Trump’s strategy: pressuring Iran to target China.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The Trump administration has decided to intensify its maximum-pressure policy against Iran by directly targeting the country’s oil sector and related logistical infrastructure. Recent U.S. actions aim to significantly reduce Iranian oil exports, especially to China, thereby limiting Tehran’s ability to finance destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East. The State Department has imposed new sanctions on three companies involved in facilitating illicit transfers of Iranian oil through ship-to-ship (STS) naval operations conducted outside port limits in Southeast Asia. At the same time, three vessels involved in these activities have been identified and declared blocked properties.
These measures aim to interrupt the financial flows that enable Tehran to sustain its nuclear and missile programs and support regional terrorist groups. Simultaneously, the Treasury Department has directly targeted Iran’s Petroleum Minister, Mohsen Paknejad, a central figure in Iranian oil operations, accused of using national energy resources to support the regime’s illicit activities.
Several companies engaged in the transportation and sale of Iranian oil, particularly to China, have also been sanctioned. The sanctioned companies operated vessels registered in various countries, concealing the true origin of the transported oil by disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to evade international monitoring. Among these companies are PT. Bintang Samudra Utama (Bintang), Shipload Maritime Pte. Ltd., and PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama (Gianira), which respectively managed the vessels CELEBES, MALILI, and MARINA VISION. These ships were involved in a significant STS transfer operation of Iranian oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.
Analysts emphasize that this strategy reflects a well-established U.S. tactic aimed not only at cutting off Tehran’s primary economic resources but also at deterring third-party companies and countries from collaborating, directly or indirectly, with the Iranian regime. Such sanctions create a strong deterrent effect, raising costs and risks for international operators seeking to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Economically and strategically, this intensified pressure seeks to progressively eliminate Iran’s oil revenues, thereby weakening the regime’s ability to finance its conventional armed forces as well as affiliated militias and groups considered by Washington as primary sources of regional instability.
The escalation of sanctions is likely to heighten international tensions further. However, it underscores the Trump administration’s resolve to maintain its maximum-pressure policy, ultimately aiming to compel Iran to reassess its regional strategies and ambitions in nuclear and missile development.
Wagner rebooted
by Andrea Molle (AI-generated cover picture)
As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.
In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s
death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its
leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A
number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while
others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state
structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with
the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a
paramilitary extension of the Russian state.
Despite these changes, Wagner has retained
its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been
deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group
remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali,
and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource
extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian
state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with
greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous
financial independence.
The group’s activities in Ukraine have also
changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture
of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the
restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian
military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where
Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the
post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a
more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its
operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.
Relationship with the Russian Government The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.
The turning point in this relationship came
in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had
been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian
state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May
2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while
an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which
handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining
illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long
functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.
This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.
Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which
Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the
catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although
the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian
government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure,
forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While
some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units,
others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established
under state supervision.
However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.
Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.
As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct
Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD
and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence
service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian
military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions
aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s
financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations
while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner
financial autonomy.
In practical terms, this meant that Wagner
no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the
Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions
abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s
primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up
allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making
processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s
activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of
individual commanders.
The transformation of Wagner from a
semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its
role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a
“PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates
with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its
influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military
forces.
In Africa, Wagner has continued its
security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya,
often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements
in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with
access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen
its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative
to Western military assistance.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s
legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s
regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting
that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control
over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian
operations in Africa.
In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat
role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner
fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist
roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence
has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.
Current Operations The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.
In the CAR, Wagner operatives have
entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President
Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018,
initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has
since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries
have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including
the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking
to overthrow Touadéra.
Beyond military operations, Wagner has
established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold
and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to
operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back
to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global
operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient
in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR
government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting
government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of
the country’s defense infrastructure.
Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends
beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in
propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives
while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is
widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing
materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial
powers such as France.
Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.
Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta
continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable
alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services,
Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s
natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the
CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy,
fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country
from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the
only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.
Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are
part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in
Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as
a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure
valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s
involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging
Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating
strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic
arenas, such as the United Nations.
Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been
reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya,
and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of
Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death
of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence
in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the
direct supervision of the Russian government.
Leadership and Command Structure After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).
With the group now firmly under Kremlin
control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals
closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of
Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin,
were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances.
In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including
high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring
that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic
interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for
overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in
Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking
Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with
overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.
Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.
To replenish its ranks, Wagner has
reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel,
special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine,
Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded,
with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian
MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.
Armaments and Equipment Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.
In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has
retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting
vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower
for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units
have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones,
particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.
Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.
Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.
In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.
Strategic Outlook With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.
Additionally, there are reports that Moscow
is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller
PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow
Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s
expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.
Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes
in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully
state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian
military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most
infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned
with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.
With its new leadership, sustained
recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains
a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control,
Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader
military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa
and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging
Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.
In the coming months, Wagner is expected to
continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited
presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian
military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger
emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.
Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.
The restructuring of Wagner under the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the
Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military
forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often
pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the
Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to
state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s
foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as
Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.
With Wagner now firmly integrated into
state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and
its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian
military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to
dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to
paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with
official Russian military assets when necessary.
The continued deployment of Wagner forces
in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy.
By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as
the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand
its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing
access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with
critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable
alternative to Western security partnerships.
Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces
continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime,
and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing
conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its
peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated
into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains
available for future military engagements.
Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.
Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.
This approach would allow Moscow to retain
the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced
diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a
powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By
maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can
continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a
cost-effective and politically manageable way.
Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a
direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s
approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension
of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence,
secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic
importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an
essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will
remain a formidable force on the global stage.
The Perils of a War Between Israel and Jordan
by Andrea Molle.
A war between Israel and Jordan remains an
unlikely but potentially catastrophic scenario. Since signing a peace treaty in
1994, the two countries have maintained diplomatic and security cooperation,
making armed conflict seem improbable. However, the Middle East is a region
where tensions can escalate unexpectedly, and in the event of war, the
consequences would be far-reaching, extending beyond the immediate battlefield
and reshaping regional and global dynamics.
Militarily, Israel holds an overwhelming
advantage. Its state-of-the-art air force, advanced missile defense systems,
and cyber warfare capabilities make it one of the most formidable militaries in
the world. Jordan’s military, while professional and well-trained, lacks the
offensive power and technological sophistication to sustain a prolonged war
against Israel. While Jordan’s mountainous terrain could offer some defensive
advantages, its key cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to Israeli
airstrikes.
Conversely, Israeli population centers such
as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would be within range of Jordanian missiles, but
Israel’s Iron Dome and other missile defense systems would likely neutralize
most of these threats. If war were to break out under a U.S. administration led
by Donald Trump, the geopolitical landscape would shift dramatically. Trump has
a history of unwavering support for Israel, having moved the U.S. embassy to
Jerusalem and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights during his
first term. In the event of conflict, Washington would likely side decisively
with Israel, providing military assistance, blocking diplomatic efforts to
restrain Israeli actions, and exerting pressure on Jordan to de-escalate.
This approach could embolden Israeli
leadership, reducing the incentive for a swift resolution and increasing the
likelihood of a drawn-out conflict. At the same time, such a stance would
further alienate Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would face the
difficult choice of supporting Jordan diplomatically while maintaining their
fragile ties with Israel. The economic consequences of such a war would be
devastating. Jordan, already reliant on foreign aid and economic cooperation
with Israel, would suffer greatly, facing trade disruptions, infrastructure
destruction, and economic collapse. While Israel has a more resilient economy,
a prolonged war would still create market instability, harm the tourism
industry, and disrupt vital sectors such as technology and defense.
A broader escalation could also lead to
rising oil prices and regional economic turmoil, further complicating global
markets. Beyond conventional military and economic consequences, one of the
most dangerous ripple effects of such a conflict would be the resurgence of
international terrorism. History has shown that war and instability in the
Middle East create fertile ground for jihadist organizations, and a war between
Israel and Jordan would likely open the door for extremist groups to exploit the
chaos. ISIS-K, an already growing threat, could seize the moment to expand its
influence, launching attacks in both Israel and Jordan while using the war as a
recruitment tool. The instability could also encourage terrorist attacks in
Western nations, as radicalized individuals respond to the conflict with
violence abroad. The specter of a global wave of terrorism, fueled by the war,
could reshape security policies worldwide and force governments to divert
resources toward counterterrorism efforts. The possible outcomes of such a
conflict vary in severity. A short, intense war could lead to a quick
diplomatic resolution, with the United States or regional powers stepping in to
mediate a ceasefire.
However, if the war dragged on and external
actors such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Palestinian militant groups became
involved, the situation could spiral into a broader regional conflict. Jordan
itself could face internal instability, with the monarchy weakened by war and
at risk of an uprising or coup. In the worst-case scenario, the war could
trigger a new era of instability, empowering extremist groups and reshaping
alliances across the region. Ultimately, a war between Israel and Jordan would
be disastrous for both countries and the broader Middle East. The strategic,
economic, and security costs far outweigh any potential gains, making a
full-scale conflict unlikely.
However, as history has shown, political
miscalculations, external provocations, or shifting alliances can sometimes
push nations toward unintended wars. While outright conflict remains
improbable, the risks of border tensions, proxy confrontations, and diplomatic
crises should not be underestimated. The only real solution is continued
dialogue and diplomatic engagement, as the alternative—a war with unpredictable
and devastating consequences—would be a tragedy for the entire region.
Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.
by Andrea Molle.
After the withdrawal of the last French military
mission, Italy remains the only European country with a significant presence in
the Sahel. This opens several opportunities but also presents various
challenges that Rome will have to address with as integrated a strategy as
possible. Italy indeed has a significant military presence in sub-Saharan
Africa, with several missions aimed at ensuring security, combating terrorism,
and supporting the stability of the region. These missions see Rome engaged in
Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Gulf of Guinea, both through bilateral
operations and within the framework of EU, NATO, and UN missions. Italy maintains
a military presence in Niger as part of the “MISIN” mission
(Bilateral Support Mission in the Republic of Niger), launched in 2018 with the
aim of supporting local authorities in contrasting terrorism, human
trafficking, and organized crime. The operation fits into Italy’s broader
commitment in the Sahel, aimed at ensuring stability and security in the
region, countering threats that can also impact Europe, such as irregular
migration flows.
The Italian mission in Niger primarily
focuses on training and mentoring local security forces to improve their
operational capabilities. Italian military personnel, drawing from various
branches of the Armed Forces, provide courses on combat techniques, special
operations, surveillance, and border control. Additionally, logistical and
medical support is an essential component of the operation. The Italian
contingent in Niger consists of several hundred units, with the possibility of
deploying up to 470 soldiers, 130 vehicles, and aircraft for logistical and
reconnaissance needs. Italy has established its operational base in Niamey, the
capital of Niger, collaborating with local authorities and other international
partners, including the United States and previously France. The operation is
also part of a broader cooperation framework between Italy and Niger, which
includes development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve
the economic and social conditions of the African country. However, the
political situation in Niger is unstable, with the recent 2023 coup leading to
a review of relations between the Nigerien government and Western states,
including Italy.
Despite the geopolitical uncertainties, the
Italian mission in Niger remains a key part of Italy’s defense and security
strategy in the Sahel, contributing to the stabilization of a region crucial
for the geopolitical and economic balance of both the region and Europe. Beyond
Niger, Italy also maintains a limited military presence in neighboring Chad,
focusing mainly on liaison, training, and supporting international missions in
the Sahel region. This commitment is part of a broader multilateral cooperation
effort aimed at combating terrorism, stabilizing the area, and strengthening
local security forces’ capabilities. Italy’s activities in Chad work in synergy
with operations led by international organizations such as the European Union,
the United Nations, and the G5 Sahel, providing strategic and operational
support through intelligence sharing, military training, and coordination with
other military contingents in the area. Lastly, Italy participates in several initiatives
to improve the country’s border security, prevent arms trafficking, and counter
radicalization, all key elements for the stability of Chad and the Sahel region
as a whole.
The Italian approach is distinguished by a
strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, promoting not only security but
also the development and resilience of local communities. Italy also established
a military base in Djibouti, the Italian Support Military Base (BMIS),
operational since 2013. Located strategically in the Horn of Africa, the BMIS
serves as a logistics and operations hub, developing intelligence capabilities
for Italian armed forces engaged in missions in the East Africa region and the
Indian Ocean. This base is a key infrastructure supporting anti-piracy
operations, contributing to the security of shipping routes and the patrolling
of international waters. It also provides logistical and operational support to
various Italian and European missions in the region, including Italy’s
participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation (against piracy in the Gulf of
Aden) and the EUTM Somalia mission, dedicated to training Somali armed forces.
The presence of the BMIS also allows for
the rapid deployment of Italian units in case of emergencies or crises in the
area, strengthening Italy’s role in the security and stabilization of the Horn
of Africa. The base hosts military personnel and advanced support
infrastructure, allowing maintenance of vehicles, supplies, and assistance to
Italian forces and allied missions. In addition to military aspects, the BMIS
also represents a point of cooperation with local Djiboutian authorities,
helping to strengthen diplomatic relations between Italy and Djibouti and
support regional security, stability, and development initiatives. Italy
maintains a significant presence in Somalia, actively contributing to the
country’s security and stabilization through two main international missions.
These are the EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission in Somalia), an EU
mission active since 2010, aimed at training and mentoring the Somali National
Army (SNA) to strengthen its operational capabilities and enable the Somali
government to deal with internal security threats, particularly from the
terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Italy plays a leading role in this mission,
providing military instructors, advisors, and strategic support. Italian
personnel are involved in training Somali officers in tactical, strategic, and
logistical aspects, as well as promoting international humanitarian law
principles. The goal is to build a professional and efficient Somali army capable
of ensuring the country’s security autonomously. In addition to military
training, the mission focuses on the development of Somali military leadership
and strengthening defense institutions, contributing to the creation of a more
effective command and control chain. The other operation, called Operation
Atalanta, is a naval mission of the European Union (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) launched
in 2008, aimed at combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean,
protecting merchant navy ships, and ensuring the safety of strategic maritime
routes.
Italy actively participates in the
operation with naval units, helicopters, and military personnel, performing
patrols and providing escorts for commercial and humanitarian ships,
particularly those of the World Food Programme (WFP) heading to Somalia. The
Italian Navy has played a prominent role in the mission, contributing to the
deterrence of piracy and maintaining security in international waters.
Operation Atalanta has had a significant impact, drastically reducing pirate
attacks and strengthening cooperation among international naval forces. Italy,
in addition to its operational contribution, has frequently held high-level
commands within the mission, confirming its commitment to global maritime
security. In addition to participating in these missions, Italy maintains
strong historical and diplomatic ties with Somalia, a country that was an
Italian colony until the mid-20th century. Italy’s commitment goes beyond the
military aspect, encompassing development cooperation, humanitarian support,
and initiatives for political stabilization.
Through the EUTM Somalia and Operation
Atalanta missions, Italy significantly contributes to the security and
stability of the Horn of Africa, consolidating its role as a key actor in
international operations in the region. Finally, with Operation Gabinia, Italy
has committed to strengthening maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a
crucial area for international oil and goods traffic, but also one of the
regions most affected by maritime piracy. The deployment of Italian naval units
aims to combat piracy, protect commercial ships (particularly those flying the
Italian flag), and ensure the security of maritime infrastructure critical to
global economic interests. All these operations are part of a broader Italian
engagement in the region, which includes economic, military, and diplomatic
cooperation with several West African countries.
Italy is working to develop strategic
partnerships that include development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and
investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the countries
involved, thereby contributing to their stability and reducing the root causes
of instability and forced migration. Key areas of intervention include training
local security forces, border control, combating illicit trafficking (drugs,
weapons, humans), and the fight against jihadist terrorism, which represents a
growing threat in the Sahel region. Strengthening local security and
intelligence capabilities is critical to counter groups such as Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
(ISGS), who exploit institutional weaknesses and ethnic tensions to expand
their influence.
An additional objective that Italy will
need to pursue more decisively in the future is containing the growing
geopolitical penetration of Russia and China in the region. Moscow has
strengthened its military and political presence through paramilitary groups
like the Wagner Group, providing support to authoritarian regimes and military
juntas in exchange for natural resources and strategic bases. Beijing, on the
other hand, continues to expand its economic influence through significant
infrastructure and financial investments, often through debt mechanisms that
bind local governments to Chinese interests. In the face of these developments,
Italy, in coordination with the United States and other NATO partners, will
need to strengthen its political-military presence, intensify cooperation with
local governments, and promote alternative development models based on
sustainability and the economic self-determination of African countries.
Italy’s commitment to West Africa is
therefore increasingly seen as a delicate balance between security, diplomacy,
development cooperation, and the protection of national and European strategic
interests.
The Islamic State in Khorasan’s “expansion” towards Europe
In 2023, Da’esh (ISIS) continued to carry out isolated attacks in Europe, generally with limited organisational support limited. The article notes the increasing effectiveness of European counter-terrorism measures European counterterrorism measures that would likely have made it less convenient for ISIS leaders deploy scarce human resources in such attacks. The author, in his article explores how the Islamic State group seems to favour the preservation of its organisational structures in Europe, delegating action to a few individuals or isolated cells. In addition, the growing involvement of the Khorasan (IS-K) branch of ISIS in planning attacks in Europe or against European targets abroad, as demonstrated by a 2020 plot against NATO bases in Germany. Despite the numerous plots identified in 2023, there is some discretion in attributing these plans exclusively to IS-K, suggesting wider intra-ISIS cooperation. The article notes that, despite appearances, Da’esh Khorasan is not necessarily expanding, but rather taking on new tasks assigned to it by the central leadership, pressed by resource scarcity.
The Islamic
State (IS) continued in 2023 to occasionally carry out isolated attacks in
Europe, usually with seemingly little organisational backup. As European
counter-terrorism has become increasingly effective, the cost effectiveness of
committing rare human resources to isolated attacks must have appeared
questionable to IS leaders and police sources around Europe tend to think that
IS indeed prefers to safeguard whatever organisational structure it still has
in Europe, leaving the task of flying the flag to a few isolated individuals or
cells. Indeed, as late as early 2022 police sources in Europe did not see an
impending IS threat, its presence being limited to online propagandists,
recruiters, and fundraisers. Taliban sources confirmed the detention of an IS-K operative in
Afghanistan, who had raised thousands of euros in Germany and Spain (Giustozzi,
2022). Taliban
intelligence sources also note that that much of IS-K online propaganda is now
being produced outside Afghanistan, including Europe. After the fall of Kabul in August
2021, IS-K started releasing a significant portion of this propaganda in
English. There might be multiple reasons for this, not all related to Europe. A
possible reason that is relevant for European security is the intent to
stimulate recruitment in Europe, perhaps in order to replace the loss of many
Da’esh media operators due to the police crackdown in recent years. Even when in
July 2023 the police detained several IS plotters in Germany and the
Netherlands and described them as being “in contact with members” of the IS-K
branch, it also noted that they were engaged in fund raising and there was no
indication that they were actively preparing a terrorist attack (Stewart ASyI, 2023).
1. IS-K and the Ambition to Strike Europe.
Some
observers have however noted a recent trend, concerning the growing
organisational involvement of the Khorasan branch (IS-K) in planning attacks in
Europe, or against European targets in Turkey. The German authorities alleged
in 2020 that the cell behind a plot to attack NATO bases in Germany, thwarted
by the police in April 2020, had received the order to act from an IS Khorasan
cadre in Afghanistan.[1] This
episode, however, was barely noticed and the evidence shared by the German
authorities remains fuzzy. What really caught the eyes of many observers was
the US intelligence report that turned up among the Discord leaks, showing that
as of February 2023 15 different IS-K linked plots to carry out attacks against
western interests in Europe, Turkey, the Middle East and elsewhere had been
identified by the US military.[2] While these
figures seem impressive, they contrast oddly with the fact that in March 2023 the
US Central Command assessed was that IS-K was within 6 months of having the
capacity to organise attacks against western interests in Asia or Europe. The
discrepancy is difficult to explain, unless for the military the 15 plots
mentioned above were not to be taken too seriously, or not to be attributed
exclusively or even primarily to IS-K. Indeed, Turkish sources describe some of
these plots, such as those aimed against Swedish and Dutch consulates on
Turkish territory, as involving Central Asians linked to IS-K and members of
the Turkish branch of IS. Apart from
reportedly issuing the order, IS-K seemingly relied on assets and personnel
that were already on location. Indeed, even the leaked US intelligence report
itself noted that IS-K “relied on resources from outside Afghanistan”.
2. Afghanistan
and the Developed Structure of IS.
In 2023 IS-K
sources in Afghanistan confirmed to the author’s research team that the group
coordinated operations in Turkey and Europe with other branches of the Islamic
State, stressing however that this happened under the leadership of the central
leadership of the ‘Caliphate”. This implies at least that IS-K as such was not
determining the overall strategy presiding over the planning of these attacks.
Sources within IS-K confirmed that Afghanistan hosted several military
commissions for neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Central Asia, but did
not mention any such entity focusing on Europe, Turkey or the Middle East. Sources
contacted by the International Crisis Group in Syria indicated in 2023 that the
Central Asians who used to operate under IS in Syria had been transferred under
the responsibility of IS-K (International Crisis
Group, 2023).
According to the IS-K sources, at least initially this was meant to prelude to
their transfer to Afghanistan, which however occurred considerably more slowly than
planned.
The picture
that these sources portray is one of a relatively developed IS-K structure in
Turkey and Syria, with 200+ working in the financial hub of IS-K in Turkey,
plus 400-500 Central Asians spread between Syria and Turkey, ex members of ISIL
who either switched their allegiance or were reassigned to IS-K (the sources
are not clear on this point), waiting to be transferred to Khorasan or in any
case to be told what to do. In Europe,
the presence of IS-K is much more modest, with 60 members. According to the
same sources, as of September 2022 there were 30 Europeans belonging to IS-K in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of these, 16 were from Germany, ten were from France
and four from Belgium. There were also four Americans, as well as a few Turks.
These individuals with passports from European and North American countries were
described as having been evacuated from the Middle East after the collapse of
the Caliphate, rather than having been dispatched to IS-K for organising
long-range attacks in Europe. While all these numbers cannot be verified, they
seem compatible with the information summarised above and provided by Europol,
ICG and others.
This picture
suggests constant exchanges of members between the IS-K and other IS branches
in Turkey, Europe and Syria (which occur incidentally, elsewhere as well), even
if the speed and size of these exchanges have been declining over time. There
was always considerable integration between IS branches, despite speculation
early in the existence of IS-K that it was an opportunistic set up, with little
organic relationship with the “Caliphate”. More than of IS-K expanding
operations to Europe, therefore, one should speak of intra-IS branches
cooperation. Such cooperation seems undoubtedly to have expanded in 2022-23,
which begs the question of why this is the case
3. Is IS waiting?
In this
regard, it is worth noticing that IS-K is not claiming or advertising its
alleged “expansion”. Even when solicited, IS-K sources in Afghanistan have stayed
well clear of boasting about such expansion. Quite the contrary, they tend to
minimise its importance. This appears odd, given that
1. IS-K has been running a sophisticated media campaign,
whose main future is magnifying its limited achievements and making unwarranted
claims .
2.
It would be committing a considerable portion of its limited resources, if the
“expansion” were really such, and
3. Private
IS-K social media chatter and interviews with members clearly show that the
organisation struggles to explain to its own members and sympathisers why its
activities have been so limited during 2023.
Perhaps IS-K
might just be waiting to glorify its “expansion” and brand attacks outside the
remit of Khorasan province (Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan,
Central Asia, China, Iran) as “made in Afghanistan” until it succeeds in
carrying out a successful one. However, IS-K shows no similar shyness in
claiming its intent of bringing jihad to China (where despite years of
propaganda, it could achieve nothing) or Central Asia, where its achievements
have been minimal (firing rockets across the border into Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan). If the primary purpose of IS-K were making a claim to having
opened new fronts of its own in Europe, Turkey and Middle East, why wouldn’t it
adopt tactics similar to those deployed in Khorasan province and carry out
random attacks against the softest targets, then produce widely inflated claims
of the damage inflicted?
4. The
strength of IS.
In sum, the
most logical explanation is that the “Caliphate”, which is at its weakest since
its inception, has summoned IS-K’s help to reclaim the headlines with some high
profile attack against European targets. One possibility is that the
“Caliphate” might now be so weak in and around Europe that it simply does not
have the strength anymore to systematically intensify operations there. Another
possibility is that, in line with what noted at the beginning of this article,
the central leadership of IS might have decided to raise its profile through
intensified terrorist operations, while at the same time safeguarding its
surviving structure in Europe and rely instead on IS-K elements, who are not
part of the same structure and do not risk compromising it if caught.
Why IS-K and
not other branches of IS? As mentioned above, IS-K has had a significant
presence in Turkey for years, with safe houses and networks dedicated to
supporting financial operations. This financial hub now struggles to carry out
its original task, due to the Turkish authorities strongly increasing their
pressure, so its conversion to more operational roles could well have appeared
logical. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Central Asians were getting ready to be
transferred to Afghanistan, having outlived their usefulness in Syria, where
operating underground is much harder for them than for native Syrians or even
Iraqis. As only a few tens were able to make the trip each month, those laying
idle in Turkey and Syria could conceivably be mobilised for other duties. In
short, IS-K happened to be readily available and well placed to provide support
to the central leadership, whose Syrian and Iraqi branches have been greatly
weakened in recent years. No other branch of IS was in a similar position.
Conclusions.
In
conclusion, IS-K is not really “expanding”. The members involved in the planned
attacks were already in IS-K, or had been scheduled to be transferred to it (in
the case of the Central Asians). What appears to have changed is that IS-K was
given additional tasks by a central leadership, which is low on money and human
resources and needs to raise its media profile to have a chance of re-emerging
from its crisis. This would also explain why IS-K members in Afghanistan and
not particularly enthusiastic about this development, which at least in the
short term is drawing scarce human resources away from them.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), during a raid on the Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza—used by Hamas as a command post for the terrorist organization—eliminated 19 militants, including key figures involved in the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
In coordination with Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Agency), the IDF also arrested over 240 terrorists as part of an operation aimed at thwarting Hamas’ latest attempt to re-establish itself in northern Gaza. The Palestinian militia leadership had deliberately exploited the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabaliya, employing the well-documented strategy of using human shields—this time, patients inside the hospital. This incident not only highlights Hamas’ criminal intent but also underscores the IDF’s efforts to minimize the war’s impact on Palestinian civilians, despite widespread media narratives depicting the conflict as disproportionately violent. In fact, this war has resulted in historically low civilian casualties compared to other urban conflicts.
Operation at al-Shifa Hospital: A New Humanitarian Standard?
The Israel-Hamas war has provided Israeli forces with the opportunity to conceptualize and implement an unprecedented standard of urban warfare. In March 2024, the IDF conducted a targeted operation at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza—repurposed by Hamas as a logistical and operational base—while adopting extraordinary measures to protect civilians during the approach, entry, and management of the facility. This approach integrated not only military personnel but also Israeli medical teams and paramedics tasked with assisting Palestinian patients, along with logistical units ensuring the supply of food, water, and medical resources.
This strategy aimed to limit the collateral damage caused by Hamas’ presence within civilian infrastructure, while simultaneously prioritizing patient welfare and minimizing civilian casualties. It stands as a first in the history of urban warfare—an innovative yet costly standard in terms of resources and the inherent risks faced by military personnel operating within hostile environments. From a doctrinal and historical perspective, this marks the first instance of an army undertaking such extensive measures to safeguard an adversarial civilian population, even as offensive military operations unfolded within the same building.
Military analyst John Spencer, in his article Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It?, remarked that Israel had implemented “more precautions to prevent civilian harm than any military in history—exceeding international legal requirements and surpassing the measures taken by the U.S. in recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
The al-Shifa precedent stands as a case study in urban warfare and civilian protection in operational areas. Despite posing a tactical disadvantage, this approach allows militaries engaged in highly scrutinized operations to prevent accusations of violating jus in bello and international conventions. It prompts reflection on the tactical applications and self-imposed limitations designed to protect civilians—not purely for humanitarian reasons but also as a defensive measure against adversary propaganda and cognitive warfare. Hamas, by using civilian infrastructure for military purposes and exploiting civilian casualties to bolster international pressure on Israel, demonstrates how lawfare (the use of legal frameworks as a weapon) plays a central role in modern conflicts.
The dominant Western military doctrine, as described at the beginning of this chapter, revolves around “maneuver warfare”—designed to physically and morally overwhelm an enemy through overwhelming force and speed, striking political and military centers of gravity to compel surrender or destruction. This doctrine underpinned the invasions of Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Russia’s attempt to swiftly capture Ukraine in 2022. In each case, civilians were given little warning or time to evacuate, resulting in significant non-combatant casualties.
Israel, however, has deviated from this entrenched “textbook” approach, prioritizing civilian protection. The IDF pre-announced nearly every operation, allowing civilians time to relocate—often forfeiting the element of surprise. This gave Hamas the opportunity to reposition military and political leaders (along with Israeli hostages) within urban areas, concealing them among civilians or through underground tunnels during evacuations. Unlike the IDF, Hamas fighters do not wear uniforms, granting them a tactical advantage—striking from within civilian populations and blending in to retreat alongside them.
As a result, Hamas has successfully pursued a dual strategy—inflicting suffering on the Palestinian population while crafting a narrative that leverages images of civilian casualties to amplify international pressure on Israel to halt its operations.
The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The recent conquest of Damascus by the jihadist leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a turning point in the political-military balance of the Middle East. After thirteen years of civil war against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria now finds itself in the most critical phase of its contemporary history: the rise to power of the Islamists led by al-Jolani, previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, sets the country on the path to becoming an “Islamic State” destined to reshape regional dynamics. Once again, the jihadist factor emerges as a destabilizing element with potentially global repercussions.
The Israeli occupation of the Golan: a preventive and strategic maneuver The Islamist advance in Syria, and the consequent loss of centralized control from Damascus, create a power vacuum in which radical groups and external actors seeking geostrategic advantages can proliferate. Israel’s action—specifically, the consolidation of its occupation of the Golan Heights—must be understood in this context. It is not yet another expansionist incursion, but a defensive and preventive maneuver. On the one hand, Tel Aviv aims to prevent jihadist forces from settling along its northern border, directly threatening its security. On the other, Israel’s military presence in the area also serves to protect UN peacekeeping forces, who might otherwise be exposed to attacks by radical groups in the absence of a reliable central authority in Damascus.
The preventive strike against strategic and chemical arsenals The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq—where conventional and unconventional arsenals fell into the hands of extremist groups—have made it clear that rapid, surgical interventions are necessary. Israel’s preventive strike on Syrian strategic weapons depots, including those suspected of containing chemical agents, seeks to prevent these tools from ending up with jihadists. This is not merely an Israeli interest: if radical groups were to gain access to chemical weapons, the entire region and even the West could suffer the consequences. As highlighted by the latest analyses from the Institute for the Study of War (Iran Update, December 11, 2024), non-state actors’ control of Syrian arsenals opens the door to extremely high-risk scenarios. Israel thus acts with strategic intelligence aimed at preventing future large-scale terrorist attacks.
The Israeli move and the Turkish choice: two sides of the same coin Israel’s policy in the Golan cannot be viewed in isolation: it is consistent with Turkey’s strategic logic of threat containment through its occupation of parts of northern Syrian territory. Ankara, as demonstrated in the past, intends to maintain a “buffer zone” between the areas under its control and regions inhabited by Syrian Kurds, regarded as a threat due to their connection with the PKK in Turkey. This action not only limits the movement of Kurdish militias, but also serves a dual purpose: curbing Kurdish power and preventing the establishment of Islamist groups hostile to Turkey. Israel’s advance on the Golan and Turkey’s buffer zone are, in different ways, two examples of preventive containment of the jihadist threat.
The rise of Islamists in Syria: the rights dilemma and the Taliban parallel The Islamist takeover led by al-Jolani and his men cannot be viewed favorably. The reassuring statements regarding minorities, women, and the Christian community sound like mere rhetoric. The history of jihadist movements is well known: the strict application of sharia, the lack of respect for religious and cultural differences, and the elimination of any pluralistic space. As previously seen in Taliban-led Afghanistan, the establishment of an Islamic State under the leadership of recycled ex-al-Qaeda members turned local political force will merely institutionalize a repressive regime contrary to fundamental human rights principles.
The terrorist threat extends to the West The Islamist victory in Syria, as was the case with the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021, will act as a catalyst for international terrorism. Recent reports show that every advancement of jihadist ideology is accompanied by an increase in attacks and violent propaganda, prompting radicalized or sympathetic individuals to carry out copycat acts in the West. As highlighted by recent analyses in international media (see the 5th Report on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism #ReaCT2024 and Il Giornale), HTS’s success in Syria increases the risk that Europe will become the target of new attacks, inspired or orchestrated by individuals who draw fresh momentum and symbolic legitimacy from al-Jolani’s “victory.” The jihadist media dimension is such that controlling territory—and proclaiming an Islamic State—becomes a powerful message directed at potential supporters and recruits.
Perspectives and conclusions Al-Jolani’s new Syria is no less dangerous than Assad’s regime. On the contrary, the open adherence to fundamentalist principles, the impending power struggles between Islamist and jihadist groups competing—primarily with the Islamic State—the influence of radical groups, and the absence of an international guarantee system make the situation more unpredictable. Israel’s move in the Golan and Turkey’s strategy in the north reflect a understandable, though partial, response to these threats. The West cannot afford to fall under the illusion of a “pragmatic” al-Jolani: the Islamist and jihadist nature of the new leadership is a fact. Added to this are the risks associated with the availability of strategic and chemical weapons, making the Israeli and Turkish interest in creating buffer zones and conducting preemptive strikes on arsenals tragically sensible. In this scenario—akin to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan—Syria could become an attractive hub for a jihadism now in search of legitimacy and symbolic victories, with direct consequences for Europe as well.
The Fall of Damascus and the Crumbling of the Iranian Resistance Axis.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
Bashar al-Assad’s Syria no longer exists.
Syria, a land with a millennia-old history, is currently undergoing a moment of epochal and unforeseen upheaval. After nearly fourteen years of a bloody conflict—one woven through with international and regional interests—the longstanding dominance of the Assad family, unbroken for over half a century, now appears to be nearing its end. Bashar al Assad, who succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, is currently portrayed as a leader on the run, while the Islamist insurgents, advancing from both the north and the south, are ominously pressing at the gates of Damascus.
International reports, including those cited by outlets such as MSN and NPR, depict a scenario of rapid disintegration of the regime’s political and military apparatus. The lightning advance of the Islamist formations led by HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, began roughly ten days ago in Idlib near the Turkish border and has shattered what were once considered unassailable fortifications. Aleppo, Hama, and Homs—long regarded as regime strongholds and pillars of the “Resistance Axis,” an alliance uniting Syria, Iran, affiliated armed groups, and Russia—have fallen. The apparent withdrawal of Russian support has further accelerated the collapse of a system built on authoritarian control and external backing.
Meanwhile, rumors abound about Assad’s fate. Some sources already claim he is in exile, with Tehran as a potential safe haven. In the United States, speculation suggests he is no longer in the Syrian capital, and there is even talk of his possible presence in Moscow or Doha. The presidential office attempts to deny such claims, insisting that the raìs remains in Damascus, but trust in these assertions appears to have waned drastically.
As Lorenzo Trombette (ANSA) reports, Doha has become the stage for high-level diplomatic consultations. While the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, and Turkey confer in Qatar, a Western “quartet”—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—has met with European Union representatives and UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. From these meetings has emerged the intent to initiate, as early as next week in Geneva, a post-Assad political transition process. This path aims to involve figures from the Assad system who have not been directly implicated in the regime’s worst atrocities, along with some representatives of armed opposition groups, in order to prevent new bloodshed and forestall institutional collapse. The goal is to preserve the Syrian state—distinguished from the disintegrating regime—and offer the population a prospect of stability.
The prospective, albeit indirect, inclusion of figures linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the Geneva talks signals an unprecedented flexibility. Although HTS has been labeled a terrorist organization by various Western powers, its mediated involvement through lesser groups associated with it appears to be a compromise aimed at forging a negotiating framework that could lead to a lasting agreement.
The sudden downfall of Assad is accompanied by the fragmentation of the Resistance Axis. Iran, a longtime supporter of the Damascus government, may now opt for a more cautious stance, focusing on its strategic interests along the coast and in territories home to ancient Shiite-Alawite clans historically loyal to the Assad family. Russia, preoccupied on multiple international fronts, seems less inclined to maintain its support, paving the way for a more uncertain scenario.
As the Islamist insurgents reach the outskirts of Damascus, the imminent collapse of the regime throws open the doors of symbolic places of repression: the notorious prisons of Adra and Saydnaya. Within these facilities, thousands of dissidents, activists, and political opponents have been detained and disappeared over the decades. Their fate, long shrouded in silence, may now be revealed, potentially marking one of the first symbolic steps of a new chapter in Syrian history.
The entire Middle East is feeling the repercussions of this upheaval. Assad’s fall affects not only Syria’s borders but also has implications for Lebanon, Iraq, and even relations between Israel and Iran. In a context where sectarian, ethnic, and political tensions have never been fully resolved, the region will be forced to reassess its balance of power. The international community, through its gatherings from Doha to Geneva, must now tackle a crucial challenge: managing a transfer of power that, from a secular dictatorial regime, may yield to an Islamist surge capable of reigniting jihadist violence.
In short, Syria risks becoming another Afghanistan: similar dynamics, worrisome prospects linked to international jihadism that, originating in Syria, could threaten the region and the West. What is even more concerning is the role Turkey might play, having supported the regime’s downfall through direct assistance to the Islamists of HTS—an organization whose roots trace back to al-Qaida and ISIS—and how it may now seek to leverage its influence in the Middle East and North Africa.
Syria. Al-Jolani’s Advance on Damascus: A New Front of Unease for Iran, Russia, and Israel.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
From the interview by Francesco De Leo on Radio Radicale – Spazio Transnazionale (episode of December 7, 2024).
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, born Ahmed Al Sharaa, is the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group active in the Syrian civil war and still designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. Originally affiliated with Al Qaeda and known as the head of Jabhat Al Nusra, Jolani started out as a radical jihadist sent to Syria in 2011 with funding and support from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—who would later become the world’s most wanted terrorist—to establish Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch.
Over the years, he has transformed both his image and his strategy. At first, he announced a formal break from Al Qaeda, then focused primarily on toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime and controlling key areas such as Idlib Province. This “break” was widely viewed as a tactical move aimed at avoiding direct international attacks against transnational jihadist formations.
At the same time, Jolani also changed his appearance and public rhetoric. He traded in his camouflage fatigues for a blazer and Western-style shirt, presenting himself as a moderate Syrian revolutionary fighting the Damascus regime rather than waging a global war against the West. In recent interviews, he has minimized references to global jihad, instead emphasizing Syria’s “liberation” and the role of HTS as a local force committed to ensuring security and governance for millions of people living under its control.
Despite this rebranding strategy and his attempt to appear as a more pragmatic interlocutor, Jolani remains an extremely controversial figure, undoubtedly tied to insurgent jihadism and one of its foremost leaders today. He has a past deeply rooted in international jihadist networks and currently leads an organization still considered terrorist by Washington. His trajectory is that of a leader seeking to distance himself from transnational extremism in order to gain local and possibly international legitimacy, positioning himself as a revolutionary political actor rather than a jihadist leader.
The Situation on the Ground Syrian rebels are advancing toward Damascus with Turkish support and are besieging Homs, a strategic hub en route to the Mediterranean and a regime stronghold. While Russia, Turkey, and Iran are set to meet in Doha to negotiate a possible political transition excluding Assad, on the ground pro-Iranian forces seem to be retreating, and Russia appears weakened and no longer proactive, as the UN reports a massive wave of displaced people. Rebel leader al-Jolani claims the right to use any means against the regime but promises not to persecute minorities. We shall see. Meanwhile, a pleased Erdogan openly announces Damascus as his next objective, while Iran, Syria, and Iraq declare their unity against “terrorism.” In the country’s south, anti-government groups are moving north, easily taking positions abandoned by fleeing loyalists, and the Druze communities of Suwayda are creating a semi-autonomous region. Meanwhile, Lebanon is closing its borders for fear of the conflict spilling over, and clashes continue between pro-Turkish forces and Kurdish militias.
Concerns for Iran and Israel
It is certain that, given the current situation, this is a problem for Iran, as well as for Russia, and also for Israel: all are watching developments with deep concern. For Moscow, it’s a major issue related to maintaining its naval mobility in the Mediterranean. For Tehran, it’s a question of the overall stability of the “Axis of Resistance” since the fall of Syria could block the vital link with Lebanon, and therefore with Hezbollah. Perhaps the Doha agreements aim to find a mediated solution that would allow Iran to maintain control over a strip of Syrian territory essential for connecting with Hezbollah.
What about Israel? Israel is very worried because the presence of a weak Syrian regime is, for it, the best-case scenario; the fall of Syria under Islamist control could open a new front of additional instability along its borders. Not to mention that “al-Jolani” takes his name from the Golan, currently occupied by Israel, and he has always held openly anti-Western and anti-Israeli positions.
Jihadist Terrorism in Europe and Mediterranean Dynamics: Historical, Social, and Operational Evolution in an Era of Global Changes
by Claudio Bertolotti, Director, START InSight, ReaCT
Abstract This article investigates terrorism beyond its traditional definitions; it examines its evolution within the geographical borders of Europe, it emphasizes its historical roots, individual and collective motivations, and operational adaptation, sharing the reasons why a revision of the very definition of terrorism is now necessary, and why it ought to be understood as an effect of violence, rather than an act which is merely organized for political ends. Analyzing the data provided by START InSight’s database, the article focuses on EU countries which are constantly affected by the trajectories of jihadism and the consequent challenges for collective security, while contributing to the academic debate with a multidimensional perspective on terrorism which considers its historical, socio-political and cultural aspects.
Keywords Jihadism, Functional blockade, Terrorism
1. Terrorism as a political and social phenomenon which evolves over time in response to the changing dynamics of competition between individuals, groups, and states. Contemporary terrorism, deeply rooted in a complex historical evolution, represents a widespread ideological threat. The threat of jihadist terrorism is particularly significant today and is linked to the historical, conflictual dynamics of international relations and competition in the Middle East and Africa, and to the violence stemming from a radical interpretation of Islam. This conflictual dynamic is increasingly associated with groups’ and individuals’ search for identity through the cultural opposition of a significant segment of second and third-generation immi-grants from the Maghreb living in Europe. We are discussing a fragmented jihadist galaxy characterized by various ideologies and practical approaches, prompting a reconsideration of the concept of contemporary terrorism, which emerges as a social phenomenon distinct from previous forms of terrorism.
This necessary reflection invites us to consider a paradigm shift in the very definition of terrorism, no longer to be understood as an action aimed at achieving political results through violence, hence in its intentions. Instead, terrorism should be seen as the effect of applied violence: it is terrorism, insofar it is a manifestation of violence, without an organization behind it. It is terrorism due to the manifestation, not organization.
Within the same jihadist galaxy, terrorism imposes itself as an instrument of struggle, resistance, and domination, employing various degrees and models of violence: from individual acts to organized, inspired, and insurgent terrorism, of the kind we became acquainted with in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that we now observe in its early manifestations in the Gaza Strip, where the Israel Defense Forces are engaging Hamas (Bertolotti, 2024).
The Afghan experience, which the author of this article has thoroughly studied for many years, combined with the wave of violence following Hamas’s call for strikes against Israel and its allies, has played a decisive role in the resurgence of inspired and emulative terrorism globally. The latter, on the one hand, is based on the victorious experience of the Taliban against the West; on the other, on the anger channeled through Hamas’s communication strategy, which finds resonance in some ideologized Western minorities, conflating Hamas’s violent and terrorist agenda with the legitimate Palestinian cause. Events in international relations are exploited by jihadist rhetoric to demonstrate the righteousness and validity of jihad, and thus of terrorism as a tool of struggle, victory, and justice.
Today, after and alongside Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, the it’s conflict dynamics in the Middle East and Hamas’s media-amplified terrorism that play this role of ideological and mass involvement drive. This results in emulative forms of violence, which terrorism against Israel has partly provoked and could increasingly provoke in Europe, as well as in North African countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel.
2. Trends and Dynamics: Numbers Decline, but the Threat of Terrorism Persists – An Analysis of Attacks from 2014 to 2023 Looking at the past five years, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend from a quantitative perspective, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-Isis/Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2024, 92 attacks (12 in 2023 and 2024 – situation at 20.09.2024), both successful and unsuccessful, were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland: 99 attacks were recorded in the previous period 2014-2018 (12 in 2015).
In the wake of major terrorist events in Europe in the name of the Islamic State group, and subsequently likely related to galvanizing elements following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the call from Hamas, 206 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2024, of which 70 were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 249 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 died in action), 446 victims were killed, and 2,558 were injured (START InSight database).
Both in 2023 and 2024, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks recorded in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by other attacks which took place over the previous days, which raised the figure to the high levels of previous years: from 17% of total emulative actions in 2022 to 58% in 2023 (56% in 2021). 2023 also confirmed an established trend in the phenomenon’s evolution, with an almost exclusive predominance of individual, unorganized actions, generally improvised, progressively replacing structured and coordinated actions characterizing the European urban “battlefield” of 2015-2017 (totality of actions in 2023 and 97% of actions recorded the previous year).
Data from START InSight’s database of jihadist events in Europe
Knives and blades Terrorists are increasingly using knives for a variety of reasons related to practical, ideological, and strategic factors:
Ease of access: Knives are readily available and do not require advanced technical skills to use. Unlike firearms or explosives, which may require logistics or technical knowledge, knives are common in every household or store.
Discretion: A knife can be carried easily without raising suspicion, unlike more conspicuous or dangerous weapons. This allows the attacker to approach victims or locations without being noticed immediately.
Terror effect: Knife attacks, often conducted in public or crowded spaces, have a strong psychological impact on the population. The close and brutal nature of a knife attack amplifies fear among those present and in the media, creating a significant symbolic effect.
Individual attacks: In recent years, many terrorist organizations have encouraged individual or “lone wolf” attacks. Knife attacks are ideal for this type of action, as they require minimal planning and can be carried out by a single person without the need for a complex organizational network.
Weapon control: In many countries, firearm laws are very strict, making it difficult to obtain guns or rifles. Knives, on the other hand, are less regulated and can be legally purchased almost anywhere.
Inspiration model: Successful knife attacks, like those in various European cities in recent years, have inspired other extremists to replicate this type of action, following the narrative that it is an effective and relatively simple means of spreading terror. In summary, the growing use of knives by terrorists is linked to their accessibility, ease of use, discretion, and effectiveness in creating panic and fear among the population (Molle, 2024).
3. Profiles of “European” Terrorists Jihadist terrorism is predominantly a male phenomenon: out of 295 attackers, 97% are male (10 women); contrary to 2020, when 3 female attackers participated in terrorist actions, the 2021-2023 triennium saw no direct participation from them. Identified terrorists (men and women) whose demographic data were disclosed have a median age of 26 years: a figure that varies over time (from 24 in 2016 to 30 in 2019), recording an increase in age in the last analyzed period, delivering a figure of 28.5 years in 2023. The study of the profile of 200 individuals about whom there’s sufficient demographic information draws a very interesting picture: 7% of terrorists are under 19 years old (with a reduction in minors over time), 38% are between 19 and 26, 41.5% are between 27 and 35, and 13.5% are over 35and 13.5% are over 35. These data confirm an in-creasing relevance over time, of the 19-35 age group, with a reduction in minors involved in terrorist attacks over the same period.
93% of the individuals who carried out a terrorist attacks, for whom we have complete information, were “immigrants” (first, second, and third generation), both regular and irregular. 45% of the 155 terrorists, out of a total of 237, who were analyzed in START InSight’s database are first-generation regular immigrants; 28% are descendants of immigrants (second or third generation); irregular immigrants are 26%: a figure which has grown over time, from 25% in 2020, to 50% in 2021, to 67% in 2023, indicating a significant change in the nature of terrorists, with an increasing presence of first-generation attackers (overall 71% of total terrorists). Significant is also the figure related to 7% of European-origin citizens converted to Islam (a slight decline compared to the average of previous years). Overall, 73% of terrorists are legally resident in Europe, while the role of irregular immigrants emerges with a ratio of about 1 in 4 terrorists (the ratio was 1:6 until 2020). In 4% of events, there were children/minors (7) among the attackers, a figure which has decreased.
Ethno-national Dimension of Terrorists in Europe The phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe affects some specific national and ethnic groups more significantly than others. There is a clear proportional relationship between the main groups of immigrants and terrorists, highlighted by the nationality of terrorists or their families of origin, which reflects the size of foreign communities in Europe. In particular, the Maghreb origin prevails: the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan (especially in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy) and Algerian (in France). The phenomenon of radicalization has been particularly evident in Belgium and France, where large Moroccan and Algerian-origin communities have seen a significant number of young people join jihadist groups. In France, for example, a significant portion of terrorists involved in recent attacks came from families of Algerian and Moroccan origin, reflecting the historical presence and size of these communities in the country (Bertolotti, 2023).
Recidivists and Terrorists Already Known to Intelligence The role of recidivists (re-offenders) has grown over time. These are individuals already convicted of terrorism who have committed violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some cases, even within prison facilities. This trend shows a 3% recidivism rate among terrorists who struck in 2018 (1 case), 7% (2) in 2019, 27% (6) in 2020, and 25% (3) in 2023. This situation confirms the social danger of individuals who, although incarcerated, delay the implementation of terrorist actions. This phenomenon suggests an increased likelihood of terrorist attacks in the coming years, parallel to the release of many detainees for terrorism-related offenses.
START InSight highlighted a significant trend regarding terrorist actions carried out by individuals already known to law enforcement or European intelligence. In 2021, such cases represented 44% of the total, while in 2020, they were 54%. This is a significant increase compared to the 10% recorded in 2019 and the 17% of 2018. In 2023 this figure grew to 75%, supporting the concerns of institutions tasked with countering violent phenomena.
Individuals with previous detentions (even for non-terrorism-related offenses) in 2021 confirmed a certain stability in participation in terrorist actions by individuals with a prison record, with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year (33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018, and 12% in 2017); which seems to confirm that, despite a significantly lower figure in 2023 (8%), prison spaces can be identified as potential radicalization hubs.
4. What is the real destructive capacity of terrorism? To understand terrorism comprehensively, one must analyze it on three distinct levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategy involves the use of resources to achieve long-term war goals. Tactics focus on deploying forces in combat to secure specific victories in battles. The operational level bridges the two, coordinating tactical actions to meet strategic objectives. This synthesis, at its core, highlights the importance of human resources in conducting military actions.
Strategic Success Is Marginal Strategic success in terrorist actions, defined as achieving significant structural impacts like national and international air/rail traffic disruptions, military mobilizations, or broad legislative interventions, has decreased from 16% to 13%. This is still considered high given the limited organizational and financial efforts by terrorist groups or individuals. Over the years, strategic success rates have shown a declining trend, highlighting a gradual reduction in capacity and effectiveness: 75% in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in 2019, 12% in 2020, and 6% in 2021. Since 2022, strategic success has not been achieved by terrorist attacks; effectively confirming an ongoing process of normalizing terrorism.
Media Attention is Decreasing Media attention towards terrorist attacks is decreasing. Strategically, attacks received international media coverage in 75% of the cases and 95% nationally. Operations by commando and team-raid units received full media coverage. This media success significantly influenced the recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihadist fighters, peaking during periods of high-intensity terrorist actions (2016-2017). However, the effects of media coverage on recruitment efforts diminishes over time due to two main reasons: firstly, a prevalence of low-intensity actions compared to high-intensity ones, which have decreased, while low and medium-intensity actions have significantly increased from 2017 to 2021, with a notable rise in medium-intensity actions in 2023. Secondly, the public has become gradually less emotionally sensitive to terrorism, particularly low and medium-intensity events.
Despite concerns, Tactical Level Concerns but Is Not a Priority for Terrorism Assuming the goal of actions is to cause the enemy’s death (with security forces as targets in 35% of cases), this was achieved on average in 50% of the cases between 2004 and 2023. However, the long timeframe significantly impacts the margin of error. An analysis of the 2014-2023 period, shows a worsening trend in the terrorists’ desired effects, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an increase in failed actions, at least until 2022, when tactical success stabilized at 33%, which is consistent with 2016 data. 2023 is an outlier. Data from the last six years show that in 2016, tactical success was achieved in 31% of cases, with 6% failed acts. In 2017, success rose to 40%, with a 20% failure rate. In 2018, success dropped to 33%, while failed attacks doubled to 42%. In 2019, success further fell to 25%, then rose to 33% in 2020-2022. This trend, interpreted as a dual effect of reduced terrorist operational capacity and increased European security responsiveness, shows a 2023 rate of 50% actions achieving tactical success, i.e., causing at least one fatality.
Operational Success: The “Functional Blockade” Even when a terrorist attack fails, it produces significant results: it heavily engages armed forces and police, distracting them from routine activities or preventing them from intervening for public welfare. It can also disrupt or overload healthcare services, limit, slow down, divert, or stop urban, air, and naval mobility, and hinder the regular conduct of daily, commercial, and professional activities, harming affected communities. This effectively reduces technological advantages, operational potential, and resilience capacity. Overall, it inflicts direct and indirect damage, regardless of causing fatalities. Limiting citizens’ freedom is a measurable result of these actions. Essentially, terrorism’s success, even without causing fatalities, lies in imposing economic and social costs on society and influencing behaviours over time in terms of security measures or restrictions imposed by political and public safety authorities. This phenomenon is known as a “functional blockade.” Despite the increasingly reduced operational capacity of terrorism, the “functional blockade” remains one of the most important results achieved by terrorists, regardless of tacti-cal success (killing at least one target). From 2004 to the present, terrorism has proven effective in achieving the a “functional blockade” in 80% of cases, peaking at 92% in 2020 and 89% in 2021. This impressive result, obtained with limited resources, confirms the advantageous cost-benefit ratio in favour of terrorism, despite a progressive loss of capacity that saw the “functional blockade” drop to 78% in 2022 and 67% in 2023.
5. Recruitment Capacity and Operational Strategies The Islamic State, having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq (2013-2017), can no longer send its terrorists to Europe due to the loss of direct external operational projection capacity. However, the group has not lost its power of attraction, which demonstrates its ability to develop indirect recruitment, based on the “posthumous” recognition of individuals who successfully carry out individual terrorist actions. For these reasons, the threat remains significant, thanks to the presence and actions of lone actors, often improvised and driven by emulation, without direct links to the organization.
While the Islamic State continues to impose itself ideologically as the main jihadist threat, particularly exploiting the territorial control and financial resources of its Afghan franchise, the Islamic State Khorasan, it is evident that it cannot replicate the overwhelming appeal of the “caliphate” in 2014-2017. The novelty advantage and consequent appeal, particularly towards the youth, have diminished. Additionally, the European Union has significantly reduced its vulnerabilities legislatively and operationally, with more emphasis on counterterrorism than preventive action.
Concerns persist regarding emulative effects and the “call to arms” related to international events that can induce individuals to act in the name of jihad. The most significant event in 2021, which continues to fuel transnational jihad, was the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. This victory fed diverse jihadist propaganda with the message that “victory is the result of continuous struggle” and created competition among jihadi groups engaged in exclusively local struggles and those like the Islamic State, which promote jihad as a relentless global struggle. This competitive dynamic includes actions associated with the Israel-Hamas war and the jihadist call to violence, where Islamic State followers and Hamas supporters have vied for battlefield successes and consequent media attention.
In this continually evolving scenario, attention must be paid to jihadist strength in the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Rwanda, and Mozambique, in order to counter the emergence of new “caliphates” or “wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe. In prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic State boasts of its spread in Africa, in a competitive / collaborative relationship with its Afghan franchise. It highlights how the aim of combating the presence and spread of Christianity will lead to the group’s expansion in other areas of the continent. In places like the Ma-ghreb, the Mashreq, and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s activity focuses on intra-Muslim sectarian struggle. In Africa, its presence has become part of a Muslim-Christian conflict, strengthened by propaganda centred on stopping Muslims from converting to Christianity through the work of “missionaries” and the pretext of humanitarian aid. Violence, kidnappings, and the kill-ing of missionary clergy, attacks on NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso to the Congo, as well as attacks on Christian communities, are all part and parcel of this context.
From North Africa to the Sahel: A Look at “Mediterranean” Terrorism Looking at North Africa, the region continues to face threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State, and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who have travelled to Iraq or Syria. The unnoticed return of these fighters to their home countries following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat poses additional security challenges. In recent years, lone actors and small cells have carried out a series of deadly attacks in various North African states, proving difficult to detect. The Sahel is becoming a new center of jihadist terrorism, with a significant increase in victims in 2023. However, the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has seen a 42% decrease in victims over the past three years. North Africa, in particular, is witnessing a steady reduction in extremist violence, with the number of violent attacks returning to pre-IS levels. In 2022, North Africa saw a 14-fold decrease in victims com-pared to 2015, with Morocco being the safest country in the region, while Egypt remains one of the most affected by terrorism. Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia fall between these extremes with medium to low terrorism impact.
The Sahel and the Maghreb are politically, economically, and security-wise connected. The presence of terrorist groups exploiting ethnic tensions, climate challenges, and lack of public services has turned this region into a hub of jihadist activity, with the risk of spreading the terrorist threat to other areas.
Instability in the Sahel has already affected West Africa and the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are active. This situation could also involve North Africa, jeopardizing the progress made in prevention, counterterrorism, and deradicalization in some countries of the region.
Considering that North African countries are both emigration and transit countries for migratory flows to Europe, this raises the question of possible jihadist contamination or transfer. Monitoring the evolution of a phenomenon in the process of consolidation, which finds its lifeblood in the Mediterranean area, is therefore paramount.
Claudio Bertolotti, ISPI, START InSight’s Director and Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism (ReaCT). Claudio Bertolotti holds a Ph.D. and serves as the Executive Director of START InSight. From 2014 to 2023, he was a senior researcher with the “5+5 Defense Initiative.” He graduated in Contemporary History, specialized in Sociology of Islam, and earned a doctorate in Sociology and Political Science, focusing on International Relations. His work focuses on crisis areas, national strategic interests, national security, the Mediterranean, intercultural dialogue, and, in particular, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, jihadism, and migration flows. Since April 17, 2019, he has been the Executive Director of ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalism and Counter-Terrorism (Rome-Milan-Lugano). Since September 30, 2021, he has been a member of the Committee on Human and Civil Rights at the Regional Council of Piedmont. He is the author of several works, including Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban Warfare between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence (START InSight, 2024), Immigration and Terrorism (START InSight, 2020), Contemporary Afghanistan. Inside the Longest War (CASD, 2019), and Shahid: Analysis of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan (FrancoAngeli, 2010). Corresponding with the Author: claudio.bertolotti@startinsight.eu.
Bibliography Bertolotti, C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight ed., Lugano. Bertolotti, C. (2023), Unraveling the Evolution of Terrorism in Europe: Left-Wing, Far-Right, Anarchist, and Individual Terrorism, and the Role of Immigrants in Jihadist Terrorism within the European Union (Correlation and Regression Analysis), pp. 77-87, in #ReaCT2023, 4th Report on Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization in Europe, START InSight ed., Lugano, ISBN 978-88-322-94-18-7, ISSN 2813-1037 (print), ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
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