Trump’s strategy: pressuring Iran to target China.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The Trump administration has decided to intensify its maximum-pressure policy against Iran by directly targeting the country’s oil sector and related logistical infrastructure. Recent U.S. actions aim to significantly reduce Iranian oil exports, especially to China, thereby limiting Tehran’s ability to finance destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East. The State Department has imposed new sanctions on three companies involved in facilitating illicit transfers of Iranian oil through ship-to-ship (STS) naval operations conducted outside port limits in Southeast Asia. At the same time, three vessels involved in these activities have been identified and declared blocked properties.
These measures aim to interrupt the financial flows that enable Tehran to sustain its nuclear and missile programs and support regional terrorist groups. Simultaneously, the Treasury Department has directly targeted Iran’s Petroleum Minister, Mohsen Paknejad, a central figure in Iranian oil operations, accused of using national energy resources to support the regime’s illicit activities.
Several companies engaged in the transportation and sale of Iranian oil, particularly to China, have also been sanctioned. The sanctioned companies operated vessels registered in various countries, concealing the true origin of the transported oil by disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to evade international monitoring. Among these companies are PT. Bintang Samudra Utama (Bintang), Shipload Maritime Pte. Ltd., and PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama (Gianira), which respectively managed the vessels CELEBES, MALILI, and MARINA VISION. These ships were involved in a significant STS transfer operation of Iranian oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.
Analysts emphasize that this strategy reflects a well-established U.S. tactic aimed not only at cutting off Tehran’s primary economic resources but also at deterring third-party companies and countries from collaborating, directly or indirectly, with the Iranian regime. Such sanctions create a strong deterrent effect, raising costs and risks for international operators seeking to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Economically and strategically, this intensified pressure seeks to progressively eliminate Iran’s oil revenues, thereby weakening the regime’s ability to finance its conventional armed forces as well as affiliated militias and groups considered by Washington as primary sources of regional instability.
The escalation of sanctions is likely to heighten international tensions further. However, it underscores the Trump administration’s resolve to maintain its maximum-pressure policy, ultimately aiming to compel Iran to reassess its regional strategies and ambitions in nuclear and missile development.
Wagner rebooted
by Andrea Molle (AI-generated cover picture)
As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.
In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s
death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its
leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A
number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while
others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state
structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with
the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a
paramilitary extension of the Russian state.
Despite these changes, Wagner has retained
its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been
deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group
remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali,
and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource
extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian
state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with
greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous
financial independence.
The group’s activities in Ukraine have also
changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture
of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the
restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian
military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where
Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the
post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a
more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its
operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.
Relationship with the Russian Government The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.
The turning point in this relationship came
in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had
been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian
state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May
2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while
an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which
handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining
illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long
functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.
This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.
Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which
Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the
catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although
the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian
government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure,
forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While
some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units,
others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established
under state supervision.
However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.
Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.
As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct
Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD
and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence
service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian
military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions
aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s
financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations
while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner
financial autonomy.
In practical terms, this meant that Wagner
no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the
Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions
abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s
primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up
allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making
processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s
activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of
individual commanders.
The transformation of Wagner from a
semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its
role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a
“PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates
with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its
influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military
forces.
In Africa, Wagner has continued its
security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya,
often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements
in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with
access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen
its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative
to Western military assistance.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s
legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s
regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting
that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control
over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian
operations in Africa.
In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat
role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner
fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist
roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence
has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.
Current Operations The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.
In the CAR, Wagner operatives have
entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President
Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018,
initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has
since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries
have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including
the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking
to overthrow Touadéra.
Beyond military operations, Wagner has
established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold
and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to
operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back
to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global
operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient
in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR
government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting
government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of
the country’s defense infrastructure.
Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends
beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in
propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives
while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is
widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing
materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial
powers such as France.
Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.
Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta
continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable
alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services,
Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s
natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the
CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy,
fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country
from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the
only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.
Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are
part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in
Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as
a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure
valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s
involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging
Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating
strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic
arenas, such as the United Nations.
Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been
reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya,
and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of
Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death
of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence
in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the
direct supervision of the Russian government.
Leadership and Command Structure After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).
With the group now firmly under Kremlin
control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals
closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of
Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin,
were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances.
In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including
high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring
that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic
interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for
overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in
Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking
Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with
overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.
Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.
To replenish its ranks, Wagner has
reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel,
special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine,
Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded,
with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian
MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.
Armaments and Equipment Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.
In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has
retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting
vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower
for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units
have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones,
particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.
Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.
Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.
In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.
Strategic Outlook With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.
Additionally, there are reports that Moscow
is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller
PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow
Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s
expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.
Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes
in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully
state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian
military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most
infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned
with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.
With its new leadership, sustained
recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains
a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control,
Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader
military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa
and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging
Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.
In the coming months, Wagner is expected to
continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited
presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian
military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger
emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.
Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.
The restructuring of Wagner under the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the
Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military
forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often
pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the
Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to
state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s
foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as
Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.
With Wagner now firmly integrated into
state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and
its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian
military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to
dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to
paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with
official Russian military assets when necessary.
The continued deployment of Wagner forces
in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy.
By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as
the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand
its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing
access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with
critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable
alternative to Western security partnerships.
Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces
continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime,
and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing
conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its
peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated
into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains
available for future military engagements.
Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.
Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.
This approach would allow Moscow to retain
the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced
diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a
powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By
maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can
continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a
cost-effective and politically manageable way.
Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a
direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s
approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension
of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence,
secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic
importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an
essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will
remain a formidable force on the global stage.
The Philippines: A Geopolitical Linchpin in the Indo-Pacific and Italy’s Strategic Opportunity
by Andrea Molle.
The Philippines, long considered a crucial
geopolitical player in Southeast Asia, has increasingly found itself at the
center of the escalating competition between the United States and China. As
Beijing’s “eleven-dash line” advances the country’s assertive foreign policy in
the South China Sea and beyond, and Washington intensifies its Indo-Pacific
strategy, Manila is playing an outsized role in shaping regional security
dynamics.
For Italy, which has traditionally focused
its foreign policy on Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean, the evolving
Indo-Pacific landscape presents an opportunity to redefine its global
engagement via a more deliberate military and civilian presence in the
Philippines archipelago. The Philippines’ strategic location at the crossroads
of the Pacific and South China Sea makes it an invaluable ally for both
regional and global powers. Situated on key maritime trade routes, it serves as
a gateway between the Pacific and the economic heartlands of East Asia. More
importantly, the archipelago provides crucial logistical and military
advantages, particularly in countering China’s aggressive territorial expansion
in disputed waters and the threat to Taiwan.
Beijing’s expansive claims over the South
China Sea, including its militarization of artificial islands and the
interruption of several fishing routes, have directly challenged Philippine
sovereignty. Despite an international tribunal ruling in 2016 that invalidated
China’s claims, Beijing continues to push its interests aggressively. In
response, Manila has sought to reinforce its defense ties with Washington,
reopening strategic bases to U.S. forces and deepening its security cooperation
with regional partners such as Japan and Australia. The Philippines has actively participated in
a series of international naval drills with countries including the United
States, Australia, Japan, and France. These exercises, conducted within the
Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, aim to enhance defense coordination and
interoperability. China has expressed objections to these activities, viewing
them as destabilizing. Manila also signed a defense agreement with Canada to
bolster joint military exercises.
This move aligns with the Philippines’
strategy to strengthen defense partnerships amid rising tensions in the South
China Sea. At the same time, the Philippines faces a delicate balancing act.
While it values U.S. security guarantees, its economic interdependence with
China complicates the equation. Beijing remains a key trade partner, a major
source of investment, and an influential actor in the region’s economic
architecture. This tension between security and economic interests highlights
the broader struggle many Southeast Asian nations face in navigating the
U.S.-China rivalry. While the Philippines is enhancing its defense
collaborations with the U.S. and other allies, it continues to engage
diplomatically with China. For instance, during a recent meeting with
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
expressed gratitude for Cambodia’s pardon of 13 Filipino women, highlighting
the Philippines’ efforts to maintain positive relations within the region. Washington’s
renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, particularly through initiatives like AUKUS,
the Quad, and enhanced security cooperation with ASEAN countries, aims to
counterbalance China’s rising influence.
For the United States, the Philippines
represents a critical anchor in its regional security framework. The Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between Manila and Washington facilitates
American access to key military installations, ensuring a forward presence that
can deter Chinese encroachments and enhance maritime security. Additionally,
the growing U.S. military footprint in the region serves as a deterrent against
any potential escalation in Taiwan—a key flashpoint in U.S.-China tensions. The
Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan makes it a vital logistical hub should
conflict arise, further solidifying its importance in Washington’s strategic
calculus.
But what about Italy? Italy, as a key
European power, has traditionally maintained a limited presence in the
Indo-Pacific. However, given the increasing global significance of the region
and the close ties currently defining its relationship with Washington, Rome
should reassess its strategic engagement. However, while France and the UK have
already enhanced their naval and economic involvement in the Indo-Pacific,
Italy has yet to fully articulate its role. Italy’s economic interests align
with a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The region is a critical market for
Italian exports, including defense technology, maritime equipment, and
infrastructure development. Strengthening economic and security ties with the
Philippines could provide a strategic gateway for broader engagement in ASEAN,
where Italy holds observer status. On the security front, Italy could enhance
naval cooperation with the Philippines by participating in joint maritime
exercises, providing coast guard training, and supporting regional efforts to
maintain freedom of navigation. Italy’s advanced defense industry could also
contribute to modernizing the Philippines’ military capabilities.
Diplomatically, Italy should leverage its
EU partnerships to push for a more coherent European Indo-Pacific strategy,
ensuring that Europe remains a relevant player in the region’s geopolitical
balance. Supporting ASEAN-led security mechanisms and advocating for adherence
to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), would further cement Italy’s role as a constructive actor. In
conclusion, the Philippines’ geopolitical significance in the Indo-Pacific is
undeniable. As the U.S. pivots to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness,
Manila finds itself at the heart of a strategic competition that will shape the
future of global order. For Italy, engaging more proactively in the
Indo-Pacific—particularly through stronger ties with the Philippines—represents
an opportunity to diversify its foreign policy and assert itself as a relevant
player in one of the world’s most dynamic regions.
By deepening economic, security, and diplomatic
ties, Italy can contribute to a more stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific while
expanding its own strategic footprint in an increasingly multipolar world.
MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
Abstract
The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information—summarized under the acronym MDHM (misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech)—represents one of the most critical challenges of the digital age, with profound consequences for social cohesion, political stability, and global security. This study examines the distinctive characteristics of each phenomenon and their interconnected impact, highlighting how they contribute to the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and political instability. Artificial intelligence emerges as a crucial resource for combating MDHM, offering advanced tools for detecting manipulated content and monitoring disinformation networks. However, the same technology also fuels new threats, such as the creation of deepfakes and the generation of automated content that amplifies the reach and sophistication of disinformation. This paradox underscores the need for the ethical and strategic use of emerging technologies. The study proposes a multidimensional approach to addressing MDHM, structured around three main pillars: critical education, with school programs and public campaigns to enhance media literacy; regulation of digital platforms, aimed at balancing the removal of harmful content with the protection of freedom of expression; and global collaboration, ensuring a coordinated response to a transnational threat. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the importance of concerted efforts among governments, technology companies, and civil society to mitigate the destabilizing effects of MDHM and safeguard democracy, security, and trust in information
The spread of false,
misleading, or manipulated information is one of the most complex and dangerous
challenges of the digital age, with significant repercussions on social, political,
and cultural balance. The phenomena known as misinformation, disinformation,
malinformation, and hate speech—collectively summarized under the acronym
MDHM—represent distinct yet closely interconnected manifestations of this
issue. A thorough understanding of their specificities is essential for
developing effective strategies to contain and counter the threats these
phenomena pose to social cohesion and institutional stability.
Definitions and Distinctions
Misinformation: False information shared without the intent to cause harm. For example,
the unintentional sharing of unverified news on social media.
Disinformation: Information deliberately created to deceive, harm, or manipulate
individuals, social groups, organizations, or nations. An example would be the
intentional dissemination of false news to influence public opinion or
destabilize institutions.
Malinformation: Information based on factual content but used out of context to mislead,
cause harm, or manipulate. For instance, the release of personal data with the
intent to damage someone’s reputation.
Hate
Speech: Expressions that incite
hatred against individuals or groups based on characteristics such as race,
religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.
Impact on Society
The spread of misinformation,
disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech poses a critical challenge to
the stability of modern societies. These phenomena, amplified by the speed and
global reach of digital media, have significant consequences that manifest
across various social, political, and cultural domains. Among the most notable
effects are the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and
heightened security threats.
Erosion of Trust
False or manipulated
information directly undermines the credibility of public institutions, the
media, and even the scientific community. When individuals are inundated with a
constant flow of contradictory or blatantly false news, the inevitable result
is a widespread crisis of trust. No source is spared from suspicion—not even
the most authoritative journalists or the most transparent government bodies.
This process weakens the very foundations of society, fostering a climate of
uncertainty that, over time, can turn into alienation.
A striking example can be
observed in the democratic process, where disinformation strikes with
particular intensity. Manipulative campaigns spreading falsehoods about voting
procedures or candidates have a devastating effect on electoral integrity. This
not only fuels suspicion and distrust in democratic institutions but also
creates a sense of disillusionment among citizens, further alienating them from
active participation.
The consequences become even
more evident in the management of global crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic,
the wave of conspiracy theories and the dissemination of unverified remedies
significantly hindered public health efforts. Disinformation fueled unfounded
fears and skepticism toward vaccines, slowing the global response to the crisis
and exacerbating the virus’s spread.
However, this erosion of trust
extends beyond the individual level. Its repercussions impact society as a
whole, fragmenting it. Social bonds, already weakened by preexisting divisions,
become even more vulnerable to manipulation. This creates fertile ground for
further conflicts and instability, isolating institutions and increasing the
risk of a society unable to respond to collective challenges.
Social Polarization
Disinformation campaigns
thrive on exploiting existing societal divisions, amplifying them with the aim
of making them insurmountable. These phenomena, driven by targeted strategies
and enhanced by digital platforms, intensify social conflict and undermine the
possibility of dialogue, paving the way for ever-deepening polarization.
The amplification of divisions
is perhaps the most visible result of disinformation. Information manipulation
is used to radicalize political, cultural, or religious opinions, constructing
narratives of opposition between “us” and “them.” In
contexts of ethnic tensions, for example, malinformation—spread with the intent
to distort historical events or exploit current political issues—exacerbates
perceived differences between social groups. These existing contrasts are
magnified until they crystallize into identity conflicts that are difficult to
resolve.
Adding to this is the effect
of so-called “information bubbles” created by digital platform
algorithms. These systems, designed to maximize user engagement, present
content that reinforces their preexisting opinions, limiting exposure to
alternative perspectives. This phenomenon, known as the “filter
bubble,” not only entrenches biases but isolates individuals within a
media reality that thrives on continuous confirmation, hindering the
understanding of differing viewpoints.
The polarization fueled by
MDHM extends beyond ideology. In many cases, the radicalization of opinions
translates into concrete actions: protests, clashes between groups, and, in
extreme cases, armed conflicts. Civil wars and social crises are often the
culmination of a spiral of division originating from divisive narratives
disseminated through disinformation and hate speech.
Ultimately, the polarization
generated by MDHM not only undermines social dialogue but also erodes the
foundations of collective cohesion. In such a context, finding shared solutions
to common problems becomes impossible. What remains is a climate of perpetual
conflict, where “us versus them” replaces any attempt at
collaboration, making society more fragile and vulnerable.
Threat to Security
In conflict contexts, MDHM
emerges as a powerful and dangerous weapon, capable of destabilizing societies
and institutions with devastating implications for both collective and
individual security. Disinformation, coupled with hate speech, fuels a cycle of
violence and political instability, threatening peace and compromising human
rights. Concrete examples of how these dynamics unfold not only illustrate the
severity of the problem but also highlight the urgency for effective responses.
Propaganda
and Destabilization.One of the
most insidious uses of disinformation is propaganda and destabilization. States
and non-state actors exploit these practices as tools of hybrid warfare, aimed
at undermining the morale of opposing populations and fomenting internal
divisions. In recent geopolitical scenarios, the spread of false information
has generated confusion and panic, slowing institutional response capabilities.
This planned and systematic strategy goes beyond disorienting public opinion;
it strikes at the very heart of social cohesion.
Hate
Speech as a Precursor to Violence.Hate speech, amplified by digital platforms, often serves as a precursor to
mass violence. A tragic example is the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, preceded
by an online hate campaign that progressively dehumanized this ethnic minority,
laying the groundwork for persecution and massacres. These episodes demonstrate
how entrenched hate speech can translate into systematic violent actions, with
irreparable consequences for the communities involved.
Individual
Impacts.On an individual level, the
effects of MDHM are deeply destructive. Phenomena such as doxxing—the public
release of personal information with malicious intent—directly endanger the
physical and psychological safety of victims. This type of attack not only
exposes individuals to threats and assaults but also amplifies a sense of
vulnerability that extends far beyond the incident itself, undermining trust in
the system as a whole.
The cumulative impact of these
dynamics undermines overall social stability, creating deep fractures that
demand immediate and coordinated responses. Addressing MDHM is not merely a
matter of defending against disinformation but an essential step in preserving
peace, protecting human rights, and ensuring global security in an increasingly
interconnected and vulnerable world.
Mitigation Strategies
Combating the MDHM phenomenon
requires a comprehensive and coordinated response capable of addressing its multifaceted
nature. Given the complex and devastating impact these phenomena have on
society, mitigation strategies must be developed with a multidimensional
approach, combining education, collaboration among various stakeholders, and an
appropriate regulatory framework.
Education and
Awareness
The first and most effective
line of defense against MDHM lies in education and the promotion of widespread
media literacy. In a global context where information circulates at
unprecedented speeds and often without adequate oversight, the ability of
citizens to identify and critically analyze the content they consume becomes an
essential skill. Only through increased awareness can the negative effects of
disinformation be curbed and a more resilient society built.
Critical thinking is the
foundation of this strategy. Citizens must be empowered to distinguish reliable
information from false or manipulated content. This process requires the
adoption of educational tools that teach how to verify sources, identify signs of
manipulation, and analyze the context of news. This effort goes beyond simple
training: it is about fostering a culture of verification and constructive
skepticism—essential elements in countering informational manipulation.
Schools play a crucial role in
this battle. They must become the primary setting for teaching media literacy,
preparing new generations to navigate the complex digital landscape
conscientiously. Integrating these teachings into educational curricula is no
longer optional but essential. Through practical workshops, real-case analysis,
and simulations, young people can develop the skills needed to recognize
manipulated content and understand the implications of spreading false
information.
However, education must not be
limited to young people. Adults, who are often more exposed and vulnerable to
disinformation, must also be engaged through public awareness campaigns. These
initiatives, delivered through both traditional and digital media, should
highlight the most common techniques used to spread false content and emphasize
the societal consequences of these phenomena. An informed citizen, aware of the
risks and able to recognize them, becomes a powerful asset in the fight against
disinformation.
Investing in education and
awareness is not just a preventive measure but a cornerstone in combating MDHM.
A population equipped with critical tools is less susceptible to manipulation,
thereby helping to strengthen social cohesion and the stability of democratic
institutions. This path, though requiring constant and coordinated effort,
represents one of the most effective responses to one of the most insidious
threats of our time.
Cross-Sector
Collaboration
The complexity of the MDHM
phenomenon is such that no single actor can effectively address it alone. It is
a global challenge requiring a collective and coordinated response in which
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), tech companies, and civil
society collaborate to develop shared strategies. Only through synergistic
efforts can the destabilizing effects of this threat be mitigated.
Government institutions must
take a leading role. Governments are tasked with creating effective regulations
and safe environments for the exchange of information, ensuring that these
measures balance two fundamental aspects: combating harmful content and
protecting freedom of expression. Excessive control risks veering into
censorship, undermining the democratic principles being safeguarded. The
approach must be transparent, targeted, and adaptable to the evolution of
technologies and disinformation dynamics.
Tech companies, particularly
social media platforms, play a central role in this challenge. They bear significant
responsibility in countering MDHM, as they are the primary channels through
which these dynamics propagate. They must invest in developing advanced
algorithms capable of identifying and removing harmful content promptly and
effectively. However, the effectiveness of interventions must not come at the
expense of users’ freedom of expression. Transparency in moderation criteria,
data management, and reporting mechanisms is essential to maintain user trust
and prevent abuse.
Alongside these actors, NGOs
and civil society serve as intermediaries. NGOs can act as a bridge between
institutions and citizens by providing verified and reliable information,
monitoring disinformation phenomena, and promoting awareness initiatives. These
organizations also have the capacity to operate locally, better understanding
the specific dynamics of certain communities and tailoring counter-strategies
to their needs.
Lastly, fostering
public-private partnerships is essential. Collaboration between the public and
private sectors is crucial for sharing resources, knowledge, and technological
tools to combat MDHM. Companies can offer innovative solutions, while
governments can provide the regulatory framework and support needed to
implement them. This synergy allows disinformation to be addressed with a
broader and more integrated approach, combining technical expertise with
monitoring and intervention capabilities.
The response to MDHM cannot be
fragmented or limited to a single sector. Only through cross-sectoral and
global collaboration can the consequences of these phenomena be mitigated,
protecting institutions, citizens, and society as a whole.
Role of
Advanced Technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Context of MDHM
Emerging technologies,
particularly artificial intelligence (AI), play a crucial role in the context
of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech. AI
represents a double-edged sword: on one hand, it offers powerful tools to
identify and combat the spread of harmful content; on the other, it fuels new
threats, making disinformation tools more sophisticated and harder to detect.
Automatic Detection
Artificial intelligence has
revolutionized the way we address disinformation, introducing advanced
detection systems capable of quickly identifying false or harmful content. In a
digital landscape where the volume of data generated daily is immense, human
monitoring alone is no longer sufficient. AI-powered tools are therefore
essential for managing this complexity, providing timely and precise responses.
Among the most significant
innovations are machine learning algorithms, which form the core of automatic
detection systems. These algorithms use machine learning techniques to analyze
vast amounts of data, looking for patterns that indicate the presence of
manipulated or false content. Trained on datasets containing examples of
previously identified disinformation, these systems can recognize common
features such as sensationalist headlines, emotionally charged language, or
altered images. The effectiveness of these tools lies in their ability to adapt
to new manipulation patterns, continually improving their performance.
Another critical area is
source verification. AI-based tools can compare online information with
reliable sources, identifying discrepancies and facilitating the work of
fact-checkers. This accelerates verification processes, enabling more efficient
counteraction against false content before it reaches a wide audience.
AI is also pivotal in tackling
one of the most sophisticated threats: deepfakes, which will be discussed
further below. Using advanced techniques, AI can analyze manipulated videos and
images, detecting anomalies in facial movements, lip synchronization, or
overall visual quality. Companies like Adobe and Microsoft are developing tools
dedicated to verifying the authenticity of visual content, providing a concrete
response to a technology easily exploited for malicious purposes.
Monitoring hate speech is another
area where AI proves valuable. Through natural language processing (NLP)
algorithms, texts can be analyzed in real time to identify expressions of hate
speech. These systems not only categorize content but also prioritize
interventions, ensuring rapid and effective responses to the most severe cases.
In a context where hate speech can quickly escalate into real-world violence,
the ability to intervene promptly is crucial.
Lastly, AI can detect and
analyze disinformation networks. By examining social interactions, AI can
identify patterns suggesting coordinated campaigns, such as the simultaneous
dissemination of similar messages by linked accounts. This functionality is
particularly useful for exposing orchestrated operations, whether political or
social, aimed at destabilizing public trust or manipulating opinions.
In summary, artificial
intelligence is an indispensable tool for addressing disinformation and hate
speech. However, like any technology, it requires ethical and responsible use.
Only through transparent and targeted implementation can the full potential of
AI be harnessed to protect the integrity of information and social cohesion.
Content Generation
While artificial intelligence
is a valuable resource for countering disinformation, it also contributes to
making the MDHM phenomenon even more dangerous by providing tools for creating
false and manipulated content with unprecedented levels of sophistication. This
dual nature makes AI both a powerful and insidious technology.
A prime example is the
aforementioned deepfakes, generated using technologies based on generative
adversarial networks (GANs). These tools enable the creation of highly
realistic videos and images in which individuals appear to say or do things
that never occurred. Deepfakes severely undermine trust in visual information,
which was once considered tangible evidence of reality. Their use extends
beyond trust issues: they can be deployed for defamation campaigns, public
opinion manipulation, or destabilization in already fragile political contexts.
The ability to create alternative visual realities poses a direct threat to the
credibility of visual sources and social cohesion.
Similarly, automatically
generated texts from advanced language models, such as GPT, have opened new frontiers
in disinformation. These systems can produce articles, comments, and social
media posts that appear entirely authentic, making it extremely difficult to
distinguish machine-generated content from that created by real individuals.
Unsurprisingly, these tools are already being used to power botnets—automated
networks that spread polarizing or entirely false narratives, often aiming to
manipulate opinions and fuel social conflicts.
Another crucial aspect is the
scalability of disinformation. AI-driven automation allows for the creation and
dissemination of false content on a massive scale, exponentially amplifying its
impact. For instance, a single malicious actor can use these tools to generate
thousands of variations of a false message, further complicating detection
efforts. In mere moments, manipulated content can be disseminated globally,
reaching millions of people before any intervention is possible.
Finally, AI provides tools for
content obfuscation, making manipulated messages even harder to detect.
Advanced algorithms can make minor but strategic modifications to texts or
images, bypassing traditional monitoring systems. This adaptability poses an
ongoing challenge for developers of countermeasures, who must continually
update their tools to keep pace with new manipulation techniques.
In conclusion, artificial
intelligence, with its ability to generate highly sophisticated content,
represents a double-edged sword in the MDHM landscape. Without proper
regulation and ethical use, it risks accelerating the spread of disinformation,
further eroding public trust in information and destabilizing society.
Addressing this threat requires awareness and appropriate tools, combining
technological innovation with ethical principles to limit the effects of this
dangerous evolution.
Challenges
and Opportunities
The use of artificial
intelligence in the fight against MDHM represents one of the most promising yet
complex frontiers of the digital era. While AI offers extraordinary
opportunities to counter the spread of harmful information, it also presents
significant challenges, underscoring the need for an ethical and strategic
approach.
Opportunities Offered
by AI
Among its most relevant
advantages is AI’s ability to analyze data in real time. This capability makes
it possible to anticipate disinformation campaigns by identifying signals
before they spread on a large scale. Such proactive measures can reduce the
impact of these phenomena by enabling timely interventions to mitigate damage.
Another key advantage is the
use of advanced tools to certify the authenticity of content. Technologies
developed by leading organizations allow verification of the origin and
integrity of digital data, restoring trust among users. In a context where
visual and textual manipulation is increasingly sophisticated, these solutions
serve as an essential bulwark against informational chaos.
AI also streamlines
fact-checking activities. Automating verification processes reduces the
workload on human operators, accelerating responses to the spread of false
content. This not only enhances efficiency but also allows human resources to
focus on particularly complex or sensitive cases.
Challenges of AI in
Combating MDHM
However, the same technologies
that offer these opportunities can also be exploited for malicious purposes.
Tools designed to combat disinformation can be manipulated to increase the
sophistication of attacks, creating content that is even harder to detect. This
paradox highlights the importance of rigorous oversight and responsible use of
these technologies.
The difficulty in
distinguishing between authentic and manipulated content is another critical
challenge. As disinformation techniques evolve, algorithms must be continuously
updated to remain effective. This requires not only technological investments
but also ongoing collaboration among experts from various fields.
Finally, the inherent biases
in AI models cannot be overlooked. Poorly designed algorithms or those trained
on unrepresentative datasets risk removing legitimate content or failing to
detect certain forms of disinformation. Such errors not only compromise the
effectiveness of operations but can also undermine trust in the system itself.
Conclusions
Artificial intelligence is a
strategic resource in the fight against misinformation, disinformation,
malinformation, and hate speech, but it also presents a complex challenge. Its
ambivalence as both a defensive and offensive tool demands conscious and
responsible use. On one hand, it offers innovative solutions to detect and
counter manipulated content; on the other, it enables the creation of
increasingly sophisticated disinformation, amplifying risks to social and
institutional stability.
MDHM (Misinformation,
Disinformation, Hate Speech, and Malinformation) is not an isolated or
temporary phenomenon but a systemic threat undermining the foundations of
social cohesion and global security. Its proliferation fuels a vicious cycle
where the erosion of trust, social polarization, and security threats reinforce
each other. When disinformation contaminates the flow of information, trust in
institutions, the media, and even science crumbles. This phenomenon not only
fosters alienation and uncertainty but also diminishes citizens’ ability to
actively participate in democratic life.
Social polarization, amplified by
information manipulation, is a direct consequence of this dynamic. Divisive
narratives and polarizing content, driven by algorithms prioritizing engagement
over accuracy, fragment the social fabric and make dialogue impossible. In a
“us versus them” climate, political, cultural, and ethnic divisions
become insurmountable barriers.
From a security perspective, MDHM
represents a global threat. Disinformation campaigns orchestrated by states or
non-state actors destabilize entire regions, incite violence, and fuel armed
conflicts. The use of hate speech as a dehumanizing tool has demonstrated its
destructive potential in various contexts, contributing to a climate of
collective and individual vulnerability.
Addressing this challenge requires
an integrated approach that combines education, regulation, and global
cooperation.
Promoting critical education: Media
literacy must be a priority. Educating citizens to recognize and counter
disinformation is the first step toward building a resilient society.
Educational programs and awareness campaigns should equip people with the tools
needed to navigate the complex informational landscape.
Strengthening the regulation of
digital platforms: Technology companies can no longer remain passive observers.
Clear and transparent standards for managing harmful content are essential,
while also ensuring respect for freedom of expression. Independent oversight
can ensure a balance between security and fundamental rights.
Encouraging global collaboration:
The transnational nature of MDHM requires a coordinated response. Governments,
private companies, and international organizations must work together to share
resources, develop innovative technologies, and combat disinformation campaigns
on a global scale.
Only through concerted action can
the devastating effects of MDHM be mitigated, paving the way for a more
resilient and informed society. The future of democracy, social cohesion, and
security depends on our collective ability to face this threat with
determination, foresight, and responsibility.
Weaponizing Chaos: Exploring Militant Accelerationism from the Far-Left to the Far-Right
By Andrea Molle, Associate Professor, Chapman University
Abstract Militant accelerationism is defined by the Accelerationism Research Consortium as a set of strategies aimed at exacerbating social divisions to hasten the collapse of society, often through violent means. This phenomenon is not confined to a single poli-tical ideology, being present in both the far-right and far-left, though manifesting in different forms. Far-right accelerationism primarily opposes equality, viewing it as a threat to the natural social order, and seeks to precipitate the collapse of liberal de-mocracies through polarization and political violence. From a geopolitical perspective, nations like Russia and China might support such movements to destabilize the West and undermine the legitimacy of the liberal democratic model, thereby reinfor-cing their authoritarian positions. On the other hand, far-left accelerationism originates from Marxism, aiming to accelerate the downfall of capitalism to trigger a proletarian revolution. These dynamics represent a growing threat to international security, as they exploit internal tensions and social divisions to promote global instability.
The Accelerationism Research Consortium, a research initiative specializing in the study of militant accelerationism, defines it as a collection of tactics and strategies aimed at intensifying latent social divisions, often through violent means, in order to expedite the collapse of society. Accelerationism does not necessarily align with a specific political ideology and can be observed on both the extreme left and extreme right of the political spectrum. However, there are distinctions between the two.
For instance, far-right militant accelerationism does not concern itself with critiquing modern capitalism or postcolonialism, but rather focuses on countering the contemporary pursuit of equality, which is perceived as a manifestation of societal decay and a threat to the established social order based on inequality, which is considered the “natural order.” In order to safeguard or reinstate this “natural order,” far-right militant accelerationism seeks to create circumstances that would lead to the downfall of the existing liberal and democratic system, such as through a “race war” or a civil war. Militant accelerationism functions as a platform for political action with the objective of hastening the downfall of liberal and capitalist societies. Its core strategy involves disseminating contradictory and problematic political ideologies through various means, such as promoting polarization or engaging in political violence. This form of terrorism aims to create social emergencies and crises, ultimately incapacitating and dismantling social institutions.
From an International Relations and Security Studies perspective it is noticeable that this goal aligns with the objectives of hostile nations. Russia and China, for example, may support militant accelerationism regardless of its political ideology alignment in the West for several strategic reasons. Firstly, fostering chaos and division within Western nations serves to undermine their stability and global influence, thereby potentially strengthening the position of Russia and China on the world stage. By exacerbating existing societal tensions and polarizations, these countries can create distrac-tions for Western governments, diverting their attention and resources away from global issues such as Ukraine or Taiwan. Secondly, supporting accelerationist groups aligns with Russia and China’s broader objectives of challenging the Western liberal democratic model. By promoting extremist ideologies that reject democratic norms and institutions, such as militant accelerationism, these countries seek to delegitimize Western values and weaken the appeal of democracy as a political system globally. This tactic can help bolster the perceived legitimacy of authoritarian regimes like those in Russia and China, presenting them as stable alternatives to Western democracies. Moreover, fostering internal strife in Western countries can serve as a form of retaliation or deterrence against perceived Western interference in the domestic affairs of Russia and China. By supporting militant accelerationism, these countries can retaliate against Western sanctions, criticisms of human rights abuses, or support for opposition movements within Russia and China. Additionally, by highlighting the internal divisions and societal unrest in Western nations, Russia and China can dissuade Western governments from intervening in their domestic affairs or pursuing aggressive foreign policies against them.
1. Far-left militant accelerationism Accelerationism, as a concept, originated from Marxism and the belief that by intensifying the detrimental forces within capitalism, its eventual destruction and subsequent liberation through revolution can be achieved. Left-wing terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. They may also advocate for environmental or animal rights, hold pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs, or support decentralized social and political systems like anarchism. In terms of incidents, the number of fatal incidents attributed to far-left ideologies is fluctuating. The global peak of revolutionary accelerationist leftist violence occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. However, until 2012, there were still four times as many far-left terrorist incidents compared to far-right incidents. In recent years, particularly in 2019 and 2020, the number of far-right and far-left incidents has been roughly equal. As per more recent times, the situation has started to differ between Europe and the United States. In Europe, far-left attacks started again to be more prevalent. German organizations such as the Engel – Guntermann and the Hammerbande have a clear focus on targeting right-wing extremists or individuals perceived as such. However, there is a noticeable shift in their approach, as they are increasingly engaging in activities that extend beyond local conflicts with the right-wing extremist milieu. The collaboration between group members and non-Germans in carrying out attacks suggests a growing connection to external groups. This interconnectedness among left-wing extremist networks in Europe has the potential to influence their strategies and the specific targets they choose.
In the United States, according to the Anti-Defamation League, only 6% of the 443 registered extremist fatalities between 2012 and 2021 were linked to far-left ideologies. In comparison, 75% were linked to far-right beliefs, and 20% were linked to Islamist beliefs. It is important to note that all the casualties related to far-left ideologies in the US were associated with Black nationalism, which the ADL categorizes as left-wing extremism. Overall, the violent threat posed by left-wing extremists in the US remains relatively small whereas in Europe it is increasing. The trend has been confirmed by several authorities. For example, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) report in 2022 that 80% of the successfully executed attacks were carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups.
Globally, movements affiliated with far-left ideologies include Antifa groups, as well as environmental or animal issue groups like the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front. There are also various far-left alternative media outlets, such as The Grayzone or Breakthrough News, and organizations like the Party for Socialism and Liberation or Workers World Party. These entities may occasionally express sympathy towards authoritarian regimes perceived as hostile to the West and embrace conspiracy theories. While these platforms may not overtly endorse violence, their content and campaigns actively advocate for authoritarian ideologies within mainstream audiences, thereby eroding the credibility of human rights and democracy advocates and promoting polarization. The Grayzone, a far-left media outlet, exemplifies this concerning trend. Established in 2015 by journalist Max Blumenthal shortly after a trip to Moscow, this media platform consistently adopts an ostensibly anti-imperialist stance, frequently defending Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, and Venezuela’s Maduro for their purported resistance against US dominance. Furthermore, it denies the occurrence of the Uyghur genocide and chemical gas attacks in Syria. Blumenthal himself has participated in anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine rallies, and currently plays a highly active role in the Pro-Hamas/Pro-Palestinian movement, which poses a significant and alarming new challenge to national security.
1.1. The use of Internet by far-left militant accelerationism The exploration of the online far-left culture is a topic that is often overlooked. This particular faction, which exists on the fringes of the broader left, positions itself as being against various ideologies and groups such as the alt-right, political correctness, social justice warriors, and centrists and liberal-democratic stances. Despite its ideological roots and the tendency of the left to look down on popular online culture, it employs similar tactics to the online alt-right, including the use of humor, memes, Twitter trolling, and open hostility. However, it remains firmly rooted in progressive leftist ideology. Referred to by various names such as the “alt-left,” the “vulgar left,” or the “Dirtbag Left,” this origin of this movement is attributed to Amber A’Lee Frost, a writer, podcaster, and activist based in Brooklyn. Her podcast Chapo Trap House, associated closely with this movement, employs comedy and irony in a shock jock style, while also criticizing both the Democratic and Republican parties. Other media outlets and individuals connected to the dirtbag left include TrueAnon and Red Scare, which are also loosely associated with the BlueAnon movement, a leftist counterpart to the well-known QAnon phenomenon.
2. Far-right militant accelerationism Initially, militant accelerationism was not primarily associated with far-right extremism. However, it gradually found its way into this milieu through two significant avenues. Firstly, in the 1990s, British philosopher Nick Land developed a right-leaning libertarian version of accelerationism after studying the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on left-wing accelerationism and incorporating his own interpretation of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Two decades later, during the early 2010s, Land’s ideas gained traction among the emerging “alt-right” movement, which became deeply interested in his anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic concept of “neo-reaction.” The second and most influ-ential pathway through which accelerationism infiltrated the far-right was the publication of the book Siege, which compiled newsletter posts written by American neo-Nazi James Mason. Mason, a follower of Charles Mason, has been involved in various neo-Nazi organizations in the United States since the late 1960s. He had personal connections with prominent far-right leaders, including George Lincoln Rockwell, the leader of the American Nazi Party, and William Pierce, the author of the novel The Turner Diaries, which inspired the 1995 terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. Mason was also influenced by Joseph Tommasi, the leader of the National Socialist Liberation Front, a group inspired by leftist organizations and urban guerrilla warfare. Tommasi advocated for the creation of chaos through terrorism as a means to destabilize the political order in the United States.
Mason created the newsletter Siege, published from 1980 to 1986, as a platform to express his disapproval of the stance taken by American far-right extremism. Within the pages of his publication, he incorporated elements of antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories, specifically focusing on a “Jewish world conspiracy” that aimed to execute a “white genocide.” This concept, now labeled as the “Great Replacement,” contributed to the development of the “deep state” myth, spawning the bipartisan trope of a “Zionist Occupied Government” in America. In his book, Mason also argued that the prevailing social order had become so deeply corrupted that established organizations like the American Nazi Party, with their conventional methods of political engagement, had become ineffective in their pursuit of liberating the “white race.” According to Mason, progress could only be achieved through revolutionary, violent, means carried out by individuals and the estab-lishment of a National Socialist “New Order” would require the destruction of society. Far-right militant ac-celerationism, as a subtype of apocalyptic terrorism, draws heavily on antisemitic tropes, including concepts like “white genocide” and the “Great Replacement Theory. Moreover, it leverages perceived traditional knowledge and cultural codes to rationalize their anti-modern beliefs and to target individuals they hold responsible for societal decay. Consequently, accelerationism can be viewed as a quasi-religion, as evidenced by its resemblances and intermingling with groups like the Branch Davidians, whose eschatology mirrors similar dynamics.
Screenshot from a PBS documentary aired on August 7th, 2018
2.1. The use of Internet by far-right militant accelerationism In the United States, adherents of far-right ideologies recognized the potential of the internet as early as the 1980s. They understood that online platforms offered an unparalleled opportunity to disseminate their message to a broader audience without the constraints imposed by traditional media. Notably, David Duke, a prominent figure in the US far-right extremist movement and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, lauded the internet as an ideal platform for a “white revolution.” The advent of online communication played a significant role in the rise of Siege, particularly during the mid-2010s when the “alt-right” gained prominence. This movement embraced militant action strategies, which were further amplified in the aftermath of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, USA, in August 2017. The events surrounding the rally, including the tragic killing of counter-protestor Heather Heyer, sparked intense debates within the American far-right extremist community. Mason’s critique of demonstrations and his advocacy for militant accelerationism resonated widely within these discussions. Consequently, following the Charlottesville events, the hashtag #ReadSiege gained traction both domestically and within the transnational far-right online discourse.
As today, the risk associated with militant accelerationism is primarily monitored in North America, with only a limited number of European analysts actively keeping tabs on its activities. The globalization of far-right militant accelerationism during the 2010s has given rise to various trajectories, all closely intertwined with digital spaces, which should raise concerns. One prominent platform for far-right militant accelerationism was the English-language Iron March, which operated from 2011 to 2017 and served as a breeding ground for accelerationist groups. This forum attracted a diverse range of militant far-right extremists who felt marginalized by other far-right internet forums like Stormfront, established in 1996, or were dissatisfied with the offerings of existing far-right organizations targeted at the youth. Within the Iron March forum, members cultivated their own subculture of far-right militant accelerationism, characterized by key texts and a distinct aesthetic featuring logos inspired by Waffen SS symbols and black and white skull masks. The administrators of Iron March actively encouraged transnational online communication and facilitated regional and local networking among members beyond the confines of the digital realm. Notably, a far-right extremist terrorist network emerged among the users of Iron March, which remains active to this day. Iron March’s influence extended beyond the development of its far-right extremist subculture, as it placed significant emphasis on taking action. Consequently, several accelerationist groups, including National Action (UK), Feuerkrieg Division (USA), and Antipodean Resistance (2016), were established as offshoots of this forum. It is also important to recognize that Iron March merely marked the beginning of this phenomenon.
3. The manosphere Despite a general decline in public activities among far-right militant accelerationists during the COVID-19 pandemic, their digital efforts have significantly increased since the spring of 2022. Consequently, the number of prevented attacks has also risen. The primary trends that originated within these tightly knit online communities during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s remain relevant within the global social network they have evolved into. Notably, new online spaces continuously emerge, often bearing little resemblance to formal, traditional far-right extremist organizations. These decentralized networks, organized in cells, foster sub-cultures defined by their cultural codes, such as memes, and constantly adapt to enhance their relevance in the public sphere. They have now permeated other online realms, including gaming platforms, and rely on the broader internet troll culture. They propagate through the manosphere, a collection of communities centered around radical anti-feminism and the conspiracy theory milieu, where individuals seek “the truth” or embrace the “Red Pill” ideology. These networks thrive in “politically incorrect” boards, forming a transnational subculture that revolves around both ironic and serious far-right extremist, misogynistic, antisemitic, and misanthropic content. Of particular interest is the manosphere, which has attracted the attention of accelerationists due to its rapid growth and potential for real-world violent outbursts.
Despite being referred to as a collective noun, the manosphere encompasses four distinct subcultures: men’s rights activists who view feminist policies as detrimental to men’s rights, incels (involuntary celibates) who hold women responsible for their lack of opportunities and social status, separatists who believe in a feminist conspiracy to dismantle masculinity and advocate for complete segregation between genders, and the seductive type who objectify women and promote the acceptance of rape culture. These emerging subcultures also align themselves with existing digital hate cultures that have already established their presence on various platforms, thereby bolstering their recruitment efforts.
4. When left and right join forces It is important to acknowledge that accelerationist groups primarily act as opportunists and will seize any opportunity to infiltrate a popular movement. This has been evident in various instances throughout history. For instance, in 2020, the far-right anti-government Boogaloo movement attempted to associate themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement by claiming shared goals. Similarly, in the 2000s, the far-left Black Blocs successfully exploited popular protests against the G8 leaders. During the pandemic, both far-left and far-right groups united against lockdown measures. In these contexts, stochastic violence has also surfaced, manifesting as sporadic acts of aggression, intimidation, or property destruction. While such gatherings ostensibly advocated against vaccination mandates and perceived infringements on personal freedoms, they often attracted individuals with extremist inclinations from both the far-left and far-right ends of the political spectrum. Amidst the commotion of these events, lone actors or small factions have engaged in acts of random (stochastic) violence, ranging from verbal harassment to physical violence, aimed at sowing chaos and instilling fear. Far-right extremists have exploited these rallies to propagate anti-government sentiment and amplify distrust in public health institutions, while far-left had view them as opportunities to challenge corporate interests and in particular Big-Pharma. The unpredictable nature of stochastic violence in this context not only poses immediate safety concerns but also underscores the broader societal polarization and radicalization fueling such events.
In the current political environment, these groups are now aligning themselves with the pro-Palestine movement. The pro-Palestine movement has gained significant support in recent weeks, with numerous protesters taking to the streets worldwide to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, this surge in support has also created an environment where various groups, including far-left, far-right accelerationists, and antise-mitic organizations, attempt to associate themselves with the mainstream pro-Palestine movement. This has resulted in a confusing web of claims and widespread dissemination of misinformation. One way these groups exploit the pro-Palestine movement is by adopt-ing its language to criticize the actions of the Israeli government in Gaza. However, they then utilize this platform to promote anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and stereotypes. The right-wing factions often reference the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, baselessly claiming that Jewish individuals purposefully facilitate migration into Western countries to replace white people. On the other hand, the left-wing factions attack liberal democracies and market-based economies by invoking references to Zionism and colonialism. Across the United States and Europe, far-right and far-left extremists have capitalized on the growing anger towards the Israeli government as an opportunity to spread anti-semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist conspiracy theories. Their intention is to legitimize these ideas within mainstream discourse and attract new recruits.
5. Main takeaways Both the far-left and the far-right militant accelerationist groups possess a digital evolutionary advantage due to the transformations in the online media landscape, which have created new avenues for radicalization. These accelerationists have also strategically utilized algorithms to target susceptible individuals for recruitment. Unlike their BBS predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s, which mirrored real-life communities, today’s platforms are characterized by the “attention economy” and “dopamine addiction.” Posts that fail to attract sufficient attention are gradually phased out from the front page to make room for particularly captivating posts, effectively turning extremism into a chemical dependency. Moreover, far-left and far-right violence is increasingly intertwined, creating a classic “security dilemma.” These characteristics further amplify the perilous nature of this phenomenon and should require active monitoring and intervention.
Stochastic violence is a disturbing tactic employed by political extremists, characterized by its unpredictable and random nature. Unlike organized violence with clear targets and objectives, stochastic violence aims to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear and uncertainty by striking seemingly at random. This strategy often involves lone actors or small groups carrying out acts of violence without direct coordination with a larger organization, making it difficult for authorities to anticipate or prevent. The perpetrators may be motivated by extreme ideologies or grievances, using violence as a means to spread terror and advance their agenda. Stochastic violence poses a significant challenge to counterterrorism efforts, as it can be difficult to detect and preemptively address the underlying radicalization that fuels such attacks. Moreover, its unpredictable nature amplifies the psychological impact on communities, fostering fear and distrust while undermining social cohesion. Addressing stochastic violence requires a multifaceted approach that addresses not only the im-mediate security concerns but also the underlying societal factors that contribute to extremism and radicalization.
Militant accelerationism has emerged as a tool for hostile foreign countries like Russia and China to sow chaos and destabilize Western nations from within. These nations may clandestinely support or manipulate extremist groups subscribing to accelerationist doctrines to exacerbate existing social tensions and exploit vulnerabilities in democratic systems. For instance, Russia has been accused of utilizing online platforms to amplify divisive narratives and support far-right accelerationist movements in Europe and the United States, aiming to undermine trust in democratic institutions and foster internal discord. Similarly, China has been implicated in funding and promoting extremist factions to exploit societal fault lines in Western societies, thereby weakening their cohesion and global influence. Such exploitation of militant accelerationism underscores the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors and fringe ideologies become instruments in the geopolitical strategies of hostile nations. Overall, Russia and China may support militant accelerationist groups in the West as part of a multifaceted strategy to weaken their adversaries, challenge Western values and institutions, and advance their own geopolitical interests on the global stage. In conclusion, the risk of accelerated terrorism is clear and significant as we head into 2024, and it could even escalate further in the run-up to the US presidential election or the next European elections. Disgruntled individuals and armed extremist groups are likely to continue resorting to violence in order to spark a revolution and prevent what they perceive as the “deep state” from manipulating elections and enslave them. The current clash of conflicting narratives, present in nearly every aspect of political discourse, worsened by partisan divides and amplified on social media, will continue to hinder governments’ efforts to address the threat of domestic terrorism. The current atmosphere is alarmingly reminiscent of the period preceding events like the “years of lead” or the Oklahoma City bombing. Back then, extremist rhetoric urged supposed patriots or revolutionaries, like Timothy McVeigh or Mario Moretti, to protect their fellow citizens from what they saw as a corrupt government backed by a wealthy elite. Today, there are potentially many more individuals like them, and we cannot afford to wait for another series of tragic events before decisive action is taken against this threat.
Andrea Molle, Ph.D., FRAS, Senior Research Fellow, Orange (California, Stati Uniti). Quantitative and computational social scientist. Since 2012, he has been an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an Associate Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Society at Chapman University. From 2006 to 2008, he was a JSPS Fellow in Anthropology at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan).
#ReaCT2024 – Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe
Introduction by Claudio Bertolotti, Executive Director, ReaCT Observatory
As the Director of the Observatory on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism in Europe (ReaCT), I am both pleased and honored to present, for the fifth consecutive year, our annual research and analysis report on terrorism and radicalisation in Europe. Building on the foundation laid by the previous four editions, #ReaCT2024 – 5th Report on Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe is the result of the dedication and perseverance of researchers, academics, and professionals who, employing different approaches, methods, and perspectives, contribute to a multidisciplinary effort aimed at defining the origins, causes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of a multifaceted phenomenon that traditional analytical methodologies can no longer adequately encapsulate within merely descriptive and indicative definitions. It is now well-established, as we thoroughly anticipated at the beginning of our research and editorial journey in 2020, that social deviance increasingly overlaps with or is associated with phenomena of radical violence, often characterized by individual participation and imitative behavior with a significant “spectacular” ambition, falling within increasingly compartmentalized ideological or identity spheres.
In line with the trajectory established thus far, the Report presents itself as a unique combination of a scientific journal and a collective volume, with contributions from various authors, researchers, and collaborators who have generously dedicated their time, experience, and knowledge. Without exception, ReaCT’s board and I, express our deepest gratitude for their invaluable field research contributions and their immense intellectual efforts. I would also like to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense for reaffirming their confidence and trust in the Observatory I direct by granting patronage to the Report’s presentation events.
What insights does the ongoing research of the Observatory yield?
Over the past five years, within the broader context of historical and operational evolution, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-ISIS/ Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2023, 80 attacks (12 in 2023) were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, both successful and failed, compared to 99 in the previous period from 2014 to 2018 (12 in 2015). Following the major terrorist events in Europe associated with the Islamic State group, and subsequently in probable relation to galvanizing factors following the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan, and Hamas’ call for war against Israel, 194 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2023, 70 of which were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 237 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 of whom died in action), 440 victims were killed, and 2,539 were injured (START InSight database). In 2023, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by previous attacks, bringing the figure to levels similar to those of previous years.
The 2024 Report also delves into the issue of the Islamic State in Khorasan and the potential threat to Europe, with particular attention to jihad returning from the Sahel to North Africa.
Broadening the scope, #ReaCT2024 focuses on the variables of terrorism and the characteristics of anti-system manifestations, highlighting the need to analyze an extremely dynamic phenomenon based on the spaces of action and, on a paradigmatic level, to urgently move towards a shared definition of terrorism. Another topic explored is “lone wolf terrorism,” understood as a multifaceted and fragmented phenomenon, influenced by the role of social networks, collective dynamics, clusters, and online waves and communities, along with the evolution of forms of extremism that are “young, autonomous, and emancipated.”
In this constantly evolving context, the phenomena of radicalization and extremism in digital ecosystems, new technologies, and artificial intelligence, as well as digital hate speech as precursors to extremist violence, are examined. The report also provides a thorough analysis of militant accelerationism, from the far left to the far right, and the intriguing hypothesis of “armed chaos.” On the level of prevention, substantial attention is devoted to the analysis of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), providing a thorough assessment of its successes, limitations, and failures in terms of policies and practices. The focus is placed on the vexed question: will radicals ever fully de-radicalize? Significant space is also allocated to the emergence of new extremisms that carry anti-democratic demands, inviting readers to reflect on the evolution of these phenomena through two specific case studies: the first explores the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism through the contribution of security forces in Portugal; the second addresses the systemic gender discrimination in Afghanistan under the Islamist Taliban government, discussing the phenomenon of gender apartheid. In conclusion, this year’s contribution reaffirms the Observatory’s ambition to bear witness to the strength and dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners in the ongoing fight against the evolving phenomena of violent social deviance, radicalism, and terrorism. As the Director of the Observatory, my hope is that the findings and insights contained in this Report will increasingly contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders committed to working together to prevent and counter violent extremism. I would like to extend my gratitude to all the Authors who, through their commendable work, have once again contributed to the realization of #ReaCT2024.
A special thanks goes, as always, to START InSight, whose support has enabled the international publication and distribution of our annual report. Lastly, I wish to honor the memory of our friend Marco Cochi, a serious and capable researcher, who was taken from us too soon.
China and Russia response to NATO’s increased attention to the Pacific ocean
by Andrea Molle.
The Sino-Russian response to NATO diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, including the recent Italian efforts, was not long in coming. After the rumors of a new liaison office of the Alliance opening in Japan were confirmed, a hypothesis deliberately omitted from the official statement following Vilnius, the two countries have announced the beginning of a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan. The Sea of Japan is a crucial strategic theater for China and Russia. In particular, the Straits of Soya, Tsushima, and Tsugaru have essential implications for the national security of Beijing and Moscow. On Saturday, China’s Defense Minister said that Russian naval and air forces would participate in the “Northern/Interaction” military exercises organized by the Northern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
It should be noted that military relations between the two countries are nothing but new; for example, since 2018, China has regularly participated in major Russian exercises, including “Vostok 2018”, “Tsentr-2019,” and “Kavkaz-2020”. In August 2021, Russia also participated in the “Western/Interaction” exercises conducted in northwestern China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the first in which China invited foreign militaries. In 2022, Beijing sent contingents of its land, naval, and air forces to Russia to participate in the “Vostok 2022” exercises, which took place in 13 Russian sites and various areas of interest in the Sea of Japan.
However, this latest joint training campaign, which adds to the joint patrol activity of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea by the two Armed Forces, which began last June, seems a leap towards a fully committed strategic partnership. The Chinese Ministry of Defense stressed that while these joint exercises have an operational purpose, i.e., to improve the necessary capabilities to secure strategic sea routes, the development of closer military imposes China and Russia as the absolute guarantors of peace and stability in the region.
Several military experts also predict that these training activities will increase in the future, also thanks to a rotation between all five PLA commands, which could affect different strategic theaters and conflict scenarios, among which, of course, Taiwan.
Details about the Russian naval contingent are not yet known, but the Chinese squad includes the Qiqihar and Guiyang missile destroyers, the Zaozhuang and Rizhao missile frigates, and the supply ship Taihu, which set sail from the port of Qingdao, located in the Shandong province in eastern China.
#ReaCT2023, n. 4: the annual Report on Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe.
As Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counterterrorism
in Europe (ReaCT), I am pleased to introduce our fourth annual Report –
#ReaCT2023, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat
represented by terrorism in Europe.
This report is conceived as a unique combination of both a scientific
journal and a book, with contributions from various authors and researchers
who devoted their time, expertise, and insights into making this report a
reality. I am grateful to all of them for their important contributions and
tireless efforts.
I also want to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense, for their
esteem and renewed trust in the Observatory I lead, and for granting their
sponsorship on the occasion of the official presentation of this report, and
the Centre for Defense Higher Studies – Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa
(CASD) in Rome. My gratitude also extends to the Italian Ministry of the
Interior which, thanks to the contribution of the Central Directorate
for Prevention Police – Direzione Centrale della Polizia di Prevenzione (DCPP)
to this publication, allowed us to add further insight into the comprehension
and definition of the contemporary threat that ideological radicalisation and
violent terrorism represent at the moment.
In Europe there were 50 attacks in 2022, compared to 73 in 2021 –
including in the UK and in Switzerland. Over the past three years, from a
quantitative perspective, the frequency of terrorist attacks remained linear.
According to GTI 2023, Europe is ranked as the third region most hit by
terrorism, following Russia and Eurasia, and Central America and the Caribbean.
The report highlights the ever-changing nature of Jihadism which, while
spreading and radicalizing, has undergone multiple transformations since its
inception in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Al Qa’ida was the embodiment of the
globalized and radicalized movement until the so-called Islamic State terror
group surfaced in 2014, espousing a more extreme approach. The defeat of the
Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria in 2017-18 marked the first tangible defeat
for the jihadist movement. National jihadist movements, mostly nurtured by
global jihadists, are now back in fashion, with the Sahel region at the
epicenter of Jihadism.
The report also highlights the threat represented by right-wing
extremism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, disinformation, conspiracy
theories and white supremacism, which requires urgent attention; developing
risk assessment tools that take into account vetting practices in extreme
right-wing radicalization processes is crucial.
In light of a changing world and of the conflict playing out on the
threshold of Europe, it is essential that we adapt our interpretative paradigms
of the threat, and that we question the definition of terrorism, the approach
to countering radicalization processes, and the relocation of terrorism itself
in the new conflict scenario. Crisis management in the 21st century
presents unique challenges due to interconnected and interdependent contexts,
making prediction difficult.
The report also highlights the danger of jihadist terrorism in the Balkan
region, which remains a threat to Italian and European security. Italy has
implemented various initiatives to counter this threat, particularly at the
level of international peacekeeping missions. Civil society organizations play
a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism, but they also
face sensitive challenges in their relationships with counter-terrorism actors.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to a recent publication which
looks at “where the fight against radicalisation and international terrorism by
means of criminal law is going”, and a research project which offers “an
empirical study of Spanish jurisprudence dealing with jihadist terrorism over
the past 21 years”. The project, focused on the Spanish system, offers
constructive proposals aimed at combining the challenges posed by this criminal
phenomenon with the granting of fundamental human rights and explores the
potential of Restorative Justice.
In conclusion, this year’s report is a testament to the strength and
dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners within the ongoing
fight against radicalisation and terrorism. I hope that the insights presented
in this report will contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat
of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders to
work together to prevent and counter violent extremism.
I’d like to thank all the authors: with their commendable work, they have once again contributed to the successful realization of our annual Report, #ReaCT2023. A special thanks for their support also goes to Chapman University in Orange, California, Università della Svizzera italiana – USI in Lugano and Piattaforma cantonale di prevenzione della radicalizzazione e dell’estremismo violento (Canton of Ticino, Switzerland). Last but not least, as usual, to the Editor – START InSight, for making this publication possible and for its contribution to the international distribution.
Claudio Bertolotti, Observatory ReaCt – The Executive Director
In the 95 days since Russia invaded
#Ukraine, I have explored adaptation and how military institutions learn during
war. Today I examine what the last couple of weeks in the Donbas tells us about
how the Russians are learning in the ongoing #adaptation battle.
Sir Michael Howard wrote in “The Uses and
Abuses of Military History” that military institutions normally get the
next war wrong, mostly for reasons beyond their control. As such, an important
virtue for military organizations must be adaptability to unexpected events.
In March I explored the concept of
adaptation in war, as well as how Russian transformation efforts since 2008
appear to have paid minimal dividends for them at the tactical and strategic
levels. In the last few weeks, the Russians have made steady, if slow, progress
in the conduct of its eastern offensive in the Donbas. The Russian advances is
an indication that they are learning from their earlier failures.
Before exploring this in detail, a
short detour is necessary to define a framework for exploring where the
Russians have learned. I will use some of the principles of war.Military
organisations use these principles to instruct soldiers, develop common
tactics, and to organise combat & support formations. The principles are,
in effect, maxims that represent essential truths about the practice of
successful wars, military campaigns & operations. In the context of this
exploration of Russian learning, three principles of war in particular stand
out. These are: selection and
maintenance of the aim; concentration of force; and cooperation.
In any military action, the aim
must be simple, widely understood and within the means of the forces available.
The initial Russian war aims were broad ranging and did not count on massive
western military aid to Ukraine. It quickly became clear that these aims were
beyond Russian military capacity. The Russians were using an invading military
that was smaller than that of the state it was attacking, and it failed. More
recently, the Russians – as highlighted in briefings by senior Russian officers
– have consolidated their aims to narrower objectives in the east. And they
have shifted their forces to give themselves a better chance at achieving these
tighter strategic goals.
Concentration of effort. Success in war often depends on
achieving a concentration of military force at the most time and place. This
should then be supported by efforts such as information operations and
diplomacy to magnify the impact of the concentrated military forces. And at the
higher level, the Russians have appointed a senior Russian general as the
overall commander of the Ukrainian campaign. He has overseen a brutal and
destructive approach in the east, but the Russians are likely to see their
limited gains as major successes.
But sustaining tactical learning to
generate an operational advantage will be a significant challenge given other
Russian leadership shortfalls. And is it too little, too late?
This begs a larger question: what
might be the impact of this Russian tactical learning be on the overall conduct
of the war? And given the intensity of Russia’s eastern operations, will they
remain capable of offensive operations after the next few weeks?
This depends on Russian logistics,
Ukrainian defensive strategy, the inflow of western aid, and the conduct of
Ukrainian offensives elsewhere that might draw away Russian forces. And
short-term tactical adaptation (though hard) is simpler than long term
strategic adaptation. Murray, Knox and Bernstein have written “it is more
important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than
at the tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever.”
Russia has demonstrated some
capacity to learn from its tactical failures. But its national ability learn
and adapt to the economic, diplomatic, informational and other impacts of its
flawed strategy to invade Ukraine remains to be seen. This will probably
prolong the war.
Editor Claudio Bertolotti, Director START InSight,
@cbertolotti1
#ReaCT2022 includes 15 contributions on jihadism and other forms of violent extremism characterising the current threat landscape, which acquired further strength and visibility throughout the pandemic. This Report aims at fostering long-term dialogue and collaboration with institutional and academic actors who are concerned with the issue of radicalisation. #ReaCT2022 is addressed to security personnel, social workers, the media, students, researchers and last but not least, the general audience.
Violent extremism, radicalization and case studies. The contents of the Report. The overall contents of the 2022 Report ranges from numbers and profiles of jihadist terrorists in Europe, to a discussion of New Insurrectional Terrorism (NIT), which draws renewed strength and motivation from the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan; from an analysis of the sub-Saharan context where jihadist organisations are characterised by globalist rhetoric but remain deeply connected to local dynamics, to European commitment in helping the Western Balkans prevent violent radicalisation; from an overview of the terrorism cases tried by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court since 9/11 to the dynamics of online jihadist communities; from the new horizons of radicalization, which broadened during the pandemic and require that more attention be paid to group dynamics and social problems linked to violence; to several articles focussing on the far-right, anti-Semitism, conspiracy theories, the NoVax movement; to case studies on the social reintegration of radicalized minors and deradicalization within the neo-Nazi context, which highlight the approach and the work carried out by Italian authorities. Finally, the Report includes considerations on the updating of Terrorism Risk Assessment Instruments (TRA-I), which are developed with the aim of being able to better assess the threat posed by radicalization processes and related activities; reflections on future war scenarios; a review of the recent book titled “Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy”.
ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalisation and Counterterrorism (Rome) was founded by a team of experts and professionals from START InSight – Strategic Analysts and Research Team, a research and editorial production company based in Lugano (Switzerland); ITSTIME –Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, a research center within the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan); CEMAS –Centro interdipartimentale per la ricerca scientifica e la cooperazione con l’Eurasia, il Mediterraneo e l’Africa Subsahariana, La Sapienza University (Rome); SIOI – The Italian Society for International Organization (Rome).
Europa Atlantica and Gruppo Italiano Studio Terrorismo (GRIST) also joined ReaCT as partners.
The Observatory includes a Board of Directors, a Steering Scientific Committee, a Parliamentary Committee and a Permanent Working Group.
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