Weaponizing Chaos: Exploring Militant Accelerationism from the Far-Left to the Far-Right
By Andrea Molle, Associate Professor, Chapman University
Abstract Militant accelerationism is defined by the Accelerationism Research Consortium as a set of strategies aimed at exacerbating social divisions to hasten the collapse of society, often through violent means. This phenomenon is not confined to a single poli-tical ideology, being present in both the far-right and far-left, though manifesting in different forms. Far-right accelerationism primarily opposes equality, viewing it as a threat to the natural social order, and seeks to precipitate the collapse of liberal de-mocracies through polarization and political violence. From a geopolitical perspective, nations like Russia and China might support such movements to destabilize the West and undermine the legitimacy of the liberal democratic model, thereby reinfor-cing their authoritarian positions. On the other hand, far-left accelerationism originates from Marxism, aiming to accelerate the downfall of capitalism to trigger a proletarian revolution. These dynamics represent a growing threat to international security, as they exploit internal tensions and social divisions to promote global instability.
The Accelerationism Research Consortium, a research initiative specializing in the study of militant accelerationism, defines it as a collection of tactics and strategies aimed at intensifying latent social divisions, often through violent means, in order to expedite the collapse of society. Accelerationism does not necessarily align with a specific political ideology and can be observed on both the extreme left and extreme right of the political spectrum. However, there are distinctions between the two.
For instance, far-right militant accelerationism does not concern itself with critiquing modern capitalism or postcolonialism, but rather focuses on countering the contemporary pursuit of equality, which is perceived as a manifestation of societal decay and a threat to the established social order based on inequality, which is considered the “natural order.” In order to safeguard or reinstate this “natural order,” far-right militant accelerationism seeks to create circumstances that would lead to the downfall of the existing liberal and democratic system, such as through a “race war” or a civil war. Militant accelerationism functions as a platform for political action with the objective of hastening the downfall of liberal and capitalist societies. Its core strategy involves disseminating contradictory and problematic political ideologies through various means, such as promoting polarization or engaging in political violence. This form of terrorism aims to create social emergencies and crises, ultimately incapacitating and dismantling social institutions.
From an International Relations and Security Studies perspective it is noticeable that this goal aligns with the objectives of hostile nations. Russia and China, for example, may support militant accelerationism regardless of its political ideology alignment in the West for several strategic reasons. Firstly, fostering chaos and division within Western nations serves to undermine their stability and global influence, thereby potentially strengthening the position of Russia and China on the world stage. By exacerbating existing societal tensions and polarizations, these countries can create distrac-tions for Western governments, diverting their attention and resources away from global issues such as Ukraine or Taiwan. Secondly, supporting accelerationist groups aligns with Russia and China’s broader objectives of challenging the Western liberal democratic model. By promoting extremist ideologies that reject democratic norms and institutions, such as militant accelerationism, these countries seek to delegitimize Western values and weaken the appeal of democracy as a political system globally. This tactic can help bolster the perceived legitimacy of authoritarian regimes like those in Russia and China, presenting them as stable alternatives to Western democracies. Moreover, fostering internal strife in Western countries can serve as a form of retaliation or deterrence against perceived Western interference in the domestic affairs of Russia and China. By supporting militant accelerationism, these countries can retaliate against Western sanctions, criticisms of human rights abuses, or support for opposition movements within Russia and China. Additionally, by highlighting the internal divisions and societal unrest in Western nations, Russia and China can dissuade Western governments from intervening in their domestic affairs or pursuing aggressive foreign policies against them.
1. Far-left militant accelerationism Accelerationism, as a concept, originated from Marxism and the belief that by intensifying the detrimental forces within capitalism, its eventual destruction and subsequent liberation through revolution can be achieved. Left-wing terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. They may also advocate for environmental or animal rights, hold pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs, or support decentralized social and political systems like anarchism. In terms of incidents, the number of fatal incidents attributed to far-left ideologies is fluctuating. The global peak of revolutionary accelerationist leftist violence occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. However, until 2012, there were still four times as many far-left terrorist incidents compared to far-right incidents. In recent years, particularly in 2019 and 2020, the number of far-right and far-left incidents has been roughly equal. As per more recent times, the situation has started to differ between Europe and the United States. In Europe, far-left attacks started again to be more prevalent. German organizations such as the Engel – Guntermann and the Hammerbande have a clear focus on targeting right-wing extremists or individuals perceived as such. However, there is a noticeable shift in their approach, as they are increasingly engaging in activities that extend beyond local conflicts with the right-wing extremist milieu. The collaboration between group members and non-Germans in carrying out attacks suggests a growing connection to external groups. This interconnectedness among left-wing extremist networks in Europe has the potential to influence their strategies and the specific targets they choose.
In the United States, according to the Anti-Defamation League, only 6% of the 443 registered extremist fatalities between 2012 and 2021 were linked to far-left ideologies. In comparison, 75% were linked to far-right beliefs, and 20% were linked to Islamist beliefs. It is important to note that all the casualties related to far-left ideologies in the US were associated with Black nationalism, which the ADL categorizes as left-wing extremism. Overall, the violent threat posed by left-wing extremists in the US remains relatively small whereas in Europe it is increasing. The trend has been confirmed by several authorities. For example, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) report in 2022 that 80% of the successfully executed attacks were carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups.
Globally, movements affiliated with far-left ideologies include Antifa groups, as well as environmental or animal issue groups like the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front. There are also various far-left alternative media outlets, such as The Grayzone or Breakthrough News, and organizations like the Party for Socialism and Liberation or Workers World Party. These entities may occasionally express sympathy towards authoritarian regimes perceived as hostile to the West and embrace conspiracy theories. While these platforms may not overtly endorse violence, their content and campaigns actively advocate for authoritarian ideologies within mainstream audiences, thereby eroding the credibility of human rights and democracy advocates and promoting polarization. The Grayzone, a far-left media outlet, exemplifies this concerning trend. Established in 2015 by journalist Max Blumenthal shortly after a trip to Moscow, this media platform consistently adopts an ostensibly anti-imperialist stance, frequently defending Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, and Venezuela’s Maduro for their purported resistance against US dominance. Furthermore, it denies the occurrence of the Uyghur genocide and chemical gas attacks in Syria. Blumenthal himself has participated in anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine rallies, and currently plays a highly active role in the Pro-Hamas/Pro-Palestinian movement, which poses a significant and alarming new challenge to national security.
1.1. The use of Internet by far-left militant accelerationism The exploration of the online far-left culture is a topic that is often overlooked. This particular faction, which exists on the fringes of the broader left, positions itself as being against various ideologies and groups such as the alt-right, political correctness, social justice warriors, and centrists and liberal-democratic stances. Despite its ideological roots and the tendency of the left to look down on popular online culture, it employs similar tactics to the online alt-right, including the use of humor, memes, Twitter trolling, and open hostility. However, it remains firmly rooted in progressive leftist ideology. Referred to by various names such as the “alt-left,” the “vulgar left,” or the “Dirtbag Left,” this origin of this movement is attributed to Amber A’Lee Frost, a writer, podcaster, and activist based in Brooklyn. Her podcast Chapo Trap House, associated closely with this movement, employs comedy and irony in a shock jock style, while also criticizing both the Democratic and Republican parties. Other media outlets and individuals connected to the dirtbag left include TrueAnon and Red Scare, which are also loosely associated with the BlueAnon movement, a leftist counterpart to the well-known QAnon phenomenon.
2. Far-right militant accelerationism Initially, militant accelerationism was not primarily associated with far-right extremism. However, it gradually found its way into this milieu through two significant avenues. Firstly, in the 1990s, British philosopher Nick Land developed a right-leaning libertarian version of accelerationism after studying the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on left-wing accelerationism and incorporating his own interpretation of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Two decades later, during the early 2010s, Land’s ideas gained traction among the emerging “alt-right” movement, which became deeply interested in his anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic concept of “neo-reaction.” The second and most influ-ential pathway through which accelerationism infiltrated the far-right was the publication of the book Siege, which compiled newsletter posts written by American neo-Nazi James Mason. Mason, a follower of Charles Mason, has been involved in various neo-Nazi organizations in the United States since the late 1960s. He had personal connections with prominent far-right leaders, including George Lincoln Rockwell, the leader of the American Nazi Party, and William Pierce, the author of the novel The Turner Diaries, which inspired the 1995 terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. Mason was also influenced by Joseph Tommasi, the leader of the National Socialist Liberation Front, a group inspired by leftist organizations and urban guerrilla warfare. Tommasi advocated for the creation of chaos through terrorism as a means to destabilize the political order in the United States.
Mason created the newsletter Siege, published from 1980 to 1986, as a platform to express his disapproval of the stance taken by American far-right extremism. Within the pages of his publication, he incorporated elements of antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories, specifically focusing on a “Jewish world conspiracy” that aimed to execute a “white genocide.” This concept, now labeled as the “Great Replacement,” contributed to the development of the “deep state” myth, spawning the bipartisan trope of a “Zionist Occupied Government” in America. In his book, Mason also argued that the prevailing social order had become so deeply corrupted that established organizations like the American Nazi Party, with their conventional methods of political engagement, had become ineffective in their pursuit of liberating the “white race.” According to Mason, progress could only be achieved through revolutionary, violent, means carried out by individuals and the estab-lishment of a National Socialist “New Order” would require the destruction of society. Far-right militant ac-celerationism, as a subtype of apocalyptic terrorism, draws heavily on antisemitic tropes, including concepts like “white genocide” and the “Great Replacement Theory. Moreover, it leverages perceived traditional knowledge and cultural codes to rationalize their anti-modern beliefs and to target individuals they hold responsible for societal decay. Consequently, accelerationism can be viewed as a quasi-religion, as evidenced by its resemblances and intermingling with groups like the Branch Davidians, whose eschatology mirrors similar dynamics.
Screenshot from a PBS documentary aired on August 7th, 2018
2.1. The use of Internet by far-right militant accelerationism In the United States, adherents of far-right ideologies recognized the potential of the internet as early as the 1980s. They understood that online platforms offered an unparalleled opportunity to disseminate their message to a broader audience without the constraints imposed by traditional media. Notably, David Duke, a prominent figure in the US far-right extremist movement and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, lauded the internet as an ideal platform for a “white revolution.” The advent of online communication played a significant role in the rise of Siege, particularly during the mid-2010s when the “alt-right” gained prominence. This movement embraced militant action strategies, which were further amplified in the aftermath of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, USA, in August 2017. The events surrounding the rally, including the tragic killing of counter-protestor Heather Heyer, sparked intense debates within the American far-right extremist community. Mason’s critique of demonstrations and his advocacy for militant accelerationism resonated widely within these discussions. Consequently, following the Charlottesville events, the hashtag #ReadSiege gained traction both domestically and within the transnational far-right online discourse.
As today, the risk associated with militant accelerationism is primarily monitored in North America, with only a limited number of European analysts actively keeping tabs on its activities. The globalization of far-right militant accelerationism during the 2010s has given rise to various trajectories, all closely intertwined with digital spaces, which should raise concerns. One prominent platform for far-right militant accelerationism was the English-language Iron March, which operated from 2011 to 2017 and served as a breeding ground for accelerationist groups. This forum attracted a diverse range of militant far-right extremists who felt marginalized by other far-right internet forums like Stormfront, established in 1996, or were dissatisfied with the offerings of existing far-right organizations targeted at the youth. Within the Iron March forum, members cultivated their own subculture of far-right militant accelerationism, characterized by key texts and a distinct aesthetic featuring logos inspired by Waffen SS symbols and black and white skull masks. The administrators of Iron March actively encouraged transnational online communication and facilitated regional and local networking among members beyond the confines of the digital realm. Notably, a far-right extremist terrorist network emerged among the users of Iron March, which remains active to this day. Iron March’s influence extended beyond the development of its far-right extremist subculture, as it placed significant emphasis on taking action. Consequently, several accelerationist groups, including National Action (UK), Feuerkrieg Division (USA), and Antipodean Resistance (2016), were established as offshoots of this forum. It is also important to recognize that Iron March merely marked the beginning of this phenomenon.
3. The manosphere Despite a general decline in public activities among far-right militant accelerationists during the COVID-19 pandemic, their digital efforts have significantly increased since the spring of 2022. Consequently, the number of prevented attacks has also risen. The primary trends that originated within these tightly knit online communities during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s remain relevant within the global social network they have evolved into. Notably, new online spaces continuously emerge, often bearing little resemblance to formal, traditional far-right extremist organizations. These decentralized networks, organized in cells, foster sub-cultures defined by their cultural codes, such as memes, and constantly adapt to enhance their relevance in the public sphere. They have now permeated other online realms, including gaming platforms, and rely on the broader internet troll culture. They propagate through the manosphere, a collection of communities centered around radical anti-feminism and the conspiracy theory milieu, where individuals seek “the truth” or embrace the “Red Pill” ideology. These networks thrive in “politically incorrect” boards, forming a transnational subculture that revolves around both ironic and serious far-right extremist, misogynistic, antisemitic, and misanthropic content. Of particular interest is the manosphere, which has attracted the attention of accelerationists due to its rapid growth and potential for real-world violent outbursts.
Despite being referred to as a collective noun, the manosphere encompasses four distinct subcultures: men’s rights activists who view feminist policies as detrimental to men’s rights, incels (involuntary celibates) who hold women responsible for their lack of opportunities and social status, separatists who believe in a feminist conspiracy to dismantle masculinity and advocate for complete segregation between genders, and the seductive type who objectify women and promote the acceptance of rape culture. These emerging subcultures also align themselves with existing digital hate cultures that have already established their presence on various platforms, thereby bolstering their recruitment efforts.
4. When left and right join forces It is important to acknowledge that accelerationist groups primarily act as opportunists and will seize any opportunity to infiltrate a popular movement. This has been evident in various instances throughout history. For instance, in 2020, the far-right anti-government Boogaloo movement attempted to associate themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement by claiming shared goals. Similarly, in the 2000s, the far-left Black Blocs successfully exploited popular protests against the G8 leaders. During the pandemic, both far-left and far-right groups united against lockdown measures. In these contexts, stochastic violence has also surfaced, manifesting as sporadic acts of aggression, intimidation, or property destruction. While such gatherings ostensibly advocated against vaccination mandates and perceived infringements on personal freedoms, they often attracted individuals with extremist inclinations from both the far-left and far-right ends of the political spectrum. Amidst the commotion of these events, lone actors or small factions have engaged in acts of random (stochastic) violence, ranging from verbal harassment to physical violence, aimed at sowing chaos and instilling fear. Far-right extremists have exploited these rallies to propagate anti-government sentiment and amplify distrust in public health institutions, while far-left had view them as opportunities to challenge corporate interests and in particular Big-Pharma. The unpredictable nature of stochastic violence in this context not only poses immediate safety concerns but also underscores the broader societal polarization and radicalization fueling such events.
In the current political environment, these groups are now aligning themselves with the pro-Palestine movement. The pro-Palestine movement has gained significant support in recent weeks, with numerous protesters taking to the streets worldwide to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, this surge in support has also created an environment where various groups, including far-left, far-right accelerationists, and antise-mitic organizations, attempt to associate themselves with the mainstream pro-Palestine movement. This has resulted in a confusing web of claims and widespread dissemination of misinformation. One way these groups exploit the pro-Palestine movement is by adopt-ing its language to criticize the actions of the Israeli government in Gaza. However, they then utilize this platform to promote anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and stereotypes. The right-wing factions often reference the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, baselessly claiming that Jewish individuals purposefully facilitate migration into Western countries to replace white people. On the other hand, the left-wing factions attack liberal democracies and market-based economies by invoking references to Zionism and colonialism. Across the United States and Europe, far-right and far-left extremists have capitalized on the growing anger towards the Israeli government as an opportunity to spread anti-semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist conspiracy theories. Their intention is to legitimize these ideas within mainstream discourse and attract new recruits.
5. Main takeaways Both the far-left and the far-right militant accelerationist groups possess a digital evolutionary advantage due to the transformations in the online media landscape, which have created new avenues for radicalization. These accelerationists have also strategically utilized algorithms to target susceptible individuals for recruitment. Unlike their BBS predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s, which mirrored real-life communities, today’s platforms are characterized by the “attention economy” and “dopamine addiction.” Posts that fail to attract sufficient attention are gradually phased out from the front page to make room for particularly captivating posts, effectively turning extremism into a chemical dependency. Moreover, far-left and far-right violence is increasingly intertwined, creating a classic “security dilemma.” These characteristics further amplify the perilous nature of this phenomenon and should require active monitoring and intervention.
Stochastic violence is a disturbing tactic employed by political extremists, characterized by its unpredictable and random nature. Unlike organized violence with clear targets and objectives, stochastic violence aims to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear and uncertainty by striking seemingly at random. This strategy often involves lone actors or small groups carrying out acts of violence without direct coordination with a larger organization, making it difficult for authorities to anticipate or prevent. The perpetrators may be motivated by extreme ideologies or grievances, using violence as a means to spread terror and advance their agenda. Stochastic violence poses a significant challenge to counterterrorism efforts, as it can be difficult to detect and preemptively address the underlying radicalization that fuels such attacks. Moreover, its unpredictable nature amplifies the psychological impact on communities, fostering fear and distrust while undermining social cohesion. Addressing stochastic violence requires a multifaceted approach that addresses not only the im-mediate security concerns but also the underlying societal factors that contribute to extremism and radicalization.
Militant accelerationism has emerged as a tool for hostile foreign countries like Russia and China to sow chaos and destabilize Western nations from within. These nations may clandestinely support or manipulate extremist groups subscribing to accelerationist doctrines to exacerbate existing social tensions and exploit vulnerabilities in democratic systems. For instance, Russia has been accused of utilizing online platforms to amplify divisive narratives and support far-right accelerationist movements in Europe and the United States, aiming to undermine trust in democratic institutions and foster internal discord. Similarly, China has been implicated in funding and promoting extremist factions to exploit societal fault lines in Western societies, thereby weakening their cohesion and global influence. Such exploitation of militant accelerationism underscores the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors and fringe ideologies become instruments in the geopolitical strategies of hostile nations. Overall, Russia and China may support militant accelerationist groups in the West as part of a multifaceted strategy to weaken their adversaries, challenge Western values and institutions, and advance their own geopolitical interests on the global stage. In conclusion, the risk of accelerated terrorism is clear and significant as we head into 2024, and it could even escalate further in the run-up to the US presidential election or the next European elections. Disgruntled individuals and armed extremist groups are likely to continue resorting to violence in order to spark a revolution and prevent what they perceive as the “deep state” from manipulating elections and enslave them. The current clash of conflicting narratives, present in nearly every aspect of political discourse, worsened by partisan divides and amplified on social media, will continue to hinder governments’ efforts to address the threat of domestic terrorism. The current atmosphere is alarmingly reminiscent of the period preceding events like the “years of lead” or the Oklahoma City bombing. Back then, extremist rhetoric urged supposed patriots or revolutionaries, like Timothy McVeigh or Mario Moretti, to protect their fellow citizens from what they saw as a corrupt government backed by a wealthy elite. Today, there are potentially many more individuals like them, and we cannot afford to wait for another series of tragic events before decisive action is taken against this threat.
Andrea Molle, Ph.D., FRAS, Senior Research Fellow, Orange (California, Stati Uniti). Quantitative and computational social scientist. Since 2012, he has been an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an Associate Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Society at Chapman University. From 2006 to 2008, he was a JSPS Fellow in Anthropology at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan).
#ReaCT2024 – Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe
Introduction by Claudio Bertolotti, Executive Director, ReaCT Observatory
As the Director of the Observatory on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism in Europe (ReaCT), I am both pleased and honored to present, for the fifth consecutive year, our annual research and analysis report on terrorism and radicalisation in Europe. Building on the foundation laid by the previous four editions, #ReaCT2024 – 5th Report on Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe is the result of the dedication and perseverance of researchers, academics, and professionals who, employing different approaches, methods, and perspectives, contribute to a multidisciplinary effort aimed at defining the origins, causes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of a multifaceted phenomenon that traditional analytical methodologies can no longer adequately encapsulate within merely descriptive and indicative definitions. It is now well-established, as we thoroughly anticipated at the beginning of our research and editorial journey in 2020, that social deviance increasingly overlaps with or is associated with phenomena of radical violence, often characterized by individual participation and imitative behavior with a significant “spectacular” ambition, falling within increasingly compartmentalized ideological or identity spheres.
In line with the trajectory established thus far, the Report presents itself as a unique combination of a scientific journal and a collective volume, with contributions from various authors, researchers, and collaborators who have generously dedicated their time, experience, and knowledge. Without exception, ReaCT’s board and I, express our deepest gratitude for their invaluable field research contributions and their immense intellectual efforts. I would also like to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense for reaffirming their confidence and trust in the Observatory I direct by granting patronage to the Report’s presentation events.
What insights does the ongoing research of the Observatory yield?
Over the past five years, within the broader context of historical and operational evolution, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-ISIS/ Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2023, 80 attacks (12 in 2023) were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, both successful and failed, compared to 99 in the previous period from 2014 to 2018 (12 in 2015). Following the major terrorist events in Europe associated with the Islamic State group, and subsequently in probable relation to galvanizing factors following the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan, and Hamas’ call for war against Israel, 194 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2023, 70 of which were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 237 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 of whom died in action), 440 victims were killed, and 2,539 were injured (START InSight database). In 2023, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by previous attacks, bringing the figure to levels similar to those of previous years.
The 2024 Report also delves into the issue of the Islamic State in Khorasan and the potential threat to Europe, with particular attention to jihad returning from the Sahel to North Africa.
Broadening the scope, #ReaCT2024 focuses on the variables of terrorism and the characteristics of anti-system manifestations, highlighting the need to analyze an extremely dynamic phenomenon based on the spaces of action and, on a paradigmatic level, to urgently move towards a shared definition of terrorism. Another topic explored is “lone wolf terrorism,” understood as a multifaceted and fragmented phenomenon, influenced by the role of social networks, collective dynamics, clusters, and online waves and communities, along with the evolution of forms of extremism that are “young, autonomous, and emancipated.”
In this constantly evolving context, the phenomena of radicalization and extremism in digital ecosystems, new technologies, and artificial intelligence, as well as digital hate speech as precursors to extremist violence, are examined. The report also provides a thorough analysis of militant accelerationism, from the far left to the far right, and the intriguing hypothesis of “armed chaos.” On the level of prevention, substantial attention is devoted to the analysis of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), providing a thorough assessment of its successes, limitations, and failures in terms of policies and practices. The focus is placed on the vexed question: will radicals ever fully de-radicalize? Significant space is also allocated to the emergence of new extremisms that carry anti-democratic demands, inviting readers to reflect on the evolution of these phenomena through two specific case studies: the first explores the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism through the contribution of security forces in Portugal; the second addresses the systemic gender discrimination in Afghanistan under the Islamist Taliban government, discussing the phenomenon of gender apartheid. In conclusion, this year’s contribution reaffirms the Observatory’s ambition to bear witness to the strength and dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners in the ongoing fight against the evolving phenomena of violent social deviance, radicalism, and terrorism. As the Director of the Observatory, my hope is that the findings and insights contained in this Report will increasingly contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders committed to working together to prevent and counter violent extremism. I would like to extend my gratitude to all the Authors who, through their commendable work, have once again contributed to the realization of #ReaCT2024.
A special thanks goes, as always, to START InSight, whose support has enabled the international publication and distribution of our annual report. Lastly, I wish to honor the memory of our friend Marco Cochi, a serious and capable researcher, who was taken from us too soon.
China and Russia response to NATO’s increased attention to the Pacific ocean
by Andrea Molle.
The Sino-Russian response to NATO diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, including the recent Italian efforts, was not long in coming. After the rumors of a new liaison office of the Alliance opening in Japan were confirmed, a hypothesis deliberately omitted from the official statement following Vilnius, the two countries have announced the beginning of a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan. The Sea of Japan is a crucial strategic theater for China and Russia. In particular, the Straits of Soya, Tsushima, and Tsugaru have essential implications for the national security of Beijing and Moscow. On Saturday, China’s Defense Minister said that Russian naval and air forces would participate in the “Northern/Interaction” military exercises organized by the Northern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
It should be noted that military relations between the two countries are nothing but new; for example, since 2018, China has regularly participated in major Russian exercises, including “Vostok 2018”, “Tsentr-2019,” and “Kavkaz-2020”. In August 2021, Russia also participated in the “Western/Interaction” exercises conducted in northwestern China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the first in which China invited foreign militaries. In 2022, Beijing sent contingents of its land, naval, and air forces to Russia to participate in the “Vostok 2022” exercises, which took place in 13 Russian sites and various areas of interest in the Sea of Japan.
However, this latest joint training campaign, which adds to the joint patrol activity of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea by the two Armed Forces, which began last June, seems a leap towards a fully committed strategic partnership. The Chinese Ministry of Defense stressed that while these joint exercises have an operational purpose, i.e., to improve the necessary capabilities to secure strategic sea routes, the development of closer military imposes China and Russia as the absolute guarantors of peace and stability in the region.
Several military experts also predict that these training activities will increase in the future, also thanks to a rotation between all five PLA commands, which could affect different strategic theaters and conflict scenarios, among which, of course, Taiwan.
Details about the Russian naval contingent are not yet known, but the Chinese squad includes the Qiqihar and Guiyang missile destroyers, the Zaozhuang and Rizhao missile frigates, and the supply ship Taihu, which set sail from the port of Qingdao, located in the Shandong province in eastern China.
#ReaCT2023, n. 4: the annual Report on Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe.
As Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counterterrorism
in Europe (ReaCT), I am pleased to introduce our fourth annual Report –
#ReaCT2023, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat
represented by terrorism in Europe.
This report is conceived as a unique combination of both a scientific
journal and a book, with contributions from various authors and researchers
who devoted their time, expertise, and insights into making this report a
reality. I am grateful to all of them for their important contributions and
tireless efforts.
I also want to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense, for their
esteem and renewed trust in the Observatory I lead, and for granting their
sponsorship on the occasion of the official presentation of this report, and
the Centre for Defense Higher Studies – Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa
(CASD) in Rome. My gratitude also extends to the Italian Ministry of the
Interior which, thanks to the contribution of the Central Directorate
for Prevention Police – Direzione Centrale della Polizia di Prevenzione (DCPP)
to this publication, allowed us to add further insight into the comprehension
and definition of the contemporary threat that ideological radicalisation and
violent terrorism represent at the moment.
In Europe there were 50 attacks in 2022, compared to 73 in 2021 –
including in the UK and in Switzerland. Over the past three years, from a
quantitative perspective, the frequency of terrorist attacks remained linear.
According to GTI 2023, Europe is ranked as the third region most hit by
terrorism, following Russia and Eurasia, and Central America and the Caribbean.
The report highlights the ever-changing nature of Jihadism which, while
spreading and radicalizing, has undergone multiple transformations since its
inception in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Al Qa’ida was the embodiment of the
globalized and radicalized movement until the so-called Islamic State terror
group surfaced in 2014, espousing a more extreme approach. The defeat of the
Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria in 2017-18 marked the first tangible defeat
for the jihadist movement. National jihadist movements, mostly nurtured by
global jihadists, are now back in fashion, with the Sahel region at the
epicenter of Jihadism.
The report also highlights the threat represented by right-wing
extremism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, disinformation, conspiracy
theories and white supremacism, which requires urgent attention; developing
risk assessment tools that take into account vetting practices in extreme
right-wing radicalization processes is crucial.
In light of a changing world and of the conflict playing out on the
threshold of Europe, it is essential that we adapt our interpretative paradigms
of the threat, and that we question the definition of terrorism, the approach
to countering radicalization processes, and the relocation of terrorism itself
in the new conflict scenario. Crisis management in the 21st century
presents unique challenges due to interconnected and interdependent contexts,
making prediction difficult.
The report also highlights the danger of jihadist terrorism in the Balkan
region, which remains a threat to Italian and European security. Italy has
implemented various initiatives to counter this threat, particularly at the
level of international peacekeeping missions. Civil society organizations play
a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism, but they also
face sensitive challenges in their relationships with counter-terrorism actors.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to a recent publication which
looks at “where the fight against radicalisation and international terrorism by
means of criminal law is going”, and a research project which offers “an
empirical study of Spanish jurisprudence dealing with jihadist terrorism over
the past 21 years”. The project, focused on the Spanish system, offers
constructive proposals aimed at combining the challenges posed by this criminal
phenomenon with the granting of fundamental human rights and explores the
potential of Restorative Justice.
In conclusion, this year’s report is a testament to the strength and
dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners within the ongoing
fight against radicalisation and terrorism. I hope that the insights presented
in this report will contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat
of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders to
work together to prevent and counter violent extremism.
I’d like to thank all the authors: with their commendable work, they have once again contributed to the successful realization of our annual Report, #ReaCT2023. A special thanks for their support also goes to Chapman University in Orange, California, Università della Svizzera italiana – USI in Lugano and Piattaforma cantonale di prevenzione della radicalizzazione e dell’estremismo violento (Canton of Ticino, Switzerland). Last but not least, as usual, to the Editor – START InSight, for making this publication possible and for its contribution to the international distribution.
Claudio Bertolotti, Observatory ReaCt – The Executive Director
In the 95 days since Russia invaded
#Ukraine, I have explored adaptation and how military institutions learn during
war. Today I examine what the last couple of weeks in the Donbas tells us about
how the Russians are learning in the ongoing #adaptation battle.
Sir Michael Howard wrote in “The Uses and
Abuses of Military History” that military institutions normally get the
next war wrong, mostly for reasons beyond their control. As such, an important
virtue for military organizations must be adaptability to unexpected events.
In March I explored the concept of
adaptation in war, as well as how Russian transformation efforts since 2008
appear to have paid minimal dividends for them at the tactical and strategic
levels. In the last few weeks, the Russians have made steady, if slow, progress
in the conduct of its eastern offensive in the Donbas. The Russian advances is
an indication that they are learning from their earlier failures.
Before exploring this in detail, a
short detour is necessary to define a framework for exploring where the
Russians have learned. I will use some of the principles of war.Military
organisations use these principles to instruct soldiers, develop common
tactics, and to organise combat & support formations. The principles are,
in effect, maxims that represent essential truths about the practice of
successful wars, military campaigns & operations. In the context of this
exploration of Russian learning, three principles of war in particular stand
out. These are: selection and
maintenance of the aim; concentration of force; and cooperation.
In any military action, the aim
must be simple, widely understood and within the means of the forces available.
The initial Russian war aims were broad ranging and did not count on massive
western military aid to Ukraine. It quickly became clear that these aims were
beyond Russian military capacity. The Russians were using an invading military
that was smaller than that of the state it was attacking, and it failed. More
recently, the Russians – as highlighted in briefings by senior Russian officers
– have consolidated their aims to narrower objectives in the east. And they
have shifted their forces to give themselves a better chance at achieving these
tighter strategic goals.
Concentration of effort. Success in war often depends on
achieving a concentration of military force at the most time and place. This
should then be supported by efforts such as information operations and
diplomacy to magnify the impact of the concentrated military forces. And at the
higher level, the Russians have appointed a senior Russian general as the
overall commander of the Ukrainian campaign. He has overseen a brutal and
destructive approach in the east, but the Russians are likely to see their
limited gains as major successes.
But sustaining tactical learning to
generate an operational advantage will be a significant challenge given other
Russian leadership shortfalls. And is it too little, too late?
This begs a larger question: what
might be the impact of this Russian tactical learning be on the overall conduct
of the war? And given the intensity of Russia’s eastern operations, will they
remain capable of offensive operations after the next few weeks?
This depends on Russian logistics,
Ukrainian defensive strategy, the inflow of western aid, and the conduct of
Ukrainian offensives elsewhere that might draw away Russian forces. And
short-term tactical adaptation (though hard) is simpler than long term
strategic adaptation. Murray, Knox and Bernstein have written “it is more
important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than
at the tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever.”
Russia has demonstrated some
capacity to learn from its tactical failures. But its national ability learn
and adapt to the economic, diplomatic, informational and other impacts of its
flawed strategy to invade Ukraine remains to be seen. This will probably
prolong the war.
Editor Claudio Bertolotti, Director START InSight,
@cbertolotti1
#ReaCT2022 includes 15 contributions on jihadism and other forms of violent extremism characterising the current threat landscape, which acquired further strength and visibility throughout the pandemic. This Report aims at fostering long-term dialogue and collaboration with institutional and academic actors who are concerned with the issue of radicalisation. #ReaCT2022 is addressed to security personnel, social workers, the media, students, researchers and last but not least, the general audience.
Violent extremism, radicalization and case studies. The contents of the Report. The overall contents of the 2022 Report ranges from numbers and profiles of jihadist terrorists in Europe, to a discussion of New Insurrectional Terrorism (NIT), which draws renewed strength and motivation from the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan; from an analysis of the sub-Saharan context where jihadist organisations are characterised by globalist rhetoric but remain deeply connected to local dynamics, to European commitment in helping the Western Balkans prevent violent radicalisation; from an overview of the terrorism cases tried by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court since 9/11 to the dynamics of online jihadist communities; from the new horizons of radicalization, which broadened during the pandemic and require that more attention be paid to group dynamics and social problems linked to violence; to several articles focussing on the far-right, anti-Semitism, conspiracy theories, the NoVax movement; to case studies on the social reintegration of radicalized minors and deradicalization within the neo-Nazi context, which highlight the approach and the work carried out by Italian authorities. Finally, the Report includes considerations on the updating of Terrorism Risk Assessment Instruments (TRA-I), which are developed with the aim of being able to better assess the threat posed by radicalization processes and related activities; reflections on future war scenarios; a review of the recent book titled “Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy”.
ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalisation and Counterterrorism (Rome) was founded by a team of experts and professionals from START InSight – Strategic Analysts and Research Team, a research and editorial production company based in Lugano (Switzerland); ITSTIME –Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, a research center within the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan); CEMAS –Centro interdipartimentale per la ricerca scientifica e la cooperazione con l’Eurasia, il Mediterraneo e l’Africa Subsahariana, La Sapienza University (Rome); SIOI – The Italian Society for International Organization (Rome).
Europa Atlantica and Gruppo Italiano Studio Terrorismo (GRIST) also joined ReaCT as partners.
The Observatory includes a Board of Directors, a Steering Scientific Committee, a Parliamentary Committee and a Permanent Working Group.
The
ideological and territorial spread of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has
triggered a latent global jihadist violence. The Taliban triumph in Afghanistan
has given new vital impetus to international jihadism and it is now presented
by jihadist propaganda as the victory of Islam over the West and its corrupt
values. This happens in contrast with the Taliban approach to jihad, which is
limited to bless their national success: a national liberation war, in
opposition to the IS-K and other groups who are looking for a global triumph.
But
regardless of this, the victory of the Taliban and the opposition to the
post-Islamic state terrorist galaxy it’s already having direct effects on the
will and on the operational capacity of jihadist terrorist groups and
individuals at a global level: from the communicative-propaganda aspect to the
tactical and operational one.
Over
the past 20 years terror groups, cells and individual jihadi fighters alike
have begun to increasingly display new tactics, which they exported to, and
adapted for, the contemporary and the future jihadi war. A first, bitter taste
of things to come were the Mumbai attacks of 2008, when a group of ten
terrorists divided into smaller groups mounted a siege which lasted for almost
three days. Western cities have since occasionally become the set of complex
suicide attacks and team-raids, and more often of individual assaults where the
perpetrator efficiently exploits techniques learned in Middle Eastern war
theaters. “Islamic State” or al-Qaeda militants and sympathizers have proven
widely capable of carrying out deadly attacks and to pose a direct threat to
the security of citizens and national institutions. As such, contemporary
terrorism can be described and must be recognized as a phenomenon with military
characteristics or inspiration, particularly since IS with its external
operations came onto the stage.
“New
Insurrectional Terrorism” (NIT): is revolutionary, subversive and utopian[1]
Today,
after the fall of Kabul and the success gained by the Taliban, the specter of
terrorism hangs over the space of the Afghan, or Syrian, or Libyan, or Sahel
battlefields. Can we claim that the significant increase in
jihadi-terror-linked violence recorded in the world and in Europe in the last
20 years is consistent with the classical concept of terrorism?
Terrorist
attacks occurring between 2015 and 2018 in Europe, United States, as well as in
North African or Middle Eastern countries do confirm the effective operational
capability of the terror groups, in particular the Islamic state, whose nature
shifted over time from a proto-state reality with territorial control, to what
we can deem a de-nationalized, borderless phenomenon. “Leaderless jihad”, which
anticipates IS, was perfected by the latter, as “aspiring” fighters were
prevented from travelling and therefore chose to strike their home countries.
What we are facing today has already been dubbed “New Insurrectional Terrorism”
(NIT),[2]
a concept which essentially includes all attempts at disrupting the national
and/or international political order through violence. NIT is revolutionary and
utopian, and whereas terrorism is functional, insurrectional terrorism
continuously evolves. The aim of this new “breed” does not consist in
instigating the masses with a view to overthrowing governments, rather in persuading
a large number of Muslims all over the world to join the fight against the
“infidels” insisting on a narrative supported by the victory of [their
interpretation of] Islam in Afghanistan and at the same time presenting that
victory as a reason to avoid any compromise with western countries.
This
emerging “New Insurrectional Terrorism” has therefore nothing to do
with the political terrorism of the ‘70s and ‘80s. It surfaced in the Middle
East following the US invasion of Iraq (2003) and developed in the mid-2000s.
It attracted world attention in 2014, due to its battlefield victories in Iraq
and Syria (and then in Afghanistan). Today, however, IS – which main affiliate
group is still fighting in (and possibly from) Afghanistan – has lost most of
what it conquered over the past ten years: territories, energy resources,
access to trade and finance channels. Its media appeal, though, is still strong
and will utilize the Afghan success and the ongoing campaign as a “clear
example”, also directed against the Taliban described as corrupted.
The
loss of “territory” forced IS to concentrate, on the one hand, on its
franchise activities abroad, especially in areas of crisis, with a new
social approach which includes outsourcing of violence based on the reciprocal
recognition between the IS central organization and local groups and opposition
movements. Its message tries to turn thousands of radicalized individuals and
dozens of young people and armed opposition groups into smart and ready
“proximity weapons” prepared to “kill and die” in the name of the
Caliphate.
In brief, “New Insurrectional Terrorism” consists in the use of violence, or threatened use of intentional, calculated, rational, self-justified violence in order to achieve political, religious and ideological goals. NIT is defined by characterizing elements. The nature of the terrorist activity consists in using (or threatening to use) violence in order to reach a political objective. It is complex and, above all, unpredictable, revolutionary, subversive and with a view to establish a proto-state aiming to obtain the “monopoly of force” within a geographical area. Furthermore, it contains political, socio-economic and religious aspects (justified on religious and apocalyptic grounds) and can be described as “stra-ctical” because of its strategic nature is being conveyed through tactics which must not necessarily be interconnected. Its nature is “glo-cal”, transnational, borderless and based on “flexibility and adaptability”. Its targets are represented by political, civilian, military, religious and symbolic combatants, as well as non-combatants. It is symbiotic: it “outsources” violence supported by emulative effects, and as a response to the “call to jihad”.
We
can find all these elements in the (re)emerging phenomenon of the Islamic
state which is findings new energies in the defeat of the United States in
Afghanistan. What emerges from this description, is a threat to security
represented by a contemporary, new form of terrorism: a phenomenon which adapts
and evolves without a temporal or geographically-defined goal. NIT simply wants
to impose a new societal model (the Caliphate) by tearing down alternatives and
will use the symbolism associated with the Afghan war to exalt the “victory of
Islam” obtained thanks to the sacrifice of “martyrs” and the “divine blessing”.
[1] Bertolotti C., Sulmoni C.
(2021), How the Twenty-Year Afghanistan War Paved the
Way for New Insurrectional Terrorism, in Carenzi S., Bertolotti C. (2021) “Charting Jihadism Twenty Years After 9/11”,
Dossier ISPI, 11 settembre 2021
[2] Bertolotti C. (2015), NIT: Il ‘Nuovo Terrorismo Insurrezionale’.
Dalla ‘5+5 Defense Initiative 2015’ il cambio di approccio alla minaccia dello
Stato islamico, Analysis ISPI n. 292. In https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analisi292_bertolotti_16.12.2015.pdf.
Rome (Italy), October 14: The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country in mid-August has sparked a series of problems in the country of nearly 40 million people and beyond, but for the Group of 20 (G20) countries the top priority now is to manage the brewing humanitarian crisis there.
Concerns abound over abuses of human rights (especially for women and girls); the spread of coronavirus; the migration of fleeing Afghans to other countries; the danger of Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for transnational terrorists again; and the recognition of the Taliban as the country’s legitimate authority.
Speaking after the conclusion of an extraordinary one-day meeting of the G20 leaders on Tuesday, Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi said the G20 had an “enormous responsibility” to foster stability in the country.
“What we have is a growing humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan and that is something we must tackle immediately,” he told reporters.
The G20’s focus on humanitarian challenges is a significant first step toward dealing with the challenges in Afghanistan
According to Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher with the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), a think tank, and co-founder of the Observatory of Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism, the G20’s focus on humanitarian challenges is a significant first step toward dealing with the challenges in Afghanistan.
“If the G20’s first step had been to reach a consensus on whether or not to recognize the Taliban or to insist on human rights, that would have been too divisive and the talks could have fallen apart,” Bertolotti told Xinhua. “But focusing on what Draghi called the ‘growing humanitarian catastrophe’ was something everyone could agree on.”
That is a point Draghi stressed even while stating that other topics remained important. “There has basically been a convergence of views on the need to address the humanitarian emergency,” Draghi said. “This is how we can hope to overcome inevitable differences when it comes to foreign policy.”
The task at hand requires a series of concrete actions from the G20 member states. On Tuesday, for example, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the European Union (EU) would spend one billion euros (1.15 billion U.S. dollars) on humanitarian assistance in the country.
Draghi said that the priorities include propping up Afghanistan’s fragile banking system and keeping the airport in the capital of Kabul operational as these were essential for delivering humanitarian aid. He said it was equally important to continue the fight against the spread of coronavirus in the country.
focusing on humanitarian issues now does not prevent the G20 and other multilateral groups from addressing the other prickly issues in the coming months or years.
Much of the aid to Afghanistan will be funneled through the United Nations (UN), but multiple news reports said some countries would still provide direct country-to-country aid, even though most states have not recognized the Taliban government. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will also play key roles, Draghi said.
According to Bertolotti, focusing on humanitarian issues now does not prevent the G20 and other multilateral groups from addressing the other prickly issues in the coming months or years.
“Finding agreement on humanitarian issues was important but not terribly surprising,” Bertolotti said. “Those issues will be addressed later, either in the G20 or in other contexts or even by individual countries.”
Source: Xinhua
Afghanistan: the G20 wants shared and comprehensive action (EuroNews)
Claudio Bertolotti, START InSight Director and ISPI Associate Researcher, comments on the outcomes and perspectives of the G20 on Afghanistan.
The G20’s focus on humanitarian challenges is a significant first step toward dealing with the challenges in Afghanistan. If the G20’s first step had been to reach a consensus on whether or not to recognize the Taliban or to insist on human rights, that would have been too divisive and the talks could have fallen apart. But focusing on what Draghi called the ‘growing humanitarian catastrophe’ was something everyone could agree on.
C. Bertolotti, START InSight Director
Focusing on humanitarian issues now does not prevent the G20 and other multilateral groups from addressing the other prickly issues in the coming months or years. “Finding agreement on humanitarian issues was important but not terribly surprising. Those issues will be addressed later, either in the G20 or in other contexts or even by individual countries.
C. Bertolotti, START InSight Director
Report #ReaCT2021 – Director’s note: terrorism in the time of Covid-19
This report offers a concise analysis on the evolution of radical ideologies and terrorist threats in accordance with the European Union directive 2017/541 on the fight against terrorism and is meant as a useful contribution, within the wider public debate, to the harmonisation of member States’ discrepancies around what should be defined and treated as terrorism.
The Observatory mainly focuses on jihadism; however, we make sure to afford enough room and support for studies on other forms of terrorism, ideological radicalisation and social deviance, as well as “conspiracy theories” leading to violent outcomes.
In their assessments, the authors who submitted their work for this issue of #ReaCT2021 took into account the repercussions of new social and conflict dynamics brought about by COVID-19.
Due to other priorities, the pandemic seemed to have sidelined terrorism when, all of a sudden, October 2020 revived the threat which had apparently been overcome. From early September to early November, a successive chain of events clearly highlighted a dramatic and articulated scenario. Those sixty days of fear tell us that terrorism is now a “normal” rather than an ‘exceptional’ phenomenon, as an instrument of the ongoing conflict.
2019-2020: the evolution of European jihadist terrorism
In 2019 according to Europol there were 119 successful, failed or thwarted attacks: 56 of these were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist groups; 26 by extreme left radical and anarchist groups; 6 by far right groups; 24 were jihadist, of which 3 were successful and 4 unsuccessful. In the same year, START InSight’s database listed 19 jihadist actions / events (as compared to the 7 reported by Europol); in 2020, the number goes up to 25.
In 2019, jihadists were responsible for all deaths from terrorism in Europe: according to Europol, 10 people lost their lives and 26 were injured (1 person was injured in a far-right attack). START InSight recorded a higher number of people with injuries (48), who were mostly victims of marginal and emulative attacks. In 2020 there was a significant increase in deaths: 16 people were killed and 55 were injured.
The long wave of terrorism which hit Europe following the emergence of the “Islamic State” phenomenon recorded 146 jihadist attacks from 2014 to 2020: 188 terrorists took part in these attacks (59 among them died in action); 406 people lost their lives; 2,421 were injured (START InSight’s database).
Cases of recidivism are on the rise: 3 out of 10 in 2020. START InSight also spotted an increase in actions carried out by terrorists already known to European police forces or intelligence services: 54% of the total in 2020.
An increase in the number of irregular migrants heightens the potential risk of terrorism: 20% of terrorists are irregular immigrants. In France, the number of irregular immigrants involved in terrorist attacks is growing. Until 2017, no attack had seen the participation of irregular immigrants; in 2018, 15% of terrorists were irregular immigrants: in 2020, they reached 40%.
Islamic State and al-Qaeda online terrorist propaganda during the Covid-19 emergency
Propaganda activities carried out during the Covid-19 pandemic and the attacks which took place in Paris, Nice and Vienna, recall how dynamic terrorism associated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda remains, especially through the Internet. In particular, the Islamic State confirmed its aggressive narrative, identifying the Coronavirus as a “soldier of Allah”. An ally, set out to punish the “infidels”, above all the military and police forces.
The concepts and importance of preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE)
PVE and CVE gradually became an integral part of the global counter-terrorism architecture. In order to be long-term and effective, these policies and projects require a constant dialogue among researchers, practitioners, law enforcement agencies and legislators which also sets out priorities and expectations. Measuring the results of these activities remains a difficult task but several European think tanks are already bent on the issue.
Countering radicalisation and terrorism via criminal law: problems and perspectives
By its very nature, counterterrorism criminal law does not affect the causes of radicalisation and terrorism. An overarching and disproportionate resort to criminal law may even produce crime-inducing side effects: radicalisation shall be addressed as a reversible process. Counterterrorism criminal law in Europe is generally prison-based, even with regard to facts that arguably do not harm legal goods or interests.
The terror threat in the UK. The challenge: identify, define, arrest and convict
The complexity of the terror threat picture faced by the UK was recently highlighted through court cases which have frustrated the efforts of the security and intelligence forces. The cases that are now emerging are so disconnected from terrorist networks, are planning such random acts and the tools of terrorism are becoming so banal that it has become almost impossible to entirely shield yourself from the threat. But it has also become almost impossible to prove who might be going in this direction. This is creating a new generation of radicals that authorities struggle to identify, define, arrest and convict.
A look at the Balkan gate to Europe
The attack which took place in Vienna in November 2020 drew attention to the issue of terrorism in Europe, especially in the Balkan Area. It also focused such attention on jihadist presence in the Balkan countries, which could become a potential logistical hub for jihadism towards Europe.
Lessons learned from Kosovo’s experience in repatriating former foreign fighters: the small Western Balkan nation of Kosovo repatriated 110 citizens, including men, women, and children, in April 2019, making it one of a very small number of countries that has actively repatriated citizens involved with the Islamic State. The paper also includes what lessons can be learned by EU countries in handling the complex issue of how to manage the return of foreign fighters and their families.
The other terrorisms: far-right, extreme left and the new QAnon phenomenon in pandemic times
The pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus has also had significant effects on the relational and communicative strategies and methodologies typical of both far-right and extreme left-wing environments. Right-wing violent extremism, a phenomenon in expansion in the West, appears to be acquiring a transnational character and has an emerging symbiotic, mutually-reinforcing interdependent relationship with Islamist extremism. This interdependence poses additional threats to European security.
A threat to democracy is QAnon, a conspiracy theory movement active in more than 70 countries and that presents a high risk of radicalization in Europe. It should be closely monitored because of its potential for violent actions.
Thanks to all of the authors who contributed to this Report. My gratitude also goes to the two co-editors who have given their fundamental input: Chiara Sulmoni, President of START InSight, and Flavia Giacobbe, Director of Airpress and Formiche.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
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In my role as Executive Director of the ReaCT Observatory, I am honoured to introduce #ReaCT2021, 
