, confirming Israel’s forefront position in the search for
underground detection technologies, employing a wide range of instruments that
span geospatial, acoustic, seismic, tomographic resistivity (ERT), and
ground-penetrating radar, capable of mapping tunnels up to twenty meters deep.
The IDF’s approach to tunnels is primarily
focused on their destruction from the surface, avoiding entry and endangering
military operators wherever possible. However, for specific missions such as
hostage recovery, special units, including Yahalom reconnaissance teams and the
Oketz canine unit, equipped with specific gear for underground operations, have
been trained. The need for direct reconnaissance using soldiers within this
vast tunnel network suggests the use of highly specialized operational
techniques, potentially entrusted to the elite Mista’arvim units, capable of
operating undercover and blending in with enemy fighters.
In this scenario of technological and tactical
confrontation, both sides could present unexpected and devastating surprises.
While the IDF has the technological and military superiority necessary to
prevail, the outcome of the battle and its human and geopolitical repercussions
remain shrouded in uncertainty, testifying to the complexity and
unpredictability of modern conflict (Schalit, 2023).
Bibliografia
Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e
urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e
intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325.
Collins L, Spencer J. (2022), Understanding Urban Warfare, Howgate
Publishing Limited, pp. 392.
Schalit A. (2023), Hidden tunnels, ambushes and explosives in
walls: the Israel-Hamas war enters a precarious new phase, The
Conversation, 23 novembre 2023.
[1]
Minefield Clearance and IED Neutralization: The Carpet is a
modern system for minefield clearance and IED neutralization, produced by the
Israeli company Rafael. It can efficiently clear a path of one hundred meters
in a minefield and neutralize all types of IEDs. To ensure maximum crew
survivability, the system is operated by two soldiers inside the vehicle. The
Carpet system consists of a launcher containing twenty rockets equipped with
FAE (Fuel-Air Explosive) warheads. The launcher is an autonomous add-on kit
that can be easily and quickly assembled in the field on any vehicle. The
Carpet is the most efficient system for minefield clearance and IED
neutralization/detonation on any terrain and in all weather conditions, while
maintaining crew safety.
Cognitive Warfare: Manipulating numbers to influence global public opinion. How Hamas deceived western media.
In the
digital age, warfare transcends mere physical confrontation. Enter the realm of
“cognitive warfare,” a sophisticated strategy aimed not just at
battles on the ground, but at the very fabric of human perception and behavior.
Cognitive warfare is characterized by the utilization of advanced technologies
and psychological methodologies to penetrate individual consciousness.
This
approach surpasses conventional disinformation or propaganda tactics; it
encompasses the utilization of artificial intelligence and machine learning
algorithms to sway thought processes and decision-making mechanisms without
explicit authorization (Farwell, 2020). This form of warfare exploits the
susceptibilities of contemporary societies to information overload, utilizing
the same platforms that facilitate global communication and access to
information to disseminate content aimed at causing instability. This article examines
how Hamas, a non-state actor designated as a terrorist organization by several
countries, has embraced cognitive warfare strategies to further its
geopolitical, economic, and social goals. Through a case study of the ongoing
conflict between Israel and Hamas and theoretical analysis, we delve into the
utilization of these tactics in a hybrid conflict context marked by
manipulation (Bachmann, 2024).
This
article, drawn from the research compiled in my latest book “Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e
urbana tra Israele e Hamas” (Bertolotti, 2024), not only highlights the
destructive capabilities of cognitive warfare but also promotes a critical
debate on the international norms and policies necessary to regulate the use of
cognitive technologies in wartime contexts.
Cognitive
warfare represents a critical and disturbing frontier in modern conflict. Our
understanding of this phenomenon is essential for the protection of democracies
and for maintaining global peace and stability.
How does Hamas influence public opinion?
During
the conflict with Israel, Hamas has employed diverse cognitive warfare
strategies to sway public opinion, targeting both Arab-Muslim and Western
audiences to garner support for its cause. Central to these efforts is the utilization
of symbols and narratives by Hamas, aimed at evoking empathy or backing for
their objectives. This deliberate selection of symbols and narratives seeks to
forge an emotional connection between the public and Hamas’s struggle, thereby
shaping individuals’ perceptions through emotional alignment with the
organization’s cause.
Additionally,
online activities have emerged as a crucial tactic for Hamas. The group has
adeptly leveraged digital platforms to disseminate its messages, engage with
public sentiment, and coordinate propaganda campaigns. This virtual presence
has enabled Hamas to extend its reach to a global audience.
Furthermore,
Hamas has employed the staging of media events as another strategic tool. These
orchestrated events are cynically designed to generate extensive and favorable
media coverage, eliciting emotions of outrage towards Israel and solidarity
with the Palestinians. By framing these events within a narrative supportive of
Hamas’s cause and intertwining them with the broader “Palestinian
cause,” Hamas aims primarily at an international audience, seeking to
shape global public opinion. The overarching objective is to garner
international support through the involvement of international organizations,
governments, and lobbying groups, thereby influencing the global perception of
the conflict.
In
summary, through the coordinated deployment of these strategies, Hamas has
endeavored to shape public perception at both local and international levels,
with the aim of mobilizing widespread support against Israel.
One of
the primary strategies employed by Hamas involves media propaganda, utilizing
various channels to disseminate a favorable portrayal of their cause. Through
mediums such as interviews, press releases, and other communication channels,
Hamas officials have actively sought to shape public perception in their favor.
Throughout the conflict, Hamas has exploited media platforms to circulate
imagery and narratives aimed at eliciting empathy and garnering support for
their agenda. This includes the presentation of images depicting civilian
casualties and dramatic scenarios, often devoid of contextualization or presented
with fragmented information.
Moreover,
Hamas has extensively employed disinformation as a tactical approach, deliberately
disseminating false or misleading information to sow confusion and manipulate
public perception of events. This strategy has contributed to an environment
characterized by a blurred truth, casting doubt on the credibility of
information sources and complicating public comprehension of factual details.
For
instance, the so-called Ministry of Health in Gaza, effectively under the
control of Hamas, claimed a death toll of over 30,000, predominantly comprising
women and children, as of March 1, 2024. Is this assertion credible? No, it is
not. Abraham Wyner, Professor of Statistics and Data Science at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania and co-director of the faculty of
Sports Analytics and Business Initiative, conducted a study on this issue using
data provided by Hamas from October 26 to November 10, 2023, published in a
condensed form in the article “How
the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers. The evidence is in their
own poorly fabricated figures“, the conclusions of which are
summarized here (Wyner 2024).
The count
of civilian casualties in Gaza has garnered global attention since the onset of
the conflict. The primary source cited by the media and international politics
is the Gaza Health Ministry, which is under the control of Hamas. As of March
1, 2024, they reported over 30,000 deaths, with the majority being children and
women. The U.S. administration, led by President Joe Biden, has endorsed these
figures. During a hearing at the House Armed Services Committee in late
February, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the number of
Palestinian women and children killed since October 7 exceeded 25,000, citing
an estimate from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry. President Biden had
previously referenced this figure, underscoring that “too many” of
the over 27,000 Palestinians killed in the conflict were innocent civilians and
children. A subsequent White House press release affirmed that the president
had relied on publicly available data regarding the total number of casualties
(Wyner, 2024).
The
discrepancy within this dataset is evident: the figures are not accurate. An
examination of the available data and information indicates that the majority
of the casualties are not women and children, but rather combatants affiliated
with Hamas. Should there be any manipulation or fraudulence in Hamas’s data,
this can be substantiated through a thorough analysis of the dataset itself.
Despite its limitations, the available data is adequate for this purpose. Let
us delve into how Wyner (2024) confirmed the reliability of this dataset.
From
October 26 to November 10, 2023, the Gaza Health Ministry disseminated daily
casualty reports, encompassing both the total count and specific figures for
women and children. Wyner’s initial focus was on the aggregate number of
reported fatalities, which, as depicted in Figure 1, exhibits a consistent,
nearly linear progression over the given period (Wyner 2024).
Figure 1. The chart reveals an extremely regular increase in casualties over the considered period. The aggregated data by Wyner, provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), are based on figures from the Gaza Health Ministry (Source: Tablet Magazine).
The
consistency observed in the pattern of fatalities reveals incongruities that
indicate a significant lack of authenticity. Put differently, they appear to be
deceptive. One would anticipate some degree of day-to-day fluctuation, yet the
average daily casualty figure during the examined period hovers around two
hundred seventy, with a variation of merely fifteen percent. This remarkably
minimal fluctuation is unexpected, as one would anticipate days with
substantially higher-than-average counts (or conversely, lower-than-average
counts). This suggests the likelihood that the Gaza ministry has disseminated
falsified daily figures, exhibiting insufficient variation compared to typical
statistical patterns. Such uniformity may result from a misunderstanding of the
natural variability inherent in data generation processes. Even without
verified control data, the specifics of the daily counts raise significant
suspicions regarding the accuracy of the numbers (Wyner, 2024).
Going
into further detail, Wyner (2024) observes that we should anticipate
fluctuations in the number of child casualties that correspond to variations in
the number of women casualties. This is because daily changes in death tolls
are driven by fluctuations in attacks on residential buildings and tunnels, which
should lead to significant variability in overall counts but with less
variability in the proportion of deaths among demographic groups (men, women,
children): it’s a fundamental statistical principle concerning random
variation. Therefore, days with high female casualties should also see high
numbers of child casualties, while days with low female casualties should
correspond to fewer reported child casualties. This association can be assessed
and quantified using the coefficient of determination (R-squared), which
indicates the level of correlation between daily counts of female casualties
and daily counts of child casualties. In the case of genuine data, one would
expect an R-squared value substantially greater than 0, approaching 1.0.
However, the R-squared coefficient, as depicted in Figure 2, stands at 0.017, a value that statistically and substantively
does not deviate from 0 (Wyner, 2024).
Figure 2.The daily count of children reported as killed has no relationship with the number of women reported. The R-squared coefficient is 0.017, and the relationship is statistically and substantively insignificant (Source: Tablet Magazine).
The lack of correlation serves as the second piece of
circumstantial evidence indicating the potential falsity of the numbers
reported by the Ministry of Health of Gaza. An in-depth examination
necessitates taking into account an additional significant factor: considering
the conflict dynamics, one would anticipate a close relationship between the
daily number of female and male casualties, excluding women and minors. This
assumption stems from the expectation that changes in the frequency and
intensity of bombings and attacks would affect the daily counts of both sexes
uniformly. Contrary to this expectation, data analysis does not show a direct
correlation; instead, it reveals a strong inverse correlation (as shown in the
graph in Figure 2). This finding
contradicts the predictions and further suggests that the reported data may not
be accurate, providing a third piece of evidence supporting the potential
inauthenticity of the figures reported.
Figure 3. The correlation between the daily count of deceased men and the daily count of deceased women is extremely strong and negative (p-value < 0.0001) (Source: Tablet Magazine).
Wyner (2024)
identified further discrepancies within the analyzed data: for example, the
male casualty numbers reported on October 29 appear to contradict those from
the previous day, suggesting the paradoxical possibility that twenty-six men might
have come back to life, or more plausibly, that there were attribution or
recording errors. Additionally, there are days when the reported number of male
casualties is strikingly low, almost nonexistent; if these were simple
recording errors, one would expect the number of female casualties to be
average, at least. However, the article’s Author points out that on the three
days where the male casualty count is nearly zero, suggesting a potential
error, the number of female casualties is notably high. Interestingly, the
three highest daily peaks of female casualties occur on these anomalous days,
as shown in the graph in Figure 3 (Wyner
2024).
Figure 4. There are three days where the count of male casualties is close to zero. These three days correspond to the three highest daily counts of female casualties (Source: Tablet Magazine).
What
conclusions can be drawn from these observations? While not definitive, the
evidence strongly suggests that the figures were generated using a method that
is minimally, if at all, linked to actual events. It appears probable that the Hamas
Ministry of Health arbitrarily determined a daily total number of casualties.
This deduction stems from the excessively consistent increases in the daily
totals, which raises doubts about their reliability. Subsequently,
approximately seventy percent of these totals seem to have been randomly
allocated between women and children, with this distribution changing daily.
Lastly, the male casualty figures were likely adjusted to align with the
pre-determined total. Such an approach could explain the observed
inconsistencies and apparent anomalies in the data (Wyner, 2024).
There are
also additional conspicuous “warning signs.” The Ministry of Health
in Gaza consistently asserts that approximately seventy percent of the
casualties consist of women and children, a proportion markedly higher than
those documented in preceding conflicts with Israel. Moreover, given that
seventy percent of the casualties are purportedly women and children while
adult males comprise twenty-five percent of the population, it strongly implies
that the reported figures are, at the very least, substantially inaccurate and
likely falsified. Furthermore, on February 15, Hamas publicly acknowledged the
loss of 6,000 of its combatants, equating to more than twenty percent of the
total casualties reported, further highlighting discrepancies. Put differently,
if Hamas claims that seventy percent of the casualties are women and children,
alongside twenty percent being combatants, such a scenario appears highly
implausible in an urban armed confrontation, unless Israel intentionally
avoided targeting non-combatant males, or Hamas implies that nearly all male
residents of Gaza are affiliated with Hamas.
Are there
alternative datasets available for those seeking to validate the reliability of
Hamas’s data? Some impartial observers have conceded that Hamas’s casualty
figures in prior conflicts with Israel were relatively accurate. However, the
Israel-Hamas conflict that commenced in 2023 differs drastically in scale and
magnitude from past events; independent monitors, previously able to oversee
clashes between Israel and Hamas, were entirely absent during the recent
conflict, rendering reliance on past occurrences as a benchmark impossible. The
“fog of war” is particularly dense in Gaza, impeding the swift and
precise determination of civilian death tolls. Additionally, official tallies
of Palestinian fatalities do not differentiate between combatants and
civilians, and Hamas attributes all deaths to Israel, including those resulting
from failed Palestinian rocket launches, accidental detonations, intentional
homicides, or internal disputes. Substantiating this, an official Hamas
document (featured in Figure 4),
retrieved by Israeli forces in Gaza, explicitly acknowledges civilian
casualties stemming from failed rocket launches by the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad group and underscores the intent to ascribe responsibility to Israel.
Figure 5. Document attributed to Hamas regarding civilian casualties caused by the misfiring of rockets by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group.
A team of
researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health conducted
a comparison between Hamas’s data and information regarding Unrwa (United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) workers. They posited
that since the mortality rates appeared to be roughly similar, Hamas’s reported
numbers would not have been artificially inflated. However, this line of
reasoning rests on an unverified assumption: that Unrwa workers are not
disproportionately more susceptible to being killed than the general
population. Wyner (2024) highlights the potential flaw in this assumption,
suggesting that some Unrwa workers may have affiliations with Hamas. This
implication gains weight given that some Unrwa workers were involved in the
events of the October 7th massacre (Wyner, 2024).
The truth
regarding the conflict between Israel and Hamas remains obscured and is likely
to remain so. However, it is plausible that the reported total of civilian
casualties is significantly inflated. Israel’s estimation of at least 12,000
Palestinian fighters killed suggests that even if this number is reasonably
accurate, the ratio between non-combatant and combatant casualties would be
remarkably low. This implies a concerted effort to minimize unnecessary loss of
civilian life while engaging an adversary intermingled within the civilian
populace (Wyner, 2024).
Figure 6. The data used by Wyner, presented in columns (Source: Tablet Magazine).
Bibliography
Bachmann S.D. (2024), Hamas-Israel: Tik Tok and the relevance of
the cognitive warfare domain, Defense Horizon Journal.
Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e
urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e
intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325, in:
https://www.amazon.it/dp/8832294230.
Wyner A. (2024), How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes
Casualty Numbers. The evidence is in their own poorly fabricated figures,
The Tablet, march 7th, in
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers.
Farwell J. (2020), Information
Warfare: Forging Communication Strategies for Twenty-first Century Operational
Environments, Chicago University Press, Doi:10.56686/9781732003095.
Iran attacks Israel: the day after.
by Claudio Bertolotti
Teheran has carried out the retaliation announced for the attack it suffered on April 1st, when its consulate in Damascus was targeted, an event that resulted in the death of at least 16 people, including two commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Overnight, more than 300 drones and cruise missiles, launched by the Islamic Republic and its regional allies – the Ansar Allah Houthis from Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and Lebanese Hezbollah – targeted Israeli military installations, with most of these intercepted by the Iron Dome defense systems.
The attack by Tehran on Israel is an event that finally highlights the conflict dynamics in the Middle East that until now have seen Tehran strike Israel indirectly, without ever exposing itself. Today everything has changed, and this is the historical event that marks a change of pace, beyond the actual results achieved on the ground. Perhaps a result achieved by Israel is that of having drawn out of the shadows those who, over the last twenty years and more, have managed attacks and offenses against Israel hiding behind its regional proxies, from Syria, to Lebanese Hezbollah to Ansar Allah Houthis in Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and more recently Hamas itself.
A historic event that could be decisive in resolving conflicts unresolved for decades but that the United States will not allow to be resolved and this not out of a fear of regional expansion of the conflict but because the event itself takes place in full electoral campaign and the incumbent president fears losing the votes of the significant Arab and Muslim component.
On the tactical level, the less relevant one, we can read it as an attempt to saturate the Israeli air defense system by sending a high number of drone aircraft to then strike the targets with ballistic missiles. A failed result.
On the strategic level, the most relevant, and which allows us to make a forecast on the future scenarios of the ongoing conflict, although many analysts argue that it was a demonstrative act, almost symbolic, with the hope on the part of Iran of considering the direct confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran concluded, personally I believe it was instead an option without choice in relation to the role of Iran in the so-called “Axis of Resistance”: asking its proxies for years to fight consistently with Tehran’s power ambitions would no longer have been sustainable after the Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria. Coherence, opportunity, sharing of effort: if Tehran had not acted, the entire Axis of Resistance would have weakened, progressively shattered, leaving Tehran alone to face Israel.
Tehran is also particularly fragile on the domestic political front, with a generational discontent increasingly acute and evident.. the search for an external enemy representing an existential threat is a political ruse as old as war. On this we must not be surprised.
However, I fear that the game is still open, although we can expect a diplomatic pause strongly desired by the Biden administration, and this for reasons of electoral campaign rather than strategic opportunity of Washington.
Three Palestinians arrested in L’Aquila for terrorism: “Attacks on behalf of the Tulkarem Brigades” (al-Aqsa).
by Claudio Bertolotti
The
Italian State Police arrested three Palestinian citizens in L’Aquila –
including Anan Yaeesh, a 37-year-old Palestinian currently in jail in Terni
after being arrested on January 27th at the request of Israeli authorities who
are seeking his extradition – accused of planning terrorist attacks, as part of
an operation against extremism. They were taken into custody following the
issuance of a pre-trial detention order for the crime of association with
terrorist purposes, including international targets, and subversion of the
democratic order. According to law enforcement, the arrested were involved in
proselytism and dissemination activities in favor of the organization and
intended to carry out attacks, including self-sacrifice, against civilian and
military targets outside national borders. The Minister of the Interior, Matteo
Piantedosi, expressed his satisfaction with the arrest of the three individuals
considered extremely dangerous, emphasizing the commitment and investigative
excellence of the Italian law enforcement. According to the minister, this
operation demonstrates the effective surveillance and preventive action against
extremism and radicalization, for which he extended his thanks to the police
and the judiciary for the significant success achieved, highlighting the
constant attention to threats to internal security.
Who are they and what are the origins and
objectives of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades?
“The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades are a militant wing of the Fatah movement, founded in the late 1950s
by Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders. Emerging at the beginning of
the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, this group has played a significant
role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conducting attacks against Israeli
military and civilian targets. The Brigades have stated their goal is to fight
Israeli occupation and have claimed responsibility for numerous suicide
attacks, shootings, and missile launches.
Within this organization, the
‘Rapid Response Group – Tulkarem Brigades’ represents a specific operational
articulation that operates mainly in the Tulkarem area, a city located in the
western part of the West Bank. This specific group was established with the aim
of providing a rapid response to Israeli military incursions, exploiting local
terrain knowledge and the ability to quickly mobilize its members in case of
conflict.
The nature of the ‘Rapid
Response Group’ is characterized by its operational agility and ability to
conduct targeted attacks. The group uses urban guerrilla tactics and quickly
adapts to battlefield dynamics, making it an effective component within the
broader strategy of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Their activity aims to
create a continuous sense of insecurity among Israeli forces, trying to prevent
or slow down military operations in their area of influence.
Despite their determination,
the actions of groups like the ‘Rapid Response Group – Tulkarem Brigades’ raise
significant questions regarding the cycle of violence in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their operations, often directed against civilian
targets, have led to international condemnations and have heightened human
suffering on both sides of the conflict. The complexity of their existence and
operations reflects the intricate network of causes, identities, and loyalties
that characterize the long and painful clash between Israelis and Palestinians.
The presence and actions of
groups like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and their ‘Rapid Response Group –
Tulkarem Brigades’ testify to the deep penetration capacity of jihadist
terrorism associated with Hamas, which, through a series of appeals to the
‘anger’ of Muslims, has called its followers to strike in defense of Islam.
Effectively pushing towards the now established phenomenon of emulative,
improvised, and predominantly individual terrorism that has imposed its
presence and will to act in Europe since the advent of the Islamic State
phenomenon (formerly ISIS) in the years 2014/2017. Today, this autonomous and
often unsuccessful terrorism has entered a new competitive dynamic between the
Islamic State brand and the ‘new’ actor of jihad, Hamas, which, while
positioning itself as a ‘national liberation movement,’ has not failed to
extend its vision and call to strike everywhere, with acts of ‘jihad’ aimed at
defending Islam from the corruption and violence of the West.”
The Egyptian strategy in Libya: between diplomacy and military intervention
by Alessia Melcangi, Atlantic Council – University “La Sapienza”
The latest developments in the Libyan crisis seem to have given new impetus to the Egyptian diplomatic initiative; Cairo’s intention to temporarily abandon the military option in support of dialogue between rival groups comes as a result of the ceasefire announced by the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Tripoli at the end of August 2020. If the diplomatic option would be ineffective or would not guarantee Egypt’s strategic interests in that country, Cairo could go back to the military option, which was never com-pletely set aside
Latest developments in the Libyan crisis and Cairo’s intentions
The latest developments in the Libyan crisis seem to have given new impetus to the Egyptian diplomatic initiative: in fact, on September 23, President al-Sisi hosted a meeting in Cairo between the Libyan National Army’s leader, General Khalifa Haftar, and the spokesman of the Tobruk parliament, Aguila Saleh. The purpose of this talk was to solicit the warring parties to restart the political process under UN supervision with the aim of restoring security and stability in the country (Ahram, 2020).
Cairo’s intention to temporarily abandon the military option in support of dialogue between rival groups comes as a result of the ceasefire announced by the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Tripoli at the end of August 2020. Egypt is not new to this type of strategy which, since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, has followed two main directions: on the one hand, Cairo uses political mediation as a tool to achieve a diplomatic solution to the conflict; on the other hand, logistically and militarily it supports Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, together with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Recently Egypt went as far as threatening to start a conflict for the defense of its own national security and its interests in Libya (Melcangi, 2020).
As a consequence of Ankara’s intervention in support of the GNA ‒, following the December 2019 agreements signed between Turkey and Libya on maritime border demarcation and military cooperation (Butler, Gumrukcu, 2020) ‒, Egypt decided to abandon the diplomatic option and recalibrate its moves in Libya. Turkey represents not only a geopolitical rival, whose strategic projection, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, represents a threat for al-Sisi, but also one of the fiercest supporters of political Islam that Cairo, together with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia always try to obstruct.
The LNA forces’ retreat from the Western front in April 2020, pushed Cairo to resume the diplomatic path, asking for a ceasefire: the motivation behind this move was to avoid the general’s collapse and the loss of Cyrenaica into the hands of Ankara. On June 6, 2020, al-Sisi, supported by Haftar and Aguila Saleh, announced the so-called “Cairo Declaration” (Mezran, Melcangi, 2020), an intra-Libyan resolution for the relaunch of the pacification process. However, the declaration provoked the strong opposition of Ankara and the government of Tripoli. The diplomatic option had therefore turned into a warning of war launched by al-Sisi against the GNA and its supporters, positioned near the so-called red line of Sirte-Al-Jufra, at the gates of the rich and disputed “oil crescent”.
Historically, Libya has been a country of great importance for Egypt from different perspectives: from a domestic security perspective, to avoid the spillover of violence into its territory and penetration of jihadist groups, especially from the porous frontier bordering Cyrenaica; from an economic viewpoint , to deal with the consequences of the drastic decrease in remittances from Egyptian migrants working in Libya, which represent a serious threat to Egypt’s stability and internal security. But also, to reaffirm its image as a geostrategic regional pivot ready to defend its interests in a disputed area as strategic as the Eastern Mediterranean.
Following the latest events, Cairo has decided to abandon its assertive posture and return to a diplomatic strategy: on September 29, 2020 an important talk between the military delegations representing the GNA and the Libyan National Army was held in Hurghada. The principal topic discussed in this meeting was the possible restart of negotiations within the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC). Strongly supported by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), this meeting allowed Egypt to gain international recognition for its commitment to restarting peace dialogue between the various Libyan factions (UNSMIL, 2020).
Analysis, assessment, forecast
Al-Sisi, during his speech at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, affirmed his support for restarting the political peace process under the aegis of the UN; but, at the same time, President al-Sisi stressed once again that violation of the red-line that goes from Sirte to Jufra, would trigger a strong military reaction by Egypt. So, Egypt seems to want to avoid an expensive military intervention with unpredictable results, but not at any cost. If the diplomatic option would be ineffective or would not guarantee Egypt’s strategic interests in that country, Cairo could go back to the military option, which was never completely set aside. Considering the extreme fluidity of the Libya context, the choice between weapons and diplomacy is far from being obvious (Melcangi, 2020).
Main events in the Maghreb and the Mashreq areas – September
Algeria: The growing importance of Algeria-Turkey relations
Both Algeria and Turkey are keen to build a relationship that is mutually beneficial- but challenges remain. Instability in the broader Middle East, in particular Libya, and a desire to broaden political and economic links, have brought Algeria and Turkey closer. Deepening relations between the two countries is still a relatively recent phenomenon. The “Friendship and Cooperation Agreement” signed in 2006 in Algeria under the current AK Party government, marks one of the first attempts by Ankara to re-calibrate its relations with the West and the global south. Since then, there have been an additional three state visits by Erdogan, the latest in January 2020, following the departure of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was pushed out of power and forced to resign in April 2019 (Gjevori, 2020). Egypt: Egypt cuts interest rates by 50 bps as inflation subsides.
Egypt’s central bank unexpectedly cut its main overnight interest rates by 50 basis points on September 24th, saying exceptionally low inflation gave it room to help boost the economy. The bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reduced the lending rate to 9.75 percent and the deposit rate to 8.75 percent. Inflation remained well below the central bank’s target range of 6 percent to 12 percent (MPC, 2020). Israel: a new peace deal with the United Arab Emirates
US President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 15th joined the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain at the White House to mark historic normalization agreements between Israel and the two Arab countries. Israel officially established full diplomatic ties with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the one hand, the agreement is a sign of Middle East peace, on the other hand it could be considered as the establishment of a new front against Iran and Turkey. Lebanon: Macron attacks Hizbollah for failure to form Lebanon government
In less than a year, Lebanon has been hit by an economic meltdown, mass protests, financial collapse, a virus outbreak and a huge explosion in August that virtually wiped out the country’s main port, killing more than 190 people and causing up to $4.6bn worth of damage to the capital Beirut.
Recently, French president warns of ‘civil war’ and calls on Beirut’s politicians to compromise: French president Emmanuel Macron blamed the Iran-backed political party and paramilitary group Hizbollah for sabotaging the French-sponsored process to form a Lebanese crisis government and called on Beirut’s political class to try again over the next six weeks. Macron’s speech came after Lebanon’s prime minister-designate resigned on September 26th, saying he was unable to form an emergency government to tackle the overlapping crises which have left Lebanon suffering its most severe turbulence since its 15-year civil war ended in 1990 (Cornish, Abboud, 2020). Morocco: Moroccan security chief warns of terror ‘time-bomb’ in the region
The Moroccan security chief Abdelhak Khiame, head of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ), warned that the so-called group Islamic State “has developed in the Sahel-Sahara region, with the conflict in Libya and in countries like Mali which do not control their security”. The Sahel covers western and north-central Africa. “Terrorist cells and terrorism are growing in the region but also organised crime networks, drug trafficking, weapons and human beings”.
About economy, the Minister of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform Mohamed Benchaâboun stated that the national economy is expected to grow by 4.8% in 2021. Given the scenario of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning the recovery of the world economy (+5.2%), notably in the euro zone (5.3%), national economic growth should stand at 4.8%». However, this growth could not completely offset the economic contraction of 2020, which is forecast at -5.8%, due to the postponement of the recovery of some sectors such as tourism and related activities, as well as the deterioration of the labor market and corporate investment – the Minister stated. Syria: Carabinieri arrest Italian ‘ISIS bride’ in Syria
The ROS unit of Italy’s Carabinieri police said September 29th that it has arrested Alice Brignoli, an Italian ‘ISIS bride’, in Syria. Brignoli was the wife of Mohamed Koraichi, an Italian with Moroccan roots who became an ISIS militant. The couple left Italy to join the so-colled Islamic State (IS) in Syria in 2015, taking their three children with them. Koraichi, who is thought to have died, took part in IS military operations while the ROS said that Brugnoli had an “active role in teaching the children the cause of the jihad”. She is accused of criminal association for terrorism. The ROS unit tracked down Brignoli and her four children – she gave birth to her fourth child in Syria – and have brought them back to Italy (ANSA).
UK government probing cyber-attack over Syria propaganda leaks. Hackers have penetrated the computer systems of the UK’s foreign ministry and taken hundreds of files detailing the country’s controversial propaganda programmes in war-torn Syria. In a security breach of enormous proportions, the hackers appear to have deliberately targeted files that set out the financial and operational relationships between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and a network of private-sector contractors that have been covertly running media platforms in Syria throughout the nine-year civil war (Middle East Eye, 2020) Tunisia: Tunisia rejects any military solution in Libya
Tunisian Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi reiterated on September 28th that he rejects any military solution in Libya and intervention in its internal affairs. Addressing heads of Tunisian diplomatic missions, he said combining efforts to push the political settlement forward through an intra-Libyan dialogue under UN supervision. In response to the UAE and Bahrain signs of the US-sponsored agreements to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, Mechichi also stressed on Tunisia’s firm position on supporting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people based on the 2002 Arab Peace initiative (Thabeti, 2020).
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