In 2023, Da’esh (ISIS) continued to carry out isolated attacks in Europe, generally with limited organisational support limited. The article notes the increasing effectiveness of European counter-terrorism measures European counterterrorism measures that would likely have made it less convenient for ISIS leaders deploy scarce human resources in such attacks. The author, in his article explores how the Islamic State group seems to favour the preservation of its organisational structures in Europe, delegating action to a few individuals or isolated cells. In addition, the growing involvement of the Khorasan (IS-K) branch of ISIS in planning attacks in Europe or against European targets abroad, as demonstrated by a 2020 plot against NATO bases in Germany. Despite the numerous plots identified in 2023, there is some discretion in attributing these plans exclusively to IS-K, suggesting wider intra-ISIS cooperation. The article notes that, despite appearances, Da’esh Khorasan is not necessarily expanding, but rather taking on new tasks assigned to it by the central leadership, pressed by resource scarcity.
The Islamic
State (IS) continued in 2023 to occasionally carry out isolated attacks in
Europe, usually with seemingly little organisational backup. As European
counter-terrorism has become increasingly effective, the cost effectiveness of
committing rare human resources to isolated attacks must have appeared
questionable to IS leaders and police sources around Europe tend to think that
IS indeed prefers to safeguard whatever organisational structure it still has
in Europe, leaving the task of flying the flag to a few isolated individuals or
cells. Indeed, as late as early 2022 police sources in Europe did not see an
impending IS threat, its presence being limited to online propagandists,
recruiters, and fundraisers. Taliban sources confirmed the detention of an IS-K operative in
Afghanistan, who had raised thousands of euros in Germany and Spain (Giustozzi,
2022). Taliban
intelligence sources also note that that much of IS-K online propaganda is now
being produced outside Afghanistan, including Europe. After the fall of Kabul in August
2021, IS-K started releasing a significant portion of this propaganda in
English. There might be multiple reasons for this, not all related to Europe. A
possible reason that is relevant for European security is the intent to
stimulate recruitment in Europe, perhaps in order to replace the loss of many
Da’esh media operators due to the police crackdown in recent years. Even when in
July 2023 the police detained several IS plotters in Germany and the
Netherlands and described them as being “in contact with members” of the IS-K
branch, it also noted that they were engaged in fund raising and there was no
indication that they were actively preparing a terrorist attack (Stewart ASyI, 2023).
1. IS-K and the Ambition to Strike Europe.
Some
observers have however noted a recent trend, concerning the growing
organisational involvement of the Khorasan branch (IS-K) in planning attacks in
Europe, or against European targets in Turkey. The German authorities alleged
in 2020 that the cell behind a plot to attack NATO bases in Germany, thwarted
by the police in April 2020, had received the order to act from an IS Khorasan
cadre in Afghanistan.[1] This
episode, however, was barely noticed and the evidence shared by the German
authorities remains fuzzy. What really caught the eyes of many observers was
the US intelligence report that turned up among the Discord leaks, showing that
as of February 2023 15 different IS-K linked plots to carry out attacks against
western interests in Europe, Turkey, the Middle East and elsewhere had been
identified by the US military.[2] While these
figures seem impressive, they contrast oddly with the fact that in March 2023 the
US Central Command assessed was that IS-K was within 6 months of having the
capacity to organise attacks against western interests in Asia or Europe. The
discrepancy is difficult to explain, unless for the military the 15 plots
mentioned above were not to be taken too seriously, or not to be attributed
exclusively or even primarily to IS-K. Indeed, Turkish sources describe some of
these plots, such as those aimed against Swedish and Dutch consulates on
Turkish territory, as involving Central Asians linked to IS-K and members of
the Turkish branch of IS. Apart from
reportedly issuing the order, IS-K seemingly relied on assets and personnel
that were already on location. Indeed, even the leaked US intelligence report
itself noted that IS-K “relied on resources from outside Afghanistan”.
2. Afghanistan
and the Developed Structure of IS.
In 2023 IS-K
sources in Afghanistan confirmed to the author’s research team that the group
coordinated operations in Turkey and Europe with other branches of the Islamic
State, stressing however that this happened under the leadership of the central
leadership of the ‘Caliphate”. This implies at least that IS-K as such was not
determining the overall strategy presiding over the planning of these attacks.
Sources within IS-K confirmed that Afghanistan hosted several military
commissions for neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Central Asia, but did
not mention any such entity focusing on Europe, Turkey or the Middle East. Sources
contacted by the International Crisis Group in Syria indicated in 2023 that the
Central Asians who used to operate under IS in Syria had been transferred under
the responsibility of IS-K (International Crisis
Group, 2023).
According to the IS-K sources, at least initially this was meant to prelude to
their transfer to Afghanistan, which however occurred considerably more slowly than
planned.
The picture
that these sources portray is one of a relatively developed IS-K structure in
Turkey and Syria, with 200+ working in the financial hub of IS-K in Turkey,
plus 400-500 Central Asians spread between Syria and Turkey, ex members of ISIL
who either switched their allegiance or were reassigned to IS-K (the sources
are not clear on this point), waiting to be transferred to Khorasan or in any
case to be told what to do. In Europe,
the presence of IS-K is much more modest, with 60 members. According to the
same sources, as of September 2022 there were 30 Europeans belonging to IS-K in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of these, 16 were from Germany, ten were from France
and four from Belgium. There were also four Americans, as well as a few Turks.
These individuals with passports from European and North American countries were
described as having been evacuated from the Middle East after the collapse of
the Caliphate, rather than having been dispatched to IS-K for organising
long-range attacks in Europe. While all these numbers cannot be verified, they
seem compatible with the information summarised above and provided by Europol,
ICG and others.
This picture
suggests constant exchanges of members between the IS-K and other IS branches
in Turkey, Europe and Syria (which occur incidentally, elsewhere as well), even
if the speed and size of these exchanges have been declining over time. There
was always considerable integration between IS branches, despite speculation
early in the existence of IS-K that it was an opportunistic set up, with little
organic relationship with the “Caliphate”. More than of IS-K expanding
operations to Europe, therefore, one should speak of intra-IS branches
cooperation. Such cooperation seems undoubtedly to have expanded in 2022-23,
which begs the question of why this is the case
3. Is IS waiting?
In this
regard, it is worth noticing that IS-K is not claiming or advertising its
alleged “expansion”. Even when solicited, IS-K sources in Afghanistan have stayed
well clear of boasting about such expansion. Quite the contrary, they tend to
minimise its importance. This appears odd, given that
1. IS-K has been running a sophisticated media campaign,
whose main future is magnifying its limited achievements and making unwarranted
claims .
2.
It would be committing a considerable portion of its limited resources, if the
“expansion” were really such, and
3. Private
IS-K social media chatter and interviews with members clearly show that the
organisation struggles to explain to its own members and sympathisers why its
activities have been so limited during 2023.
Perhaps IS-K
might just be waiting to glorify its “expansion” and brand attacks outside the
remit of Khorasan province (Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan,
Central Asia, China, Iran) as “made in Afghanistan” until it succeeds in
carrying out a successful one. However, IS-K shows no similar shyness in
claiming its intent of bringing jihad to China (where despite years of
propaganda, it could achieve nothing) or Central Asia, where its achievements
have been minimal (firing rockets across the border into Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan). If the primary purpose of IS-K were making a claim to having
opened new fronts of its own in Europe, Turkey and Middle East, why wouldn’t it
adopt tactics similar to those deployed in Khorasan province and carry out
random attacks against the softest targets, then produce widely inflated claims
of the damage inflicted?
4. The
strength of IS.
In sum, the
most logical explanation is that the “Caliphate”, which is at its weakest since
its inception, has summoned IS-K’s help to reclaim the headlines with some high
profile attack against European targets. One possibility is that the
“Caliphate” might now be so weak in and around Europe that it simply does not
have the strength anymore to systematically intensify operations there. Another
possibility is that, in line with what noted at the beginning of this article,
the central leadership of IS might have decided to raise its profile through
intensified terrorist operations, while at the same time safeguarding its
surviving structure in Europe and rely instead on IS-K elements, who are not
part of the same structure and do not risk compromising it if caught.
Why IS-K and
not other branches of IS? As mentioned above, IS-K has had a significant
presence in Turkey for years, with safe houses and networks dedicated to
supporting financial operations. This financial hub now struggles to carry out
its original task, due to the Turkish authorities strongly increasing their
pressure, so its conversion to more operational roles could well have appeared
logical. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Central Asians were getting ready to be
transferred to Afghanistan, having outlived their usefulness in Syria, where
operating underground is much harder for them than for native Syrians or even
Iraqis. As only a few tens were able to make the trip each month, those laying
idle in Turkey and Syria could conceivably be mobilised for other duties. In
short, IS-K happened to be readily available and well placed to provide support
to the central leadership, whose Syrian and Iraqi branches have been greatly
weakened in recent years. No other branch of IS was in a similar position.
Conclusions.
In
conclusion, IS-K is not really “expanding”. The members involved in the planned
attacks were already in IS-K, or had been scheduled to be transferred to it (in
the case of the Central Asians). What appears to have changed is that IS-K was
given additional tasks by a central leadership, which is low on money and human
resources and needs to raise its media profile to have a chance of re-emerging
from its crisis. This would also explain why IS-K members in Afghanistan and
not particularly enthusiastic about this development, which at least in the
short term is drawing scarce human resources away from them.
New Insurrectional Terrorism ignites individual terrorism in Europe
by Claudio Bertolotti
From Africa to Afghanistan: Europe looks with concern at jihadist exaltation
The Islamic State no longer has the strength to
dispatch terrorists to Europe as the loss of territory, financial strenght and
recruits reduced its operational capability to zero. However, the threat
remains significant due to the availability and action of lone actors, self-starters
driven by emulation without a direct link to the organization.
While on the ideological level the Islamic State
remains the main jihadist threat, it is however unlikely that it will be able
to replicate the overwhelming appeal the “Caliphate” enjoyed in the
2014-2017 period, as it lost the advantage of novelty, which constituted its
strength, particularly with younger people. In addition, both from a legislative
and operational perspective, Europe has been able to significantly reduce its own
vulnerabilities, although there were greater achievements in terms of counter-terrorism
rather than prevention. On the whole, however, the scenario remains uncertain due
to the risks connected to copycat attacks (“effetto
emulativo” in Italian) and the “call to war” issued in relation to
international events, which can mobilise individuals in the name of jihad. The
most important event which occured in 2021 that has provided and will continue
to provide impetus with respect to transnational jihad is the success of the
Taliban in Afghanistan as, on the one hand, it feeds jihadist propaganda via
the underlying message that “victory results from fighting to the bitter
end”; on the other hand, it fuels a competition between jihadist groups
engaged in exclusively local forms of struggle and resistance and those which,
like the Islamic State, understand and promote jihad solely as an means of
fighting to the bitter end on a global level.
In this overall and constantly evolving picture, we
must pay attention to growing extremist forces in some areas of Africa, specifically
in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and, furthermore, in Rwanda
and Mozambique, in order to counter the rise of new “caliphates” or
“wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe.
In its prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic
State boasts of its spread throughout the African continent and emphasizes
how the goal of countering the presence and spread of Christianity will lead
the group to expand into other areas of the continent. In the Maghreb, Mashreq
and Afghanistan, the activities of the Islamic State are centered around the
intra-Muslim sectarian struggle, while in Africa its presence imposes itself as
part of a conflict between Muslims and Christians with the help of propaganda
insisting on the need to stop the conversion of Muslims to Christianity by
“missionaries”, and under the “pretext” of humanitarian
aid. Within this context, there’s no
shortage of violence taking place; kidnappings and murders of religious
missionaries, attacks against NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso
to Congo, and attacks on Christian villagers, especially during Christmas and
New Year’s holidays.
A drop in attacks,
but the threat of terrorism persists
Over the past three years, from a quantitative
perspective, the frequency of terrorist attacks
remained linear. From 2017 to 2020, 457 attacks took place in the European
Union, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, including failed and foiled attacks:
from 2014 to 2017, their number stood at 895.
In 2020, there were 119 attacks -including 62 in the
UK and 2 in Switzerland-. According to Europol (TeSat 2020) 43% of those are attributed to radical left-wing
movements (with a decrease from 26 to 25); 24% to separatist and
ethno-nationalist groups; 7% to far-right groups (compared to 2019, there was
an increase in percentage yet they decreased in absolute term); 26% are
jihadist actions. Although jihadist violence is marginal compared to the total
number of actions motivated by other ideologies, it
remains the most relevant and dangerous in terms of results, the victims it causes
-from 16 victims in 2020 to 13 in 2021- and direct effects.
In the wake of major terror events linked to the
Islamic State group in Europe, 165 jihadist actions have taken place from 2014
to 2021, according to START InSight’s database; of those, 34 were explicitly
claimed by the Islamic State; they were perpetrated by 219 terrorists (63 were
killed in action); 434 victims lost their lives and 2,473 were injured.
The number of jihadist events recorded in 2021 stands
at 18, down slightly from the 25 attacks of the previous year, but with an
increase in the percentage of “emulative” actions – meaning, actions inspired
by other attacks that occured over the previous days-; from 48% in 2020, they rose
to 56% in 2021 (in 2019, they stood at 21%). 2021 also confirmed the
predominance of individual, un-organized, mainly improvised and unsuccessful
actions that progressively replaced the structured and coordinated actions which
had characterized the European urban “battlefield” in the years from 2015
to 2017.
The “European” terrorists
Active
terrorism is a male prerogative: out of 207 attackers, 97% are male (7 are
women); unlike in 2020, when there were 3 female attackers, 2021 did not record
the active participation of women.
The
median age of the 207 terrorists (male and female) is 26: a figure which varies
over time (from 24 years of age in 2016, to 30 in 2019). The biographical data
of 169 individuals for whom we have complete information allow us to draw a
very interesting picture which tells us that 10% are younger than 19, 36% are
between 19 and 26, 39% are between 27 and 35 and, finally, 15% are older than
35.
88%
of the attacks (where we have complete information) were carried out by second
and third-generation “immigrants” and first-generation immigrants,
both legal and irregular.
Of
the 154 out of 207 terrorists analyzed through START InSight’s database, 45%
are legal immigrants; 24% are descendants of immigrants (second or third
generation); 19% are irregular immigrants; this last figure is growing, rising
to 25% in 2020 and doubling to 50% in 2021. The presence of an 8% of citizens
of European origin who have converted to Islam is significant. Overall, 77% of
terrorists are regular residents of Europe, while the role of irregular
immigrants stands out with a ratio of about 1 for every 6 terrorists. In 4% of
the attacks, children/minors (7) were found to be among the attackers.
The ethno-national map of terrorism in Europe
The
phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe afflicts certain
national/ethnic groups more than others. There is a proportional relationship
between the main immigrant groups and terrorists, as it seems to appear from the
nationality of the terrorists, or of the families of origin, which is in line
with the size of foreign communities in Europe. The Maghrebi origins prevail:
the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan
(in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy) and Algerian (in France).
Increase in recidivism and individuals already known to
intelligence
The
role played by repeat offenders – individuals already convicted of terrorism
who carry out violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some
cases, in prison – is prominent; they accounted for 3% of the terrorists in
2018 (1 case), then rose to 7% (2) in 2019, to 27% (6) in 2020, and were down
to a single case in 2021. This seems to confirm the social danger represented
by individuals who, in the face of a prison sentence, tend to postpone the
conduct of terrorist actions; this evidence points to a potential increase in
terrorist acts over the coming years, coinciding with the release of most terrorists
currently detained.
Parallel
to repeat offenders, START InSight found another significant trend, which is related
to actions carried out by terrorists already known to European law enforcement
or intelligence agencies: they account for 44% and 54% of the total in 2021 and
2020 respectively, compared to 10% in 2019 and 17% in 2018.
There
is a certain stability related to participation in terrorist actions by
individuals with a prison history (including those detained for non-terrorist
offenses) with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year
(33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018 and 12% in 2017);
this confirms the hypothesis that sees prisons as places of radicalization.
Is the offensive capacity of terrorism being reduced?
In
order to draw a precise picture of terrorism, one needs to analyse the three
levels on which terrorism itself develops and operates, and that is the strategic,
the operational and the tactical. Strategy consists in the employment of combat
for the purpose of war; tactics is the employment of troops for the purpose of
battle; the operational level is between these two. This is a simple summary which
underlines an essential feature: that is, the employment of fighters.
Success
at the strategic level is marginal
16%
of the actions were successful at the strategic level, as they brought about
structural consequences consisting in a blockade of national and/or
international air/rail traffic, mobilization of the armed forces, far-reaching
legislative interventions. This is a very high figure, in consideration of the
limited organizational and financial capabilities of the groups and lone
attackers. The trend over the years has been uneven, but it highlighted a
progressive reduction in capability and effectiveness: 75% of strategic success
was recorded in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in
2019, 12% in 2020 and 6% in 2021. Overall, attacks garnered international media
attention 79% of the time, 95% domestically, while organized and structured
commando and team-raid actions received full media attention. An evident, as
much as sought after, media success that may have significantly affected the
recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihad fighters, whose numerical
magnitude remains high in correspondence with periods of heightened terrorist
activity (2016-2017).But while it is true that mass media amplification has positive
effects on recruitment, it is also true that this attention tends to diminish
over time, due to two main reasons: the first, is the prevalence of
low-intensity actions over high-intensity actions – which have been decreasing
– and on low- and medium-intensity actions – which increased significantly from
2017 to 2021. The second, is that public opinion is increasingly inured to
terroristic violence and consequently less ‘touched’, particularly by
“low” and “medium intensity” events.
The tactical level is worrisome, but it is not
the priority of terrorism
Assuming that the aim of terrorist attacks consists in killing
at least one enemy (in 35% of the cases, the targets are security forces), this
aim has been achieved over the period from 2004 to 2021 on average in 50% of
the cases. However, it should be taken into account that the large time frame tends
to affect the margin of error; the trend over the 2014-2021 period, hints at a decline
in the results of terrorism, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an
increase in actions with a failed outcome at least until 2019. The results of
the last six years in particular, show that success at a tactical level was
obtained, in 2016, in 31% of the cases (against 6% of formally unsuccessful
acts), while 2017 recorded a success rate of 40% and a failure rate of 20%. An
overall trend that, when taking into consideration a 33% success rate at the tactical
level, a doubling of failed attacks (42%) in 2018 and a further downward figure
of 25% success rate in 2019, can be read as a result of the progressive
decrease in the operational capability of terrorists and the increased
reactivity of European security forces. But if the analysis suggests a
technical capability that has indeed been reduced, it is also true that the
improvised and unpredictable character of the new individual and emulative
terrorism has led to an increase in successful actions, growing from 32% in
2020 to 44% in 2021.
The real success is at operational level. The
“functional blockade”
Even
when it fails, terrorism gains, in terms of the costs inflicted upon its
target: e.g. by engaging the armed forces and Police in an extraordinary way,
distracting them from normal routine activities and/or preventing them from
intervening in support of the community; by interrupting or overloading the
health services; by limiting, slowing down, diverting or stopping collective
urban, air and naval mobility; by restricting the regular course of daily personal,
commercial and professional activities, to the detriment of affected
communities and, moreover, by significantly reducing the technological
advantage, the operational potential and resilience; and finally, more in
general, by inflicting direct and indirect damage, regardless of the ability to
cause casualties. Consistently, the limitation in the freedom of citizens is a
measurable result that terrorism obtains through its actions.
In
other words, terrorism is successful even in the absence of victims, as it can
still impose economic and social costs on the community and influence the
latter’s behaviour over time as a consequence of new security measures aimed at
safeguarding the community: this effect is what we call the “functional
blockade”.
The
ever-decreasing operational capability of terrorism notwithstanding, the
“functional blockade” continues to be the most significant result
obtained by terrorists, regardless of tactical success (killing of at least one
target). While tactical success has been observed in 34% of the attacks which
took place since 2004, terrorism has proven its effectiveness by inducing a “functional
blockade” in an average of 82% of the cases, with a peak of 92% in 2020 and 89%
in 2021: an impressive result, when considering the limited resources deployed
by terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is, no doubt, in favour of terrorism.
Michele Brunelli (ed.), Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy (Book Review)
By Andrea Carteny,Elena Tosti Di Stefano
In recent decades, radicalisation and
terrorism have come to the forefront of International Relations, giving rise to
a wealth of conceptualisations and study perspectives, which shed light on the multiple,
diverse connections between terrorist phenomena, radical ideologies, and
global, regional, or local conflicts. Particularly relevant in this respect is
the need to consider factors such as ethnicity, religion, historical heritages,
as well as migration. Such consideration is even more salient if the military
dimension of counteraction is flanked – and sometimes replaced – by prevention,
deterrence, and integration strategies involving the educational, economic, and
social resilience spheres.
It is on this premise that the volume Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and
de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational
perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy was developed.Published
by Rubbettino in the editorial series “Laboratorio sull’Intelligence dell’Università
della Calabria”, the collective work presents the results of an intense and
fruitful two-year research activity carried out within the project PRaNet – Prevention ofRadicalisation Network (2019-2021).
The PRaNet project, led by the Italian
University of Bergamo, entails the creation of a university network between the
latter institution and two universities from countries belonging to the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Algeria and Azerbaijan, with the aim of deepening
knowledge and understanding of phenomena linked to radicalisation, as well as promoting
social inclusion and developing de-radicalisation policies for integration
purposes. Project activities have been implemented within the framework of the
multiannual programme “Strategy for the Promotion of Italian Higher Education Abroad
2017/2020”, jointly supported by the Italian Ministry of Education, University
and Research (MIUR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation (MAECI). These include, in addition to research initiatives,
exchanges of students, teachers, researchers, and trainees through ad hoc
programmes, such as the MaRTe Master’s degree at the University of Bergamo in “Prevention
and Fight Against Radicalisation, Terrorism and for International Integration
and Security Policies”, as well as vocational activities at the University
Mohamed Lamine Debaghine (Sétif 2), in Algeria, and the ADA University fi Baku
in Azerbaijan.
The book draws on the consolidated
experience of Michele Brunelli, Professor of History and Institutions of
Islamic Societies at the University of Bergamo and Director of the Master
MaRTe, who has coordinated international projects concerning de-radicalisation
and prevention of violent extremism in Algeria, Azerbaijan and Burkina Faso, and
edited, also last year and for the same publishing house, the volume Prevention and countering of confessional
terrorism and radicalisation.
The scientific quality of the book derives not
only from addressing, through various perspectives, the main key-categories for
understanding terrorism (definition, causality, consequences, and response), but
also from analysing the historical, cultural, and socio-economic factors
relating to the phenomena of radicalisation, terrorism, anti-terrorism, and de-radicalisation,
taking as case studies three different confessional contexts: Italy, as a traditionally
Christian society; Algeria, a Sunni Islamic country; and Azerbaijan, characterised
by a Shia Muslim majority but a prevailingly secular society.
As the title suggests, the study revolves
around three concepts – radicalisation, terrorism, and de-radicalisation – which
are in turn the subjects of the three sections of the book respectively.
The first section scrutinises the complex
relationship between radicalisation and the question of minorities and identity
cleavages. Lala Jumayeva, Assistant Professor in
International Affairs at the ADA University of Baku with an expertise in conflict resolution, investigates the link between ethnic
minorities and radicalisation in the Caucasian area, while Naouel Abdellatif
Mami, Professor of Psycho-pedagogical Sciences and Foreign Languages at the University
Sétif 2, deals with the issue of identity and freedom of expression as drivers of
extremism in the Algerian context. Šeila Muhić, Researcher at the University of
Bergamo specialised in the field of human rights, explores the migration
phenomenon in Italy as a potential fertile ground for radicalisation. Further insights are offered by the second chapter of
the section, which brings together a series of essays on female radicalisation
and women victims or actors of terrorism. Anar
Valiyev, also a Professor at ADA University and an expert on history and
institutions of the post-Soviet space, discusses case of ISIS in relation to women
and children victims of radicalisation in Azerbaijan, with particular reference
to Salafist environments. Next, Naouel
Abdellatif Mami examines the condition of women in Algerian history, focusing
on the “black decade” (1991-2002) as well as on women’s role in the development
of approaches to resilience. The last study of the second chapter, carried out
by Emilija Davidovic – an expert on human rights in the post-Yugoslavian
scenario – concerns the involvement of women in extremist violence in the
European (Western and Balkan) context. The third chapter then provides a broad
overview of the phenomenon of political-religious radicalisation in post-Soviet
Azerbaijan, which mainly affects minority religious and ethnic communities
(Sunni and alloglot).
The second section of the book addresses terrorism
and its several conceptualisations. First, Ilas Touazi, Researcher at the University
Sétif 2 with an expertise in terrorism/counter-terrorism, presents an analysis
of the jihadist threat in Algeria, placing emphasis on the transnationalisation
of local terrorism. Professor Michele Brunelli subsequently explores the
evolution of politically and ideologically motivated terrorist crimes in the
European scenario, notably in Italy. The book
continues with the contribution of Aydan Ismayilova, a graduate of the MaRTe
Master’s course and an expert on jihadism, who examines terrorist phenomena in
the Caucasus area, focusing on Armenian terrorist movements and religious
extremist groups. Further food for thought is
provided by the fifth chapter, which includes research contributions on
critical infrastructure as the main targets of terrorist attacks. As such, Inara
Yagubova (Project Manager at the ADA University of Baku) deals with the
terrorist threat to energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan, while Nabil Benmoussa, Professor of Economics at the University
Sétif 2, analyses the economic implications of terrorism in Algeria and the related
policies of contrast. The essay written by Fabio Indeo, Analyst at the NATO
Defense College Foundation and expert in energy geopolitics of Central Asia, explains
the vulnerabilities and the strategies of protection of European critical
infrastructure, also in light of the new challenges posed by cybercrime. Afterwards,
Commander Mario Leone Piccinni, Officer of the Italian Guardia di Finanza and specialist
in cybercrime, outlines the intricate financing systems of terrorist
organisations at the international and local level.
The third and last section deals with de-radicalisation
policies and strategies. The seventh chapter hence investigates counter-terrorist
responses, with a first essay by Stefano Bonino, a criminologist expert in
terrorism and organised crime, who discusses Algerian counter-terrorist
strategies – from the most repressive ones to “soft” measures. As for the other
two countries under consideration, counter-terrorism and radicalism activities in
the Azerbaijani context are examined by Anar Valiyev, while the Italian case is
carefully analysed by Stefano Bonino and Andrea Beccaro, the latter being Professor
of Strategic Studies and War Studies at the University of Turin and the State
University of Milan respectively. The following chapter puts emphasis on the
role of education in preventing and responding to terrorism and radicalism, as
clearly emerges from the case study of Azerbaijan, here discussed by Valiyev. Likewise, Benmoussa outlines the recent educational
reforms in Algeria, conceived as part of the response to these phenomena; Šeila
Muhić, for her part, illustrates the programmes
of civil society involvement to counter violent extremism at the European
level. Last but not least, the ninth chapter closes the book with an essay by
Karim Regouli (Researcher at the University Sétif 2) on the delicate process of
reconciliation in Algeria after the decade of violence triggered by Islamic terrorism.
For the breadth of the topics it covers,
for the multiplicity of perspectives it offers and for the originality of the
comparative case studies, the book provides a significant contribution to research
on radicalisation and terrorism, representing, furthermore, an invaluable reference
for developing effective counteraction policies. Among recent studies, the
volume ranks amongst the most relevant on such topics, together with – inter
alia – Communities and Counterterrorism (Routledge, 2019), edited by Basia
Spalek and Douglas Weeks, Countering Violent Extremism. The international deradicalisation agenda (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021) by Tahir
Abbas, as well as “Countering International Terrorism, with particular reference to the
phenomenon of foreign fighters” edited by the Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione
Internazionale (SIOI) in 2019.
Understanding
radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political
and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy undoubtedly constitutes a point of
reference for scholars and experts, as well as for national and international institutions. The adopted multidisciplinary approach – historical,
political-institutional, economic, social, operational, and socio-educational –
provides for a comprehensive and articulated framework, which can be applied not only to religiously motivated
terrorism and radicalisation, but also to the many historical-political
expressions of such phenomena.
#ReaCT2022: 3rd Report on Radicalization and Terrorism
Director’s introduction: The new terrorism among pandemic, social unrest and jihadist extremism
In my role as ReaCT’s Executive Director, I am pleased to introduce #ReaCT2022, the 3rd Report on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism in Europe (go to #ReaCT2022, n.3 year 3).
In their assessments, the
authors who submitted their work for this issue took into account the
repercussions of new social and conflict dynamics brought about by COVID-19 and
also the effects of the Taliban victory in Afghanistan.
COVID and the Taliban drive diverse terrorist
threats
Terrorism adapts,
evolves and is affected by events which ignite violent actions in the name of
an ideology that justifies its methods, aims and purposes. Trends recorded in 2021
are coherent with the dynamics of the past few years; they also anticipate a likely
scenario for 2022, a year that will continue to be shaped by
two major developments: the
Covid-19 pandemic and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. These two
developments, in different ways, contribute to an increasingly threatening
landscape.On the one hand, the social consequences of the Covid-19
pandemic will increase heterogeneous radical phenomena and bolster violence
linked to conspiracy or ideologically-driven extremist movements; on the other
hand, the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan represents a leitmotif within the
global jihadist narrative.
The terrorism landscape we face in 2022
Most data
presented in this paper are drawn from START InSight’s database, which provides
annual trends in jihadist terrorism and events in Europe.
In more general
terms, the West is currently looking with concern at jihadist exaltation, from
Afghanistan to Africa. The Islamic State no longer has the strength to dispatch
terrorists to Europe as the loss of territory, financial strenght and recruits
greatly reduced its operational capability. However, the threat remains
significant due to the availability and action of lone actors and self-starters
without a link to the organisation yet mobilised by jihadist narratives around
global events. Risks connected to emulative attacks are high; 56% of the events
in 2021 can be categorised as emulative actions, according to START InSight’s
database. This trend is growing. Over the past three years, from a quantitative
point of view, the frequency of terrorist attacks has remained linear. Europol
attributes 43% of the attacks to radical left-wing movements, 24% to separatist
and ethno-nationalist groups, 7% to far-right groups, while 26% are jihadist
actions. While jihadist violence might be marginal in absolute terms, it
continues to be most relevant in terms of its consequences and the number of
victims. The number of jihadist events which took place in Europe in 2021
stands at 18 (START InSight).
Two decades of terrorism trials in Switzerland
Although
Switzerland has not experienced a large-scale attack of the kind experienced in
other European countries over the last decade, the phenomenon of
politico-ideological violence in the jihadist spectrum is nevertheless present.
Ahmed Ajil explains that from 2004 until November 2021, the Swiss
Federal Criminal Court has tried a total of 17 criminal proceedings related to
jihadist terrorism cases. Most of these proceedings took place after the
outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the subsequent territorial expansion of the
IS group in June 2014.
The African challenge
As highlighted
by Enrico Casini and Luciano Pollichieni, since the early 2000s,
a growing number of jihadist organizations emerged in Africa. They are
characterised by a globalist rhetoric but remain deeply connected to local
dynamics (political, ethnic, or criminal) and they are also increasingly
involved in illicit traffics of different types and shapes (from smuggling to
human trafficking and slavery to maritime piracy). In virtue of its contiguity
with the Mediterranean, instability generated by terrorist groups in Africa has
an immediate effect on Europe, as demonstrated by the various migration crises
of the last years.
Jihadist communities online expand the terrorism universe
by forming new entities
We asked Michael Krona, a media scholar
researching salafi-jihadist propaganda, to provide us with his take on the
dynamics of jihadist online communities; he underlines how communities that
were previously started as direct extensions of a specific organization (like
the Islamic State – IS) increasingly become intertwined with broader
ideological strains, rather than only relaying official IS propaganda.
Supporter groups online are expanding the terrorism universe by forming new
entities.
The new horizons of radicalisation
Two decades since
the 9/11 attacks and in pandemic times, the threat of terrorism has become more
widespread, fragmented and complex to deal with. Chiara Sulmoni writes that the ecosystem of violent extremism is
characterized by strong competition, but also by a growing exposure to the
strategies and narratives of different groups. New profiles underline the
domestic character of the threat and indicate how terrorists and individuals
who radicalise frequently have a history of mental distress and exhibit a
propensity for violence rather than ideological conviction. As society itself
is becoming increasingly polarized and extremism finds its way into the
mainstream, there’s a need for renewed attention on the sociological and
psychological aspects inherent to radicalisation processes, with a view to
enhancing prevention.
The EU supports the Western Balkans with a new project
on prevention of radicalisation
With reference to the Western Balkan area, Matteo
Bressan explains how prevention of radicalisation leading to violent
extremism and terrorism represents a key priority for EU Member States and
Western Balkan partners. As common challenges require a common approach, the
Commission will support the region in preventing and countering all forms of
radicalisation. The Commission will mobilise practitioners’ expertise within
the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) to support prevention work and
facilitate exchanges among professionals.
Dealing with radicalised minors: the Italian approach
Minors are among
the targets of jihadist propaganda and extremist ideologies more in general.
They can be involved in different ways: as unaware victims of adults’ choices
or as direct recipients of an ideology which exploits their need to belong. In
her case study, Alessandra Lanzetti illustrates how the State Police’s Central Directorate of the
Prevention Police (DCPP) gained experience in this field and how it developed
an experimental intervention protocol on child returnees, based on the criteria
of timeliness and multidisciplinarity.
New radicalisms and other terrorisms fueled by the
pandemic effects. Far right, radical left, anti-Semitism: from conspiracy to
violence
Mattia Caniglia
explains how one of the most worrying trends in 2021 has been the increasing
attraction exercised by right-wing violent extremism on young people. This is
probably linked to the fact that right-wing extremist propaganda is mainly
disseminated online, and gaming platforms have been increasingly used to spread
extremist and terrorist narratives. Evidence from investigations and research activities
that emerged over the past year suggests that, in some instances, RWVE seek to
emulate jihadists with respect to recruitment techniques, modi operandi
and propaganda strategies. Furthermore, high-profile terrorist attacks –
whether Islamist or far-right in nature – can increase reciprocal
radicalization processes, where neo-Nazis and jihadists attempt to
“up the ante” by increasing the frequency and lethality of attacks.
Within this
context, there’s also a growth in anti-Semitic sentiment; Sarah Ibrahimi
Zijno discusses the extreme and easy propagation of substantially
anti-Semitic points of view, first within the American alternative right and
later also within the alternative European right, with particular reference to
the former communist part of the continent; as well as the substantial
rapprochement of some left-oriented press towards the same conspiracy algorithm
already of the alternative right, with the silent, progressive abandonment of
the distinction – already fragile and questionable in itself – between
anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism.
Conspiracy
theories from pop culture to violent militancy: the NoVax paradox
Andrea Molle
explains how the NoVax movement is now spearheading the rise of militant
conspiracy and rapidly replacing religious radicalism as the primary concern
for national security. His paper analyzes some of its essential traits,
highlighting the risk of mass radicalization it carries.
Updating
Terrorism Risk Assessment Instruments
In
recent years, with the advance in Europe and the United States of more or less
organised forms of extreme right-wing extremism and white supremacism, notes Barbara
Lucini, the Terrorism Risk
Assessment Instruments
(TRA-I) have been the subject of renewed reflection with
respect to their adaptive capacity, resilience and effective assessment of the
multiple and varied paths of radicalisation that are being witnessed.
Neo-Nazi
extremism and deradicalisation
The case study presented by Luca Guglielminetti is the first in Italy that concerns a so-called
deradicalization activity aimed at a boy involved in subversive activities of
the neo-Nazi far right. The path undertaken was born in the framework of a
European project “Exit Europe”, which involved partners from 5
countries with a view to integrating P/CVE interventions.
Future wars: the new centrality of
intelligence and the redefinition of cyberspace
In this
analysis, Marco Lombardi shares his reflections on some emerging aspects
of warfare, intelligence and the role of terrorism. The scenario of
the future war seems to underline the maintenance, indeed the strengthening of
the operating methods of terrorism in recent years, which has found its success
for the ability to penetrate media communication and for the innovative (ie
surprising) use of technologies. It almost seems that the terrorism
of the first twenty years of the new century has experienced the new
opportunities of warfare, which then consolidated into widespread practices
among all the actors in the conflict.
And
finally, Andrea Carteny and Elena Tosti Di Stefano reviewed for
us a recent publication –Understanding
radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political
and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy – which
collectively presents the results of an intense and fruitful two-year research
activity carried out within the project PRaNet – Prevention of Radicalisation
Network (2019-2021).
Thanks to all the Authors who have contributed to the
current #ReaCT2022 Report. My gratitude goes in particular to the Editor,
Chiara Sulmoni, START InSight’s President, for her fundamental and special
input.
Claudio Bertolotti (ENG), Director’s introduction: The new terrorism among pandemic, social unrest and jihadist extremism
Claudio Bertolotti (ENG), New Insurrectional Terrorism ignites individual terrorism in Europe
Ahmed Ajil (ENG), Two decades of terrorism trials: an overview of the cases tried by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court since 9/11
Claudio Bertolotti (ENG), Afghanistan, Syria and the Sahel: the ‘New Insurrectional Terrorism’ (NIT) takes root. A revolutionary, subversive and utopian phenomenon looks to the West
Enrico Casini, Luciano Pollichieni (ENG), Caliphs, trafficking, and discontent: convergences and perspectives of jihadist terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa
Michael Krona (ENG), Jihadist communities online build their own brands and expand the terrorism-universe by forming new entities
Chiara Sulmoni (ENG), The new horizons of radicalization
Alessandra Lanzetti (ENG), Case study – Radicalised minors: the Italian model, between security protection and social reintegration
Matteo Bressan (ENG), The EU supports Western Balkans with a new project on prevention of radicalization
Barbara Lucini (ENG), TRA-I and radicalisation processes: current considerations and future prospects
Mattia Caniglia (ENG), Right-wing violent extremism in 2021: a rising threat across Europe?
Sarah Ibrahimi Zijno (ENG), New anti-Semitism: main factors and trends after the pandemic
Luca Guglielminetti (ENG), Case study – Neo-Nazi extremism and deradicalisation: the first case study in Italy
Andrea Molle (ENG), Conspiracy theories from pop culture to violent militancy: the NoVax paradox
Marco Lombardi (ENG), Future wars: the new centrality of intelligence and the redefinition of cyberspace
Andrea Carteny, Elena Tosti Di Stefano (ENG), Review – Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy, M. Brunelli (edited by).
#ReaCT2022: The 3rd Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe
#ReaCT2022 includes 15 contributions on jihadism and other forms of violent extremism characterising the current threat landscape, which acquired further strength and visibility throughout the pandemic. This Report aims at fostering long-term dialogue and collaboration with institutional and academic actors who are concerned with the issue of radicalisation. #ReaCT2022 is addressed to security personnel, social workers, the media, students, researchers and last but not least, the general audience.
Violent extremism, radicalization and case studies. The contents of the Report. The overall contents of the 2022 Report ranges from numbers and profiles of jihadist terrorists in Europe, to a discussion of New Insurrectional Terrorism (NIT), which draws renewed strength and motivation from the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan; from an analysis of the sub-Saharan context where jihadist organisations are characterised by globalist rhetoric but remain deeply connected to local dynamics, to European commitment in helping the Western Balkans prevent violent radicalisation; from an overview of the terrorism cases tried by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court since 9/11 to the dynamics of online jihadist communities; from the new horizons of radicalization, which broadened during the pandemic and require that more attention be paid to group dynamics and social problems linked to violence; to several articles focussing on the far-right, anti-Semitism, conspiracy theories, the NoVax movement; to case studies on the social reintegration of radicalized minors and deradicalization within the neo-Nazi context, which highlight the approach and the work carried out by Italian authorities. Finally, the Report includes considerations on the updating of Terrorism Risk Assessment Instruments (TRA-I), which are developed with the aim of being able to better assess the threat posed by radicalization processes and related activities; reflections on future war scenarios; a review of the recent book titled “Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy”.
ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalisation and Counterterrorism (Rome) was founded by a team of experts and professionals from START InSight – Strategic Analysts and Research Team, a research and editorial production company based in Lugano (Switzerland); ITSTIME –Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, a research center within the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan); CEMAS –Centro interdipartimentale per la ricerca scientifica e la cooperazione con l’Eurasia, il Mediterraneo e l’Africa Subsahariana, La Sapienza University (Rome); SIOI – The Italian Society for International Organization (Rome).
Europa Atlantica and Gruppo Italiano Studio Terrorismo (GRIST) also joined ReaCT as partners.
The Observatory includes a Board of Directors, a Steering Scientific Committee, a Parliamentary Committee and a Permanent Working Group.
#ReaCT2021 Co-editor’s note: Flavia Giacobbe, Director Formiche and Airpress
by Flavia Giacobbe, Director Formiche and Airpress
Pandemic, crisis, vaccines and recovery. The great spotlight of politics and public opinion have been fo-cused for months on the Covid-19 emergency. Yet, latent but concrete, other threats keep on pressing on Europe (and not only): terrorism, ji-hadist radicalism and different forms of extrem-ism. In early January, the as-sault on the U.S. Capitol shocked the world. An attack on the very heart of the star and stripes democracy that was thought unthink-able, perpetuated thanks to movements like the now well-known conspiracy organization QAnon. It shows how real the threat is and how much attention it de-serves, even now when other issues and other urgen-cies have climbed the ranks of public attention.
The main issue is how to address these risks, de-ploying effective preventive measures to anticipateradicalization processes before they occur, before they turn into tangible violence, like the one witnessed on Capitol Hill. However, jihadist terrorism keeps frightening the most, and Europe is at the front line both because of its proximity to war zones, and the presence of numer-ous foreign fighters returned from the battlefield.
Among the data in the ReaCT 2021 report, one is par-ticularly striking: 20% of terrorists who acted last year were irregular immigrants. This shows how prevention is closely tied to migratory policies, coordinationamong European partners and dialogue with countriesof origin and transit. It also proves that it is essential to have a clear understanding of the constantly evolving geopolitical framework surrounding our country and Europe. The ashes of the Islamic State in Syria andIraq have left many questions on the ground, first and foremost the displacement or repatriation of fighters, a phenomenon that requires international coordination. The Balkan route remains at the core of the attention by authorities, in particular Kosovo, from which most of the fighters who went to Syria came and in which Italy has a leading role, also thanks to the leadership of the NATO mission KFOR.
Within our national borders, the threat has been well outlined in the latest annual Intelligence reports. In addition to warning policymakers about jihadist risks that can undermine the Republic’s security, they have also recently highlighted far-right resurgences. This trend has to be watched, contrary to European general data that show a prevalence of the phenomenon linked to the extreme left.
Overall, an important boost to de-radicalization may come from our Parliament. During the last legislature, after a very troubled process, the Manciulli-Dambruoso bill has passed only in the Chamber of Deputies. This has undoubtedly made the country to miss an opportu-nity to have a regulatory instrument capable of com-bating and preventing the phenomenon of terrorism, at a time when public opinion was paying the greatest attention. In the new legislature, the text has been put back in the making, and we all hope for a shared and bipartisan political process, with the common goal of providing the country with more effective and far-sighted tools to combat the causes and spread of a threat never disappeared. Of course, dialogue be-tween politics, experts and security services remains the key to achieving good results. To this end, the ReaCT 2021 report proves to be a useful working tool, a compass to orientate the under-standing of the phenomenon, its roots and evolutions.
For this reason, Airpress and Formiche chosen to co-edit the second edition of the report, to contribute in keeping alive the interest of decision makers on a topic that significantly affects our collective security.
#ReaCT2021 – Tools to counter violent radicalisation: a case study
by Alessandra Lanzetti
The killing of the French professor Samuel Paty and the recent attacks conducted in Nice and Wien, clearly show that the jihadist-inspired terrorism represents one of the most dangerous threat to Europe, notwithstanding the fall of the Caliphate.
The counter terrorism agency is aware that to counteract effectively this phenomenon, it is necessary to place side-by-side to the law enforcement tools, also measures that allow to anticipate the radicalisation process, by affecting the stages that precede the perpetration of terrorist crimes.
In Italy, already in the past legislature, a Parliament debate started aiming at channelling into an Act, all the tools that are usually employed in practice in order to detect in time all the radicalised subjects and, therefore, to facilitate their de-radicalisation, which means giving up a violent ideology and fostering their social, cultural, employment integration, in compliance with the fundamental rights of religious freedom.
The debate of a bill signed by the honourable MP Fiano is still pending at the Chamber of Deputies; its contents follow closely the previous one being signed by the Honourable Manciulli – Dambruoso; in the Italian practice, the legal tools in force were used to start some de-radicalisation interventions.
One of them is the case of B.A., a teenager of Algerian origin, who in 2017 was investigated into by the Tribunal for minors in Trieste for instigation to perpetrate terrorist crimes, with the aggravating circumstances of the use of IT tools.
B.A. was fourteen years old when in 2017 Digos personnel in Udine and UCIGOS found him in possession of some important messages related to the religious war and the image of the Islamic State flag. The investigators have been after him for months, through a constant monitoring of his chats on Telegram platform; a virtual space where he was not any longer an introverted boy with no friends, but rather a contact point of the so called Islamic State group, who administered numerous IT channels and widespread the contents of the jihadist propaganda, teaching how to manufacture home-made bombs and instigating users to perpetrate terrorism crimes against humanity, also offering substantial help to whosoever intended to join the jihadist cause.
The investigation started from a notification issued by the intelligence, shared at CASA – Committee for Counterterrorism Strategic Analysis, according to which a young Italian of Arabic origin allegedly intended to commit an unspecified attack against the school “Deganutti” in Udine.
But who is B.A.? And how did he end in the Islamic State network?
B.A. was born in Italy from a family of Algerian immigrants who grew him up according to the traditional principles of the culture of their country of origin; this made the integration of the entire family group in the North of Italy social context, difficult.
The above is a key issue to better understand which were the mechanisms that triggered B.A.’s radicalisation process, which most of the times starts from a generic, psychological, social, cultural discomfort. Often, young immigrants of second-generation join the radical Islamist ideology; they were born, grew up and educated in a western country, most of the times by families bound to a popular religion, but who feel like strangers because of the so-called double absence, that is they do not feel completely part of their own original culture and at the same time they do not feel integrated in the country in which they live.
This frustration, associated to a personality marked by intelligence and self-confidence, but with a poor empathy and a high self-control and emotional detachment, lead these people to look into the web for the answers to their solitude; they try to gain importance and to play a role in the society through the tasks that are electronically assigned them by the “Islamic State teachers”.
The structure of the Minor proceedings made it possible to balance the needs for security and for ascertaining the crime, with the boy’s rehabilitation, in order to give him an alternative based on the compliance with legality. Indeed, in the phase preceding the trial, the Prosecutor entrusted a psychologist, together with a mentoring[1], with a professional support to B.A., in order to correctly interpret the religious aspects mentioned in the propaganda. During the proceedings, the defendant asked to enter the so-called probation; thus, the boy was assigned to the Social Service for Minors in Trieste, with the task of arranging an ad-hoc project based on the defendant’s needs and rehabilitation; B.A. had partially recognised his responsibility, confirming his conduct, but underestimating its dangerousness, and reiterating his own interest in the Islamic State group as a mere curiosity.
The programme started in May 2019 and lasted twelve months; its performance included many experts who, according to one’s competence, contributed in managing B.A.’s reintegration into society and de-radicalisation: in particular, the Judiciary, law enforcement, psychologists with the help of the mentoring, social workers all worked with the synergy of a multiagency.
The guidelines issued by the Judiciary had the primary objective to make the radicalised subject understand and elaborate the seriousness of his conduct, the dangerousness of his activity, not only as to security and public order was concerned but also as to life, health and people’s safety.
Together with the psychotherapeutic support program and the attendance at a school, B.A. started to carry out some activities in favour of disabled people and victims of violence inside intercultural aggregation centres: by giving support to weak and/or disabled subjects from different social, national or religious background, or to people who suffered from migration traumas, he managed to face cultural prospects and social dynamics which were different from his own, so as to learn the value of tolerance and non-violence as a way to recognise his own values and to develop a feeling of belonging to the community.
Moreover, these activities gave him the opportunity for a sound socialisation and for the reactivation of emotions, which were “anesthetized” by the social isolation and by the deep involvement in the propaganda material posted by the Islamic State group.
In June 2020, at the end of this process, the Judiciary issued[2] a judgement of dismissal due to extinction of the offence, considering that “the above processes led the defendant to acknowledge his own past experience and to frame it in a more coherent understanding; the stable trend of the defendant towards legality and a substantial commitment to base his own life on education and self-support through work, so as to concretely assume a future conduct based on the respect of himself and of other people”.
[1] Expert of jihadist narrative, in particular, in the case under review, it was a so-called former, that is a person who had already joined a violent extremist group and who managed to rehabilitate himself.
[2] Sentence issued by the Tribunal for Minors in Trieste n. 59/20 dated 9/6/2020 lodged on June 19, 2020.
#ReaCT2021- Extreme right and extreme left in pandemic times: some reflections
by Barbara Lucini, ITSTIME “Cattolica” University
The pandemic scenario that emerged with the spread of the Covid-19 epidemic has highlighted some challenges, which many companies will face in the coming years.
The new types of extremism that took shape in the immediate weeks following the onset of the pandemic are one of them. In fact, like any crisis, the health pandemic crisis has had an impact on terrorist organisations and extremist movements.
The first considerations that can be made in this field, focus on some emerging and typical characteristics of left and right extremism, which seem increasingly to have common trends in the use of skills, methodologies and communication strategies spread both online and in real life.
First of all, the paradox present in the increasingly international vocation, which promotes the prospect of an organizational network, animated by the crossing of geographical boundaries to unite dissimilar currents of thought and action: this internationalization, however, implies for both the extreme right and left orientations, a strong roots on the territory of origin, which increasingly assumes the cultural signature of these extremist groups. An example for everyone, the far-right PEGIDA group in Germany, which was born in Dresden and which could not be eradicated from that city and from that socio-cultural context.
This group is also interesting because it highlights another characteristic of extremist groups at the time of the pandemic: the transfer of their thought dissemination, recruitment and funding activities, mainly online. In fact, it was precisely for the PEGIDA group, which organized marches on a Youtube channel during the lockdown in Germany.
New methodologies and different uses of the network are now increasingly appearing to be a systematic trend for both extremist orientations.
Another aspect to note, which has affected national and international far-right groups, is the promotion of disinformation and fake news on issues related to the pandemic. This mode of action is a new form of communicative extremism, which has the aim of producing even more chaos and uncertainty generated by the pandemic crisis, reinforcing the dominant thinking orientation of the extremist group of reference.
In this regard, the various conspiracy theories have been fertile ground, for the use of this methodology by some extreme right-wing movements, already in place with the Cambridge Analytica scandal.
In Italy, the situation regarding right-wing and left-wing extremism is similar to that of other European countries, while preserving some cultural specificities.
Comparing forms of the extreme right and left in Italy at the time of the pandemic it is possible to argue that a competition is taking place, which concerns their survival in a national framework changed by the pandemic; the demands made between the two orientations of some anti-lockdown protests demonstrate a reorganisation in place and, above all, the new heterogeneous structure of the future threat, which will see more and more mixed and varied cultural extremist forms compete or ally, with the aim of provoking social disorder and institutional crises.
In this context, it becomes essential to rethink from a theoretical perspective ideological definitions, which no longer satisfy as in the past the classification of extremism and terrorism of right and left and finally develop methodologies of study and analysis suitable for the consideration of socio-cultural aspects, often underestimated, expressed by the various forms of extremism especially in online environments.
#ReaCT2021 – Jihadist extremism in Europe. The concepts and importance of PVE/CVE
by Chiara Sulmoni, START InSight
The concepts of preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE / CVE) gained prominence along with the growth of so-called homegrown radicalization and gradually became an integral part of the global anti-terrorism architecture, of which they represent the noncoercive side. The mobilisation of thousands of foreign fighters, sympathizers and would-be jihadists which unleashed a long string of attacks from 2015 onwards in Europe, pushed the two acronyms to the top of the agenda of international and regional organizations (such as the UN and the EU) and of individual countries alike. PVE and CVE developed into a proper professional field which today can rely on interdisciplinary, collaborative networks, the exchange of know-how among experts and, last but not least, substantial funding.
The efforts sustaining PVE and CVE are driven by the awareness that counter-terrorism measures based on military or police forces are insufficient to deal with the problem as we know it, as they do not address the origins and nature of the phenomenon (they can rather add to its motivations); moreover, the high number of extremists and the complexity of their profiles make it impossible to counter it with the sole tools of repression or intelligence; especially so, when perpetrators are lone-attackers who might act out on a spirit of emulation. The current terrorist threat in the West is fluid and stratified; it can both “materialize” through attacks borne out of a well-defined Islamist/jihadist context, or by means of individuals affected by personal distress rather than entrenched ideology. Europol points out that sometimes suspects arrested for propaganda have a long history of involvement in jihadist activities, including attempts to join the Islamic State on the frontline and the planning of violent actions. A comparative study on prisons and terrorism which examines the situation in 10 European countries (ICSR, 2020) recorded 22 prison-related attacks or plots over the past 5 years; 12 of these were carried out by recently released jihadists. The real proportions of recidivism -and how to deal with it- are currently a topic for debate. According to Neil Basu, head of counter-terrorism policing in the UK, “the real way to prevent terrorism is to get it right at the start of the radicalisation cycle.”
Limits and opportunities
The objective of PVE essentially consists in pre-empting processes of radicalisation; activities can include educational projects or initiatives promoting social cohesion. CVE on the other hand refers to policies and programmes aimed at countering extremism with a view to preventing violence, therefore reducing the risk of terrorism (de-radicalization and counter-narrative fall into this category). In order to be effective, projects in both these sectors need to be very knowledgeable about the reality they intend to influence, and its constant evolution. Hence, the importance of dialogue (and mutual listening) among researchers, practitioners, law enforcement agencies and legislators on issues such as the mechanisms and contexts affecting radicalization and recruitment but also on defining priorities, expectations, training necessities, methodologies and supervision, so that all this work which involves different actors (NGOs, public and private institutions, civil society) and a wide range of “proposals” with a preventive potential, can find some continuity and represent more than just virtuous experiments. Measuring the results of PVE initiatives remains a difficult task (the same holds true for de-radicalisation); assessing the relevance of an intervention aimed at preventing a “fact” from happening is a complex exercise, which must take into account many variables -from individual psychology to the organizational or financial difficulties a program can run into. This issue is already keeping many European think tanks busy.
This report offers a concise analysis on the evolution of radical ideologies and terrorist threats in accordance with the European Union directive 2017/541 on the fight against terrorism and is meant as a useful contribution, within the wider public debate, to the harmonisation of member States’ discrepancies around what should be defined and treated as terrorism.
The Observatory mainly focuses on jihadism; however, we make sure to afford enough room and support for studies on other forms of terrorism, ideological radicalisation and social deviance, as well as “conspiracy theories” leading to violent outcomes.
In their assessments, the authors who submitted their work for this issue of #ReaCT2021 took into account the repercussions of new social and conflict dynamics brought about by COVID-19.
Due to other priorities, the pandemic seemed to have sidelined terrorism when, all of a sudden, October 2020 revived the threat which had apparently been overcome. From early September to early November, a successive chain of events clearly highlighted a dramatic and articulated scenario. Those sixty days of fear tell us that terrorism is now a “normal” rather than an ‘exceptional’ phenomenon, as an instrument of the ongoing conflict.
2019-2020: the evolution of European jihadist terrorism
In 2019 according to Europol there were 119 successful, failed or thwarted attacks: 56 of these were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist groups; 26 by extreme left radical and anarchist groups; 6 by far right groups; 24 were jihadist, of which 3 were successful and 4 unsuccessful. In the same year, START InSight’s database listed 19 jihadist actions / events (as compared to the 7 reported by Europol); in 2020, the number goes up to 25.
In 2019, jihadists were responsible for all deaths from terrorism in Europe: according to Europol, 10 people lost their lives and 26 were injured (1 person was injured in a far-right attack). START InSight recorded a higher number of people with injuries (48), who were mostly victims of marginal and emulative attacks. In 2020 there was a significant increase in deaths: 16 people were killed and 55 were injured.
The long wave of terrorism which hit Europe following the emergence of the “Islamic State” phenomenon recorded 146 jihadist attacks from 2014 to 2020: 188 terrorists took part in these attacks (59 among them died in action); 406 people lost their lives; 2,421 were injured (START InSight’s database).
Cases of recidivism are on the rise: 3 out of 10 in 2020. START InSight also spotted an increase in actions carried out by terrorists already known to European police forces or intelligence services: 54% of the total in 2020.
An increase in the number of irregular migrants heightens the potential risk of terrorism: 20% of terrorists are irregular immigrants. In France, the number of irregular immigrants involved in terrorist attacks is growing. Until 2017, no attack had seen the participation of irregular immigrants; in 2018, 15% of terrorists were irregular immigrants: in 2020, they reached 40%.
Islamic State and al-Qaeda online terrorist propaganda during the Covid-19 emergency
Propaganda activities carried out during the Covid-19 pandemic and the attacks which took place in Paris, Nice and Vienna, recall how dynamic terrorism associated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda remains, especially through the Internet. In particular, the Islamic State confirmed its aggressive narrative, identifying the Coronavirus as a “soldier of Allah”. An ally, set out to punish the “infidels”, above all the military and police forces.
The concepts and importance of preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE)
PVE and CVE gradually became an integral part of the global counter-terrorism architecture. In order to be long-term and effective, these policies and projects require a constant dialogue among researchers, practitioners, law enforcement agencies and legislators which also sets out priorities and expectations. Measuring the results of these activities remains a difficult task but several European think tanks are already bent on the issue.
Countering radicalisation and terrorism via criminal law: problems and perspectives
By its very nature, counterterrorism criminal law does not affect the causes of radicalisation and terrorism. An overarching and disproportionate resort to criminal law may even produce crime-inducing side effects: radicalisation shall be addressed as a reversible process. Counterterrorism criminal law in Europe is generally prison-based, even with regard to facts that arguably do not harm legal goods or interests.
The terror threat in the UK. The challenge: identify, define, arrest and convict
The complexity of the terror threat picture faced by the UK was recently highlighted through court cases which have frustrated the efforts of the security and intelligence forces. The cases that are now emerging are so disconnected from terrorist networks, are planning such random acts and the tools of terrorism are becoming so banal that it has become almost impossible to entirely shield yourself from the threat. But it has also become almost impossible to prove who might be going in this direction. This is creating a new generation of radicals that authorities struggle to identify, define, arrest and convict.
A look at the Balkan gate to Europe
The attack which took place in Vienna in November 2020 drew attention to the issue of terrorism in Europe, especially in the Balkan Area. It also focused such attention on jihadist presence in the Balkan countries, which could become a potential logistical hub for jihadism towards Europe.
Lessons learned from Kosovo’s experience in repatriating former foreign fighters: the small Western Balkan nation of Kosovo repatriated 110 citizens, including men, women, and children, in April 2019, making it one of a very small number of countries that has actively repatriated citizens involved with the Islamic State. The paper also includes what lessons can be learned by EU countries in handling the complex issue of how to manage the return of foreign fighters and their families.
The other terrorisms: far-right, extreme left and the new QAnon phenomenon in pandemic times
The pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus has also had significant effects on the relational and communicative strategies and methodologies typical of both far-right and extreme left-wing environments. Right-wing violent extremism, a phenomenon in expansion in the West, appears to be acquiring a transnational character and has an emerging symbiotic, mutually-reinforcing interdependent relationship with Islamist extremism. This interdependence poses additional threats to European security.
A threat to democracy is QAnon, a conspiracy theory movement active in more than 70 countries and that presents a high risk of radicalization in Europe. It should be closely monitored because of its potential for violent actions.
Thanks to all of the authors who contributed to this Report. My gratitude also goes to the two co-editors who have given their fundamental input: Chiara Sulmoni, President of START InSight, and Flavia Giacobbe, Director of Airpress and Formiche.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
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Pandemic, crisis, vaccines and recovery. The great spotlight of politics and public opinion have been fo-cused for months on the Covid-19 emergency. Yet, latent but concrete, other threats keep on pressing on Europe (and not only): terrorism, ji-hadist radicalism and different forms of extrem-ism. In early January, the as-sault on the U.S. Capitol shocked the world. An attack on the very heart of the star and stripes democracy that was thought unthink-able, perpetuated thanks to movements like the now well-known conspiracy organization QAnon. It shows how real the threat is and how much attention it de-serves, even now when other issues and other urgen-cies have climbed the ranks of public attention.
The killing of the French professor Samuel Paty and the recent attacks conducted in Nice and Wien, clearly show that the jihadist-inspired terrorism represents one of the most dangerous threat to Europe, notwithstanding the fall of the Caliphate.
The pandemic scenario that emerged with the spread of the Covid-19 epidemic has highlighted some challenges, which many companies will face in the coming years.
The concepts of preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE / CVE) gained prominence along with the growth of so-called homegrown radicalization and gradually became an integral part of the global anti-terrorism architecture, of which they represent the noncoercive side. The mobilisation of thousands of foreign fighters, sympathizers and would-be jihadists which unleashed a long string of attacks from 2015 onwards in Europe, pushed the two acronyms to the top of the agenda of international and regional organizations (such as the UN and the EU) and of individual countries alike. PVE and CVE developed into a proper professional field which today can rely on interdisciplinary, collaborative networks, the exchange of know-how among experts and, last but not least, substantial funding.
In my role as Executive Director of the ReaCT Observatory, I am honoured to introduce #ReaCT2021, 
