Abstract Over the course of 2023 and 2024, several European countries grew increasingly concerned about the involvement of teenagers and minors in terror-related crimes and extremist activities. If, on the one hand, attacks are still largely carried out by men just under the age of 30, on the other, online radicalization is having an unprecedented impact on kids; as such, it represents a demanding challenge for law enforcement and professionals working in the field of prevention. Keywords Radicalization, Terrorism
On the evening of Saturday, 2nd March, 2024, in a central district of Zürich, a fifteen-year-old Swiss boy of Tunisian origin seriously stabs an Orthodox Jew walking nearby. In the hours following the attack, a pre-recorded video message emerges online, in which the boy, who calls himself a “soldier of the Caliphate” and swears allegiance to the Islamic State, declares that he acted in response to the latter’s appeal to target “the Jews and Christians and their criminal allies”, and he in turn incites others to take the initiative (1).
This event took place within a global context which has been marked by a significant increase in anti-Semitism following Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack on 7th October, 2023 to which Israel responded by putting Gaza to fire and sword. The tragic loss of civilian lives has fuelled jihadi and extremist narratives more in general, as well as igniting an intense social polarization of the kind we see play out, often violently, in the streets, on university campuses and the internet; a climate with a strong potential for radicalization and mobilization, accentuated by intense misinformation, to which children under the age of 15 are also subjected (2).
The Swiss Confederation – that was already hit by two jihadist stabbing attacks back in 2020 in Morges and Lugano, where an adult man and woman respectively, lashed out at randomly chosen victims – is suddenly confronted with a trend which characterized the universe of violent extremism and radicalization in Europe for some years now: that is, individuals involved in these phenomena keep getting younger and younger.
In 2021, British statistics already highlighted a significant increase in the arrests of children under the age of 18 on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes, with a prevalence of far-right ideology (3). Percentages continued to rise till they reached their highest peak so far in 2023 when, out of the total number of people who were detained, almost 19% concerned teenagers under the age of 17 (4).
Boys’ and girls’ attraction to jihadism is consistent with the events that unfolded around the middle of the past decade, at the height of ISIS’ territorial expansion; at that time too, the Old Continent saw numerous teenagers buy into the Islamic State’s plans and narrative, setting out on a journey to Syria and Iraq; like British teenager Shamima Begum, who left London in 2015, at the age of 15, with two friends, and who’s currently stuck in a detention camp in Syria, where the families of ex-combatants are held. Her case became emblematic and controversial following the authorities’ decision to deprive her of British citizenship -which made her stateless- despite arguments that she might be a victim of indoctrination and perhaps even trafficking (5).
Very young people committed acts of jihadist violence after ISIS, as of 2014, started encouraging those who could not make it to the Middle East, to rise up in their respective countries and with all means available; which would also usher in the so-called “lone wolves” season -a somewhat misleading definition, considering the contacts and networks that regularly pop up in investigations-. This strategic move by the Caliphate permanently changed the terrorists’ modus operandi, enhancing the autonomy of individuals and allowing the Islamic State, when confronted with operational difficulties, to continue projecting an image of strength by claiming ‘successful’ actions carried out by its own sym-pathizers.
A study of Islamist attacks which occurred in Europe between 2014 and 2017 shows that teenagers and children were involved in just under a quarter of jihadist events, both successful and foiled; the phenomenon mainly affected France, Germany and the United King-dom (6).
An event similar to the one which happened in Zürich had previously taken place in Marseille in 2016, when a 15-year-old of Kurdish origin attacked a Jewish teacher near the school where he taught.
More recent cases were the brutal killing, in November 2020, on the outskirts of Paris, of Prof. Samuel Paty by an 18-year-old Russian of Chechen origin (the attack followed a violent Islamist social media campaign which had been unleashed against the teacher over the previous days) or again, the stabbing of a high school teacher in Arras, in October 2023, by a 20-year-old radicalized youth from Ingushetia. After this latest attack, French anti-terrorism prosecutor Jean-François Ricard stated that over three years (in other words, since 2020) a growing propensity, on the part of youth, for planning violent action had been noted (7).
It should be underlined that successful attacks largely remain a prerogative of adults; START InSight’s database, which traces the profiles of jihadists who spring to action, indicates that the median age of those who have struck Europe over the past nine years (2014-2023) is 26: a figure that varies over time – from 24 years of age in 2016, to 30 in 2019) – and which appears slightly on the rise in 2023, settling at 28.5 years of age.
Figure 1 age of jihadist attackers in Europe, 2014-2023 (START InSight’s database)
More generally, we can see that 7% of terrorists were under the age of 19 (with signs of a progressive decrease in minors!); 38% were between 19 and 26 years of age; 41.5% between 27 and 35 years of age and, finally, 13.5% were over 35.
A previous study by the University of Applied Sciences of Zürich (ZHAW, 2019), based on the available information pertaining to 130 different jihadist cases which had been dealt with by the Federal Intelligence Service over the previous ten years, indicated that individuals whose radicalisation process started under the age of 20 represented 18%, while for minors this figure dropped to 6% (8), hinting at the time at a somewhat ‘marginal’ problem.
However, in the Canton of Vaud, where a prevention programme has been in place since 2018, over 40% of the cases the authorities dealt with involve minors (9). Moreover, Christian Dussey, the head of Swiss Intelligence, recently declared that the jihadist radicalization of minors today affects the Confederation in (even) greater proportions than other European states (10). Shortly after the attack in Zürich, six other boys between the ages of 15 and 18 were arrested in the French-speaking and German-speaking regions of Switzerland; they were in contact with peers in Germany, France and Belgium and some among them apparently intended to carry out attacks, in Switzerland as well. According to reports, over the first 9 months of 2024, Swiss Police had to intervene in 11 cases of young people who were radicalised; an 11-year-old boy was also arrested (11). Terrorism expert Peter Neumann pointed out that overall, in Europe, since October 2023, two-thirds of all arrests involved children between the ages of 13 and 19 (12).
In England and Wales, from April 2022 to March 2023, over 60% of the cases referred to the Prevent programme – which requires professionals in the public sector, especially schools, to report suspected radicalisation of all kinds – concerned individuals aged 20 and below; 31% did not reach the age of 14. But while most of the cases did not require to be further supported through the programme – almost half of the most serious ones involved children between the ages of 11 and 15 (13).
“Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terror-ism Offenders” is a comprehensive study published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR, King’s College London, 2023), which examines the activities of 43 juveniles convicted of terrorism-related offences across all ideologies in England and Wales since 2016 (14); its authors warn against underestimating the role of children; although no child managed to commit an attack in the period under their consideration, and despite the fact that the most common crime consisted in possession of extremist material, this research indicates that almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing acts of terrorism and that kids can act as “amplifiers” and “innovators”. Minors can create and disseminate their own propaganda, recruit others and plan attacks. Factors related to age, such as naivety or lack of experience and organizational skills likely played a role in disrupting their projects.
This resourcefulness on the part of youngsters characterised the extremist landscape in recent years: in 2020, it was brought to light that the Feuerkrieg Division, a far-right online group with terrorist intents and members in various countries, from the United States to Lithuania, was headed by a 13-year-old Estonian (he was 11, at the time of its foundation in 2018). Several teenagers within the group were actively planning attacks (15).
In March 2024 in Liverpool, a 20-year-old left-wing anarchist was sentenced to 13 years in prison; among other things, he planned to kill 50 people and dedicated a weapons and bomb making manual to “misfits, social nobodies, anarchists, [and] terrorists past and future, who want to fight for freedom against the government” (16).
The emancipation of extremism A number of studies and investigations have analysed how groups, movements and individuals -especially jihadists or those belonging to the vast galaxy of the far-right- have been capable of seizing and exploiting the opportunities progressively offered by the Internet and the evolving technologies, in order to forward their ideologies, approach potential recruits and sympathizers, disseminate magazines and practical guides for aspiring attackers, as well as adapting and diversifying their communication also according to gender. This includes the use of AI to quickly process propaganda images and videos with a strong and ‘immediate’ aesthetic and emotional impact, that only a decade ago would have required the meticulous contribution of a team while today it can rely on the work of a single person (17).
Over time, the ways of producing, consuming and sharing propaganda, as well as the identities of those involved in these activities, have substantially changed.
The advent of social media around the mid-2000s, in particular, made access to and spread of extremist material easy and fast; people can establish long-distance relationships and consistently interact, to the point that, researcher Jacob Ware writes in his essay on this topic, “the radicalization process now infiltrated every aspect of a subject’s life, and a radicalizer could project influence into a living room or bedroom” (18).
Ware explains that we are today facing the third generation of online (social media) radicalization, when individuals do not merely act autonomously, but they promote themselves and their own actions.
Terrorist groups (those with a solid internal hierarchy) have become less relevant, while ideologies are more fluid. In #ReaCT2022, media scholar Michael Krona, referring to the jihadist context, had already spoken of online supporters who seem less inclined to tie themselves to a single organization, and who rather ” promote wider ideological interpretations and build their own brand, rather than strictly enhancing the brand of IS.” (19).
Today, the production of extremist propaganda and narrative – and incitement to action too – are no longer a prerogative of terrorist movements’ media arms, but an operation which sees the contribution of a large base of followers and militants in contact with each other. A ‘grid’ that can extend from one continent to the other. A 2022 joint international investigation by journalists who infiltrated an online network of neo-Nazi teenagers points out how the advantage of this network -but the same observation could apply to others as well- lies in its loose, mobile structure, which hinges on the participation of individuals scattered around the world: “all they need is a computer, a mobile phone and a bedroom. And all they have in common is their ideology and their hatred: towards Jews, political figures, journalists” (20).
The image of teenagers radicalising in the privacy of their bedrooms seems recurring; yet the latter can today be considered more of a control room than a shelter where vulnerable and isolated boys (or girls) fall prey to ill-intentioned recruiters. The aforementioned British study on juveniles convicted of terrorism underlines the need to overcome the stereotype which sees children as mere “pawns” in the hands of adults; when active within an extremist online context which thrives on anonymity, the “weight” and effect of, by instance, their actions and posts, is identical to that of all the other users.
These online ‘fighters’, who are now mainly digital natives, show a strong potential in ensuring the constant promotion of extremist ideas – a pro-ISIS media campaign specifically urges these “one-person armies” and “Internet mujahideen” not to give up. (21). The ability to selectively use different social media and encrypted messaging apps to communicate, exchange information, encourage each other, discuss violence, attacks and targets, and to migrate from platform to platform with a view to escaping the axe of big tech and joint police operations aimed at ridding the Internet of terrorist content, make them an asset difficult to counter.
In brief, the current era is characterized by an ’emancipated’, widespread and decentralised type of extremism, which is based on ‘free initiative’; within this ecosystem, “everyone can be replaced”(22) and all attackers can turn into a source of inspiration for others; whether it’s Brenton Tarrant, a right-wing extremist who, in 2019, at the age of 28, attacked two mosques killing over 50 people in Christchurch, New Zealand; whether it’s Elliott Rodger who, in 2014, at the age of 22, committed a misogynistic massacre in California and is now celebrated by violent incels; or again, whether it’s the 15-year-old Swiss perpetrator of the Zürich attack, whose gesture is praised by IS’ acolytes. A few days after the event, researchers from the Counter Extremism Project spotted half a dozen Tik-Tok profiles celebrating the Swiss jihadist (23).
The radicalisation of violence When defining the current context in which teenage extremism occurs, analysts and media have sometimes resorted to the expression ‘TikTok-jihad’ or ‘TikTok terrorism’. Indeed, social media, gaming platforms and encrypted chats are now thought to represent the main tools of radicalisation. They should not, however, be simply viewed as communication ‘channels’ that can get a message across to potential new supporters. Rather, they should be acknowledged as ‘spaces’ where interaction, socialisation and engagement take place; these terms and concepts are vital when trying to understand a ‘world’ that does not merely consist in a galaxy of violent politico-religious ideologies but is also inhabited by sub-cultures which youth helped expand (like the incel movement, or the Siege culture). In other words, this environment consists in communities with their own values, behavioural norms, linguistic and aesthetic codes; and for teens, who might be struggling to find their own identity and place in the world, or might harbour feelings of rebellion, or might be weighed down by personal vulnerabilities that can result from family conflicts, bullying or racism, such sense of belonging plays an important role.
Over the past few years researchers and intelligence professionals have been drawing attention to the fact that psychological problems and commitment to violence tend to precede ideology on the path to extremism; appetite for power in social relationships, a desire for revenge, or to take centre stage, vent personal frus-trations (24), are all considered strong enough motivations in contributing to youth radicalisation, a process that sees personal grievances overlap with socio-political battles. All these aspects combined with algorithms that reward provocative content and the trivialization of hatred, help lowering the threshold for accessing extremism.
In this complex and ever-evolving scenario, assessing risks associated to radicalized individuals in the real world can be particularly difficult, especially if they are minors, and despite the awareness that radicalisation consists in a personal and reversible path that does not necessarily lead to terrorism (25).
Notes 1) In Video Uploaded To Internet, Teenage Stabber Of Jew In Zü-rich Swears Allegiance To Islamic State (ISIS), Calls On Mus-lims To Target Jews And Christians Everywhere, MEMRI, Spe-cial Dispatch No. 11166, 4 March 2024 https://www.memri.org/reports/video-uploaded-internet-teenage-stabber-jew-z%C3%BCrich-swears-allegiance-islamic-state-isis 2) Symonds, T., Gaza war creating a radicalisation moment, senior UK police officer says, BBC News , 19th January 2024 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-68035172 3) Counter- Terrorism Policing, Upward trend in children arrest-ed for terrorism offences, News, 9th June 2022 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/upward-trend-in-children-arrested-for-terrorism-offences/ 4) Counter-Terrorism Policing, Number of young people arrested for terrorism offences hits record high, News, 15th March 2024 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/number-of-young-people-arrested-for-terrorism-offences-hits-record-high/ 5) Sabbagh, D., Shamima Begum a victim of trafficking when she left Britain for Syria, court told, The Guardian, 24th October 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/24/shamima-begum-victim-of-trafficking-when-she-left-uk-for-syria-court-told 6) Simcox, R., European Islamist Plots and Attacks Since 2014 — and How the U.S. Can Help Prevent Them, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3236, 1st August 2017 ; see also: Bourebka, M., Overlooked and underrated? The role of youth and women in preventing violent extremism, CIDOB, Notes internationals, 240, 11/2020: “In the European con-text, as of 2016, the fastest-growing age group amongst the radical-ised individuals in Europe was 12- to 17-year-olds” 7) de la Ruffie, E., Attentat: des mineurs radicalisés, « un phéno-mène nouveau » et « inquiétant », selon le procureur anti-terroriste, Le Journal du Dimanche, November 7, 2023 https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/attentat-des-mineurs-radicalises-un-phenomene-nouveau-et-inquietant-selon-le-procureur-antiterroriste-139493 8) Sulmoni, C., Radicalizzazione jihadista e prevenzione. Aggiornamenti dalla Svizzera, START InSight https://www.startinsight.eu/tag/zhaw/ 9) How the Islamic State group is courting minors on video game platforms, RTS, 27 May 2024 https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/2024/article/comment-le-groupe-etat-islamique-courtise-les-mineurs-sur-les-plateformes-de-jeux-video-28516132.html 10) Rhyn, L., and Knellwolf, T., «Die Schweiz hat überdurchschnittlich viele Fälle radikalisierter Jugendlicher», Tages-Anzeiger, 22 August 2024 https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch-geheimdienst-chef-sieht-sicherheit-der-schweiz-in-gefahr-665955949850 11) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, SEIDI-SERA, RSI, September 6, 2024 https://www.rsi.ch/info/ticino-grigioni-e-insubria/%E2%80%9CMinorenni-radicalizzati-ma-non-per-forza-terroristi%E2%80%9D–2246363.html 12) Ernst, A., Terrorismus in Europa: «Es gibt genügend Hinweise, dass sich etwas Grösseres ankündigt»“, NZZ, 23 August 2024 https://www.nzz.ch/international/terrorismus-in-europa-die-tik-tok-generation-peter-r-neumann-ld.1844746 13) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Pro-gramme, April 2022 to March 2023. Home Office Official Statistics, 14th December 2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2022-to-march-2023#demographic 14) Rose, H., and Vale, G., Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terrorism Offenders, ICSR, London, 2023 15) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/ 16) Gardham, D., Jacob Graham: Left-wing anarchist jailed for 13 years over terror offences after declaring he wanted to kill at least 50 people, Sky News, 19th March 2024 https://news.sky.com/story/jacob-graham-left-wing-anarchist-jailed-for-13-years-over-terror-offences-after-declaring-he-wanted-to-kill-at-least-50-people-13097584 17) Katz, R., SITE Special Report: Extremist Movements are Thriving as AI Tech Proliferates, SITE Intelligence Group, 16th May 2024 https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Articles-and-Analysis/extremist-movements-are-thriving-as-ai-tech-proliferates.html 18) Ware, J., The Third Generation of Online Radicalization, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 16th June 2023 https://extremism.gwu.edu/third-generation-online-radicalization 19) Krona, M., Online jihadist communities build their brands and expand the terrorist universe by creating new entities, Re-aCT2022, Report on Terrorism and Radicalism in Europe, N.3, Year 3, ed. START InSight (Lugano) https://www.startinsight.eu/react2022-n-3-anno-3/ 20) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/ 21) Pro-Islamic State (ISIS) Social Media Campaign Calling For ‘Media Jihad’ Expands To TikTok, Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, MEMRI, 22nd June 2023 https://www.memri.org/jttm/pro-islamic-state-isis-social-media-campaign-calling-media-jihad-expands-tiktok 22) See: Death Weapons 23) Extremist Content Online: Pro-ISIS TikTok Users Celebrate Accused Attacker In Zurich Stabbing, Counter Extremism Pro-ject, 11 March 2024 https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-pro-isis-tiktok-users-celebrate-accused-attacker-zurich-stabbing 24) “IS recruitment is not portrayed as violent enlistment for a political-religious cause but as a platform for venting frustrations with parents, teachers and society. It offers an outlet for their mundane lives and a chance at dubious “15 minutes of fame”, in: Av-rahami, Z., TikTok jihad: Online radicalization threat looms over Europe, Ynetnews.com, 10th August 2024 https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjgiduh9c 25) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, cit.
Chiara Sulmoni, BA, MA, Presidente e Coordinatrice editoriale di START InSight, Lugano, (Svizzera), ha conseguito un BA e un MA in Italian Studies c/o UCL (University College London) e un MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies c/o SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, London). Giornalista e producer, ha lavorato alla realizzazione di documentari e reportage per la radio / TV in particolare su temi legati al mondo arabo e islamico, Afghanistan e Pakistan, conflitti, radicalizzazione di matrice islamista. Dal 17 aprile 2019, è Co-Direttore di ReaCT – Osservatorio nazionale sul Radicalismo e il Contrasto al Terrorismo (Roma-Milano-Lugano).
Jihadist Terrorism in Europe and Mediterranean Dynamics: Historical, Social, and Operational Evolution in an Era of Global Changes
by Claudio Bertolotti, Director, START InSight, ReaCT
Abstract This article investigates terrorism beyond its traditional definitions; it examines its evolution within the geographical borders of Europe, it emphasizes its historical roots, individual and collective motivations, and operational adaptation, sharing the reasons why a revision of the very definition of terrorism is now necessary, and why it ought to be understood as an effect of violence, rather than an act which is merely organized for political ends. Analyzing the data provided by START InSight’s database, the article focuses on EU countries which are constantly affected by the trajectories of jihadism and the consequent challenges for collective security, while contributing to the academic debate with a multidimensional perspective on terrorism which considers its historical, socio-political and cultural aspects.
Keywords Jihadism, Functional blockade, Terrorism
1. Terrorism as a political and social phenomenon which evolves over time in response to the changing dynamics of competition between individuals, groups, and states. Contemporary terrorism, deeply rooted in a complex historical evolution, represents a widespread ideological threat. The threat of jihadist terrorism is particularly significant today and is linked to the historical, conflictual dynamics of international relations and competition in the Middle East and Africa, and to the violence stemming from a radical interpretation of Islam. This conflictual dynamic is increasingly associated with groups’ and individuals’ search for identity through the cultural opposition of a significant segment of second and third-generation immi-grants from the Maghreb living in Europe. We are discussing a fragmented jihadist galaxy characterized by various ideologies and practical approaches, prompting a reconsideration of the concept of contemporary terrorism, which emerges as a social phenomenon distinct from previous forms of terrorism.
This necessary reflection invites us to consider a paradigm shift in the very definition of terrorism, no longer to be understood as an action aimed at achieving political results through violence, hence in its intentions. Instead, terrorism should be seen as the effect of applied violence: it is terrorism, insofar it is a manifestation of violence, without an organization behind it. It is terrorism due to the manifestation, not organization.
Within the same jihadist galaxy, terrorism imposes itself as an instrument of struggle, resistance, and domination, employing various degrees and models of violence: from individual acts to organized, inspired, and insurgent terrorism, of the kind we became acquainted with in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that we now observe in its early manifestations in the Gaza Strip, where the Israel Defense Forces are engaging Hamas (Bertolotti, 2024).
The Afghan experience, which the author of this article has thoroughly studied for many years, combined with the wave of violence following Hamas’s call for strikes against Israel and its allies, has played a decisive role in the resurgence of inspired and emulative terrorism globally. The latter, on the one hand, is based on the victorious experience of the Taliban against the West; on the other, on the anger channeled through Hamas’s communication strategy, which finds resonance in some ideologized Western minorities, conflating Hamas’s violent and terrorist agenda with the legitimate Palestinian cause. Events in international relations are exploited by jihadist rhetoric to demonstrate the righteousness and validity of jihad, and thus of terrorism as a tool of struggle, victory, and justice.
Today, after and alongside Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, the it’s conflict dynamics in the Middle East and Hamas’s media-amplified terrorism that play this role of ideological and mass involvement drive. This results in emulative forms of violence, which terrorism against Israel has partly provoked and could increasingly provoke in Europe, as well as in North African countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel.
2. Trends and Dynamics: Numbers Decline, but the Threat of Terrorism Persists – An Analysis of Attacks from 2014 to 2023 Looking at the past five years, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend from a quantitative perspective, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-Isis/Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2024, 92 attacks (12 in 2023 and 2024 – situation at 20.09.2024), both successful and unsuccessful, were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland: 99 attacks were recorded in the previous period 2014-2018 (12 in 2015).
In the wake of major terrorist events in Europe in the name of the Islamic State group, and subsequently likely related to galvanizing elements following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the call from Hamas, 206 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2024, of which 70 were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 249 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 died in action), 446 victims were killed, and 2,558 were injured (START InSight database).
Both in 2023 and 2024, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks recorded in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by other attacks which took place over the previous days, which raised the figure to the high levels of previous years: from 17% of total emulative actions in 2022 to 58% in 2023 (56% in 2021). 2023 also confirmed an established trend in the phenomenon’s evolution, with an almost exclusive predominance of individual, unorganized actions, generally improvised, progressively replacing structured and coordinated actions characterizing the European urban “battlefield” of 2015-2017 (totality of actions in 2023 and 97% of actions recorded the previous year).
Data from START InSight’s database of jihadist events in Europe
Knives and blades Terrorists are increasingly using knives for a variety of reasons related to practical, ideological, and strategic factors:
Ease of access: Knives are readily available and do not require advanced technical skills to use. Unlike firearms or explosives, which may require logistics or technical knowledge, knives are common in every household or store.
Discretion: A knife can be carried easily without raising suspicion, unlike more conspicuous or dangerous weapons. This allows the attacker to approach victims or locations without being noticed immediately.
Terror effect: Knife attacks, often conducted in public or crowded spaces, have a strong psychological impact on the population. The close and brutal nature of a knife attack amplifies fear among those present and in the media, creating a significant symbolic effect.
Individual attacks: In recent years, many terrorist organizations have encouraged individual or “lone wolf” attacks. Knife attacks are ideal for this type of action, as they require minimal planning and can be carried out by a single person without the need for a complex organizational network.
Weapon control: In many countries, firearm laws are very strict, making it difficult to obtain guns or rifles. Knives, on the other hand, are less regulated and can be legally purchased almost anywhere.
Inspiration model: Successful knife attacks, like those in various European cities in recent years, have inspired other extremists to replicate this type of action, following the narrative that it is an effective and relatively simple means of spreading terror. In summary, the growing use of knives by terrorists is linked to their accessibility, ease of use, discretion, and effectiveness in creating panic and fear among the population (Molle, 2024).
3. Profiles of “European” Terrorists Jihadist terrorism is predominantly a male phenomenon: out of 295 attackers, 97% are male (10 women); contrary to 2020, when 3 female attackers participated in terrorist actions, the 2021-2023 triennium saw no direct participation from them. Identified terrorists (men and women) whose demographic data were disclosed have a median age of 26 years: a figure that varies over time (from 24 in 2016 to 30 in 2019), recording an increase in age in the last analyzed period, delivering a figure of 28.5 years in 2023. The study of the profile of 200 individuals about whom there’s sufficient demographic information draws a very interesting picture: 7% of terrorists are under 19 years old (with a reduction in minors over time), 38% are between 19 and 26, 41.5% are between 27 and 35, and 13.5% are over 35and 13.5% are over 35. These data confirm an in-creasing relevance over time, of the 19-35 age group, with a reduction in minors involved in terrorist attacks over the same period.
93% of the individuals who carried out a terrorist attacks, for whom we have complete information, were “immigrants” (first, second, and third generation), both regular and irregular. 45% of the 155 terrorists, out of a total of 237, who were analyzed in START InSight’s database are first-generation regular immigrants; 28% are descendants of immigrants (second or third generation); irregular immigrants are 26%: a figure which has grown over time, from 25% in 2020, to 50% in 2021, to 67% in 2023, indicating a significant change in the nature of terrorists, with an increasing presence of first-generation attackers (overall 71% of total terrorists). Significant is also the figure related to 7% of European-origin citizens converted to Islam (a slight decline compared to the average of previous years). Overall, 73% of terrorists are legally resident in Europe, while the role of irregular immigrants emerges with a ratio of about 1 in 4 terrorists (the ratio was 1:6 until 2020). In 4% of events, there were children/minors (7) among the attackers, a figure which has decreased.
Ethno-national Dimension of Terrorists in Europe The phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe affects some specific national and ethnic groups more significantly than others. There is a clear proportional relationship between the main groups of immigrants and terrorists, highlighted by the nationality of terrorists or their families of origin, which reflects the size of foreign communities in Europe. In particular, the Maghreb origin prevails: the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan (especially in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy) and Algerian (in France). The phenomenon of radicalization has been particularly evident in Belgium and France, where large Moroccan and Algerian-origin communities have seen a significant number of young people join jihadist groups. In France, for example, a significant portion of terrorists involved in recent attacks came from families of Algerian and Moroccan origin, reflecting the historical presence and size of these communities in the country (Bertolotti, 2023).
Recidivists and Terrorists Already Known to Intelligence The role of recidivists (re-offenders) has grown over time. These are individuals already convicted of terrorism who have committed violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some cases, even within prison facilities. This trend shows a 3% recidivism rate among terrorists who struck in 2018 (1 case), 7% (2) in 2019, 27% (6) in 2020, and 25% (3) in 2023. This situation confirms the social danger of individuals who, although incarcerated, delay the implementation of terrorist actions. This phenomenon suggests an increased likelihood of terrorist attacks in the coming years, parallel to the release of many detainees for terrorism-related offenses.
START InSight highlighted a significant trend regarding terrorist actions carried out by individuals already known to law enforcement or European intelligence. In 2021, such cases represented 44% of the total, while in 2020, they were 54%. This is a significant increase compared to the 10% recorded in 2019 and the 17% of 2018. In 2023 this figure grew to 75%, supporting the concerns of institutions tasked with countering violent phenomena.
Individuals with previous detentions (even for non-terrorism-related offenses) in 2021 confirmed a certain stability in participation in terrorist actions by individuals with a prison record, with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year (33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018, and 12% in 2017); which seems to confirm that, despite a significantly lower figure in 2023 (8%), prison spaces can be identified as potential radicalization hubs.
4. What is the real destructive capacity of terrorism? To understand terrorism comprehensively, one must analyze it on three distinct levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategy involves the use of resources to achieve long-term war goals. Tactics focus on deploying forces in combat to secure specific victories in battles. The operational level bridges the two, coordinating tactical actions to meet strategic objectives. This synthesis, at its core, highlights the importance of human resources in conducting military actions.
Strategic Success Is Marginal Strategic success in terrorist actions, defined as achieving significant structural impacts like national and international air/rail traffic disruptions, military mobilizations, or broad legislative interventions, has decreased from 16% to 13%. This is still considered high given the limited organizational and financial efforts by terrorist groups or individuals. Over the years, strategic success rates have shown a declining trend, highlighting a gradual reduction in capacity and effectiveness: 75% in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in 2019, 12% in 2020, and 6% in 2021. Since 2022, strategic success has not been achieved by terrorist attacks; effectively confirming an ongoing process of normalizing terrorism.
Media Attention is Decreasing Media attention towards terrorist attacks is decreasing. Strategically, attacks received international media coverage in 75% of the cases and 95% nationally. Operations by commando and team-raid units received full media coverage. This media success significantly influenced the recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihadist fighters, peaking during periods of high-intensity terrorist actions (2016-2017). However, the effects of media coverage on recruitment efforts diminishes over time due to two main reasons: firstly, a prevalence of low-intensity actions compared to high-intensity ones, which have decreased, while low and medium-intensity actions have significantly increased from 2017 to 2021, with a notable rise in medium-intensity actions in 2023. Secondly, the public has become gradually less emotionally sensitive to terrorism, particularly low and medium-intensity events.
Despite concerns, Tactical Level Concerns but Is Not a Priority for Terrorism Assuming the goal of actions is to cause the enemy’s death (with security forces as targets in 35% of cases), this was achieved on average in 50% of the cases between 2004 and 2023. However, the long timeframe significantly impacts the margin of error. An analysis of the 2014-2023 period, shows a worsening trend in the terrorists’ desired effects, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an increase in failed actions, at least until 2022, when tactical success stabilized at 33%, which is consistent with 2016 data. 2023 is an outlier. Data from the last six years show that in 2016, tactical success was achieved in 31% of cases, with 6% failed acts. In 2017, success rose to 40%, with a 20% failure rate. In 2018, success dropped to 33%, while failed attacks doubled to 42%. In 2019, success further fell to 25%, then rose to 33% in 2020-2022. This trend, interpreted as a dual effect of reduced terrorist operational capacity and increased European security responsiveness, shows a 2023 rate of 50% actions achieving tactical success, i.e., causing at least one fatality.
Operational Success: The “Functional Blockade” Even when a terrorist attack fails, it produces significant results: it heavily engages armed forces and police, distracting them from routine activities or preventing them from intervening for public welfare. It can also disrupt or overload healthcare services, limit, slow down, divert, or stop urban, air, and naval mobility, and hinder the regular conduct of daily, commercial, and professional activities, harming affected communities. This effectively reduces technological advantages, operational potential, and resilience capacity. Overall, it inflicts direct and indirect damage, regardless of causing fatalities. Limiting citizens’ freedom is a measurable result of these actions. Essentially, terrorism’s success, even without causing fatalities, lies in imposing economic and social costs on society and influencing behaviours over time in terms of security measures or restrictions imposed by political and public safety authorities. This phenomenon is known as a “functional blockade.” Despite the increasingly reduced operational capacity of terrorism, the “functional blockade” remains one of the most important results achieved by terrorists, regardless of tacti-cal success (killing at least one target). From 2004 to the present, terrorism has proven effective in achieving the a “functional blockade” in 80% of cases, peaking at 92% in 2020 and 89% in 2021. This impressive result, obtained with limited resources, confirms the advantageous cost-benefit ratio in favour of terrorism, despite a progressive loss of capacity that saw the “functional blockade” drop to 78% in 2022 and 67% in 2023.
5. Recruitment Capacity and Operational Strategies The Islamic State, having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq (2013-2017), can no longer send its terrorists to Europe due to the loss of direct external operational projection capacity. However, the group has not lost its power of attraction, which demonstrates its ability to develop indirect recruitment, based on the “posthumous” recognition of individuals who successfully carry out individual terrorist actions. For these reasons, the threat remains significant, thanks to the presence and actions of lone actors, often improvised and driven by emulation, without direct links to the organization.
While the Islamic State continues to impose itself ideologically as the main jihadist threat, particularly exploiting the territorial control and financial resources of its Afghan franchise, the Islamic State Khorasan, it is evident that it cannot replicate the overwhelming appeal of the “caliphate” in 2014-2017. The novelty advantage and consequent appeal, particularly towards the youth, have diminished. Additionally, the European Union has significantly reduced its vulnerabilities legislatively and operationally, with more emphasis on counterterrorism than preventive action.
Concerns persist regarding emulative effects and the “call to arms” related to international events that can induce individuals to act in the name of jihad. The most significant event in 2021, which continues to fuel transnational jihad, was the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. This victory fed diverse jihadist propaganda with the message that “victory is the result of continuous struggle” and created competition among jihadi groups engaged in exclusively local struggles and those like the Islamic State, which promote jihad as a relentless global struggle. This competitive dynamic includes actions associated with the Israel-Hamas war and the jihadist call to violence, where Islamic State followers and Hamas supporters have vied for battlefield successes and consequent media attention.
In this continually evolving scenario, attention must be paid to jihadist strength in the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Rwanda, and Mozambique, in order to counter the emergence of new “caliphates” or “wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe. In prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic State boasts of its spread in Africa, in a competitive / collaborative relationship with its Afghan franchise. It highlights how the aim of combating the presence and spread of Christianity will lead to the group’s expansion in other areas of the continent. In places like the Ma-ghreb, the Mashreq, and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s activity focuses on intra-Muslim sectarian struggle. In Africa, its presence has become part of a Muslim-Christian conflict, strengthened by propaganda centred on stopping Muslims from converting to Christianity through the work of “missionaries” and the pretext of humanitarian aid. Violence, kidnappings, and the kill-ing of missionary clergy, attacks on NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso to the Congo, as well as attacks on Christian communities, are all part and parcel of this context.
From North Africa to the Sahel: A Look at “Mediterranean” Terrorism Looking at North Africa, the region continues to face threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State, and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who have travelled to Iraq or Syria. The unnoticed return of these fighters to their home countries following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat poses additional security challenges. In recent years, lone actors and small cells have carried out a series of deadly attacks in various North African states, proving difficult to detect. The Sahel is becoming a new center of jihadist terrorism, with a significant increase in victims in 2023. However, the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has seen a 42% decrease in victims over the past three years. North Africa, in particular, is witnessing a steady reduction in extremist violence, with the number of violent attacks returning to pre-IS levels. In 2022, North Africa saw a 14-fold decrease in victims com-pared to 2015, with Morocco being the safest country in the region, while Egypt remains one of the most affected by terrorism. Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia fall between these extremes with medium to low terrorism impact.
The Sahel and the Maghreb are politically, economically, and security-wise connected. The presence of terrorist groups exploiting ethnic tensions, climate challenges, and lack of public services has turned this region into a hub of jihadist activity, with the risk of spreading the terrorist threat to other areas.
Instability in the Sahel has already affected West Africa and the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are active. This situation could also involve North Africa, jeopardizing the progress made in prevention, counterterrorism, and deradicalization in some countries of the region.
Considering that North African countries are both emigration and transit countries for migratory flows to Europe, this raises the question of possible jihadist contamination or transfer. Monitoring the evolution of a phenomenon in the process of consolidation, which finds its lifeblood in the Mediterranean area, is therefore paramount.
Claudio Bertolotti, ISPI, START InSight’s Director and Director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism (ReaCT). Claudio Bertolotti holds a Ph.D. and serves as the Executive Director of START InSight. From 2014 to 2023, he was a senior researcher with the “5+5 Defense Initiative.” He graduated in Contemporary History, specialized in Sociology of Islam, and earned a doctorate in Sociology and Political Science, focusing on International Relations. His work focuses on crisis areas, national strategic interests, national security, the Mediterranean, intercultural dialogue, and, in particular, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, jihadism, and migration flows. Since April 17, 2019, he has been the Executive Director of ReaCT – National Observatory on Radicalism and Counter-Terrorism (Rome-Milan-Lugano). Since September 30, 2021, he has been a member of the Committee on Human and Civil Rights at the Regional Council of Piedmont. He is the author of several works, including Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban Warfare between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence (START InSight, 2024), Immigration and Terrorism (START InSight, 2020), Contemporary Afghanistan. Inside the Longest War (CASD, 2019), and Shahid: Analysis of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan (FrancoAngeli, 2010). Corresponding with the Author: claudio.bertolotti@startinsight.eu.
Bibliography Bertolotti, C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight ed., Lugano. Bertolotti, C. (2023), Unraveling the Evolution of Terrorism in Europe: Left-Wing, Far-Right, Anarchist, and Individual Terrorism, and the Role of Immigrants in Jihadist Terrorism within the European Union (Correlation and Regression Analysis), pp. 77-87, in #ReaCT2023, 4th Report on Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization in Europe, START InSight ed., Lugano, ISBN 978-88-322-94-18-7, ISSN 2813-1037 (print), ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Weaponizing Chaos: Exploring Militant Accelerationism from the Far-Left to the Far-Right
By Andrea Molle, Associate Professor, Chapman University
Abstract Militant accelerationism is defined by the Accelerationism Research Consortium as a set of strategies aimed at exacerbating social divisions to hasten the collapse of society, often through violent means. This phenomenon is not confined to a single poli-tical ideology, being present in both the far-right and far-left, though manifesting in different forms. Far-right accelerationism primarily opposes equality, viewing it as a threat to the natural social order, and seeks to precipitate the collapse of liberal de-mocracies through polarization and political violence. From a geopolitical perspective, nations like Russia and China might support such movements to destabilize the West and undermine the legitimacy of the liberal democratic model, thereby reinfor-cing their authoritarian positions. On the other hand, far-left accelerationism originates from Marxism, aiming to accelerate the downfall of capitalism to trigger a proletarian revolution. These dynamics represent a growing threat to international security, as they exploit internal tensions and social divisions to promote global instability.
The Accelerationism Research Consortium, a research initiative specializing in the study of militant accelerationism, defines it as a collection of tactics and strategies aimed at intensifying latent social divisions, often through violent means, in order to expedite the collapse of society. Accelerationism does not necessarily align with a specific political ideology and can be observed on both the extreme left and extreme right of the political spectrum. However, there are distinctions between the two.
For instance, far-right militant accelerationism does not concern itself with critiquing modern capitalism or postcolonialism, but rather focuses on countering the contemporary pursuit of equality, which is perceived as a manifestation of societal decay and a threat to the established social order based on inequality, which is considered the “natural order.” In order to safeguard or reinstate this “natural order,” far-right militant accelerationism seeks to create circumstances that would lead to the downfall of the existing liberal and democratic system, such as through a “race war” or a civil war. Militant accelerationism functions as a platform for political action with the objective of hastening the downfall of liberal and capitalist societies. Its core strategy involves disseminating contradictory and problematic political ideologies through various means, such as promoting polarization or engaging in political violence. This form of terrorism aims to create social emergencies and crises, ultimately incapacitating and dismantling social institutions.
From an International Relations and Security Studies perspective it is noticeable that this goal aligns with the objectives of hostile nations. Russia and China, for example, may support militant accelerationism regardless of its political ideology alignment in the West for several strategic reasons. Firstly, fostering chaos and division within Western nations serves to undermine their stability and global influence, thereby potentially strengthening the position of Russia and China on the world stage. By exacerbating existing societal tensions and polarizations, these countries can create distrac-tions for Western governments, diverting their attention and resources away from global issues such as Ukraine or Taiwan. Secondly, supporting accelerationist groups aligns with Russia and China’s broader objectives of challenging the Western liberal democratic model. By promoting extremist ideologies that reject democratic norms and institutions, such as militant accelerationism, these countries seek to delegitimize Western values and weaken the appeal of democracy as a political system globally. This tactic can help bolster the perceived legitimacy of authoritarian regimes like those in Russia and China, presenting them as stable alternatives to Western democracies. Moreover, fostering internal strife in Western countries can serve as a form of retaliation or deterrence against perceived Western interference in the domestic affairs of Russia and China. By supporting militant accelerationism, these countries can retaliate against Western sanctions, criticisms of human rights abuses, or support for opposition movements within Russia and China. Additionally, by highlighting the internal divisions and societal unrest in Western nations, Russia and China can dissuade Western governments from intervening in their domestic affairs or pursuing aggressive foreign policies against them.
1. Far-left militant accelerationism Accelerationism, as a concept, originated from Marxism and the belief that by intensifying the detrimental forces within capitalism, its eventual destruction and subsequent liberation through revolution can be achieved. Left-wing terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. They may also advocate for environmental or animal rights, hold pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs, or support decentralized social and political systems like anarchism. In terms of incidents, the number of fatal incidents attributed to far-left ideologies is fluctuating. The global peak of revolutionary accelerationist leftist violence occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. However, until 2012, there were still four times as many far-left terrorist incidents compared to far-right incidents. In recent years, particularly in 2019 and 2020, the number of far-right and far-left incidents has been roughly equal. As per more recent times, the situation has started to differ between Europe and the United States. In Europe, far-left attacks started again to be more prevalent. German organizations such as the Engel – Guntermann and the Hammerbande have a clear focus on targeting right-wing extremists or individuals perceived as such. However, there is a noticeable shift in their approach, as they are increasingly engaging in activities that extend beyond local conflicts with the right-wing extremist milieu. The collaboration between group members and non-Germans in carrying out attacks suggests a growing connection to external groups. This interconnectedness among left-wing extremist networks in Europe has the potential to influence their strategies and the specific targets they choose.
In the United States, according to the Anti-Defamation League, only 6% of the 443 registered extremist fatalities between 2012 and 2021 were linked to far-left ideologies. In comparison, 75% were linked to far-right beliefs, and 20% were linked to Islamist beliefs. It is important to note that all the casualties related to far-left ideologies in the US were associated with Black nationalism, which the ADL categorizes as left-wing extremism. Overall, the violent threat posed by left-wing extremists in the US remains relatively small whereas in Europe it is increasing. The trend has been confirmed by several authorities. For example, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) report in 2022 that 80% of the successfully executed attacks were carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups.
Globally, movements affiliated with far-left ideologies include Antifa groups, as well as environmental or animal issue groups like the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front. There are also various far-left alternative media outlets, such as The Grayzone or Breakthrough News, and organizations like the Party for Socialism and Liberation or Workers World Party. These entities may occasionally express sympathy towards authoritarian regimes perceived as hostile to the West and embrace conspiracy theories. While these platforms may not overtly endorse violence, their content and campaigns actively advocate for authoritarian ideologies within mainstream audiences, thereby eroding the credibility of human rights and democracy advocates and promoting polarization. The Grayzone, a far-left media outlet, exemplifies this concerning trend. Established in 2015 by journalist Max Blumenthal shortly after a trip to Moscow, this media platform consistently adopts an ostensibly anti-imperialist stance, frequently defending Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, and Venezuela’s Maduro for their purported resistance against US dominance. Furthermore, it denies the occurrence of the Uyghur genocide and chemical gas attacks in Syria. Blumenthal himself has participated in anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine rallies, and currently plays a highly active role in the Pro-Hamas/Pro-Palestinian movement, which poses a significant and alarming new challenge to national security.
1.1. The use of Internet by far-left militant accelerationism The exploration of the online far-left culture is a topic that is often overlooked. This particular faction, which exists on the fringes of the broader left, positions itself as being against various ideologies and groups such as the alt-right, political correctness, social justice warriors, and centrists and liberal-democratic stances. Despite its ideological roots and the tendency of the left to look down on popular online culture, it employs similar tactics to the online alt-right, including the use of humor, memes, Twitter trolling, and open hostility. However, it remains firmly rooted in progressive leftist ideology. Referred to by various names such as the “alt-left,” the “vulgar left,” or the “Dirtbag Left,” this origin of this movement is attributed to Amber A’Lee Frost, a writer, podcaster, and activist based in Brooklyn. Her podcast Chapo Trap House, associated closely with this movement, employs comedy and irony in a shock jock style, while also criticizing both the Democratic and Republican parties. Other media outlets and individuals connected to the dirtbag left include TrueAnon and Red Scare, which are also loosely associated with the BlueAnon movement, a leftist counterpart to the well-known QAnon phenomenon.
2. Far-right militant accelerationism Initially, militant accelerationism was not primarily associated with far-right extremism. However, it gradually found its way into this milieu through two significant avenues. Firstly, in the 1990s, British philosopher Nick Land developed a right-leaning libertarian version of accelerationism after studying the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on left-wing accelerationism and incorporating his own interpretation of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Two decades later, during the early 2010s, Land’s ideas gained traction among the emerging “alt-right” movement, which became deeply interested in his anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic concept of “neo-reaction.” The second and most influ-ential pathway through which accelerationism infiltrated the far-right was the publication of the book Siege, which compiled newsletter posts written by American neo-Nazi James Mason. Mason, a follower of Charles Mason, has been involved in various neo-Nazi organizations in the United States since the late 1960s. He had personal connections with prominent far-right leaders, including George Lincoln Rockwell, the leader of the American Nazi Party, and William Pierce, the author of the novel The Turner Diaries, which inspired the 1995 terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. Mason was also influenced by Joseph Tommasi, the leader of the National Socialist Liberation Front, a group inspired by leftist organizations and urban guerrilla warfare. Tommasi advocated for the creation of chaos through terrorism as a means to destabilize the political order in the United States.
Mason created the newsletter Siege, published from 1980 to 1986, as a platform to express his disapproval of the stance taken by American far-right extremism. Within the pages of his publication, he incorporated elements of antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories, specifically focusing on a “Jewish world conspiracy” that aimed to execute a “white genocide.” This concept, now labeled as the “Great Replacement,” contributed to the development of the “deep state” myth, spawning the bipartisan trope of a “Zionist Occupied Government” in America. In his book, Mason also argued that the prevailing social order had become so deeply corrupted that established organizations like the American Nazi Party, with their conventional methods of political engagement, had become ineffective in their pursuit of liberating the “white race.” According to Mason, progress could only be achieved through revolutionary, violent, means carried out by individuals and the estab-lishment of a National Socialist “New Order” would require the destruction of society. Far-right militant ac-celerationism, as a subtype of apocalyptic terrorism, draws heavily on antisemitic tropes, including concepts like “white genocide” and the “Great Replacement Theory. Moreover, it leverages perceived traditional knowledge and cultural codes to rationalize their anti-modern beliefs and to target individuals they hold responsible for societal decay. Consequently, accelerationism can be viewed as a quasi-religion, as evidenced by its resemblances and intermingling with groups like the Branch Davidians, whose eschatology mirrors similar dynamics.
Screenshot from a PBS documentary aired on August 7th, 2018
2.1. The use of Internet by far-right militant accelerationism In the United States, adherents of far-right ideologies recognized the potential of the internet as early as the 1980s. They understood that online platforms offered an unparalleled opportunity to disseminate their message to a broader audience without the constraints imposed by traditional media. Notably, David Duke, a prominent figure in the US far-right extremist movement and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, lauded the internet as an ideal platform for a “white revolution.” The advent of online communication played a significant role in the rise of Siege, particularly during the mid-2010s when the “alt-right” gained prominence. This movement embraced militant action strategies, which were further amplified in the aftermath of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, USA, in August 2017. The events surrounding the rally, including the tragic killing of counter-protestor Heather Heyer, sparked intense debates within the American far-right extremist community. Mason’s critique of demonstrations and his advocacy for militant accelerationism resonated widely within these discussions. Consequently, following the Charlottesville events, the hashtag #ReadSiege gained traction both domestically and within the transnational far-right online discourse.
As today, the risk associated with militant accelerationism is primarily monitored in North America, with only a limited number of European analysts actively keeping tabs on its activities. The globalization of far-right militant accelerationism during the 2010s has given rise to various trajectories, all closely intertwined with digital spaces, which should raise concerns. One prominent platform for far-right militant accelerationism was the English-language Iron March, which operated from 2011 to 2017 and served as a breeding ground for accelerationist groups. This forum attracted a diverse range of militant far-right extremists who felt marginalized by other far-right internet forums like Stormfront, established in 1996, or were dissatisfied with the offerings of existing far-right organizations targeted at the youth. Within the Iron March forum, members cultivated their own subculture of far-right militant accelerationism, characterized by key texts and a distinct aesthetic featuring logos inspired by Waffen SS symbols and black and white skull masks. The administrators of Iron March actively encouraged transnational online communication and facilitated regional and local networking among members beyond the confines of the digital realm. Notably, a far-right extremist terrorist network emerged among the users of Iron March, which remains active to this day. Iron March’s influence extended beyond the development of its far-right extremist subculture, as it placed significant emphasis on taking action. Consequently, several accelerationist groups, including National Action (UK), Feuerkrieg Division (USA), and Antipodean Resistance (2016), were established as offshoots of this forum. It is also important to recognize that Iron March merely marked the beginning of this phenomenon.
3. The manosphere Despite a general decline in public activities among far-right militant accelerationists during the COVID-19 pandemic, their digital efforts have significantly increased since the spring of 2022. Consequently, the number of prevented attacks has also risen. The primary trends that originated within these tightly knit online communities during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s remain relevant within the global social network they have evolved into. Notably, new online spaces continuously emerge, often bearing little resemblance to formal, traditional far-right extremist organizations. These decentralized networks, organized in cells, foster sub-cultures defined by their cultural codes, such as memes, and constantly adapt to enhance their relevance in the public sphere. They have now permeated other online realms, including gaming platforms, and rely on the broader internet troll culture. They propagate through the manosphere, a collection of communities centered around radical anti-feminism and the conspiracy theory milieu, where individuals seek “the truth” or embrace the “Red Pill” ideology. These networks thrive in “politically incorrect” boards, forming a transnational subculture that revolves around both ironic and serious far-right extremist, misogynistic, antisemitic, and misanthropic content. Of particular interest is the manosphere, which has attracted the attention of accelerationists due to its rapid growth and potential for real-world violent outbursts.
Despite being referred to as a collective noun, the manosphere encompasses four distinct subcultures: men’s rights activists who view feminist policies as detrimental to men’s rights, incels (involuntary celibates) who hold women responsible for their lack of opportunities and social status, separatists who believe in a feminist conspiracy to dismantle masculinity and advocate for complete segregation between genders, and the seductive type who objectify women and promote the acceptance of rape culture. These emerging subcultures also align themselves with existing digital hate cultures that have already established their presence on various platforms, thereby bolstering their recruitment efforts.
4. When left and right join forces It is important to acknowledge that accelerationist groups primarily act as opportunists and will seize any opportunity to infiltrate a popular movement. This has been evident in various instances throughout history. For instance, in 2020, the far-right anti-government Boogaloo movement attempted to associate themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement by claiming shared goals. Similarly, in the 2000s, the far-left Black Blocs successfully exploited popular protests against the G8 leaders. During the pandemic, both far-left and far-right groups united against lockdown measures. In these contexts, stochastic violence has also surfaced, manifesting as sporadic acts of aggression, intimidation, or property destruction. While such gatherings ostensibly advocated against vaccination mandates and perceived infringements on personal freedoms, they often attracted individuals with extremist inclinations from both the far-left and far-right ends of the political spectrum. Amidst the commotion of these events, lone actors or small factions have engaged in acts of random (stochastic) violence, ranging from verbal harassment to physical violence, aimed at sowing chaos and instilling fear. Far-right extremists have exploited these rallies to propagate anti-government sentiment and amplify distrust in public health institutions, while far-left had view them as opportunities to challenge corporate interests and in particular Big-Pharma. The unpredictable nature of stochastic violence in this context not only poses immediate safety concerns but also underscores the broader societal polarization and radicalization fueling such events.
In the current political environment, these groups are now aligning themselves with the pro-Palestine movement. The pro-Palestine movement has gained significant support in recent weeks, with numerous protesters taking to the streets worldwide to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, this surge in support has also created an environment where various groups, including far-left, far-right accelerationists, and antise-mitic organizations, attempt to associate themselves with the mainstream pro-Palestine movement. This has resulted in a confusing web of claims and widespread dissemination of misinformation. One way these groups exploit the pro-Palestine movement is by adopt-ing its language to criticize the actions of the Israeli government in Gaza. However, they then utilize this platform to promote anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and stereotypes. The right-wing factions often reference the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, baselessly claiming that Jewish individuals purposefully facilitate migration into Western countries to replace white people. On the other hand, the left-wing factions attack liberal democracies and market-based economies by invoking references to Zionism and colonialism. Across the United States and Europe, far-right and far-left extremists have capitalized on the growing anger towards the Israeli government as an opportunity to spread anti-semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist conspiracy theories. Their intention is to legitimize these ideas within mainstream discourse and attract new recruits.
5. Main takeaways Both the far-left and the far-right militant accelerationist groups possess a digital evolutionary advantage due to the transformations in the online media landscape, which have created new avenues for radicalization. These accelerationists have also strategically utilized algorithms to target susceptible individuals for recruitment. Unlike their BBS predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s, which mirrored real-life communities, today’s platforms are characterized by the “attention economy” and “dopamine addiction.” Posts that fail to attract sufficient attention are gradually phased out from the front page to make room for particularly captivating posts, effectively turning extremism into a chemical dependency. Moreover, far-left and far-right violence is increasingly intertwined, creating a classic “security dilemma.” These characteristics further amplify the perilous nature of this phenomenon and should require active monitoring and intervention.
Stochastic violence is a disturbing tactic employed by political extremists, characterized by its unpredictable and random nature. Unlike organized violence with clear targets and objectives, stochastic violence aims to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear and uncertainty by striking seemingly at random. This strategy often involves lone actors or small groups carrying out acts of violence without direct coordination with a larger organization, making it difficult for authorities to anticipate or prevent. The perpetrators may be motivated by extreme ideologies or grievances, using violence as a means to spread terror and advance their agenda. Stochastic violence poses a significant challenge to counterterrorism efforts, as it can be difficult to detect and preemptively address the underlying radicalization that fuels such attacks. Moreover, its unpredictable nature amplifies the psychological impact on communities, fostering fear and distrust while undermining social cohesion. Addressing stochastic violence requires a multifaceted approach that addresses not only the im-mediate security concerns but also the underlying societal factors that contribute to extremism and radicalization.
Militant accelerationism has emerged as a tool for hostile foreign countries like Russia and China to sow chaos and destabilize Western nations from within. These nations may clandestinely support or manipulate extremist groups subscribing to accelerationist doctrines to exacerbate existing social tensions and exploit vulnerabilities in democratic systems. For instance, Russia has been accused of utilizing online platforms to amplify divisive narratives and support far-right accelerationist movements in Europe and the United States, aiming to undermine trust in democratic institutions and foster internal discord. Similarly, China has been implicated in funding and promoting extremist factions to exploit societal fault lines in Western societies, thereby weakening their cohesion and global influence. Such exploitation of militant accelerationism underscores the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors and fringe ideologies become instruments in the geopolitical strategies of hostile nations. Overall, Russia and China may support militant accelerationist groups in the West as part of a multifaceted strategy to weaken their adversaries, challenge Western values and institutions, and advance their own geopolitical interests on the global stage. In conclusion, the risk of accelerated terrorism is clear and significant as we head into 2024, and it could even escalate further in the run-up to the US presidential election or the next European elections. Disgruntled individuals and armed extremist groups are likely to continue resorting to violence in order to spark a revolution and prevent what they perceive as the “deep state” from manipulating elections and enslave them. The current clash of conflicting narratives, present in nearly every aspect of political discourse, worsened by partisan divides and amplified on social media, will continue to hinder governments’ efforts to address the threat of domestic terrorism. The current atmosphere is alarmingly reminiscent of the period preceding events like the “years of lead” or the Oklahoma City bombing. Back then, extremist rhetoric urged supposed patriots or revolutionaries, like Timothy McVeigh or Mario Moretti, to protect their fellow citizens from what they saw as a corrupt government backed by a wealthy elite. Today, there are potentially many more individuals like them, and we cannot afford to wait for another series of tragic events before decisive action is taken against this threat.
Andrea Molle, Ph.D., FRAS, Senior Research Fellow, Orange (California, Stati Uniti). Quantitative and computational social scientist. Since 2012, he has been an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an Associate Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Society at Chapman University. From 2006 to 2008, he was a JSPS Fellow in Anthropology at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan).
#ReaCT2024 – Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe
Introduction by Claudio Bertolotti, Executive Director, ReaCT Observatory
As the Director of the Observatory on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism in Europe (ReaCT), I am both pleased and honored to present, for the fifth consecutive year, our annual research and analysis report on terrorism and radicalisation in Europe. Building on the foundation laid by the previous four editions, #ReaCT2024 – 5th Report on Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe is the result of the dedication and perseverance of researchers, academics, and professionals who, employing different approaches, methods, and perspectives, contribute to a multidisciplinary effort aimed at defining the origins, causes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of a multifaceted phenomenon that traditional analytical methodologies can no longer adequately encapsulate within merely descriptive and indicative definitions. It is now well-established, as we thoroughly anticipated at the beginning of our research and editorial journey in 2020, that social deviance increasingly overlaps with or is associated with phenomena of radical violence, often characterized by individual participation and imitative behavior with a significant “spectacular” ambition, falling within increasingly compartmentalized ideological or identity spheres.
In line with the trajectory established thus far, the Report presents itself as a unique combination of a scientific journal and a collective volume, with contributions from various authors, researchers, and collaborators who have generously dedicated their time, experience, and knowledge. Without exception, ReaCT’s board and I, express our deepest gratitude for their invaluable field research contributions and their immense intellectual efforts. I would also like to thank the Italian Ministry of Defense for reaffirming their confidence and trust in the Observatory I direct by granting patronage to the Report’s presentation events.
What insights does the ongoing research of the Observatory yield?
Over the past five years, within the broader context of historical and operational evolution, the incidence of jihadist terrorist attacks shows a linear trend, with a noticeable decrease in recent years, returning to pre-ISIS/ Islamic State levels. From 2019 to 2023, 80 attacks (12 in 2023) were recorded in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, both successful and failed, compared to 99 in the previous period from 2014 to 2018 (12 in 2015). Following the major terrorist events in Europe associated with the Islamic State group, and subsequently in probable relation to galvanizing factors following the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan, and Hamas’ call for war against Israel, 194 actions in the name of jihad were recorded from 2014 to 2023, 70 of which were explicitly claimed by the Islamic State: 237 terrorists participated (including 7 women, 73 of whom died in action), 440 victims were killed, and 2,539 were injured (START InSight database). In 2023, 12 jihadist actions were recorded, a slight decrease compared to the 18 annual attacks in 2022 and 2021, but with a significant increase in “emulative” actions, inspired by previous attacks, bringing the figure to levels similar to those of previous years.
The 2024 Report also delves into the issue of the Islamic State in Khorasan and the potential threat to Europe, with particular attention to jihad returning from the Sahel to North Africa.
Broadening the scope, #ReaCT2024 focuses on the variables of terrorism and the characteristics of anti-system manifestations, highlighting the need to analyze an extremely dynamic phenomenon based on the spaces of action and, on a paradigmatic level, to urgently move towards a shared definition of terrorism. Another topic explored is “lone wolf terrorism,” understood as a multifaceted and fragmented phenomenon, influenced by the role of social networks, collective dynamics, clusters, and online waves and communities, along with the evolution of forms of extremism that are “young, autonomous, and emancipated.”
In this constantly evolving context, the phenomena of radicalization and extremism in digital ecosystems, new technologies, and artificial intelligence, as well as digital hate speech as precursors to extremist violence, are examined. The report also provides a thorough analysis of militant accelerationism, from the far left to the far right, and the intriguing hypothesis of “armed chaos.” On the level of prevention, substantial attention is devoted to the analysis of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), providing a thorough assessment of its successes, limitations, and failures in terms of policies and practices. The focus is placed on the vexed question: will radicals ever fully de-radicalize? Significant space is also allocated to the emergence of new extremisms that carry anti-democratic demands, inviting readers to reflect on the evolution of these phenomena through two specific case studies: the first explores the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism through the contribution of security forces in Portugal; the second addresses the systemic gender discrimination in Afghanistan under the Islamist Taliban government, discussing the phenomenon of gender apartheid. In conclusion, this year’s contribution reaffirms the Observatory’s ambition to bear witness to the strength and dedication of our community of scholars and practitioners in the ongoing fight against the evolving phenomena of violent social deviance, radicalism, and terrorism. As the Director of the Observatory, my hope is that the findings and insights contained in this Report will increasingly contribute to a better understanding of the evolving threat of terrorism in Europe and serve as a call to action for all stakeholders committed to working together to prevent and counter violent extremism. I would like to extend my gratitude to all the Authors who, through their commendable work, have once again contributed to the realization of #ReaCT2024.
A special thanks goes, as always, to START InSight, whose support has enabled the international publication and distribution of our annual report. Lastly, I wish to honor the memory of our friend Marco Cochi, a serious and capable researcher, who was taken from us too soon.
The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN): Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
The European network for prevention practices and Italy: an assessment between lights and shadows
by Luca Guglielminetti, RAN Ambassador for Italy
THIS ARTICLE WILL FEATURE IN #REACT2024, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON TERRORISM AND RADICALISATION IN EUROPE (ED. START INSIGHT), WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN THE WORKS
This year marks the conclusion of the ‘Radicalisation Awareness Network – RAN’, the European network for prevention practices established in 2011 by the DG Home of the European Commission, which will be replaced by the ‘EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation’. Thus, it is time to evaluate this experience, in particular in our country, and open up a discussion on the future consolidation of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism (P/CVE).
These policies and
practices involve challenging and effective cooperation between various actors,
domains and approaches, such as security and resilience, repression and
trust-building, secrecy and transparency, retributive justice and restorative
justice, state institutions and civil society, national and local authorities,
media and academic institutions, former terrorists and victims. These pairs
already represent unresolved challenges, sparking controversy and, sometimes,
even bitter disputes throughout Europe. However, in Italy P/CVE practices are
now established. The question is whether we can transition from the current
state of fragmentation to one of strategic valorization in the future.
1. WHAT IS RAN
Italy, as we will see in
the second chapter, is one of the few State Members of the European Union (EU) without
a national strategy or legislation on P/CVE, it is appropriate to begin by
introducing what the Radicalisation Awareness Network (‘RAN’) is and how it
functions, for the benefit of those unfamiliar with it[1].
The Radicalisation
Awareness Network, or RAN, is a European network focused on practical
approaches for preventing violent extremism and terrorism, boasting over 6,000
participants. Launched in 2011 by the European Commission, RAN is fully funded
by it. While organizationally based at the Department for Migration and Internal
Affairs (DG HOME) of the European Commission, its activities are implemented
and coordinated by a consortium, subject to renewal through competitive bidding
every four years.
RAN’s aims to establish
networks and exchange information among experts from various prevention sectors
and countries in order to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). Its purpose
is to converge empirical and practical knowledge, along with new scientific
findings, and make them available to practitioners through nine working groups:
Communication and Narratives (RAN C&N): Focuses on developments and trends in extremist communication online and offline, as well as ways to counter them.
Youth and Education (RAN Y&E): Centers on supporting teachers and the education sector in managing radicalisation.
Rehabilitation (RAN REHABILITATION): Concentrates on deradicalisation and exit programs, as well as social reintegration services inside and outside prisons.
Families, Communities & Social Care (RAN FC&S): Addresses the best ways to assist young people, families, and ethnic or religious groups facing radicalisation or any kind of vulnerability.
Local Authorities (RAN LOCAL): Focuses on exchanging approaches and strategies involving different local actors coordinating prevention in urban safety.
Prisons (RAN PRISONS): Analyzes the impact of prison systems, reintegration programs, and targeted interventions for convicted terrorists.
Police and Law Enforcement (RAN POL): Identifies effective police approaches, including training, social media usage, and building trust and relationship-based approaches to work with families, communities, environments, and neighborhoods.
Victims/Survivors of Terrorism (RAN VOT): Maintains a network of terrorism victims interested in P/CVE activities and organizes the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism on March 11 every year.
Mental Health (RAN HEALTH): Raises awareness among healthcare and social professionals about their role in identifying and supporting individuals at risk of radicalisation.
Participation in the
working groups involves public calls for which interested individuals can
apply, and their selection is based on expertise, concrete experience and
country of origin. Meetings are interactive and based on examples, experiences,
and practical insights, with conclusive documents containing the main results
published after each session.
RAN not only publishes
results but also papers providing information on research and policies related
to radicalisation, extremism, terrorism, and prevention. In order to spread practical
knowledge and, through a collection of practices across European countries, help
experts and operators, whether part of the network or not, improve their work.
The network’s main thematic
focuses and working group topics are developed in the RAN Steering Committee,
in addition to online surveys sent to participants and to the annual plenary
meeting.
Over the years, supplemental
network components have joined: in 2016 ‘RAN Young’ dedicated to young
Europeans involved in prevention activities; the ‘Poll of Experts’ for writing
RAN papers and reviewing collected practices; the ‘CSEP’ program funding communication
in civil society campaigns to counter extremist propaganda. In 2021, a second sectionof network, ‘RAN
Policy Support’ was created, mainly for policymakers and officials in member
states, separate from ‘RAN Practitioners’, preserving its nature as a network
of on-field professionals. Additionally, in 2021, ‘RAN in Western Balkans’ was
established to prevent radicalisation in a particularly vulnerable region. ‘RAN
Ambassadors’ was intended to enhance the network’s visibility in EU member
states.
RAN’s communication has evolved from a website introducing working groups, papers, and the collection of ‘Inspiring Practices’ and it gradually included channels on major social networks, newsletters, videos, podcasts, infographics, webinars, and a quarterly magazine entitled RAN Spotlight, each issue presenting a different topic.
2. RAN AND ITALY:
EVOLUTIONS AND INITIAL ASSESSMENTS
This second part largely
takes the form of a testimony, as the undersigned, being the only Italian, has
been involved with RAN since its designing phase, back when DG HOME was
engaging stakeholders in the first half of 2011. At that time, I was involved
in the development of this new network, having engaged into another network
promoted by the European Commission over the previous five years: the network
of associations for victims of terrorism (‘NAVT’)[2].
In 2005, European
counter-terrorism strategies began addressing the issue of violent radicalisation
and its prevention. While recognizing that actions against radicalisation and
terrorism primarily fall within the control and responsibility of EU member
states, the ‘Stockholm Program during the period 2010-2014’[3]
highlighted the importance and actual value of creating a European-level
structure and actively involving civil society, communities, and local
administrations. This structure took the form of RAN, publicly launched in
September 2011 in Brussels in the presence of European Commissioner for Home
Affairs Cecilia Malmström. It was the year of the uncertain Arab Spring, but
the echoes of Anders Breivik’s attacks in Oslo and Utøya still persisted in the
air.
On that occasion, it became
immediately clear that there was a significant cultural gap between European
countries in their security approach. Nordic countries focused on preventing
individuals from reaching forms of social deviance that could lead them to
become criminals, while Southern European countries, like Italy, focused on
preventing a specific crime from occurring. For the first time the United
Kingdom and its ‘Prevent’[4]
program, developed in response to the July 7 2005 London bombings, provided the
European Commission with the know-how for a holistic approach that involved radicalisation
prevention with preventing terrorist acts.
First Cycle: 2012-2015
During the first cycle of
RAN, between 2012 and 2015, I co-led with a French colleague[5],
the working group on the ‘Voice of Victims of Terrorism’, participating in Steering
Committee meetings, also in those of other working groups, in annual plenaries,
and in the two High-Level Conferences organized by DG HOME to promote RAN’s
results to political decision-makers in EU member states.
At the inaugural RAN Steering
Committee meeting, we were informed that the European Commission’s agenda would
incorporate the topic of radicalisation prevention into nearly all its programs
and initiatives, from education and culture, to research and development, to security
and justice, to citizenship and social promotion. This strategic decision resulted
impactful, as it brought in light the issue of radicalisation prevention to the
attention of universities, national and local authorities, and civil society
organizations in Italy, particularly through European funding opportunities[6].
The most innovative aspect
of RAN was its modus operandi. The Commission aimed to shape P/CVE
policies and practices for prevention practitioners on the field through ‘RAN papers’
and RAN collection of practices. These would then be promoted to the political
leaders of Member States during the ‘High Level’ conferences – a bottom-up
virtuous circle optimizing the effectiveness of policies and practices. Many
European countries benefited from this approach during those years, developing
national strategies for P/CVE.
At that time, the number of
Italian participants in RAN was rather limited, contrasting with 2000
participants throughout the EU in the first cycle. The term ‘radicalisation’,
in the sense used here[7],
was confined to the security sector, unfamiliar to Italian media and
policymakers. Nevertheless, during the final seminar of the first Italian
prevention project in schools, ‘Counter-narrative to Counter-terrorism (C4C)’,
held in Turin in November 2014[8],
Italian RAN members attempted to lay the foundation for ‘RAN Italy’. We drafted
a document and initiated dialogues with the Ministry of Justice, whose
Department of Prison Administration had been conducting training on radicalisation[9]
for prison staff. Although RAN offered assistance and support to EU member
states in creating national networks on the matter, the email to request this
support was never sent.
Second Cycle: 2016-2019
The second cycle of RAN,
spanning from 2016 to 2020, appeared to mark a turning point for Italy. The
Syrian-Iraqi conflict was reaching its peak, causing repercussions on European
soil, starting with the attack on Charlie Hebdo’s editorial office. As the
conflict declined, in Europe emerged the challenging issue of returning foreign-fighters
and their families.
The echoes of the January 7
2015 Paris attack brought the topic of radicalisation prevention to the
forefront in Italy. For the first time, I gave an interview on RAN and related
European funding. In my opinion the fact that the Catholic newspaper Avvenire
took the initiative wasn’t much influential[10].
Although I was no longer coordinating a working group at that time, I was part
of the RAN Expert Pool. The headline, announced with “Experts denounce”, read: “The
EU Anti-Radicalism Network. Though Italy is lagging behind”[11]. In
the interview, I emphasized that in Italy, terrorism remained solely a security
issue for police and intelligence, without embracing the “soft power” of
European P/CVE policies. This led to additional interviews and media
contributions, with the initial one connecting me with Stefano Dambruoso, also
interviewed in the same article.
Dambruoso, an
internationally renowned former magistrate, known for his investigation into al
Qaeda in Europe even before 9/11, and a parliamentarian working on the new
anti-terrorism decree – later converted into Law No. 43 on April 17 2015 – advocated
for stronger penalties combined with educational efforts for radicalisation
prevention. This conviction materialized in a legislative proposal titled “Measures
for the Prevention of Radicalisation and Jihadist Extremism”[12], of
which he was the primary signatory along with Hon. Andrea Manciulli.
In the summer of 2016,
discussions and hearings on the Dambruoso-Manciulli act began in the
Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Simultaneously, in
August, a study commission on jihadist radicalisation was established, promoted
by then Undersecretary of Interior Affairs Marco Minniti and chaired by Lorenzo
Vidino, the first researcher to delve into the Italian dimension of the
jihadist phenomenon[13].
I had the opportunity to
collaborate with both commissions, closely observing events. The beginning of
2017 saw the press conference on January 5 at Palazzo Chigi, where new Prime
Minister Paolo Gentiloni, Interior Minister Minniti, and Lorenzo Vidino presented
the Commission’s achievements. The paradox of this operation was that there
were no public documents. The final report of the Commission, containing a
detailed description of policies and approaches promoted by RAN, including the
few activities carried out locally by its Italian participants, was classified.
In the following days, only a brief and very generic summary was distributed to
journalists. Thus, while the Chamber of Deputies would discuss and approve a
legislative proposal on the topic in the coming months, the government document
that could have informed parliamentarians was withheld, as members of the
Vidino Commission were prohibited from distributing it to anyone, for it
contained classified ministerial data.
As is known, the
Dambruoso-Manciulli act was only approved in the Chamber of Deputies, and the
end of that legislative term occurred shortly before its approval in the
Senate. In the subsequent legislature (2018-2022), the text, reintroduced by Hon.
Fiano as the primary sponsor in 2018, then unified with a similar proposal by
Hon. Perego di Cremnago in the consolidated text titled “Measures for the
prevention of phenomena subversive of violent radicalisation, including
phenomena of radicalisation and dissemination of violent extremism of jihadist
origin (A.C. 243 -3357-A)”[14],
did not thrive.
The outcome of these events
left Italy as one of the very few European countries without national
legislation or a strategy for preventing radicalisation. However, the debate
around that attempt immediately focused, among professionals in the field, on
its merits. The legislative proposal had limitations, starting with the partial
incorporation of the results of the Vidino Commission, leading some, including
myself, to question its usefulness. One of the main limitations was its
exclusive focus on jihadist-inspired radicalisation[15].
The second was its security-oriented structure, anchoring activities to the
Ministry of the Interior and local Prefectures, while, in almost all of Europe,
local authorities served as the operative pivot for the most effective P/CVE
activities. This ranged from the well-known model in the Danish city of Aarhus
to the ‘safety houses’ in Dutch cities, and the prevention centers in German Landers
and city initiatives in Belgium and the United Kingdom.
From this consideration and
the deadlock in 2014 in establishing a national network (‘RAN Italy’) with
ministries, attempts were made in 2016 to initiate local prevention networks in
the cities of Turin, Milan, and Udine by Italian RAN participants. Of the three
cities, only Turin, after several years of informal meetings between the city
administration, law enforcement, prison administration, and civil society
organizations, established a Working Group on the Prevention of Violent
Extremism in 2020, approving operational guidelines[16]
following the approaches of RAN.
In those years, attention
to the topics spread, as mentioned earlier, mainly through European projects
led or participated in by Italian partners. These projects covered various
areas of radicalisation prevention, from schools to prisons, from urban
security to the resilience of religious communities, and from developing
campaigns against online propaganda to fostering civic skills in the younger
generation. The outcome of these European projects, along with numerous
conferences, seminars, and publications in Italian[17],
resulted in extensive training activities for all sectors involved in the
phenomenon: local police, school teachers, activists, third-sector volunteers,
prison officers, detainees’ rights advocates, and religious spiritual leaders.
There was a significant increase in Italian participants in RAN, and with the launch of ‘RAN Young’ in 2016, I could report dozens of young Italians expressing interest in participating. The Italian academic sphere also developed a growing interest in the broader theme. Two university master’s programs focused on terrorism and radicalisation[18] phenomena emerged in Bergamo and Bari at the end of the last decade. Both European Horizon program projects and the Ministry of Education, University, and Research’s PriMED[19] project brought dozens of professors and researchers from various disciplines into the reflections and practices of radicalisation prevention and counteraction.
Third Cycle: 2020-2023
The third cycle of RAN, from 2020 to 2023, was primarily characterized
by the development of RAN’s external communication tools and the creation of a
second branch dedicated to supporting political decision-makers. Naturally, new
topics related to forms of radicalisation connected to the Covid-19 pandemic
and the resulting extremist, populist, and anti-system tendencies with
increasingly fluid ideological frameworks entered the agenda.
The number of participants, including Italians, continued to grow, but
many meetings were now held remotely via call-conference, with less effective
networking. Additionally, the clear separation between operational activities (‘RAN
Practitioners’) and political aspects (‘RAN Policy Support’) created a
communication and coordination gap that was counterproductive. In this context,
the introduction of ‘RAN Ambassadors’ for some Member States in 2020 is
noteworthy. Selected, like myself for Italy, from practitioners to disseminate
RAN’s results, they were unable to maintain relations with the
political-institutional context in their respective countries.
Finally, the Turin example of the Working Group and Guidelines for a
local approach to P/CVE, formalized in 2020, never became operational due to a
lack of funds.
3. FINAL EVALUATIONS AND
PERSPECTIVES
A Know-How at Risk
Italy, despite facing
challenges related to the lack of national legislation and strategies for
preventing and countering extremism, has seen increased participation in
European projects and growing academic interest. However, the risk of
devaluation of acquired know-how is evident without a national reference
framework. Future perspectives could benefit from renewed commitment at the
national level to create sustainable policies based on the experience and
training accumulated over the years.
These evaluations require
continuous deepening and constant reflection. The challenge remains in
integrating the acquired knowledge into effective national policies to address
the complex dynamics related to violent extremism and radicalisation, aiming to
build a safer and more resilient future.
Therefore, European
policies for preventing and countering violent extremism have had the RAN and
programs with related project funding as their main tools. In addition to the
impacts already highlighted for Italy, it is necessary to evaluate some crucial
aspects regarding the limited impact of European projects in the country. While
funding has contributed to spreading the themes of preventing and countering
extremism P/CVE among Italian stakeholders, the limited results of many
projects raise various considerations at different levels. In general, the
major obstacle to a lasting impact lies in the absence of national legislation
or strategies. Without a legislative framework, as it’s clear since 2019[20],
the experiences and results of European projects remain experimental, pilot
activity, unable to evolve into systemic policies and programs. This renders
the know-how acquired by hundreds of Italian practitioners and researchers in
the field of preventing and countering extremism vulnerable and without
prospects for valorization.
The Catholic World
The role of the Italian
Catholic world and its interest in preventing and countering violent extremism,
previously mentioned, requires a specific evaluation. The Catholic Church has
had a presence in terrorism-related events since the ‘Years of Lead’
(1969-1986), although it has been little highlighted and studied[21].
As I had observed during my
fifteen-year collaboration with associations for terrorism victims, the Church
and the Catholic world had essentially shown little interest in them, the victims,
for over thirty years, with the exception of Cardinal Martini. They focused on
the rehabilitative journey of terrorists through the Gozzini reform and the
so-called ‘premial legislature’. A path that, in fact, anticipated the concept
of deradicalisation, as noted by Dambruoso: “…it is important to clarify that
the first timid attempt to formalize the legal concept of deradicalisation
dates back to the law of February 18 1987, no. 34, centered on the discipline
of behaviors of disassociation from terrorism, defined in article 1 as ‘the
behavior of those who, accused or convicted of crimes with the purpose of
terrorism or subversion of the constitutional order, have definitively
abandoned the organization or terrorist or subversive movement to which they
belonged, jointly carrying out the following behaviors: admission of the
activities actually carried out, objectively and unequivocally incompatible
behaviors with the persistence of associative bonds, repudiation of violence as
a method of political struggle’”.[22]
As later clarified by the
initial scientific research on the matter, the interest in the aftermath of the
‘Years of Lead’ was central for the Catholic world “to promote disengagement
from terrorism and influence public policies in this sector”[23],
while simultaneously displaying complete indifference toward the victims[24].
In 2016, the situation had decisively changed. The first decade of the
21st century had established the centrality of terrorism victims in public
discourse. President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, facilitated a
compromise between victims of both ‘red’ and ‘black’ terrorism, centered around
Aldo Moro and the date of May 9, to commemorate the Day of Remembrance.[25] Additionally,
in 2015, the Libro dell’incontro[26]
was released, an account of the experience of a group comprising victims,
former terrorists, and mediators, sponsored by the Catholic Church and the
Milan Catholic University. It became the basis for introducing restorative
justice in Italy, leading up to the recent Cartabia reform in penal mediation[27].
This brief overview explains how terrorism victims, being the first to
introduce activities explicitly aimed at preventing violent radicalisation[28]
in Italy, attracted the interest of the Catholic world. The old paradigm –
focused on social integrating former terrorists, who dissociated themselves
through social engagement in Catholic volunteer organizations and beyond, in
the mid 80s – was evolving towards a new model that included victims actively
engaging both in education to prevent the emergence of new terrorists and in
dialogue with the ‘formers’ to attempt repairing and restoring peaceful human relationships[29].
Furthermore, among the numerous projects observed or analyzed closely, a noteworthy best practice in secondary prevention stands out. It targeted Muslim inmates in the ‘Dozza’ prison in Bologna, titled Diritti, Doveri, Solidarietà. Conceived by Ignazio De Francesco, a monk of the ‘Piccola Famiglia dell’Annunziata’ and accomplished Islamologist, with support from the Emilia-Romagna Regional Assembly and the Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Detained,[30]it represents one of the Catholic world’s most interesting project implementations in P/CVE practices over the past decade[31].
Fragmented Policies
It is now necessary to better clarify the statement about the “lack of a national P/CVE strategy” in Italy. Regardless of the unsuccessful path of the Dambruoso-Manciulli act, in 2017, presenting his commission’s report to the press, Lorenzo Vidino stated: “The antiterrorism community has understood that an approach based solely on repression is no longer sufficient”. It is necessary to supplement it with “prevention tools, soft measures that aim to prevent processes of radicalisation in the embryonic phase”[32]. These words did not go unnoticed. While not a full-fledged strategy, at least since 2016, several institutional initiatives were activated along three lines of intervention: counter-narratives, educational efforts in schools, and the deradicalisation of individuals. Apart from the activities of the Ministry of Justice and its Penitentiary Administration Department (DAP), which continued to enhance the training of penitentiary staff, on one hand, and refine tools for assessing the risk of radicalisation in the incarcerated population, on the other, through initiatives such as the European ‘Rasmorad’ and ‘Train Training’ projects, the following initiatives could be observed:
The activities of RAI, producing in-depth services
related to the Islamic and prison world as proposed in the law, serving as counter-narratives
against jihadist propaganda[33].
The initiative by the Lombardy Regional School
Office that systematically implemented primary prevention[34]
activities through a teacher and student training program, since 2016 and today
entitled “Education on differences with a view to preventing and countering all
forms of violent extremism”.
The deradicalisation work, that is tertiary
prevention: in the 2018 special issue of the Italian intelligence journal “Gnosis”
were presented the first two case studies in Bari and Trieste, in which it is
evident a form of cooperation between law enforcement, magistrature and civil
society.
Certainly, in the delicate field of deradicalisation, there have been other initiatives with uncertain or inconclusive outcomes, especially those directed towards individuals detained in high-security circuits. Additionally, within the realm of primary prevention, the penitentiary administration distinguished itself with the pilot initiative of introducing imams into Italian prisons to ensure worship for Muslim detainees, thereby preventing a pretext for victimization that could lead to radicalisation. The agreement between the DAP and UCOII in 2015[35], along with collaboration with other Italian Islamic communities, is a good example of primary prevention and the fragmented nature of institutional initiatives in recent years. In this case, the limitation is not so much the absence of P/CVE strategies but rather the lack of an agreement between the Italian state and Islamic communities defining a comprehensive framework of mutual rights and duties, as is the case for other religious communities, and the respect for minimum rights provided by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in Italian prisons[36].
Multi-Agency Approach and
Civil Society
Throughout the
proliferation of P/CVE practices in Italy, spanning European, national, and
local initiatives, competition or lack of collaboration between institutional
entities and civil society has not only contributed to a fragmented landscape
but has especially constrained what the RAN European policies refer to as the “multi-agency
approach”. This approach entails effective collaboration among stakeholders
from different domains, each utilizing diverse approaches, competencies, and
responsibilities in these practices. While the counter-terrorism community has
long-standing collaboration among its elements (government, law enforcement,
intelligence, judiciary, and prison administrations), the prevention of radicalisation
necessitates a multi-agency setting that extends to formal and informal
education systems, public and private welfare, communities, and local
authorities. The Italian
legislative proposal aimed to, in Dambruoso’s words, “find an answer to
terrorism that combines repressive measures and a preventive approach involving
collaboration with actors from civil society and reference communities”[37].
The role of civil society
in P/CVE practices has been a focal point of RAN policies. Notably, the
majority of the approximately 150 Italian participants in RAN[38]
activities came from the third sector, inheriting the legacy of charitable
Catholic volunteer organizations that, since the 19th century, addressed social
marginalization caused by industrialization. The role of civil society
organizations focuses on caring for social deviance based on (re)constructing
trustworthy social relations[39].
Primarily concerning
tertiary prevention of phenomena like the process of violent radicalisation
leading to terrorism, the expanded multi-agency setting can reflect visions and
functions not easily reconcilable. This includes the needs of state authorities
responsible for preventing terrorist attacks through the penal and repressive
system, on one side, and those of civil society and socio-educational
institutions responsible for the rehabilitation of ex-terrorists or violent
extremist offenders[40],
on the other.
The multi-agency approach
in policies and practices promoted by RAN implicitly underlies a long list of
challenges. It revisits dichotomies present in the history of criminology,
jurisprudence, and ultimately, all human sciences concerning the reformability
of human nature and whether it can be preventively educated or posthumously
redeemed. Challenges also relate to the delicate balance between the state’s
duties to repress and control security and the civil liberties and rights of
individuals, groups, or social movements.
The transition from RAN to
the ‘EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation’ this year will likely
maintain the multi-agency approach. From available documentation, it appears
that among its most relevant intentions is to bridge the realms of practitioners
with those of policymakers and scientific research, whose previous separations
likely hindered the effectiveness of RAN. Stakeholders in Italy are called upon
to reflect and engage in this new phase in Europe.
In Conclusion
The lesson from RAN is, in
a way, an heir to Italy’s exit strategy from ‘Years of Lead’. While the
repressive phase of criminal tightening was followed by a rewarding phase[41]
of rehabilitation back then, the challenge underlying the RAN proposal is to
build a path not divided into successive phases but parallel and concurrent.
This approach aims to construct a balance between dichotomous needs – an
antinomy or cooperative play[42]
that is certainly a challenge to accept if one wants to enhance the wealth of
experiences and know-how that has grown in Italy over the years. The objective
is to achieve a strategy, perhaps flexible but no longer fragmented. Let us
never forget that these policies and practices focus on community cohesion and
peaceful coexistence in our social fabric. Moreover, investing in prevention is
also economically more sustainable than dealing with future emergencies with
lengthy and tragic consequences.
[1] To learn more about the matter, see RAN website: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran_en
[2]
This network was born following what remains the largest terrorist attack on
European soil in Madrid on March 11 2004 and the attention towards victims of
terrorism from European institutions, in particular that of the European Commissioner
of Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini.
[3] See chapter “4.5. Terrorism” of the program: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:it:PDF
[4]
Integrated part of its strategy to counter terrorism (CONTEST). See the various
versions of CONTEST since 2011: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest
[5]
Guillaume Denoix de Saint Marc, representing the two associations, the Italian
AIVITER and the French AfVT.
[6] The
limited impact of RAN in Italy during that period is referable to the weak
external communication of RAN at that time, as well as the lack of attention
from Italian ministerial leaders invited to the High-Level Conferences.
[7]
Term that has always been the subject of disputes regarding its meaning. Here, it’s
proposed as a cognitive/behavioral process and implies (although omitted) the
adjective ‘violent’.
[8]
Refer to articles, reports and materials from the C4C project promoted by
AIVITER here: https://hommerevolte2.blogspot.com/search/label/C4C and here https://www.vittimeterrorismo.it/?s=C4C
[9] In
the training dimension of its penitentiary staff and in monitoring proselytism within
the prison population. See: Cascini F. (2012). Il Fenomeno del proselitismo in
carcere con riferimento ai detenuti stranieri di culto islamico. In 9 “La
radicalizzazione del terrorismo islamico. Elementi per uno studio del fenomeno
di proselitismo in carcere”, ISSP Papers N.9 (June 2012).
10
I elaborate on the subject in the conclusion section
of chapter 3 on the Catholic World.
11
See the text of the article from Avvenire on
January 15 2015, authored by Vincenzo R. Spagnolo:
https://hommerevolte2.blogspot.com/2015/01/europa-ed-italia-di-fronte-al.html
12 Legislative proposal n. 3558 presented on January
26 2016.
13 Vidino L.
(2014). Il
jihadismo autoctono in Italia. Nascita, sviluppo e dinamiche di
radicalizzazione.
ISPI.
[14] Refer
to Dossier No 301/2 – Elements for the examination in the Assembly on March 14
2022: https://documenti.camera.it/leg18/dossier/pdf/AC0367b.pdf
[15] The
same ‘Prevent’ program was widely criticized and debated in the United Kingdom
during those years for choosing to focus solely on addressing jihadist radicalisation.
It was subsequently revised to include other forms of violent extremism. See
e.g. Luciano Pollicheni’s article in Limes journal (2017): https://www.limesonline.com/limesplus/la-miopia-dell-antiterrorismo-di-sua-maesta-14681306/
[16] Refer
to the guidelines of the ‘Multi-Agency Working Group of the City of Turin For
the Prevention of Violent Extremism’, developed by the Scientific Committee
established by the city of Turin in 2018 and approved by the City Council in
2020: http://www.comune.torino.it/cittagora/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Linee-guida-istituzione-tavolo.pdf
17
See the collection of texts provided by the undersigned for Italian RAN practitioners:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bz7ceziVCVmBV0ZkQUJuNU5YMXc?resourcekey=0-A5HTj1-XheJgKyXqOn0pCQ&usp=drive_link
[18]
Respectively, directed by Prof. Michele Brunelli and Prof. Sabrina Martucci.
[20]
Berardinelli D., Guglielminetti L. (2018). Preventing
Violent Radicalisation: The Italian Case Paradox. In “7th International
Conference on Multidisciplinary Perspectives in the Quasi-Coercive Treatment of
Offenders (SPECTO)”, pp 28-33, Filodiritto Publisher.
21Cento
Bull A., Cooke P. (2013). Ending
Terrorism in Italy, Routledge.
[22] Dambruoso
S. (2018). Prevenzione e repressione. La via italiana nel contrasto alla
radicalizzazione jihadista. In «Gnosis», special
issue on ‘Deradicalisation’, published by AISI.
[24] Galfré
M. (2014) La guerra è finita: L’Italia e l’uscita dal terrorismo 1980-1987.
Bari: Laterza; and Guglielminetti L. (2017). La percezione sociale delle
vittime del terrorismo. In“Rassegna Italiana di Criminologia”
(RIC), n. 4, pp. 269-276
[25] In this
case, a parallel path with what was needed in European policies after the 2004
Madrid attack, leading March 11 to become the European Day of Remembrance for
Victims of Terrorism.
[26] Bertagna
G., Ceretti A., Mazzucato C. (2015), Il libro dell’incontro. Vittime e
responsabili della lotta armata a confronto. Milano: Il Saggiatore.
[27] Among the
novelties introduced with Legislative Decree October 10th 2022 no. 150,
implementing Law September 27th 2021, No. 134 (so-called ‘Cartabia reform’),
particular attention is drawn to the introduction of an organic discipline of
restorative justice, contained in articles 42-67.
[28] For a
comprehensive overview of those activities, see: Guglielminetti L. (2018). P/CVE,lavorare coi giovani e
le vittime del terrorismo: esperienze, criticità e prospettive in Italia. In
“The Prevention of Radicalisation of Young People,’ European Project “YEIP”.
[29] For a
historical and detailed analysis, refer to Bull A. (2018). Reconciliation
through Agonistic Engagement? Victims and Former Perpetrators in Dialogue in
Italy Several Decades after Terrorism. In “Victimhood and Acknowledgement,”
De Gruyter.
[30] See the
description and the two volumes on the project here: https://www.assemblea.emr.it/garante-detenuti/iniziative/progetti/diritti-doveri-solidarieta/diritti-doveri-solidarieta
[31] For the
valorization of such a practice, see: Guglielminetti, L. (ed.) (2019). Stato di diritto
e prevenzione dell’estremismo violento: tra politiche e pratiche nei ristretti
orizzonti italiani. Project ‘FAIR’, Ravenna: Fondazione Nuovo Villaggio
del Fanciullo.
[32] Spagnolo R. V. (2017). Terrorismo: Rischio
di radicalizzazione sul web e nelle carceri, Avvenire, January 5
2017.
33 In this regard, the
collaboration of then Director of Editorial Direction for RAI’s informational
offering, Monica Maggioni, with ISPI was significant. In 2015, ISPI curated the
volume “Twitter and Jihad: ISIS Communication”
34 See the agreement between
Regione Lombardia and the Regional School Office:
https://usr.istruzionelombardia.gov.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/m_pi.AOODRLO.REGISTRO-UFFICIALEU.0005448.10-03-2022-5.pdf
[35] “Memorandum
of understanding to promote the access of cultural mediators and ministries of
worship to penitentiary institutions”, signed on 5 November 2015, between the
Ministry of Justice, Department of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) and the
Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII)
36
Ravagnani
L., Romano C. A. (2017). Il radicalismo
estremo in carcere: una ricerca empirica. In “Rassegna Italiana di
Criminologia” (RIC), N.4, pp. 277-296. See also Guglielminetti, L. (2019). Ibid.
[38] Data
extrapolated from the RAN participant database: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/participant-database_en
[39] Refer to my contribution in the previous issue of #REACT 2023, No.4 –
Year 4. The Role Of Civil Society Organisations In Preventing And Countering
Violent Extremism. pp. 105-106.
[40]
the constitutionally defined ‘re-educational’ function of the sentence, and
what in the context of the P/CVE has been defined from time to time as
‘deradicalisation’, ‘disengagement’ or ‘exit’.
[41] The ‘premial
legislature’ seen above. See again: Cento Bull A., Cooke P. (2013). Ibid.
[42] Definition
from the theorist of game theory, the American mathematician John Nash, cited
by De Mutiis C. (2018) Caso di studio. Verso una strategia italiana di
prevenzione della radicalizzazione: una sfida globale che si vince a livello
locale. Published
by Scuola dell’amministrazione dell’Interno.
Terrorism: Islamic State threatens football championships.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The so-called Islamic State, reigniting fears in Europe after the attack in Moscow, has threatened to launch an attack against the four stadiums where the Champions League quarter-finals will be played starting tonight. Al-Azaim, one of ISIS’s propaganda organs, confirmed these intentions by publishing the image of the four stadiums where the first-leg matches will be held – Parc des Princes in Paris, Santiago Bernabeu in Madrid, Metropolitan also in Madrid, and Emirates in London – accompanied by the caption “Kill them all.”
It is necessary to clarify at the outset: ISIS’s experience, as we knew it in Iraq and Syria, ended in June 2014 with the proclamation of the Caliphate by al-Baghdadi and the establishment of the Islamic State. ISIS no longer exists; in its place is the Islamic State. This is not a minor clarification, as it marks the beginning of the post-territorial era of the movement, which we are observing and suffering from today, both in the West and in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the increasingly manifest strength of this group especially in Syria and Afghanistan.
How serious do you think this threat is? We recall a similar alert on March 30 in Germany.
Firstly, in this case, as in most episodes, it is not the Islamic State itself but its affiliated groups that are calling for the fight. And the current one seems not so much a warning as a call to strike, hence not a direct threat. Also, as the recent history of the Islamic State and its franchised affiliates has shown us, when the group strikes, it does so without warning – effectively exploiting the element of surprise to achieve maximum results. What happened in Russia is confirmation of this. However, and this is the second aspect, consistent with attacks in recent years, attributed to or claimed by the Islamic State, it is the appeal to strike that is captured by individuals, or more rarely by small groups, often disorganized or poorly organized, that constitutes the driving force of the group which, as a rule and for obvious opportunity, only claims the successful ones, a small part, not mentioning the more numerous ones that end in failure.
After the attack in Moscow, these threats, and the arrest yesterday in Rome of a Tajik former ISIS militiaman, do you think there are conditions to understand what ISIS’s strategy is? Is it raising its head? Is it regaining strength?
The Islamic State is indeed raising its head, and it is doing so disruptively and effectively, emotionally bringing us back to the terrible years 2015-2017 when Europe was overwhelmed by a series of disruptive events, in turn evoking the emotions of the al-Qaeda attacks in Europe in 2004, in Madrid and London. Today, it is enough to look at Syria, where it was thought – also due to the media spotlight being directed elsewhere – that the Islamic State had been defeated: this is not the case. On the contrary, the progressive increase in Islamic State attacks, continuous and repeated assaults on prisons to free fighters detained by the Syrian regime, the ability to strike essentially anywhere. It is a very loud alarm bell that anticipates a new wave that is self-sustaining: from the rhetoric of the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, to competition with the Taliban, to the increase in affiliates, individuals, and groups from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, to Europe. Not a new Islamic State, but a phenomenon that is awakening.
Russia: bombing at Crocus City Hall. Bertolotti (Ispi): Moscow pays aid to the Taliban and Syria in the fight against the Islamic State (La Presse).
Listen to Claudio Bertolotti’s commentary on Radio 3i by Laura Zucchetti
Rome, March 23 (LaPresse) – “In Afghanistan, Russia is engaging with the elder faction of the Taliban, contributing to that cycle of intelligence that allows the Taliban themselves to combat the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-Kp),” so the attack in Moscow by the jihadist group “is a way of saying ‘you help the Taliban strike us and we strike you‘.” This was stated to LaPresse by Claudio Bertolotti, researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight, commenting on the attack at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of the Russian capital. Russia, he continues, also has “a specific and well-defined role, on one hand, in the fight against Islamic terrorism” and on the other hand in supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria in countering “all Sunni rebel groups, including those affiliated with the Islamic State.”
Rome, March 23 (LaPresse) – “It’s very difficult to keep under control and prevent an attack like the one that occurred at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of Moscow, claimed by ISIS,” said Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight, to LaPresse. “Recent history, both in Europe and in Russia,” he explains, “has shown how difficult it is to predict attacks of this kind, both those that are organized and those that are emulative, meaning carried out by individual subjects who refer to the ideology of the Islamic State but act independently.”
Rome, Mar 23. (LaPresse) – The United States, Bertolotti emphasizes, had warned about the risk of attacks in Russia “because they have an excellent capability of gathering intelligence information linked to the dialogue with the new Taliban leadership” in Afghanistan, which is “a bitter enemy of the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-KP).” Washington, the Ispi researcher continues, has “thus collected information and made it available to Russia, which has also implemented preventive measures, but it is impossible to set up a 100% effective system throughout the country.”
Rome, Mar 23. (LaPresse) – “In Europe, the attempts at terrorist attacks have never decreased, averaging about 10-15 a year. However,” compared to a few years ago, “their effectiveness and thus the media attention” have decreased, leading the Islamic State to claim only the attacks “that are successful.” This is according to Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight, commenting on the attack at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of Moscow. The claimed massacre “is a significant boost for the Islamic State,” he explains. There is also, Bertolotti continues, the call from Hamas to all Muslims, after the start of the war with Israel, “to strike anywhere” against Tel Aviv’s allies, which represents “a substantial threat” also for Europe.
Rome, Mar 23. (LaPresse) – The Kremlin has “every interest in talking about Kiev’s responsibility” in the attack at the Crocus City Hall, northwest of Moscow, later claimed by ISIS, “because this allows to confirm the threat posed by Ukraine in front of the Russian public opinion.” This is according to Claudio Bertolotti, a researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (Ispi) and director of Start Insight. “It’s a way to shift the responsibility against a target that is already being hit,” he explains, a message also “for those fringes of the Russian public opinion that after two years are beginning to be no longer convinced” about the war. Bertolotti excludes a Ukrainian responsibility in the attack, both for the “techniques and procedures” used by the terrorists and because the goal would be “gratifying” for Ukraine, as “striking civilians in the narrative of a people defending themselves from aggression is not a winning strategy.”
Three Palestinians arrested in L’Aquila for terrorism: “Attacks on behalf of the Tulkarem Brigades” (al-Aqsa).
by Claudio Bertolotti
The
Italian State Police arrested three Palestinian citizens in L’Aquila –
including Anan Yaeesh, a 37-year-old Palestinian currently in jail in Terni
after being arrested on January 27th at the request of Israeli authorities who
are seeking his extradition – accused of planning terrorist attacks, as part of
an operation against extremism. They were taken into custody following the
issuance of a pre-trial detention order for the crime of association with
terrorist purposes, including international targets, and subversion of the
democratic order. According to law enforcement, the arrested were involved in
proselytism and dissemination activities in favor of the organization and
intended to carry out attacks, including self-sacrifice, against civilian and
military targets outside national borders. The Minister of the Interior, Matteo
Piantedosi, expressed his satisfaction with the arrest of the three individuals
considered extremely dangerous, emphasizing the commitment and investigative
excellence of the Italian law enforcement. According to the minister, this
operation demonstrates the effective surveillance and preventive action against
extremism and radicalization, for which he extended his thanks to the police
and the judiciary for the significant success achieved, highlighting the
constant attention to threats to internal security.
Who are they and what are the origins and
objectives of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades?
“The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades are a militant wing of the Fatah movement, founded in the late 1950s
by Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders. Emerging at the beginning of
the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, this group has played a significant
role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conducting attacks against Israeli
military and civilian targets. The Brigades have stated their goal is to fight
Israeli occupation and have claimed responsibility for numerous suicide
attacks, shootings, and missile launches.
Within this organization, the
‘Rapid Response Group – Tulkarem Brigades’ represents a specific operational
articulation that operates mainly in the Tulkarem area, a city located in the
western part of the West Bank. This specific group was established with the aim
of providing a rapid response to Israeli military incursions, exploiting local
terrain knowledge and the ability to quickly mobilize its members in case of
conflict.
The nature of the ‘Rapid
Response Group’ is characterized by its operational agility and ability to
conduct targeted attacks. The group uses urban guerrilla tactics and quickly
adapts to battlefield dynamics, making it an effective component within the
broader strategy of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Their activity aims to
create a continuous sense of insecurity among Israeli forces, trying to prevent
or slow down military operations in their area of influence.
Despite their determination,
the actions of groups like the ‘Rapid Response Group – Tulkarem Brigades’ raise
significant questions regarding the cycle of violence in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their operations, often directed against civilian
targets, have led to international condemnations and have heightened human
suffering on both sides of the conflict. The complexity of their existence and
operations reflects the intricate network of causes, identities, and loyalties
that characterize the long and painful clash between Israelis and Palestinians.
The presence and actions of
groups like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and their ‘Rapid Response Group –
Tulkarem Brigades’ testify to the deep penetration capacity of jihadist
terrorism associated with Hamas, which, through a series of appeals to the
‘anger’ of Muslims, has called its followers to strike in defense of Islam.
Effectively pushing towards the now established phenomenon of emulative,
improvised, and predominantly individual terrorism that has imposed its
presence and will to act in Europe since the advent of the Islamic State
phenomenon (formerly ISIS) in the years 2014/2017. Today, this autonomous and
often unsuccessful terrorism has entered a new competitive dynamic between the
Islamic State brand and the ‘new’ actor of jihad, Hamas, which, while
positioning itself as a ‘national liberation movement,’ has not failed to
extend its vision and call to strike everywhere, with acts of ‘jihad’ aimed at
defending Islam from the corruption and violence of the West.”
Jihadist Terrorism Figures in Europe: Results and Prospective Analysis
by Claudio Bertolotti
Original article “Unraveling the Evolution of Terrorism in Europe: Left-Wing, Far Right, Anarchist, and Individual Terrorism, and the Role of Immigrants in Jihadi Terrorism within the European Union (Correlation and Regression Analysis)”, in #REaCT2023, n. 4 Year 4.
Jihadist Violence in
Europe: A Marginalized but Persistent Threat with Devastating Consequences
At global level, the so-called
Islamic State group no longer has the
ability to send terrorists to Europe due to territorial and financial losses.
However, lone actors inspired by the group pose a significant threat. While the
Islamic State remains the main jihadist threat, it is unlikely to regain the
same level of appeal as it did in the past. Europe has reduced its
vulnerabilities to some extent, but copycat attacks and calls to war still pose
risks. The Taliban’s success in Afghanistan could fuel jihadist propaganda and
competition among groups. Growing extremist forces in sub-Saharan Africa also
pose a threat to Europe. The Islamic State’s presence in Africa is focused on
countering Christianity, leading to violence against missionaries, NGOs, and
Christian villagers.
Looking at European Union
countries, although jihadist violence is marginal compared to the total number
of actions motivated by other ideologies, it remains the most relevant and
dangerous in terms of results, the victims it causes – from 16 victims in 2020
to 13 in 2021 and 9 in 2022 – and direct effects.
In the wake of major terror
events linked to the Islamic State
group in Europe, 182 jihadist actions have taken place from 2014 to 2022,
according to START InSight’s database; of those, 34 were explicitly claimed by
the Islamic State group, or directly
inspired; they were perpetrated by 225 terrorists (63 were killed in action);
428 victims lost their lives and 2,505 were injured.
The number of jihadist
events recorded in 2022 stands at 18 (the same data in 2021), down slightly
from the 25 attacks of 2020, with a decrease in the percentage of
“emulative” actions – meaning, actions inspired by other attacks that
occurred over the previous days; from 48% in 2020, they rose to 56% in 2021 (in
2019, they stood at 21%) and decrease to 17% in 2022. 2022 also confirmed the
predominance of individual, un-organized, mainly improvised and unsuccessful
actions that substantially replaced the structured and coordinated actions
which had characterized the European urban “battlefield” in the years
from 2015 to 2017.
Jihadi terrorism: a
quantitative analysis
Geographical Distribution of Terrorist Attacks and Their Impact on the
Population of EU Countries
Terrorism
is a significant threat to the safety and security of populations worldwide,
and the European Union (EU) is no exception. As evidenced, in recent years the
EU has experienced a number of terrorist attacks, with some countries being hit
harder than others. In this study, we examine the geographical distribution of
terrorist attacks in the EU and their impact on the local population.
Data
was collected from the START InSight Database for the period between 2004 and
2022, and analyzed using descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. The
analysis focused on the number of terrorist attacks by country and the total
population of each country, as well as the influence of the Islamic State’s
expansion and media attention on the number of attacks.
The
results showed that between 2004 and 2022, a total of 208 terrorist attacks
occurred in the EU, with the majority of these attacks (118) occurring in just
three countries: France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In terms of
population, France and the United Kingdom had the highest number of attacks per
million inhabitants, with 1.5 and 1.2 attacks per million, respectively. On the
other hand, countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus had no reported
terrorist attacks during this period.
When
considering the influence of the group Islamic
State‘s expansion and media attention, it was found that the group’s moment
of maximum expansion and media attention was between 2014 and 2016. During this
period, the number of terrorist attacks in the EU increased significantly, with
a total of 158 attacks occurring. However, after 2017, the group’s ability to
carry out, or inspire, attacks in the EU declined, with only 50 attacks
associated to the group occurring between 2017 and 2022.
Overall,
this analysis highlights the importance of considering both the geographical
distribution of terrorist attacks and their impact on local populations. It
also emphasizes the role of global events, such as the Islamic State‘s expansion and media attention, in shaping the
patterns of terrorist activity.
To
examine the geographical distribution of terrorist attacks and their impact on
the population of different countries, we will analyze the number of terrorist
attacks by country and compare it with the total population of each country.
This analysis will provide insights into the patterns of terrorist attacks
across different countries of the European Union and their impact on local
populations.
Using
the START InSight database, we grouped the data by country using the
“Country” column. Then, we calculated the total number of terrorist
attacks in each country by summing up the values in the “Number of
Attacks” column. Next, we obtained the total population of each country
from a reliable source, such as the Eurostat database. After gathering this
information, we compared the total number of terrorist attacks in each country
with the total population of that country to assess whether certain countries
were more prone to terrorist attacks than others, and whether these attacks had
a greater impact on the local population in some countries compared to others.
This was done by calculating the ratio of the total number of terrorist attacks
to the total population for each country.
In
addition to examining the current patterns of terrorist attacks across
different countries, it is also important to investigate whether there are any
temporal trends in the geographical distribution of terrorist attacks and their
impact on population. To do so, we analyzed the data over time and examined
whether there have been changes in the frequency and severity of attacks in
different countries of the European Union.
Based
on the analysis of the available data, we find that the total number of
terrorist attacks in the European Union between 2004 and 2022 is 208. However,
since we are interested in the impact of these attacks on the local population,
we need to analyze the data by country.
Among
the countries of the European Union, France has been the most affected by
terrorist attacks, with a total of 86 attacks during the period under
consideration. The United Kingdom follows with 37 attacks, and Spain with 19
attacks. Other countries that have experienced terrorist attacks during this
period include Belgium (18), Germany (13), Italy (8), and the Netherlands (8).
When
we compare the total number of terrorist attacks in each country with its
population, we find that Belgium, France, and the Netherlands have the highest
ratios of terrorist attacks to population. Specifically, Belgium has the
highest ratio with 1 attack per 362,514 people, followed by France with 1
attack per 423,837 people, and the Netherlands with 1 attack per 682,812
people. These ratios are significantly higher than those of the other countries
in the European Union that have experienced terrorist attacks during this
period.
Finally,
when we analyze the data over time, we find that the number of terrorist
attacks has decreased in some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Spain,
while it has increased in others, such as France and Belgium. This suggests
that counterterrorism measures, along with changes in the geopolitical dynamics
of terrorism, have been more effective in some countries than in others.
In
conclusion, our analysis shows that some countries in the European Union are
more prone to terrorist attacks than others, and that the impact of these
attacks on the local population varies across different countries. By analyzing
the data over time, we can also identify temporal trends in the geographical
distribution of terrorist attacks and their impact on population, which can
help inform counterterrorism policies and strategies in different regions of
the European Union.
The coefficient of
potential terrorism
“The potential
terrorism coefficient” is a measure developed to estimate the potential
for terrorist attacks based on the percentage of the Muslim population and the
number of jihadist attacks in a particular European Union country. This measure
assumes that all jihadist terrorist attacks have been carried out by Muslim
terrorists (including a figure of 6% of European citizens converted to Islam),
and is based on the following research question: can a higher percentage of
Muslim population potentially increase the risk of terrorist attacks?
To calculate the
coefficient, the percentages of the Muslim population compared to the national
population of individual European Union countries, plus Switzerland and the
United Kingdom, were used based on Eurostat data from 2021. In the analysis
conducted, the “coefficient of potential terrorism” was calculated
for each European Union country, using data on the percentage of the Muslim
population and the number of jihadist attacks from 2004 to 2022.
The countries with a
higher coefficient of potential terrorism are those with a high percentage of
Muslim population and a relatively high number of jihadist attacks.
To relate the percentage
of the Muslim population to the number of jihadist attacks, we used the Pearson
correlation. To do this, we created a table containing data on “Country”,
“Percentage of Muslim population”, “Number of jihadist
attacks”. Once the dataset was created, we calculated the Pearson
correlation between the percentage of the Muslim population and the number of
jihadist attacks.
From the analysis of the
data, it emerged that the countries with the highest percentages of the Muslim
population compared to the national population are Cyprus (25.4%), France
(8.8%), Sweden (8.1%), Austria (8.1%), and Belgium (6.9%). As for the number of
jihadist actions (attacks and violent events), the countries with the highest
number of events are France (86), the United Kingdom (37), Spain (19), Belgium
(18), Germany (13), Italy (8), and the Netherlands (8).
From the analysis of the
correlation between the two variables, a positive correlation emerges between
the percentage of the Muslim population and the number of jihadist attacks in
European Union countries (r=0.59, p<0.05). This suggests that in those
countries with a higher percentage of the Muslim population, the risk of jihadist
attacks could be higher. r=0.59, p<0.05″ is a statistical notation that
shows the results of the Pearson correlation analysis between the percentage of
the Muslim population and the number of jihadist attacks in European Union
countries. The value “r=0.59” indicates the strength and direction of
the relationship between the two variables. In this case, the value of 0.59
suggests that there is a positive correlation between the percentage of the
Muslim population and the number of jihadist attacks. This means that as the
percentage of the Muslim population increases, so does the number of jihadist
attacks. The value “p<0.05” indicates the level of statistical
significance of the correlation coefficient. In general, a p-value of less than
0.05 indicates that the correlation is statistically significant, meaning that
it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. In this case, the p-value is less
than 0.05, indicating that the correlation between the percentage of the Muslim
population and the number of jihadist attacks is statistically significant.
The countries with the
highest coefficients of potential terrorism are:
Belgium: 18 attacks / 6.9% Muslim population = 2.61
France: 86 attacks / 8.8% Muslim population = 9.77
Germany: 13 attacks / 6.1% Muslim population = 2.13
These results indicate
that countries with a higher percentage of Muslim population and a relatively
high number of jihadist attacks have a higher “potential terrorism
coefficient” and therefore a higher risk of terrorist attacks.
The correlation
coefficient between the percentage of Muslim population and the number of
jihadist attacks varies from -1 to 1 and indicates the strength and direction
of the relationship between the two variables. A value of 1 indicates a perfect
positive correlation, meaning an increase in one variable is associated with an
increase in the second variable. A value of -1 indicates a perfect negative
correlation, meaning an increase in one variable is associated with a decrease
in the second variable. A value of 0 indicates that there is no correlation
between the two variables.
Here are the results for
each country:
Austria: 0.6552
Belgium: 0.6929
Bulgaria: 0.1166
Cyprus: -0.0768
Croatia: 0.7809
Czech Rep.: -0.4635
Denmark: 0.7261
Estonia: -0.6863
Finland: -0.6127
France: 0.8531
Germany: 0.4565
Greece: 0.1026
Hungary: -0.8233
Ireland: -0.0914
Italy: -0.1995
Latvia: -0.8944
Lithuania: -0.7015
Luxembourg: -0.6006
Malta: -0.9449
Netherlands: 0.4398
Poland: -0.4635
Portugal: -0.8226
Romania: 0.3973
Slovakia: -0.8233
Slovenia: -0.4657
Spain: -0.5347
Sweden: 0.6269
United Kingdom: 0.4708
Switzerland: -0.4966
In general, the analysis
results show a positive correlation between the percentage of Muslim population
and the number of jihadist attacks in many European countries. As can be seen,
the United Kingdom has a positive correlation coefficient, but less strong than
countries like France and Belgium. Instead, Switzerland has a negative
correlation coefficient, but also less strong than countries like Malta and Latvia.
It is also observed that the United Kingdom shows a strong positive correlation
between the two variables, as well as France. Italy, on the other hand, has a
non-significant negative correlation, while Switzerland has a positive
correlation but less strong than the United Kingdom and France.
This suggests that the
relationship between the percentage of Muslim population and the number of
jihadist attacks can vary significantly from country to country; it is
therefore not possible to assert that a single country is more at risk of
terrorism based solely on the potential terrorism coefficient, as there are
many other factors that can influence the level of terrorist threat in a
country, such as political and social stability, the presence of radical groups,
and the authorities’ ability to prevent and counter terrorist attacks. Finally,
the correlation coefficient does not necessarily imply a causal relationship
between the percentage of Muslim population and the number of jihadist attacks,
but simply indicates the strength and direction of the statistical relationship
between the two variables, defining the potential terrorism coefficient as one
of the multiple factors to be taken into consideration for evaluating the risk
of terrorism in a country.
A possible relationship
between the number of terrorist attacks and the number of casualties?
In order to investigate whether there is a relationship between the
number of terrorist attacks and the number of casualties, we analyzed the
dataset provided and focused on the columns “Number of Killed” and
“Number of Injured”. To obtain a measure of the total number of
victims per attack, we summed these two variables for each row in the database.
We then calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient between the total
number of victims and the number of attacks. The correlation coefficient was
found to be 0.794, indicating a strong positive correlation between the two
variables.
We also performed a linear regression analysis with the total number of
victims as the dependent variable and the number of attacks as the independent
variable. The regression analysis yielded a coefficient of determination
(R-squared) of 0.631, suggesting that approximately 63% of the variation in the
total number of victims can be explained by the number of attacks.
Overall, our analysis suggests that there is a positive relationship
between the number of terrorist attacks and the number of casualties, and that
the number of attacks is a significant predictor of the total number of victims.
Further research could investigate other potential factors that may impact the
number of casualties in terrorist attacks.
Relevance of the victim’s rate
To further explore the data on terrorist
attacks in the European Union between 2004 and 2022, we decided to calculate
the total number of victims for each attack. To do so, we used the “Number
of Killed” and “Number of Injured” columns to compute the total
number of victims per attack.
We then aggregated the data by country
to estimate the total number of victims for each country. This allowed us to
gain a better understanding of the overall impact of terrorist attacks in each
country during the analyzed period.
Our analysis revealed that the country
with the highest number of total victims was France, with a total of 1,741
victims over the 2004-2022 period. The country with the second-highest number
of victims was the United Kingdom, with a total of 1,400 victims.
Other countries with significant numbers
of victims included Belgium (685), Germany (583), and Spain (547). It is
important to note, however, that the number of victims may not necessarily
reflect the severity or frequency of attacks in each country, and other factors
such as population size and geopolitical factors should also be taken into account
when interpreting these results.
Overall, our analysis highlights the
devastating impact of terrorist attacks in the European Union and the
importance of continued efforts to prevent and combat terrorism in the region.
To investigate whether there is a
relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the total number of
victims by country, we conducted a correlation analysis using the number of
attacks and the total number of victims by country.
The correlation analysis revealed a
positive and moderately strong correlation between the number of attacks and
the total number of victims (r=0.685, p<0.001), indicating that as the
number of attacks increases, so does the number of victims.
These findings suggest that countries
with a higher number of terrorist attacks are also likely to have a higher
number of victims, underscoring the need for effective measures to prevent and
respond to terrorist attacks.
Who are the “European”
terrorists: gender, age, ethnicity, recidivist.
Active terrorism is a male prerogative: out of 225
attackers, 97% are male (7 are women); unlike in 2020, when there were 3 female
attackers, 2021 and 2022 did not record the active participation of women.
The median age of the 225 terrorists (male and
female) is 27: a figure which varies over time (from 24 years of age in 2016,
to 30 in 2019). The biographical data of 169 individuals for whom we have
complete information allow us to draw a very interesting picture which tells us
that 10% are younger than 19, 36% are between 19 and 26, 39% are between 27 and
35 and, finally, 15% are older than 35.
The ethno-national map of terrorism in Europe
The phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe
afflicts certain national/ethnic groups more than others. There is a
proportional relationship between the main immigrant groups and terrorists, as it
seems to appear from the nationality of the terrorists, or of the families of
origin, which is in line with the size of foreign communities in Europe. The Maghrebi
origins prevail: the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist
adherence are Moroccan (in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy) and Algerian (in
France).
Increase in recidivism and individuals already known to intelligence
The role played by repeat offenders – individuals
already convicted of terrorism who carry out violent actions at the end of
their prison sentence and, in some cases, in prison – is prominent; they
accounted for 3% of the terrorists in 2018 (1 case), then rose to 7% (2) in
2019, to 27% (6) in 2020, were down to a single case in 2021 and 2022. This seems
to confirm the social danger represented by individuals who, in the face of a
prison sentence, tend to postpone the conduct of terrorist actions; this
evidence points to a potential increase in terrorist acts over the coming
years, coinciding with the release of most terrorists currently detained.
Parallel to repeat offenders, START InSight found another
significant trend, which is related to actions carried out by terrorists
already known to European law enforcement or intelligence agencies: they
account for 37%, 44% and 54% of the total in 2022, 2021 and 2020 respectively,
compared to 10% in 2019 and 17% in 2018.
There is a certain stability related to participation
in terrorist actions by individuals with a prison history (including those
detained for non-terrorist offenses) with a figure of 11% in 2022, slightly
down from the previous years (23% in 2021, 33% in 2020, 23% in 2019, 28% in
2018 and 12% in 2017); this confirms the hypothesis that sees prisons as places
of radicalization.
Is there a link between
immigration and terrorism? Correlation and Regression Analysis of Immigrants
and Terrorism in the European Union
The relationship between immigration and terrorism has been the subject
of numerous studies and debates in recent years[1]. In this study, we conducted a correlation and regression analysis to
investigate the relationship between immigrant status, family background, and
country of origin of attackers with the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the
European Union. As methodology, we analyzed START InSight’s database containing
information on terrorist attacks carried out by Islamist extremists in the European
Union between 2004 and 2022. We used Pearson correlation and Spearman
correlation to explore the relationship between different combinations of
columns, and we performed a multiple linear regression analysis to predict the
occurrence of attacks based on the attacker’s immigrant status, family
background, and country of origin.
The origins of
terrorists: immigrants or Europeans?
89% of terror attacks in Europe between 2004 and 2022 (where we have complete information) were carried out by second and third generation “immigrants”
and first generation immigrants, both regular and irregular. A statistical
correlation between immigration and terrorism does therefore exist; however,
the number of terrorists compared to the total number of immigrants is so
marginal that it makes such correlation insignificant: the order of measurement
is one unit per million immigrants.
65 (47%) out
of 138 terrorists registered in START InSight’s database are regular migrants;
36 (26%) are second or third generation immigrants; 22 (16%) are irregular
immigrants. The latter figure is on the rise and represents 32% of perpetrators
in 2022. Also significant is the number of European converts to Islam, who
amount to 8% of attackers. Overall, 73% of terrorists are legal residents,
while the ratio of irregular immigrants is 1 to every 6 terrorists. In 4% of the attacks, children/minors (7) were found
to be among the attackers.
An increase in the
number of irregular migrants heightens the potential risk of terrorism:
research results
As evidenced, 16% of terrorists are irregular immigrants (2014-2022):
25% in 2020, 50%
in 2021 and 32% in 2022.
There’s therefore a statistical risk, as more immigrants mean greater
chances that some terrorist might hide among them or join jihadist terrorism at
a later stage. But despite this correlation, there is no manifest causal link:
the choice of becoming a terrorist is not determined or influenced by one’s
status as a migrant, but a series of factors such as individual experiences;
living conditions at the time of arrival; voluntary or involuntary contacts
with criminal or jihadist networks can all play a role (Dreher, 2017; Leiken,
2006).
Here the research results. Our Pearson correlation analysis showed a
moderate positive correlation between the attacker’s immigrant status (regular,
irregular, descendants) and their country of origin with a correlation coefficient
of 0.652. Similarly, we found a moderate positive correlation between the
attacker’s family immigrant status and their country of origin with a
correlation coefficient of 0.657. However, we did not find any significant
correlation between the other combinations of datas. Our regression analysis
revealed that the three independent variables explained approximately 18%
(R-squared di 0.177) of the variation in the dependent variable, which is the
country where the attack occurred. Furthermore, the regression model showed
that the attacker’s country of origin was the most significant independent
variable in predicting the occurrence of attacks.
What can we conclude
about immigration and terrorism correlations?
Immigration does “contribute” to the spread of terrorism from
one country to another, but immigration per se is unlikely to be a
direct cause of terrorism. There’s no empirical evidence so far that first
generation immigrants are more inclined to become terrorists. However,
migratory flows from Muslim majority countries where terrorism is an
occurrence, are thought to exercise a significant influence on attacks in the
country of destination. It’s difficult to argue the existence of a causal link
between the two phenomena: therefore, being a migrant would not be a triggering
factor for joining terrorism.
However, there are other multiple links between immigration and
terrorism and between immigrants and terrorists, in particular: 1) organized
crime – terrorist groups – irregular migrants; 2) terrorist returnees –
European terrorists who went to Syria are in fact “migrants”: Europe can
therefore be considered an “exporter” of terrorists; 3) economic migrants who
join terrorism over the course of their journey; and 4) migrants joining jihad
or migrating with the intention of carrying out attacks, as evidenced by the terrorist attack in Nice (France) on
29th October, 2020, which was perpetrated by an irregular immigrant
who had previously landed in Italy from Tunisia.
Our study suggests a moderate positive correlation between the
attacker’s immigrant status, family background, and their country of origin
with the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the European Union.
Is the offensive
capacity of terrorism being reduced?
In order to draw a precise picture of terrorism, one
needs to analyse the three levels on which terrorism itself develops and
operates, and that is the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategy
consists in the employment of combat for the purpose of war; tactics is the
employment of troops for the purpose of battle; the operational level is
between these two. This is a simple summary which underlines an essential
feature: that is, the employment of fighters.
Success at the strategic level is marginal
As anticipated with the previous report #ReaCT2022, 14%
of the actions conducted since 2014, were successful at the strategic level, as
they brought about structural consequences consisting in a blockade of national
and/or international air/rail traffic, mobilization of the armed forces,
far-reaching legislative interventions. This is a very high figure, in
consideration of the limited organizational and financial capabilities of the
groups and lone attackers. The trend over the years has been uneven, but it
highlighted a progressive reduction in capability and effectiveness: 75% of strategic
success was recorded in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018,
5% in 2019, 12% in 2020, 6% in 2021 and 0% in 2022. Overall, attacks garnered
international media attention 79% of the time, 95% domestically, while
organized and structured commando and
team-raid actions received full media attention. An evident, as much as sought
after, media success that may have significantly affected the recruitment
campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihad fighters, whose numerical magnitude
remains high in correspondence with periods of heightened terrorist activity
(2016-2017).But while it is true that mass media amplification has positive
effects on recruitment, it is also true that this attention tends to diminish
over time, due to two main reasons: the first, is the prevalence of
low-intensity actions over high-intensity actions – which have been decreasing
– and on low- and medium-intensity actions – which increased significantly from
2017 to 2021. The second, is that public opinion is increasingly inured to
terroristic violence and consequently less ‘touched’, particularly by
“low” and “medium intensity” events.
The tactical level is worrisome, but it is not the priority of terrorism
Assuming that the aim of terrorist attacks consists
in killing at least one enemy (in 35% of the cases, the targets are security
forces), this aim has been achieved over the period from 2004 to 2022 on
average in 48% of the cases. However, it should be taken into account that the
large time frame tends to affect the margin of error; the trend over the 2014-2022
period, hints at a decline in the results of terrorism, with a prevalence of
low-intensity attacks and an increase in actions with a failed outcome at least
until 2019. The results of the last seven years in particular, show that
success at a tactical level was obtained, in 2016, in 31% of the cases (against
6% of formally unsuccessful acts), while 2017 recorded a success rate of 40%
and a failure rate of 20%. An overall trend that, when taking into
consideration a 33% success rate at the tactical level, a doubling of failed
attacks (42%) in 2018 and a further downward figure of 25% success rate in
2019, can be read as a result of the progressive decrease in the operational
capability of terrorists and the increased reactivity of European security
forces. But if the analysis suggests a technical capability that has indeed
been reduced, it is also true that the improvised and unpredictable character
of the new individual and emulative terrorism has led to an increase in
successful actions, growing from 32% in 2020 to 44% in 2021. The result of
actions carried out in 2022 shows a new inversion of trend, with 33% of
tactical success.
The real success is at operational level: the “functional blockade”
Even when it fails, terrorism gains, in terms of the costs inflicted upon
its target: e.g. by engaging the armed forces and Police in an extraordinary
way, distracting them from normal routine activities and/or preventing them
from intervening in support of the community; by interrupting or overloading the
health services; by limiting, slowing down, diverting or stopping collective
urban, air and naval mobility; by restricting the regular course of daily personal,
commercial and professional activities, to the detriment of affected
communities and, moreover, by significantly reducing the technological advantage,
the operational potential and resilience; and finally, more in general, by
inflicting direct and indirect damage, regardless of the ability to cause
casualties. Consistently, the limitation in the freedom of citizens is a
measurable result that terrorism obtains through its actions.
In other words, terrorism is successful even in the absence of victims,
as it can still impose economic and social costs on the community and influence
the latter’s behaviour over time as a consequence of new security measures
aimed at safeguarding the community: this effect is what we call the
“functional blockade”.
The ever-decreasing operational capability of terrorism notwithstanding,
the “functional blockade” continues to be the most significant result
obtained by terrorists, regardless of tactical success (killing of at least one
target). While tactical success has been observed in 48% of the attacks which
took place since 2004, terrorism has proven its effectiveness by inducing a “functional
blockade” in an average of 79% of the cases, with a peak of 92% in 2020, then 89%
in 2021 and 78% in 2022: an impressive result, when considering the limited
resources deployed by terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is, no doubt, in favour of terrorism.
[1] Cfr. Dreher, A., Gassebner, M., Schaudt, P. (2017), The Effect of Migration on Terror – Made at
Home or Imported from Abroad?, CESIfo Working Paper, no. 6441, Center for
Economic Studies and Ifo Institute, Munich; and, Schmid, A.P. (2015), Links between Terrorism and Migration: an
Exploration, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – ICCT, The
Hague; and Leiken, R.S., Brooke, S. (2006), The
Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration,
Terrorism and Political Violence 18, 4: 503-521; and, Kephart, J.L., (2005), Immigration and Terrorism – Moving Beyond
the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, Washington: Centre for
Immigration Studies
The more complex scenarios of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation
Abstract Definitions, categories and the very idea of terrorism and violent extremism which informed strategies aimed and preventing and countering radicalisation over the past few years, and which focused mainly on the fight against jihadist mobilization and the Islamic State group, no longer mirror reality; or, at best, they fail to grasp it in its entirety. The current situation in the West is characterized by a variety of ideologies, beliefs, profiles and motivations which can be blurry and often overlap; which makes it all the more difficult to evaluate their extent, to predict associated risks and to trace the evolution of these phenomena.
An increasingly intricate reality Jihadist terrorism continues to represent the deadliest form of violence, both in Europe and globally. However, not only the analysts, but a 2022 Report by the UN Secretary-General too draws attention to an increase in attacks based on xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or against minorities, in the name of religion or belief, as well as a growth in misogyny, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (1). What worries Member States, in particular, is the transnational dimension of this threat, which can take shape thanks to online contacts and networks but also through participation in real-world meetings at joint events or even paramilitary training. The so-called ‘manifestos’, proper ideological legacies which attackers of different orientations leave behind, and in which they make reference to previous attackers and to massacres that have taken place in distant geographical areas, testify to a communality of themes and intent. The battle against propaganda is a particularly difficult one, due to the broad array of communication tools used by militants and sympathizers, including social, gaming and messaging platforms, alternative information channels and forums.
Further to that, political and economic tensions at the height of the COVID19 pandemic, mixed with personal vulnerabilities and predispositions, helped accelerate dissent or distrust of governments and institutions and contributed to the dissemination of conspiracy theories and disinformation, which make up the fabric of extremist narratives, promote radicalization and social encapsulation, can lead to violence against symbols and/or political representatives and quickly adapt to shifting scenarios, such as the war in Ukraine. Movements, sub-cultures and conspiracies which are typically American – such as accelerationism, sovereign citizens, incels (involuntary celibates) and QAnon – were progressively incorporated and adapted to the European landscape.
Data from the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2022 and 2023 indicate that over the past ten years, in the West, ideological terrorism (that is, by the extreme right and left) exceeded religious terrorism by over three times.
Profiles and objectives have expanded Most ideologically-motivated attacks are carried out by individuals who do not belong to formally (re) cognized groups, so much so that the GTI 2023 points out how, in several countries, the intelligence refrains from attributing them to the extreme right or left. Those who are attracted to extremism are increasingly younger, particularly in the UK, where teenagers under 15 feature in terrorism-related investigations (2) . However, researchers were able to observe further nuances, namely that when misogyny is concerned (in the case of incels, for example), subjects tend to be younger than those who are hostile to minorities (and harbor anti-immigration sentiments)(3). The Institute for Strategic Dialogue published an analysis in the aftermath of the attack on the Dover migrant center in 2022 (Comerford, Squirrel, Leenstra, Guhl), which underlines the importance of not focusing on a single trend: “the increasingly singular focus on ‘vulnerable’ younger terrorists has created a blind-spot for older perpetrators and the radicalisation of an older generation of people, statistically more likely to be involved in acts of terrorism, often driven by hatred towards various marginalised groups rather than a coherent ideology“(4).
In the case of jihadism as well, there’s a consolidated post-organisational trend in Europe, whereby attacks are carried out by single (yet not necessarily solitary) actors who can be motivated as much by solid ideology as by personal and mental problems leading to violence, whose actions tend to take the form of improvised events, with easily available ‘weapons’, ‘inspired’ (rather than claimed) and isolated, with respect to broader group goals. The numerous foiled attacks and arrests indicate that -the efficiency of law enforcement notwithstanding- this matrix is not fading at all but is rather constantly evolving. In its latest Report, Europol mentions that it has dismantled a series of groups intent on planning attacks with more complex modus operandi (TE-SAT 2022).
Such stratified scenario is therefore dynamic and unpredictable, characterized by the presence of opposing ideologies and motivations which reinforce each other, giving shape to so-called cumulative extremism (this is what happens, for example, between jihadism and the extreme right); or by groups and individuals with different beliefs, which in turn represent different levels of risk (not all are violent), united by a single, common stance – as in the case of the German anti-government and anti-democratic network Reichsbürger (with a presence in Austria, Switzerland, Italy), which rose to prominence in December 2022 following a raid, when some members were thought to be planning a coup. As Alexander Ritzmann writes in an analysis for West Point magazine CTC Sentinel “the only thing that connects them is the fundamental denial of the legitimacy of the German state. This is one of the main reasons why German authorities have a somewhat difficult time assessing their (changing) potential for violence and terrorist acts in comparison to more ideologically coherent, unified, and structured extremist movements” (5).
In such a composite reality, the range of targets also widens ad is potentially endless – from regular citizens in public spaces to places of worship, religious representatives, institutions and government figures, law enforcement and members of the armed forces, health personnel and authorities (for violent no-vax and COVID deniers), infrastructures (which are the object of sabotage and cyberattacks), teachers, women, minorities (including the LGBT+ community), migrant shelters and so on.
The challenges of prevention. Shifting themes and priorities Today, so-called “everyday extremists” can arise either in a context of “atmospheric jihadism” -as Prof. Gilles Kepel defines it- in which hate-mongers unleash (collective) anger against an objective – e.g. a person accused of blasphemy – with deadly outcomes, should a radicalized individual take the initiative; or in a context where radical propositions and attitudes gain visibility and traction on the web and social media, thanks to controversial and violent role models and influencers who can boast a large following among youth and adults (this is the case for misogyny or conspiracy), while conspiracy theories and disinformation make their way into mainstream discourse and -at times- into government, via the election of controversial political figures who espouse them. In a situation where the threat is not embodied solely by violent ideologies, but by violent rhetoric rooted in a more or less widespread mentality, prevention takes on a more prominent role; it requires a greater involvement on the part of civil society; and, finally, it must engage with a wider range of recipients than in the past.
Prevention (PVE) essentially consists in multi-agency projects and initiatives which are not securitarian in nature, are carried out by public and private institutions, NGOs and various other organizations (including welfare) and are ultimately designed to pre-empt processes of radicalisation with a view to decreasing risks linked to extremism and terrorism, e.g. by promoting social cohesion and supporting vulnerable people. In order to be attuned to current trends, PVE now requires a more diversified span of activities compared to those put in place at the height of the fight against jihadism, with new themes and shifting priorities.
Education and schools have long been considered (and rightly so) at the forefront in providing young people -who are increasingly exposed to a toxic virtual ecosystem- with valid defense tools such as technological know-how and critical thinking. However, this is only one side of the coin: despite the fact that, since the beginning of the pandemic, the Internet has been instrumental in facilitating radicalisation, research carried out on a sample of jihadists who sprang into action between 2014 and 2021 in 8 Western countries highlighted how those who radicalise offline still represent the majority and above all, a higher degree of danger -“those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online”(6) . Such data draws attention to the importance of the context – be it domestic, social or local (the socalled community)- which has always been deemed crucial on the path to radicalisation, but is frequently underestimated.
Another study which was conducted in Spain by an internationl team and which was based, inter alia, on the brain scans of jihadists / sympathisers in different stages of radicalisation proved, on the one hand, that social exclusion represents an important factor in radicalisation -a process that essentially pushes the boundaries of mental flexibility towards inflexibility. Or towards a progressive propensity to “fight and die for one’s sacred values” (as this research highlights); on the other hand, it discovered how social influence can help disengage from violence, by ‘reactivating’ deliberate reasoning in areas of the brain that had previously been ‘turned off’ (7) .
Today, the tide seems to be changing as more and more minors – and adults alike – risk getting entangled in the meshes of online extremism; there’s also a need for more comparative studies, in order to better understand the peculiarities and similarities of different types of radicalisation. Yet, not losing sight of (re) socialization as an aspect which is inherent to these processes, is still paramount.
Furthermore, taking heed of the role of ‘grievances’ is just as crucial, since it’s on this cross-ideological element that extremist base their narratives, whether it’s in defence of masculinity, race, Islam or other issues. Prevention will therefore have to focus not only on encouraging critical thinking and providing counternarratives (whose effectiveness is disputed), but also on promoting alternative narratives, positive models and opportunities in the real world, following the social isolation which was brought about by the pandemic.
Notes 1. Terrorist attacks on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief, Report of the Secretary-General, August 3, 2022.
2. The number of young people arrested on suspicion of terrorism related offences in the UK continues to rise, statistics reveal, News, Counter-Terrorism Policing, 9 March 2023
3. See: Roose, J., Interview on “Masculinity and Violent Extremism”, #ReaCT2023, pp. 128-129.
4. Comerford, M., Squirrell, T., Leenstra, D., and Guhl, J., What the UK Migrant Centre Attack Tells Us About Contemporary Extremism Trends, ISD, 14th November 2022
5. Ritzmann, A., “The December 2022 German Reichsbürger Plot to Overthrow the German Government”, CTC Sentinel, March 2023, Vol. 16, Issue 3
6. Hamid, N. and Ariza, C., Offline Versus Online Radicalisation: Which is the Bigger Threat?, Global Network on Extremism and Technology, February 2022)
7. Nafees Hamid discusses his research at lenght in: De-radicalizzazione. Dentro la mente jihadista, a documentary by Chiara Sulmoni for RSI (Radiotelevisione Svizzera di lingua italiana), aired on 22 September 2020 https:// www.startinsight.eu/en/laser-episode-discusses-de-radicalisation-and-studies-on-the-brain-of-jihadist-supportersswiss-national-radio/
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
🔴📚 OUT SOON! #ReaCT2023 Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe | Start Insight ⬇ 16 articles by different authors discuss current trends and numbers. Available in Italian and English startinsight.eu/en/out-soon-r…
🔴@cbertolotti1 a FanPage sulle varie ipotesi dell'attacco👉"(...) non si tratterebbe di droni in grado di fare danni significativi, ma piuttosto di una tipologia di equipaggiamento in grado di fare danni limitati con l'obiettivo di portare l'attenzione mediatica sulla questione" twitter.com/cbertolotti1/s…
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The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistiche
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.L'archiviazione tecnica o l'accesso che viene utilizzato esclusivamente per scopi statistici anonimi. Senza un mandato di comparizione, una conformità volontaria da parte del vostro Fornitore di Servizi Internet, o ulteriori registrazioni da parte di terzi, le informazioni memorizzate o recuperate per questo scopo da sole non possono di solito essere utilizzate per l'identificazione.
Marketing
L'archiviazione tecnica o l'accesso sono necessari per creare profili di utenti per inviare pubblicità, o per tracciare l'utente su un sito web o su diversi siti web per scopi di marketing simili.
