The Perils of a War Between Israel and Jordan

by Andrea Molle.

A war between Israel and Jordan remains an unlikely but potentially catastrophic scenario. Since signing a peace treaty in 1994, the two countries have maintained diplomatic and security cooperation, making armed conflict seem improbable. However, the Middle East is a region where tensions can escalate unexpectedly, and in the event of war, the consequences would be far-reaching, extending beyond the immediate battlefield and reshaping regional and global dynamics.

Militarily, Israel holds an overwhelming advantage. Its state-of-the-art air force, advanced missile defense systems, and cyber warfare capabilities make it one of the most formidable militaries in the world. Jordan’s military, while professional and well-trained, lacks the offensive power and technological sophistication to sustain a prolonged war against Israel. While Jordan’s mountainous terrain could offer some defensive advantages, its key cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes.

Conversely, Israeli population centers such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would be within range of Jordanian missiles, but Israel’s Iron Dome and other missile defense systems would likely neutralize most of these threats. If war were to break out under a U.S. administration led by Donald Trump, the geopolitical landscape would shift dramatically. Trump has a history of unwavering support for Israel, having moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights during his first term. In the event of conflict, Washington would likely side decisively with Israel, providing military assistance, blocking diplomatic efforts to restrain Israeli actions, and exerting pressure on Jordan to de-escalate.

This approach could embolden Israeli leadership, reducing the incentive for a swift resolution and increasing the likelihood of a drawn-out conflict. At the same time, such a stance would further alienate Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would face the difficult choice of supporting Jordan diplomatically while maintaining their fragile ties with Israel. The economic consequences of such a war would be devastating. Jordan, already reliant on foreign aid and economic cooperation with Israel, would suffer greatly, facing trade disruptions, infrastructure destruction, and economic collapse. While Israel has a more resilient economy, a prolonged war would still create market instability, harm the tourism industry, and disrupt vital sectors such as technology and defense.

A broader escalation could also lead to rising oil prices and regional economic turmoil, further complicating global markets. Beyond conventional military and economic consequences, one of the most dangerous ripple effects of such a conflict would be the resurgence of international terrorism. History has shown that war and instability in the Middle East create fertile ground for jihadist organizations, and a war between Israel and Jordan would likely open the door for extremist groups to exploit the chaos. ISIS-K, an already growing threat, could seize the moment to expand its influence, launching attacks in both Israel and Jordan while using the war as a recruitment tool. The instability could also encourage terrorist attacks in Western nations, as radicalized individuals respond to the conflict with violence abroad. The specter of a global wave of terrorism, fueled by the war, could reshape security policies worldwide and force governments to divert resources toward counterterrorism efforts. The possible outcomes of such a conflict vary in severity. A short, intense war could lead to a quick diplomatic resolution, with the United States or regional powers stepping in to mediate a ceasefire.

However, if the war dragged on and external actors such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Palestinian militant groups became involved, the situation could spiral into a broader regional conflict. Jordan itself could face internal instability, with the monarchy weakened by war and at risk of an uprising or coup. In the worst-case scenario, the war could trigger a new era of instability, empowering extremist groups and reshaping alliances across the region. Ultimately, a war between Israel and Jordan would be disastrous for both countries and the broader Middle East. The strategic, economic, and security costs far outweigh any potential gains, making a full-scale conflict unlikely.

However, as history has shown, political miscalculations, external provocations, or shifting alliances can sometimes push nations toward unintended wars. While outright conflict remains improbable, the risks of border tensions, proxy confrontations, and diplomatic crises should not be underestimated. The only real solution is continued dialogue and diplomatic engagement, as the alternative—a war with unpredictable and devastating consequences—would be a tragedy for the entire region.

Gaza: Attack on Kamal Adwan Hospital. Israel and the al-Shifa Precedent – A New Humanitarian Standard.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Article from the book by C. Bertolotti, Gaza Underground. La guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. START InSight (2024).

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), during a raid on the Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza—used by Hamas as a command post for the terrorist organization—eliminated 19 militants, including key figures involved in the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

In coordination with Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Agency), the IDF also arrested over 240 terrorists as part of an operation aimed at thwarting Hamas’ latest attempt to re-establish itself in northern Gaza. The Palestinian militia leadership had deliberately exploited the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabaliya, employing the well-documented strategy of using human shields—this time, patients inside the hospital. This incident not only highlights Hamas’ criminal intent but also underscores the IDF’s efforts to minimize the war’s impact on Palestinian civilians, despite widespread media narratives depicting the conflict as disproportionately violent. In fact, this war has resulted in historically low civilian casualties compared to other urban conflicts.

Operation at al-Shifa Hospital: A New Humanitarian Standard?

The Israel-Hamas war has provided Israeli forces with the opportunity to conceptualize and implement an unprecedented standard of urban warfare. In March 2024, the IDF conducted a targeted operation at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza—repurposed by Hamas as a logistical and operational base—while adopting extraordinary measures to protect civilians during the approach, entry, and management of the facility. This approach integrated not only military personnel but also Israeli medical teams and paramedics tasked with assisting Palestinian patients, along with logistical units ensuring the supply of food, water, and medical resources.

This strategy aimed to limit the collateral damage caused by Hamas’ presence within civilian infrastructure, while simultaneously prioritizing patient welfare and minimizing civilian casualties. It stands as a first in the history of urban warfare—an innovative yet costly standard in terms of resources and the inherent risks faced by military personnel operating within hostile environments. From a doctrinal and historical perspective, this marks the first instance of an army undertaking such extensive measures to safeguard an adversarial civilian population, even as offensive military operations unfolded within the same building.

Military analyst John Spencer, in his article Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It?, remarked that Israel had implemented “more precautions to prevent civilian harm than any military in history—exceeding international legal requirements and surpassing the measures taken by the U.S. in recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The al-Shifa precedent stands as a case study in urban warfare and civilian protection in operational areas. Despite posing a tactical disadvantage, this approach allows militaries engaged in highly scrutinized operations to prevent accusations of violating jus in bello and international conventions. It prompts reflection on the tactical applications and self-imposed limitations designed to protect civilians—not purely for humanitarian reasons but also as a defensive measure against adversary propaganda and cognitive warfare. Hamas, by using civilian infrastructure for military purposes and exploiting civilian casualties to bolster international pressure on Israel, demonstrates how lawfare (the use of legal frameworks as a weapon) plays a central role in modern conflicts.

The dominant Western military doctrine, as described at the beginning of this chapter, revolves around “maneuver warfare”—designed to physically and morally overwhelm an enemy through overwhelming force and speed, striking political and military centers of gravity to compel surrender or destruction. This doctrine underpinned the invasions of Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Russia’s attempt to swiftly capture Ukraine in 2022. In each case, civilians were given little warning or time to evacuate, resulting in significant non-combatant casualties.

Israel, however, has deviated from this entrenched “textbook” approach, prioritizing civilian protection. The IDF pre-announced nearly every operation, allowing civilians time to relocate—often forfeiting the element of surprise. This gave Hamas the opportunity to reposition military and political leaders (along with Israeli hostages) within urban areas, concealing them among civilians or through underground tunnels during evacuations. Unlike the IDF, Hamas fighters do not wear uniforms, granting them a tactical advantage—striking from within civilian populations and blending in to retreat alongside them.

As a result, Hamas has successfully pursued a dual strategy—inflicting suffering on the Palestinian population while crafting a narrative that leverages images of civilian casualties to amplify international pressure on Israel to halt its operations.

Iron Swords: The New Challenges of Ground Offensives in the Israel-Hamas War.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Article from the original book: C. Bertolotti,Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight Lugano (Link: https://www.amazon.it/dp/8832294230).

Introduction to the Urban Evolution of the Conflict

No environment presents more formidable challenges for military forces than urban areas. Urban warfare is uniquely destructive, yet military forces frequently find themselves ill-prepared for the specific difficulties of operating in densely populated battlefields and often cannot avoid being drawn into the severe realities of urban combat. In their book “Understanding Urban Warfare“, Liam Collins and John Spencer highlight the distinct challenges posed by urban warfare. These include the limiting effects of three-dimensional terrain on various weapon systems, the numerous enemy firing points along urban communication routes (such as streets, alleys, and avenues), and the crucial need to minimize civilian casualties, protect critical infrastructure, and preserve cultural heritage (Collins & Spencer, 2022). Urban areas, serving as battlefields, provide diverse and often unpredictable maneuvering options based on the type of urban environment, whether it be a megalopolis, metropolitan city, peripheral town, conurbation, or even a smart city, each with characteristics that significantly impact military operations.

As I highlighted in my latest volume on urban warfare in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale (English title: “Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban War between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence”), many of the most recent urban battles – from the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 to the Second Battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, the Battle of Shusha in 2020 during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and also Mariupol in 2022 and Bakhmut in 2023 in the Russo-Ukrainian War – provide us with trends and lessons learned to better understand urban warfare. In an increasingly urbanized world, the future nature of conflict will also be increasingly urban.

The Israeli Approach to Urban Combat: The Lesson from Gaza

On the tactical level, Israeli soldiers last engaged in a major ground battle in 2014 when Israel deployed its troops inside Gaza. Strategically, however, since then the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have focused on countering potential threats from Iran rather than the immediate neighbor. This overall strategic shift has effectively distracted the Israeli armed forces from a substantial but different nature of threat.

Conversely, Hamas has militarily strengthened since 2008/2009, when it first faced an Israeli ground assault. Back then, Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, consisted of 16,000 militiamen and approximately 2,000 troops specialized in combat. This was in stark contrast to the situation on the eve of the 2023 offensive when, according to the IDF, Hamas could rely on a force of 40,000 elite fighters, an arsenal of drones, and about 30,000 rockets. This significant arsenal overwhelmed the Iron Dome system on October 7, 2023, leading to a saturation point where the number of rockets fired by Hamas exceeded the system’s defensive capacity, prompting the United States to urgently send reinforcements (Bertolotti, 2024).

With the launch of the ground offensive of Operation Iron Swords, the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in the urban area of Gaza, the most densely populated part of the Strip, initiating a new phase of the conflict focused mainly on urban warfare, including subterranean combat. Engineering units conducted breaching operations to access tunnels, allowing specialized underground combat units to overpower the enemy (Schalit, 2023).

As part of their defense strategy, Hamas engineers had an extensive network of tactical tunnels at their disposal; some interconnected, others isolated. Many, as previously argued, were dug to a depth safe from aerial bombing, while others were closer to the surface for quick access or exit. Furthermore, Hamas prepared tunnels and “mouse holes” to allow fighters to move covertly between buildings and attack Israeli soldiers before disappearing again (Schalit, 2023). In addition to these tactical advantages for troop movement, Palestinian engineers also set up improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – some hidden in walls to detonate as armored vehicles passed, larger ones buried under roads or rubble piles, and some with tunnel traps designed to lure and strike Israeli soldiers engaged in hostage search and rescue operations.

Urban warfare is extremely slow.

The war entered a critical phase with the entry of units into the urban perimeter of Gaza, where the Israeli army, equipped with top-tier urban combat skills, faced an enemy determined to fight to the last, having prepared for years for that confrontation. A battle that took place in an environment favorable to the defender (Schalit, 2023).

Combat experiences in urban areas, such as those in Mosul, Iraq, and Marawi, Philippines between 2016 and 2017, offer important lessons. In Mosul, a 100,000-strong Iraqi contingent supported by the United States took nine months to neutralize a group of Islamic State militants in a fortified city, suffering the loss of 8,000 men and numerous military equipment due to improvised explosive devices. Similarly, in Marawi, Filipino forces took five months to overcome Islamic State-Maute militants, facing the harsh reality of being able to take control of only one building per day due to the constant risk of ambushes and hidden explosives. These scenarios underscore the complex challenges of urban combat and the resilience required to overcome them.

The Three Levels of Challenge in Urban Warfare

As previously mentioned, urban warfare is one of the most complex and multifaceted challenges an army can face. This type of conflict is distinguished by its intensity and profound implications not only tactically but also perceptually and ethically.

Perceptually, urban warfare highlights a marked contrast between the expectations of a society inclined towards moderation and the pursuit of ethically acceptable conduct in conflict, and the brutal reality of urban combat, where the costs in terms of human lives, material destruction, and loss of international legitimacy can be devastating. This discrepancy creates a form of cognitive dissonance, making it difficult for modern armies, anchored in the values of liberal societies, to adequately prepare for the inherent brutality of this type of combat.

Tactically, urban warfare scenarios present a series of unique difficulties, which we have partly illustrated. Combat in densely built environments involves the risk of long-range attacks via drones or improvised explosive devices, significantly increasing the danger for forces on the ground. The urban environment facilitates the adversaries’ ability to hide and set ambushes, creating a climate of constant uncertainty. Maneuvering troops are exposed to high risks, with their firepower diluted by the need to disperse among buildings, often with reduced visibility. Additionally, the degradation of sensor and communication systems, essential for coordinating operations, poses a significant problem.

Ethically and morally, the presence of civilians in the urban theater of war introduces significant dilemmas. Civilians disproportionately suffer the consequences of the conflict, both directly as victims of the fighting and indirectly due to displacement and epidemics resulting from the destruction of urban infrastructure. Military commanders face the delicate dilemma of proportionality, having to balance the need to act for the safety of their soldiers with the responsibility to avoid civilian harm, in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This balance is further complicated by the presence of civilians who can use electronic devices and social media, those who may be hostile or resist unarmed, and the psychological and political weight these decisions impose on commanders, potentially influencing their judgment and choices.

The Evolution of the Technical and Tactical Capabilities of the Israeli Forces

The Israeli armed forces have historically faced numerous challenges in the urban context of Gaza, particularly after the 2005 withdrawal, with military operations in 2008 and subsequent ones in 2014; different periods in which the Israeli forces learned valuable lessons. Politically, Jerusalem recognized the crucial importance of gaining public favor, both internationally and domestically. Militarily, it became evident that air power alone is never sufficient, leading to a redefinition of the capabilities and organization of ground forces, particularly regarding the acquisition and deployment of robust armored vehicles and the application of innovative techniques, tactics, and procedures aimed at managing underground threats.

As a direct consequence of these lessons, the IDF equipped itself with some of the best technologies for urban operations; among these are tanks and armored personnel carriers, considered among the safest in the world. The Israeli arsenal also includes the armored “Doobi” D9 bulldozers from Caterpillar, designed to demolish buildings and create safe pathways in potentially mined environments, thus reducing the risk of ambushes and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. These powerful machines, which can also be remotely operated, have been controversial due to their use in demolishing homes, which some interpret as punitive measures.

However, the operational use of the D9s, contrary to the criticisms which fit into a broader context of instrumental opposition, involves creating safe pathways through hazardous areas, partially destroying buildings to create alternative routes, and building protective barriers around strategic areas to consolidate territorial gains by military units. This approach reflects a combination of strength and ingenuity, marking the continued evolution of Israeli military strategies in the face of the unique challenges of urban warfare.

The Israeli army, within its vast arsenal of specialized vehicles, also possesses a particular vehicle, the “Puma,” dedicated to neutralizing minefields and countering improvised explosive devices. Equipped with an elaborate mine clearance system called “IED Carpet,^[1] ” the “Puma” can detonate or neutralize hidden explosive devices through controlled explosions with rockets. Beyond this cutting-edge technology, the vehicles used by the engineering units are equipped with devices capable of disrupting circuits or transmissions used for controlled activation of IEDs, some of which include the “Thor” system that uses precision lasers to trigger devices from a distance (Schalit, 2023).

In the realm of subterranean combat, the Israeli army boasts specialized units, such as the Sarayet Yahalom elements, trained in detecting, maneuvering, and destroying tunnels. These special forces use special explosive charges, drones, and underground robots to conduct their operations, confirming Israel’s forefront position in the search for underground detection technologies, employing a wide range of instruments that span geospatial, acoustic, seismic, tomographic resistivity (ERT), and ground-penetrating radar, capable of mapping tunnels up to twenty meters deep.

The IDF’s approach to tunnels is primarily focused on their destruction from the surface, avoiding entry and endangering military operators wherever possible. However, for specific missions such as hostage recovery, special units, including Yahalom reconnaissance teams and the Oketz canine unit, equipped with specific gear for underground operations, have been trained. The need for direct reconnaissance using soldiers within this vast tunnel network suggests the use of highly specialized operational techniques, potentially entrusted to the elite Mista’arvim units, capable of operating undercover and blending in with enemy fighters.

In this scenario of technological and tactical confrontation, both sides could present unexpected and devastating surprises. While the IDF has the technological and military superiority necessary to prevail, the outcome of the battle and its human and geopolitical repercussions remain shrouded in uncertainty, testifying to the complexity and unpredictability of modern conflict (Schalit, 2023).

Bibliografia

Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325.

Collins L, Spencer J. (2022), Understanding Urban Warfare, Howgate Publishing Limited, pp. 392.

Schalit A. (2023), Hidden tunnels, ambushes and explosives in walls: the Israel-Hamas war enters a precarious new phase, The Conversation, 23 novembre 2023.

[1] Minefield Clearance and IED Neutralization: The Carpet is a modern system for minefield clearance and IED neutralization, produced by the Israeli company Rafael. It can efficiently clear a path of one hundred meters in a minefield and neutralize all types of IEDs. To ensure maximum crew survivability, the system is operated by two soldiers inside the vehicle. The Carpet system consists of a launcher containing twenty rockets equipped with FAE (Fuel-Air Explosive) warheads. The launcher is an autonomous add-on kit that can be easily and quickly assembled in the field on any vehicle. The Carpet is the most efficient system for minefield clearance and IED neutralization/detonation on any terrain and in all weather conditions, while maintaining crew safety.

Cognitive Warfare: Manipulating numbers to influence global public opinion. How Hamas deceived western media.

by Claudio Bertolotti

Excerpted from the book by C. Bertolotti (2024), Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban Warfare between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325. [GO TO BOOK].

Introduction

In the digital age, warfare transcends mere physical confrontation. Enter the realm of “cognitive warfare,” a sophisticated strategy aimed not just at battles on the ground, but at the very fabric of human perception and behavior. Cognitive warfare is characterized by the utilization of advanced technologies and psychological methodologies to penetrate individual consciousness.

This approach surpasses conventional disinformation or propaganda tactics; it encompasses the utilization of artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to sway thought processes and decision-making mechanisms without explicit authorization (Farwell, 2020). This form of warfare exploits the susceptibilities of contemporary societies to information overload, utilizing the same platforms that facilitate global communication and access to information to disseminate content aimed at causing instability. This article examines how Hamas, a non-state actor designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, has embraced cognitive warfare strategies to further its geopolitical, economic, and social goals. Through a case study of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas and theoretical analysis, we delve into the utilization of these tactics in a hybrid conflict context marked by manipulation (Bachmann, 2024).

This article, drawn from the research compiled in my latest book “Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas” (Bertolotti, 2024), not only highlights the destructive capabilities of cognitive warfare but also promotes a critical debate on the international norms and policies necessary to regulate the use of cognitive technologies in wartime contexts.

Cognitive warfare represents a critical and disturbing frontier in modern conflict. Our understanding of this phenomenon is essential for the protection of democracies and for maintaining global peace and stability.

How does Hamas influence public opinion?

During the conflict with Israel, Hamas has employed diverse cognitive warfare strategies to sway public opinion, targeting both Arab-Muslim and Western audiences to garner support for its cause. Central to these efforts is the utilization of symbols and narratives by Hamas, aimed at evoking empathy or backing for their objectives. This deliberate selection of symbols and narratives seeks to forge an emotional connection between the public and Hamas’s struggle, thereby shaping individuals’ perceptions through emotional alignment with the organization’s cause.

Additionally, online activities have emerged as a crucial tactic for Hamas. The group has adeptly leveraged digital platforms to disseminate its messages, engage with public sentiment, and coordinate propaganda campaigns. This virtual presence has enabled Hamas to extend its reach to a global audience.

Furthermore, Hamas has employed the staging of media events as another strategic tool. These orchestrated events are cynically designed to generate extensive and favorable media coverage, eliciting emotions of outrage towards Israel and solidarity with the Palestinians. By framing these events within a narrative supportive of Hamas’s cause and intertwining them with the broader “Palestinian cause,” Hamas aims primarily at an international audience, seeking to shape global public opinion. The overarching objective is to garner international support through the involvement of international organizations, governments, and lobbying groups, thereby influencing the global perception of the conflict.

In summary, through the coordinated deployment of these strategies, Hamas has endeavored to shape public perception at both local and international levels, with the aim of mobilizing widespread support against Israel.

One of the primary strategies employed by Hamas involves media propaganda, utilizing various channels to disseminate a favorable portrayal of their cause. Through mediums such as interviews, press releases, and other communication channels, Hamas officials have actively sought to shape public perception in their favor. Throughout the conflict, Hamas has exploited media platforms to circulate imagery and narratives aimed at eliciting empathy and garnering support for their agenda. This includes the presentation of images depicting civilian casualties and dramatic scenarios, often devoid of contextualization or presented with fragmented information.

Moreover, Hamas has extensively employed disinformation as a tactical approach, deliberately disseminating false or misleading information to sow confusion and manipulate public perception of events. This strategy has contributed to an environment characterized by a blurred truth, casting doubt on the credibility of information sources and complicating public comprehension of factual details.

For instance, the so-called Ministry of Health in Gaza, effectively under the control of Hamas, claimed a death toll of over 30,000, predominantly comprising women and children, as of March 1, 2024. Is this assertion credible? No, it is not. Abraham Wyner, Professor of Statistics and Data Science at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and co-director of the faculty of Sports Analytics and Business Initiative, conducted a study on this issue using data provided by Hamas from October 26 to November 10, 2023, published in a condensed form in the article “How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers. The evidence is in their own poorly fabricated figures“, the conclusions of which are summarized here (Wyner 2024).

The count of civilian casualties in Gaza has garnered global attention since the onset of the conflict. The primary source cited by the media and international politics is the Gaza Health Ministry, which is under the control of Hamas. As of March 1, 2024, they reported over 30,000 deaths, with the majority being children and women. The U.S. administration, led by President Joe Biden, has endorsed these figures. During a hearing at the House Armed Services Committee in late February, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the number of Palestinian women and children killed since October 7 exceeded 25,000, citing an estimate from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry. President Biden had previously referenced this figure, underscoring that “too many” of the over 27,000 Palestinians killed in the conflict were innocent civilians and children. A subsequent White House press release affirmed that the president had relied on publicly available data regarding the total number of casualties (Wyner, 2024).

The discrepancy within this dataset is evident: the figures are not accurate. An examination of the available data and information indicates that the majority of the casualties are not women and children, but rather combatants affiliated with Hamas. Should there be any manipulation or fraudulence in Hamas’s data, this can be substantiated through a thorough analysis of the dataset itself. Despite its limitations, the available data is adequate for this purpose. Let us delve into how Wyner (2024) confirmed the reliability of this dataset.

From October 26 to November 10, 2023, the Gaza Health Ministry disseminated daily casualty reports, encompassing both the total count and specific figures for women and children. Wyner’s initial focus was on the aggregate number of reported fatalities, which, as depicted in Figure 1, exhibits a consistent, nearly linear progression over the given period (Wyner 2024).

The consistency observed in the pattern of fatalities reveals incongruities that indicate a significant lack of authenticity. Put differently, they appear to be deceptive. One would anticipate some degree of day-to-day fluctuation, yet the average daily casualty figure during the examined period hovers around two hundred seventy, with a variation of merely fifteen percent. This remarkably minimal fluctuation is unexpected, as one would anticipate days with substantially higher-than-average counts (or conversely, lower-than-average counts). This suggests the likelihood that the Gaza ministry has disseminated falsified daily figures, exhibiting insufficient variation compared to typical statistical patterns. Such uniformity may result from a misunderstanding of the natural variability inherent in data generation processes. Even without verified control data, the specifics of the daily counts raise significant suspicions regarding the accuracy of the numbers (Wyner, 2024).

Going into further detail, Wyner (2024) observes that we should anticipate fluctuations in the number of child casualties that correspond to variations in the number of women casualties. This is because daily changes in death tolls are driven by fluctuations in attacks on residential buildings and tunnels, which should lead to significant variability in overall counts but with less variability in the proportion of deaths among demographic groups (men, women, children): it’s a fundamental statistical principle concerning random variation. Therefore, days with high female casualties should also see high numbers of child casualties, while days with low female casualties should correspond to fewer reported child casualties. This association can be assessed and quantified using the coefficient of determination (R-squared), which indicates the level of correlation between daily counts of female casualties and daily counts of child casualties. In the case of genuine data, one would expect an R-squared value substantially greater than 0, approaching 1.0. However, the R-squared coefficient, as depicted in Figure 2, stands at 0.017, a value that statistically and substantively does not deviate from 0 (Wyner, 2024).

The lack of correlation serves as the second piece of circumstantial evidence indicating the potential falsity of the numbers reported by the Ministry of Health of Gaza. An in-depth examination necessitates taking into account an additional significant factor: considering the conflict dynamics, one would anticipate a close relationship between the daily number of female and male casualties, excluding women and minors. This assumption stems from the expectation that changes in the frequency and intensity of bombings and attacks would affect the daily counts of both sexes uniformly. Contrary to this expectation, data analysis does not show a direct correlation; instead, it reveals a strong inverse correlation (as shown in the graph in Figure 2). This finding contradicts the predictions and further suggests that the reported data may not be accurate, providing a third piece of evidence supporting the potential inauthenticity of the figures reported.

Wyner (2024) identified further discrepancies within the analyzed data: for example, the male casualty numbers reported on October 29 appear to contradict those from the previous day, suggesting the paradoxical possibility that twenty-six men might have come back to life, or more plausibly, that there were attribution or recording errors. Additionally, there are days when the reported number of male casualties is strikingly low, almost nonexistent; if these were simple recording errors, one would expect the number of female casualties to be average, at least. However, the article’s Author points out that on the three days where the male casualty count is nearly zero, suggesting a potential error, the number of female casualties is notably high. Interestingly, the three highest daily peaks of female casualties occur on these anomalous days, as shown in the graph in Figure 3 (Wyner 2024).

What conclusions can be drawn from these observations? While not definitive, the evidence strongly suggests that the figures were generated using a method that is minimally, if at all, linked to actual events. It appears probable that the Hamas Ministry of Health arbitrarily determined a daily total number of casualties. This deduction stems from the excessively consistent increases in the daily totals, which raises doubts about their reliability. Subsequently, approximately seventy percent of these totals seem to have been randomly allocated between women and children, with this distribution changing daily. Lastly, the male casualty figures were likely adjusted to align with the pre-determined total. Such an approach could explain the observed inconsistencies and apparent anomalies in the data (Wyner, 2024).

There are also additional conspicuous “warning signs.” The Ministry of Health in Gaza consistently asserts that approximately seventy percent of the casualties consist of women and children, a proportion markedly higher than those documented in preceding conflicts with Israel. Moreover, given that seventy percent of the casualties are purportedly women and children while adult males comprise twenty-five percent of the population, it strongly implies that the reported figures are, at the very least, substantially inaccurate and likely falsified. Furthermore, on February 15, Hamas publicly acknowledged the loss of 6,000 of its combatants, equating to more than twenty percent of the total casualties reported, further highlighting discrepancies. Put differently, if Hamas claims that seventy percent of the casualties are women and children, alongside twenty percent being combatants, such a scenario appears highly implausible in an urban armed confrontation, unless Israel intentionally avoided targeting non-combatant males, or Hamas implies that nearly all male residents of Gaza are affiliated with Hamas.

Are there alternative datasets available for those seeking to validate the reliability of Hamas’s data? Some impartial observers have conceded that Hamas’s casualty figures in prior conflicts with Israel were relatively accurate. However, the Israel-Hamas conflict that commenced in 2023 differs drastically in scale and magnitude from past events; independent monitors, previously able to oversee clashes between Israel and Hamas, were entirely absent during the recent conflict, rendering reliance on past occurrences as a benchmark impossible. The “fog of war” is particularly dense in Gaza, impeding the swift and precise determination of civilian death tolls. Additionally, official tallies of Palestinian fatalities do not differentiate between combatants and civilians, and Hamas attributes all deaths to Israel, including those resulting from failed Palestinian rocket launches, accidental detonations, intentional homicides, or internal disputes. Substantiating this, an official Hamas document (featured in Figure 4), retrieved by Israeli forces in Gaza, explicitly acknowledges civilian casualties stemming from failed rocket launches by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group and underscores the intent to ascribe responsibility to Israel.

A team of researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health conducted a comparison between Hamas’s data and information regarding Unrwa (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) workers. They posited that since the mortality rates appeared to be roughly similar, Hamas’s reported numbers would not have been artificially inflated. However, this line of reasoning rests on an unverified assumption: that Unrwa workers are not disproportionately more susceptible to being killed than the general population. Wyner (2024) highlights the potential flaw in this assumption, suggesting that some Unrwa workers may have affiliations with Hamas. This implication gains weight given that some Unrwa workers were involved in the events of the October 7^th massacre (Wyner, 2024).

The truth regarding the conflict between Israel and Hamas remains obscured and is likely to remain so. However, it is plausible that the reported total of civilian casualties is significantly inflated. Israel’s estimation of at least 12,000 Palestinian fighters killed suggests that even if this number is reasonably accurate, the ratio between non-combatant and combatant casualties would be remarkably low. This implies a concerted effort to minimize unnecessary loss of civilian life while engaging an adversary intermingled within the civilian populace (Wyner, 2024).

Bibliography

Bachmann S.D. (2024), Hamas-Israel: Tik Tok and the relevance of the cognitive warfare domain, Defense Horizon Journal.

Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325, in: https://www.amazon.it/dp/8832294230.

Wyner A. (2024), How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers. The evidence is in their own poorly fabricated figures, The Tablet, march 7^th, in https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers.

Farwell J. (2020), Information Warfare: Forging Communication Strategies for Twenty-first Century Operational Environments, Chicago University Press, Doi:10.56686/9781732003095.