d31df90c-afbe-49b4-8992-3d0032dd7fc9

Wagner rebooted

by Andrea Molle
(AI-generated cover picture)

As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.

In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a paramilitary extension of the Russian state.

Despite these changes, Wagner has retained its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous financial independence.

The group’s activities in Ukraine have also changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.

Relationship with the Russian Government
The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.

The turning point in this relationship came in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May 2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.

This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.

Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure, forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units, others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established under state supervision.

However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.

Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.

As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner financial autonomy.

In practical terms, this meant that Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of individual commanders.

The transformation of Wagner from a semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a “PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military forces.

In Africa, Wagner has continued its security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya, often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative to Western military assistance.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian operations in Africa.

In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.

Current Operations
The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.

In the CAR, Wagner operatives have entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018, initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking to overthrow Touadéra.

Beyond military operations, Wagner has established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of the country’s defense infrastructure.

Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial powers such as France.

Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.


Image by James Wiseman on Unsplash

Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services, Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy, fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.

Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic arenas, such as the United Nations.

Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya, and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the direct supervision of the Russian government.

Leadership and Command Structure
After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).

With the group now firmly under Kremlin control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin, were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances. In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.

Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency
The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.

To replenish its ranks, Wagner has reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel, special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded, with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.

Armaments and Equipment
Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.

In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones, particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.

Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.

Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.

In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.


Moscow, image by jacqueline macou on Pixabay

Strategic Outlook
With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.

Additionally, there are reports that Moscow is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.

Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.

With its new leadership, sustained recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control, Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.

In the coming months, Wagner is expected to continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.

Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy
In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.

The restructuring of Wagner under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.

With Wagner now firmly integrated into state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with official Russian military assets when necessary.

The continued deployment of Wagner forces in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy. By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable alternative to Western security partnerships.

Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains available for future military engagements.

Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.

Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.

This approach would allow Moscow to retain the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a cost-effective and politically manageable way.

Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence, secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.




There are no comments

Add yours