Iron Swords: The New Challenges of Ground Offensives in the Israel-Hamas War.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Article from the original book: C. Bertolotti,Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, START InSight Lugano (Link: https://www.amazon.it/dp/8832294230).

Introduction to the Urban Evolution of the Conflict

No environment presents more formidable challenges for military forces than urban areas. Urban warfare is uniquely destructive, yet military forces frequently find themselves ill-prepared for the specific difficulties of operating in densely populated battlefields and often cannot avoid being drawn into the severe realities of urban combat. In their book “Understanding Urban Warfare“, Liam Collins and John Spencer highlight the distinct challenges posed by urban warfare. These include the limiting effects of three-dimensional terrain on various weapon systems, the numerous enemy firing points along urban communication routes (such as streets, alleys, and avenues), and the crucial need to minimize civilian casualties, protect critical infrastructure, and preserve cultural heritage (Collins & Spencer, 2022). Urban areas, serving as battlefields, provide diverse and often unpredictable maneuvering options based on the type of urban environment, whether it be a megalopolis, metropolitan city, peripheral town, conurbation, or even a smart city, each with characteristics that significantly impact military operations.

As I highlighted in my latest volume on urban warfare in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale (English title: “Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban War between Israel and Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial Intelligence”), many of the most recent urban battles – from the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 to the Second Battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, the Battle of Shusha in 2020 during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and also Mariupol in 2022 and Bakhmut in 2023 in the Russo-Ukrainian War – provide us with trends and lessons learned to better understand urban warfare. In an increasingly urbanized world, the future nature of conflict will also be increasingly urban.

The Israeli Approach to Urban Combat: The Lesson from Gaza

On the tactical level, Israeli soldiers last engaged in a major ground battle in 2014 when Israel deployed its troops inside Gaza. Strategically, however, since then the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have focused on countering potential threats from Iran rather than the immediate neighbor. This overall strategic shift has effectively distracted the Israeli armed forces from a substantial but different nature of threat.

Conversely, Hamas has militarily strengthened since 2008/2009, when it first faced an Israeli ground assault. Back then, Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, consisted of 16,000 militiamen and approximately 2,000 troops specialized in combat. This was in stark contrast to the situation on the eve of the 2023 offensive when, according to the IDF, Hamas could rely on a force of 40,000 elite fighters, an arsenal of drones, and about 30,000 rockets. This significant arsenal overwhelmed the Iron Dome system on October 7, 2023, leading to a saturation point where the number of rockets fired by Hamas exceeded the system’s defensive capacity, prompting the United States to urgently send reinforcements (Bertolotti, 2024).

With the launch of the ground offensive of Operation Iron Swords, the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in the urban area of Gaza, the most densely populated part of the Strip, initiating a new phase of the conflict focused mainly on urban warfare, including subterranean combat. Engineering units conducted breaching operations to access tunnels, allowing specialized underground combat units to overpower the enemy (Schalit, 2023).

As part of their defense strategy, Hamas engineers had an extensive network of tactical tunnels at their disposal; some interconnected, others isolated. Many, as previously argued, were dug to a depth safe from aerial bombing, while others were closer to the surface for quick access or exit. Furthermore, Hamas prepared tunnels and “mouse holes” to allow fighters to move covertly between buildings and attack Israeli soldiers before disappearing again (Schalit, 2023). In addition to these tactical advantages for troop movement, Palestinian engineers also set up improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – some hidden in walls to detonate as armored vehicles passed, larger ones buried under roads or rubble piles, and some with tunnel traps designed to lure and strike Israeli soldiers engaged in hostage search and rescue operations.

Urban warfare is extremely slow.

The war entered a critical phase with the entry of units into the urban perimeter of Gaza, where the Israeli army, equipped with top-tier urban combat skills, faced an enemy determined to fight to the last, having prepared for years for that confrontation. A battle that took place in an environment favorable to the defender (Schalit, 2023).

Combat experiences in urban areas, such as those in Mosul, Iraq, and Marawi, Philippines between 2016 and 2017, offer important lessons. In Mosul, a 100,000-strong Iraqi contingent supported by the United States took nine months to neutralize a group of Islamic State militants in a fortified city, suffering the loss of 8,000 men and numerous military equipment due to improvised explosive devices. Similarly, in Marawi, Filipino forces took five months to overcome Islamic State-Maute militants, facing the harsh reality of being able to take control of only one building per day due to the constant risk of ambushes and hidden explosives. These scenarios underscore the complex challenges of urban combat and the resilience required to overcome them.

The Three Levels of Challenge in Urban Warfare

As previously mentioned, urban warfare is one of the most complex and multifaceted challenges an army can face. This type of conflict is distinguished by its intensity and profound implications not only tactically but also perceptually and ethically.

Perceptually, urban warfare highlights a marked contrast between the expectations of a society inclined towards moderation and the pursuit of ethically acceptable conduct in conflict, and the brutal reality of urban combat, where the costs in terms of human lives, material destruction, and loss of international legitimacy can be devastating. This discrepancy creates a form of cognitive dissonance, making it difficult for modern armies, anchored in the values of liberal societies, to adequately prepare for the inherent brutality of this type of combat.

Tactically, urban warfare scenarios present a series of unique difficulties, which we have partly illustrated. Combat in densely built environments involves the risk of long-range attacks via drones or improvised explosive devices, significantly increasing the danger for forces on the ground. The urban environment facilitates the adversaries’ ability to hide and set ambushes, creating a climate of constant uncertainty. Maneuvering troops are exposed to high risks, with their firepower diluted by the need to disperse among buildings, often with reduced visibility. Additionally, the degradation of sensor and communication systems, essential for coordinating operations, poses a significant problem.

Ethically and morally, the presence of civilians in the urban theater of war introduces significant dilemmas. Civilians disproportionately suffer the consequences of the conflict, both directly as victims of the fighting and indirectly due to displacement and epidemics resulting from the destruction of urban infrastructure. Military commanders face the delicate dilemma of proportionality, having to balance the need to act for the safety of their soldiers with the responsibility to avoid civilian harm, in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This balance is further complicated by the presence of civilians who can use electronic devices and social media, those who may be hostile or resist unarmed, and the psychological and political weight these decisions impose on commanders, potentially influencing their judgment and choices.

The Evolution of the Technical and Tactical Capabilities of the Israeli Forces

The Israeli armed forces have historically faced numerous challenges in the urban context of Gaza, particularly after the 2005 withdrawal, with military operations in 2008 and subsequent ones in 2014; different periods in which the Israeli forces learned valuable lessons. Politically, Jerusalem recognized the crucial importance of gaining public favor, both internationally and domestically. Militarily, it became evident that air power alone is never sufficient, leading to a redefinition of the capabilities and organization of ground forces, particularly regarding the acquisition and deployment of robust armored vehicles and the application of innovative techniques, tactics, and procedures aimed at managing underground threats.

As a direct consequence of these lessons, the IDF equipped itself with some of the best technologies for urban operations; among these are tanks and armored personnel carriers, considered among the safest in the world. The Israeli arsenal also includes the armored “Doobi” D9 bulldozers from Caterpillar, designed to demolish buildings and create safe pathways in potentially mined environments, thus reducing the risk of ambushes and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. These powerful machines, which can also be remotely operated, have been controversial due to their use in demolishing homes, which some interpret as punitive measures.

However, the operational use of the D9s, contrary to the criticisms which fit into a broader context of instrumental opposition, involves creating safe pathways through hazardous areas, partially destroying buildings to create alternative routes, and building protective barriers around strategic areas to consolidate territorial gains by military units. This approach reflects a combination of strength and ingenuity, marking the continued evolution of Israeli military strategies in the face of the unique challenges of urban warfare.

The Israeli army, within its vast arsenal of specialized vehicles, also possesses a particular vehicle, the “Puma,” dedicated to neutralizing minefields and countering improvised explosive devices. Equipped with an elaborate mine clearance system called “IED Carpet,^[1] ” the “Puma” can detonate or neutralize hidden explosive devices through controlled explosions with rockets. Beyond this cutting-edge technology, the vehicles used by the engineering units are equipped with devices capable of disrupting circuits or transmissions used for controlled activation of IEDs, some of which include the “Thor” system that uses precision lasers to trigger devices from a distance (Schalit, 2023).

In the realm of subterranean combat, the Israeli army boasts specialized units, such as the Sarayet Yahalom elements, trained in detecting, maneuvering, and destroying tunnels. These special forces use special explosive charges, drones, and underground robots to conduct their operations, confirming Israel’s forefront position in the search for underground detection technologies, employing a wide range of instruments that span geospatial, acoustic, seismic, tomographic resistivity (ERT), and ground-penetrating radar, capable of mapping tunnels up to twenty meters deep.

The IDF’s approach to tunnels is primarily focused on their destruction from the surface, avoiding entry and endangering military operators wherever possible. However, for specific missions such as hostage recovery, special units, including Yahalom reconnaissance teams and the Oketz canine unit, equipped with specific gear for underground operations, have been trained. The need for direct reconnaissance using soldiers within this vast tunnel network suggests the use of highly specialized operational techniques, potentially entrusted to the elite Mista’arvim units, capable of operating undercover and blending in with enemy fighters.

In this scenario of technological and tactical confrontation, both sides could present unexpected and devastating surprises. While the IDF has the technological and military superiority necessary to prevail, the outcome of the battle and its human and geopolitical repercussions remain shrouded in uncertainty, testifying to the complexity and unpredictability of modern conflict (Schalit, 2023).

Bibliografia

Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325.

Collins L, Spencer J. (2022), Understanding Urban Warfare, Howgate Publishing Limited, pp. 392.

Schalit A. (2023), Hidden tunnels, ambushes and explosives in walls: the Israel-Hamas war enters a precarious new phase, The Conversation, 23 novembre 2023.

[1] Minefield Clearance and IED Neutralization: The Carpet is a modern system for minefield clearance and IED neutralization, produced by the Israeli company Rafael. It can efficiently clear a path of one hundred meters in a minefield and neutralize all types of IEDs. To ensure maximum crew survivability, the system is operated by two soldiers inside the vehicle. The Carpet system consists of a launcher containing twenty rockets equipped with FAE (Fuel-Air Explosive) warheads. The launcher is an autonomous add-on kit that can be easily and quickly assembled in the field on any vehicle. The Carpet is the most efficient system for minefield clearance and IED neutralization/detonation on any terrain and in all weather conditions, while maintaining crew safety.